The Israel-Iran War Is Bigger Than Its Protagonists… And Its Spectators

Asharq Al-Awsat

26-06-2025

The ongoing exchange of missiles, and the accompanying psychological and intelligence warfare, seems like a foregone conclusion, because all the supposed dividing lines in the Israeli-Iranian conflict have collapsed. These lines collapsed as the possibility of saving the Middle East, alongside the United States and Israel, from an ominous unknown began to vanish.
In the Arab portion of the Middle East, we are witnessing two distinct realities: One that has already surrendered to an imbalanced and inherently lopsided status quo. And another, existentially threatened, because its political discourse had long relied, albeit out of necessity, on formulas that now belong to the past.
In the first case, the rapid pace of unfolding events suggests that those who advocated accepting this imbalance may have won the wager of engagement with Israel. This outcome is, of course, understandable in light of the United States' clear and forceful insistence on tying its relations with any country in the world to that country's relationship with Israel. Normalization is no longer just an option. Washington no longer treats it as negotiable.
For the record, I cannot recall a comparable situation in modern international relations between sovereign, independent states that are members of the United Nations. Arguably, the current scenario differs even from the United States' alliance with Taiwan. There, Washington's 'carrot and stick' policy regarding the world's dealings with Beijing and Taipei was primarily driven by hostility and apprehension toward China, not out of fondness for Chiang Kai-shek's regime.
By contrast, the situation with Israel is entirely different. Every Israeli government enjoys near-unanimous support in both houses of the US Congress, a level of bipartisan backing that no American president can claim. The deeply entrenched and influential Israeli lobbies in Washington's political, economic, and cultural fabric have long monopolized narratives such as the 'shared Judeo-Christian values,' weaponized accusations of 'anti-Semitism,' and bankrolled electoral campaigns from Capitol Hill to the White House and state legislatures.
Even though recent weeks have exposed an unprecedented rift since the Cold War's end, between the hardline Jewish Likud movement and the white evangelical Christian right, most observers doubt that this 'dissonance' will escalate into open hostility or soften the Trump administration's zeal in supporting Benjamin Netanyahu's military and political agenda.
As for the second Arab reality, it concerns the Arab entities currently under full or partial Iranian influence. Here, the picture is far from reassuring either in terms of sovereignty or internal security. Any military defeat or serious threat to Iran's regime is likely to destabilize countries like Iraq and Lebanon, and certainly Yemen.
Iranian-backed militias, which took center stage in Iraqi politics following the 2003 US invasion, remain a powerful force across both political and military arenas. As such, any radical shift within Iran is likely to produce unpredictable consequences in Iraq. This becomes even more apparent when considering the intricate ties between Washington and Iraq's Kurdish population, as well as the transformations that have unfolded in Syria and their far-reaching effects on both Syria and Lebanon.
On the Kurdish front, I would argue that the Iraqi state cannot prevent full Kurdish secession if that's the course chosen by Kurdish leadership, especially if this decision aligns with American endorsement of Israel's regional vision and Türkiye proves incapable of stopping it.
Regarding Syria: Should Iranian influence be expelled, and a new government emerge in Damascus that explicitly deprioritizes confrontation with Israel, we'd be looking at a significant transformation, one that must not be overlooked.
Most importantly, Syria and Lebanon share long borders with Israel that remain unstable, fluid and volatile.
Another critical factor: both countries suffer from deep internal sectarian fragility. This latest Israeli campaign against Iran pours salt into wounds long opened by decades of Assad family dictatorship, propped up by Iran and its Revolutionary Guard.
A third factor is the Syrian-Lebanese diaspora in the United States, particularly its Christians, who are poised to play an influential role in reconfiguring the political futures of both Syria and Lebanon. Already, there are American figures of Syrian and Lebanese descent, closely tied to the current US administration and not hostile to Israel, moving behind the scenes in various key posts, such as Ambassador Tom Barrack, President Trump's envoy to Syria.
With all this in mind, if we acknowledge that the current war is, above all, an American–Iranian confrontation, then we must also admit, at least in my view, that Iran's chances of enduring it are very slim.
But that's not the end of the story. There are urgent questions still awaiting answers that are unlikely to be simple or come without a heavy price. Chief among them: What will the region's map look like when the dust settles? Which entities will remain, and which ones will be transformed? And how will Israel's radical expansionist right capitalize on the outcome?