The thing around your neck: how do youth throw off the leash?
Pali Lehohla and Nomvula Mabuza of IDS compare young South Africans with their Kenyan counterparts as the East Africans confront a cannibalistic state
By
Pali Lehohla and Nomvula Mabuza engage in deliberative polemics of a country silenced in what historian Martin Legassick characterises as the dissolution-preservation dichotomy and uncover the classical apartheid management framework that has fossilised in our current and like cancer survives by devouring its host.
When you get asked a million dollar question, what do you do? Obviously you answer. But suddenly the discourse uncovers more than you sought to answer.
A relevant concerns Kenya and South Africa, which represent two settler colonial experiences, and an unfolding crisis of existence, one with deep apartheid structures, the other cutting not as deep.
To try to answer, the immediate obvious is about the necessary intervention that government has put in place to avert cannibalism as explicated in the Indlulamithi Scenarios as a Vulture State.
This perhaps is what the national dialogue should be about.
But necessary as it is, the intervention tends to be a palliative consisting of grants and the like.
In Kenya the assistive government system is far lower than in South Africa. This to an extent exposes the youth of Kenya to the immediacy of their challenge, whereas in South Africa that immediacy is muted by R350 per month and an apartheid infrastructure that has kept the native populations hidden far from power centres.
These centres of power, by being occupied by populations largely from the continent, Asia and South Africa's middle class, act as a buffer relative to the in-your-face experiences of Kenya.
So here is the metaphor for the situation represented by a dog and a hyena that meet one day. The hyena admires the fur of the dog. Asking the dog why when times are so tough, the dog's fur is so smooth and not scrubby like that of the hyena, the dog replies that its master feeds and takes care of it, and it even has a house. Impressed, the hyena wants to join the dog at its master's place, until it notices a ring around the neck that looks unnatural and where the fur has disappeared. The hyena asks the dog about the collar. The dog replies, master keeps me on a leash. That's it, the hyena says, no leash for me. Freedom is what I need.
So it looks like the R350 and other programmes are these multiple leashes. The contemplative polemic buried in your question, Mabuza tells me, addresses the form and palliative nature of these multiple leashes that lull the nerves of the youth who often sit heads in their hands, eyes fixated on an empty future. And, she adds, each of your columns seek to undo the links of these chains.
The deliberative polemic brought even more clarity as Mabuza began to plough into my metaphor: 'Your parable of the dog and the hyena so elegantly captures the psychological and structural trade-offs that we've normalised in South Africa: the appearance of care, comfort and protection masking a deeper restraint on agency, imagination and action. That collar — soft but constraining — is precisely what so many of our young people wear. Not visible, yet profoundly shaping posture, movement, and ultimately, destiny.
'What struck me most in your reply was the idea that the R350 and other social grants, while vital in a context of deep deprivation, have inadvertently become part of a broader architecture of containment. They soothe but do not solve. They stabilise but do not transform. And, as you rightly point out, they lull the nerves while futures remain locked behind structural bars.
'Your framing also challenged me to reflect more critically on what I've been trying to do through my columns. You've helped me see that what I am writing is not just analysis — it is an attempt to unhook the leash, one link at a time. Not to attack the dog or romanticise the hyena, but to ask a more fundamental question: what kind of freedom are we prepared to fight for, and what are we willing to give up to claim it?'
This perhaps is what the national dialogue should be about.
• Nomvula Mabuza is a risk governance and compliance specialist with extensive experience in strategic risk and industrial operations and an MBA candidate at Henley Business School
• Dr Pali Lehohla is a Professor of Practice at the University of Johannesburg, a Research Associate at Oxford University, a board member of Institute for Economic Justice at Wits and a distinguished Alumni of the University of Ghana. He is the former Statistician-General of South Africa
Hashtags

Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles


The South African
an hour ago
- The South African
Ireland swamped by South African visa applications
Nearly a year after Ireland ended visa-free access for South Africans, the country is struggling under the weight of surging visa applications, leading to widespread delays and growing frustration among travellers. In July 2024, Ireland introduced new regulations requiring South African and Botswanan nationals to apply for visas, including transit visas, to enter or pass through the country. This marked a significant change for South Africans, who had previously enjoyed visa-free access to Ireland – one of the few European nations that allowed it. The Irish government cited multiple concerns at the time, including: A rise in forged South African passports , often used by nationals from other countries , often used by nationals from other countries An increase in international protection (asylum) claims by South Africans upon arrival by South Africans upon arrival The need to align immigration policies with the UK, which shares a common travel area with Ireland Irish Minister of State for International Development and Diaspora, Neale Richmond, acknowledged the decision was 'harsh but necessary.' He pointed to a 100% increase in South African arrivals claiming asylum as a key trigger for the policy change. Despite the move, South Africa remains a key source of skilled migrants for Ireland, with deep business, trade, and educational ties. Many South African professionals, students, and entrepreneurs seek opportunities in Ireland, which is actively recruiting foreign talent to fill post-pandemic skills gaps. Since the policy took effect, Ireland has seen a massive influx of visa applications from South Africans. Although authorities committed to three-month turnaround times, many applicants report delays of 12 to 16 weeks, forcing them to cancel travel plans, including business trips and family visits. Former Irish Justice Minister Helen McEntee had announced the set-up of a dedicated 'South Africa desk' at the Dublin Visa Office, supported by three local Visa Application Centres (VACs) managed by VFS Global in South Africa. However, this has proven inadequate. The Irish government has now doubled resources in a bid to clear the backlog, aiming to reduce turnaround to 4-6 weeks. 'We're seeing far more applications than expected,' Richmond said. 'We underestimated the demand, and we're now scaling operations accordingly.' Ireland has also proposed streamlining business and work permit visa processes, with a focus on faster approval timelines for skilled professionals. South African passports had faