Air India crash findings raise more questions than answers
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( Originally published on Jul 12, 2025 )
The preliminary report into the Air India flight 171 crash confirmed that both engine fuel control switches were moved to the cut-off position shortly after takeoff, but it left the key question as to why this happened unanswered, said experts."I'm very surprised and disheartened to learn about the movement of the fuel control switches," said Capt. John Cox, veteran pilot and safety analyst. "There is more investigative work to do, a lot more, but I think that we know what happened. Now the focus becomes why."As per standard protocol, the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau 's (AAIB) preliminary report did not offer any analysis or conclusions, which will figure in the final report. According to the cockpit voice recorder , one pilot asked why did the other shut off the fuel control switches. The other replied that he didn't. The report did not clarify which pilot said what.Cox said that the switches are designed to prevent accidental activation. "You have to deliberately lift them and move them. It wouldn't be something that could vibrate out of position. That is by design," he said. "There's a lot of evidence pointing to these switches being moved by a person." "In all my 55 years in aviation, I can think of only one other case I'm aware of where something like that happened," he added, referring to a 1987 Delta Air Lines 767 incident. The crew accidentally moved both switches but managed to restart the engines and land safely.David Soucie, former Federal Aviation Administration safety inspector and author of 'Why Planes Crash', called the Air India crash "highly irregular and without precedent". He said that pilots are trained to identify the failed engine and shut down only that one using a checklist."In this case, both cutoffs were pulled in rapid succession, with no verbal coordination or checklist discipline, which raises serious concerns," he said. "From a procedural standpoint, the only justification for such action would be if both engines had already failed or were on fire. That was clearly not the case."Soucie said he was initially inclined to believe the action wasn't intentional. "But the timing and manner of the shutdown are not consistent with standard pilot training . Either the pilot didn't understand what the switches do, or the action was made without deliberate cognitive intent. Both are deeply troubling," he said.Capt. Amit Singh, founder of the Safety Matters Foundation, pointed to a potential discrepancy in the timeline.
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NDTV
15 minutes ago
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"Not Satisfied": Air India Plane Crash Victim's Father Demands Strict Action
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The Print
18 minutes ago
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Air India crash should push India to create independent board for transport safety oversight
I was on a 'deadheading' flight to Surat (VASU) just as the first newsbreaks of the crash erupted on social media. Fortunately, our crew were on 'airplane mode' and blissfully unaware about the horrific crash till we landed at Surat about an hour later. The immediate aftermath of any major air accident is often dominated by shock, confusion, devastation, (mass) casualties and, in a country like India with 1.4 bn population, a flood of curious onlookers and volunteers trying to help or rescue. Such first aid efforts must soon make way for professional rescue and fire fighting efforts. This should be followed by securing of the accident site for initial investigation. AAIB spells it out clearly on their website: ' the primary aim for the initial investigation is to gather and preserve perishable evidence, for subsequent analysis, that may be lost over time and not available to the Investigators after a delay '. This is the first fatal accident and hull loss of Boeing's Dreamliner which, as per Boeing Company website 'has carried more than one billion passengers, faster than any other widebody jet in aviation history' in over 5 million flights. Air India's ill-fated VT-ANB was manufactured in 2013 and had flown 41868 hours. On June 12, 2025, VT-ANB, a Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner operated by Air India as AI-171 from Ahmedabad to London Gatwick, crashed soon after takeoff from Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel International Airport's (VAAH) Runway 23 at about 0809 UTC (1339 IST). Amateur videos, CCTV grabs and eyewitness accounts indicated a distinct loss of thrust immediately after liftoff. The aircraft went into the ground wings level, nose up, landing gear down and impacted BJ Medical College Hostel, about 0.9 NM from departure end of RW 23. 241 of the 242 onboard (12 crew + 229 pax) and 19 on the ground perished in the crash. One passenger, Mr Vishwas Kumar Ramesh, miraculously survived with minor injuries and walked away from the burning wreckage (report classifies his injuries as 'serious'). Disaster tourism impacts investigation A team from AAIB headed by the DG himself reached Ahmedabad on the same day. It is likely that dusk/night would have set in by that time, leaving the quick reaction team from AAIB struggling to retrieve evidence from a site literally and metaphorically draped in darkness. This is about the time in India most VVIPs finalise their plan to visit accident sites. As expected, PM Modi and his entourage arrived at the crash site the very next day (Jun 13). Amidst a mountain of debris, flaming avcat, strewn body parts and pieces of wreckage screaming 'evidence', I leave it to the readers to estimate what impact such kind of catastrophe porn will have on an investigative process in its most important and fragile phase. They were literally walking all over the evidence. Such visits by political leaders are party-agnostic and maybe meant to assuage shocked citizens but it takes a bulldozer to the investigative process. Careful collection & preservation of all evidence is key to any investigation. Anyone not directly involved with rescue or investigation, incl VIPs, should keep away from the crash site. It does not happen in any part of the developed world. It should be proscribed by law in my view. AAIB India In India, the authority designated by the State as responsible for aircraft accident and incident investigations within the framework of ICAO Annex 13 is the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) headed by a Director General (DG). The AAIB works as an attached office to Government of India, Ministry of Civil Aviation. The DG, AAIB reports to Secretary, Ministry of Civil Aviation. AAIB India is relatively new, so is the current DG, an IAF officer on deputation to the AAIB who took over on 18 Dec 2023. The investigation is conducted under the framework defined in Aircraft (Investigation of Accidents and Incidents) Rules, 2017. Lack of timely updates After such an accident with mass casualties, victims' families, air travelers, and all stakeholders deserve timely updates on how the accident investigation is proceeding. Nobody expects a running commentary but in the absence of timely factual data from authorities, there is a serious risk of conspiracy theories and speculation running riot. That is exactly what happened after AI-171. An information blackout followed till release of the first update on 26th June, clear two weeks after the crash. By this time, keyboard warriors and air crash influencers flooded the space with speculation, notching up millions of views per video and driving the 'narrative war'. The sketchy information shared by Indian media (sample below) only added to the embarrasment. For instance, in which country does air accident investigation wait for the prime minister's suggestion on due process to be followed? There were absolutely no briefs, no updates worth the loss. The usual drama & violation of crash site by ministers for photo ops, wreckage snagging in trees during transportation etc. inspired little confidence. Meanwhile a news scoop by a foreign media The Air Current couple of days prior to release of the preliminary report by AAIB at about 0200 IST on 12 Jun 25 exposed the leaky system we have. Here is what I can glean from the preliminary report Technical Scrutiny of the aircraft journey log book detailed in the prelim report does not indicate any major issues. It is not unusual for aircraft to fly with Minimum Equipment List (MEL) invoked. It includes equipment 'which may be inoperative and yet maintain an acceptable level of safety by appropriate conditions and limitations'. 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The total cockpit experience was a solid 19000h (9700h on type). The pilot-in-command was highly experienced with multiple endorsements including B787, B777 and A310. He was the Pilot Monitoring (PM) while the copilot with about 3400h (1128h on type) was the Pilot Flying (PF). Both pilots had adequate rest period before their duty roster and cleared preflight breathalyser tests. Postmortem examination findings of the crew are being analysed 'to corroborate aeromedical findings with the engineering appreciation'. This is usual practice in any accident investigation. EAFR VT-ANB was equipped with dual Enhanced Airborne Flight Recorders (EAFR) in two distinct locations, forward and aft. The prelim report analyses are likely based on data retrieved from the forward EAFR, which owing to its independent power source continues to record digital flight data and cockpit voice even in the event of a total power loss. This will be important in reconstructing the events preceding and immediately following the dual engine rollback due to its uninterrupted recording capability. The aft EAFR suffered extensive damage and could not be downloaded, as per the report. Also read: Uttarakhand crash shows how cheap a pilgrim's life is. Helicopter rides cheaper than pony The final moments The aircraft started up, taxied out, backtracked and lined up on Runway 23 as per normal procedure. The takeoff roll commenced at 08:07:37 UTC and liftoff was achieved roughly a minute later at 08:08:39 UTC. The report has time-stamped data of critical speeds achieved during the takeoff roll (V1, Vr, V2). There seems to be nothing unusual while the aircraft was still in 'ground' mode. The accident sequence unravelled about 3 seconds after liftoff, immediately after the aircraft's air/ground sensors transitioned to 'air' mode. The highlighted para from AAIB report below is likely to be the focal point of further investigation: The aircraft achieved the maximum recorded airspeed of 180 knots IAS at about 08:08:42 UTC and immediately thereafter, the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF position one after another with a time gap of 01 sec. The Engine N1 and N2 began to decrease from their take-off values as the fuel supply to the engines was cut off. From that point onwards, AI-171 was doomed. The first cockpit exchange following the uncommanded engine roll back is also very unusual given that both pilots would be scanning areas in and out of the cockpit that doesn't include the thrust lever quadrant. Even if the fuel switches move from RUN to CUTOFF, it would have set off a series of failure captions, audio voice warnings and loss of thrust that demand immediate action rather than the query recorded in the report below: In the cockpit voice recording, one of the pilots is heard asking the other why did he cutoff. The other pilot responded that he did not do so. Thrust lever and fuel switch movement till impact indicate a last-ditch effort to relight the engine, which includes recycling the fuel switches from CUTOFF to RUN. By then it was too late. No wide-body aircraft can safely recover from a dual engine failure at that low height. Impact, death and destruction were imminent, but there was no sign of any sharp change in attitude or a wing drop. One of the pilots transmitted a MAYDAY call 5 seconds before impact. The crew likely flew the aircraft all the way till impact. There is no sign of any kind of startle response or pilot incapacitation. How/why did the fuel control switches roll back? There is science and human factors behind the engineering design of every single switch in a cockpit. A host of safeguards such as location, shape, tactile feel, guard, detent, etc. are used to reduce or preclude inadvertent or incorrect operation of any safety critical switch or lever. It is inconceivable that ANY sane pilot would inadvertently or intentionally move a critical engine control to CUTOFF at such a point during takeoff. The trans-cockpit authority gradient was hardly shallow with a senior 15000h PIC and a 3400h first officer. Since the younger, less experienced copilot was the PF, the query 'why did he (you) cutoff' likely came from the PM. The fuel switches are nowhere near the yoke; there is no reason for the PF to reach down to the two fuel switches at that critical point in takeoff. His reply that 'he (i) did not do so' also leaves a critical question unanswered — was the 'transition'of fuel switches from RUN to CUTOFF commanded or uncommanded? The last minute relight effort also runs counter to a deliberate shut down. It also bears mention that no guarded switch with pull detent will roll back on its own. This is where the crux of the investigation lies, going forward. See the highlighted extract from the report attached below: Safety bulletins unactioned It is apparent from the report that Boeing in their wisdom decided that providing such a critical switch (with potential for inadvertent operation) with a 'pull-detent' or mechanical lock should be a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin rather than an Airworthiness Directive or Alert Service Bulletin. This by itself is questionable. Air India, the Maharaja who had just found its new clothes, decided to not implement Boeing's SAIB NM-18-33, thus setting the stage for this disaster (as it appears at this stage). Another line from the report, viz. 'there has been no defect reported pertaining to the fuel control switch since 2023 on VT-ANB' raises more questions than it answers. This line when read with reference to SAIB NM-18-33 of Dec 2018 reveals possible operation of fuel switch in an unintended manner since Air India had not complied with the SAIB. These switches also double up as engine start switches and are used only twice in a normal flight (one for starting, second for switching off at the ramp). Without acting on SAIB NM-18-33, did Boeing and Air India set up the 'black swan' event of uncommanded or inadvertent operation of the two switches is something AAIB will have to probe deep into. On first look, this is going the B737 Max route. The usual suspects — Boeing, FAA, DGCA, and a transitioning major carrier, are at play. So are pilot shaming, conspiracy theories, scale of tragedy & dependency on Boeing, NTSB & FAA on crucial aspects related to airworthiness and certification of a critical flight/engine control. A lot to unpack. Are we prepared? AAIB has a lot on their plate with this crash. It will test the bandwidth of this nascent organisation that runs key departments on borrowed expertise. Implanting a serving air force officer cannot be expected to lift the agency out of the deep morass DGCA and MoCA have created for itself and its progeny over the years. My immediate thought after news of the crash broke was 'are they even prepared for the scale of this tragedy?' People vested with such serious, technical, investigative work should not be beholden to ministers & bureaucrats. William P. Rogers, during a pause in the proceedings of the Rogers Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster of Jan 28, 1986 famously said of an empaneled Nobel Laureate SME member: 'Feynman is becoming a real pain in the ass.' As per AAIB's preliminary report, VT-ANB crash investigation team comprises 'Mr. Sanjay Kumar Singh as Investigator-in-Charge, Mr. Jasbir Singh Larhga as Chief Investigator and, Mr. Vipin Venu Varakoth, Mr. Veeraragavan K and Mr. Vaishnav Vijayakumar as Investigators. Experienced Pilots, Engineers, Aviation Medicine Specialist, Aviation Psychologist and Flight Recorder Specialists have been taken on board as Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to assist the Investigation in the area of their domain expertise'. The area of expertise of investigation team or SMEs has not been mentioned, but one expects AAIB to cover all bases while also ensuring no conflict of interest. Under a MoCA run by bureaucrats, with a regime known to be economical with facts & hard data, the only hope for a deep, impartial investigation rests with at least a few 'pain in the a**' members who are loyal only to science and truth, not any maharaja (emperor). Let us not forget how biased media & Boeing aficionados tried to push the blame for 737 Max on Lion Air & Ethiopian pilots till evidence hit them on the nose. It is far too early, indeed malicious, to blame pilots of AI171. Let AAIB do its work. GoI on its part must ensure zero interference. Much as the preliminary report sounds ominous in content, stranger things have happened. Remember 'kid in the cockpit'? AI-171 is a national tragedy, but hopefully one that should spur India to set up an independent transportation safety board that will serve the cause of promoting safety across ALL modes of transportation, including space travel. The existing system of silos is incompatible with needs & aspirations of 1.4bn. In closing, with the available information at this stage, I complement AAIB India on not bucking to pressure, quietly doing their duty and presenting factual information within the prescribed framework of ICAO Annex 13. I look forward to the final report with a hope spelt out by former NTSB Chair Robert Sumwalt: 'human error should be the start point of any investigation and not its end'. Cdr KP Sanjeev Kumar is a former Navy test pilot and alumnus of Air Force Test Pilots School, ASTE. He has flown over 5,000 hours on 24 types of aircraft and helicopters. He calls himself 'full-time aviator, part-time writer' and blogs at Views are personal.
Indian Express
37 minutes ago
- Indian Express
Air India crash report: Unanswered questions, and some reading between the lines
At the heart of the June 12 Air India flight AI 171 crash in Ahmedabad is the fact that the Boeing 787-8 aircraft's two engine fuel control switches transitioned from 'RUN' to 'CUTOFF' position within a second of each other moments after lift-off, according to the preliminary report into the investigation of the aviation disaster. One of the pilots is recorded as asking the other why he cut off the fuel, to which the other pilot responded saying he did not. Now, aviation experts are pointing to the likelihood of there being much more on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) than what's been shared in the report. Why was only the one paraphrased remark — one pilot asking the other why did he 'cutoff' and the second pilot's response in the negative—included, that too without direct quotes from the CVR transcript? What was the pilots' conversation like before and after this specific exchange? Who was the pilot who asked the question, and who answered? The initial report is silent on these. Most preliminary air accident investigation reports in the past have been a compilation of basic facts, mostly detailing 'what happened' more than the 'why it happened'. This particular report marks a departure from the normal in providing more details of what led to the crash, but limits the information on the most crucial exchange that took place in the cockpit to just that one line and a really brief response. Both switches are documented as transitioning back to 'RUN' after the exchange between the pilots captured in the report. Generally, when the CVR is played, the room has colleagues of the pilots who've worked with both of them so that their voices can be identified in exchanges. In all probability, that exercise would have already been done. The recording data should also be able to identify the individual headset microphones of the two pilots. The report, however, stops short of identifying which of the two pilots asked the question in the cockpit, and who answered. The fully-labelled cockpit voice recorder transcript, which could be released in the final report, should be able to reveal which of the two pilots tried to restart the engines—co-pilot Clive Kunder (pilot flying) or pilot-in-command Sumeet Sabharwal (pilot monitoring). Experts believe that only the full audio and transcript of the cockpit voice recorder recording would be able to shed light on the pilots' discussions and actions in the cockpit in the minutes leading up to the tragedy. The recording must also be correlated with the flight data from the flight recorders. The Ahmedabad crash could also underline the need for cockpit video recorders, experts said. The US NTSB is among agencies that have been recommending the need for video recorders in the cockpit for years, only to be met with strong resistance from pilot unions. A video would have given a clear view of the instrument console over the shoulders of the pilots, which would have helped establish if any crucial switches were moved when they weren't supposed to be touched, and if so, by whom. The preliminary report from the investigation, led by the AAIB, had experts from Boeing, General Electric, Air India, Indian regulators other than the AAIB, and participants from the US, the UK and Canada. Alongside 'experienced pilots, engineers, aviation medicine specialists…and Flight Recorder Specialists', who have been taken on board as subject matter experts to assist the investigation, there is one interesting addition: an aviation psychologist. Given the circumstances of the crash, an aviation psychologist could have been drafted to peruse human factors like stress, fatigue, quality of communication between the pilots, and indications of their alertness and decision-making. In this particular case, given the indication that both the fuel control switches transitioned to CUTOFF position in quick succession, the psychologist could help analyse any human involvement that might have been there. It is not clear whether the inclusion of the aviation psychologist in the initial probe was to cover all bases, or to look into any specific aspect. Aviation psychologists are learnt to have played a big role in the Germanwings Flight 9525 crash enroute from Barcelona–El Prat Airport in Spain to Düsseldorf Airport in Germany in 2015. Relevance of FAA advisory on 'potential disengagement' of switch locking feature The AAIB report does make a specific reference to a December 2018 US Federal Aviation Administration issued Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) highlighting that some Boeing 737 fuel control switches were installed with the locking feature disengaged. The same switch design is used in Boeing 787-8 aircraft, including Air India's AI 171 that crashed. It goes on to say the SAIB was advisory and not a directive, and that Air India did not perform the advised inspections as they were not mandatory. Notably, the cockpit's throttle control module — which is integrated with the fuel control switches — was replaced in 2019 and 2023, but the reason for replacement was not linked to the switches. The initial report said that no defect pertaining to the fuel control switches on the aircraft was reported since 2023. If that is the case, then why did the initial probe report include this specific SAIB? Was it in the spirit of maximum disclosure while suggesting the issue was not really relevant to this particular aircraft? It is not clear. If there indeed was a problem with the fuel control switches' locking mechanism, does it imply that the spring-loaded switch could be moved with just a single flick, instead of being pulled up first and then moved from one mode to the other, which is how it is normally operated? Was there any possibility of the switch, if the locking mechanism was disengaged, just flipping on its own and shutting down the engine? That really is not clear. The report nowhere clearly states that the fuel control switches were indeed moved by either of the pilots during take-off. It just says that they 'transitioned' from RUN to CUTOFF based on the black box data. Some pilots and experts have said that the investigators must also closely examine the possibility of an electrical or software malfunction signalling to the aircraft system that the switches were in cut-off mode without being physically moved. The fact that the preliminary report has not issued any recommendation to the operators of the Boeing 787 aircraft and the GE GEnx-1B engines suggests that the investigators, at least for the time being, do not have sufficient reason to believe that an electrical or system malfunction could have led to the fuel control switches 'transitioning' to CUTOFF. It is worth noting that the preliminary report is only an account of the initial findings of the investigation, and is subject to change on the basis of the progress of the probe over the coming months. Aircraft are extremely sophisticated and complex machines, and detailed and painstaking investigations are required to ascertain the exact cause or combination of causes. The odds that an aviation accident has a single trigger are rare, and crashes usually have a series of things that go wrong together or one leading to another. The AAIB is expected to release the final probe report within a year of the crash, as per international guidelines.
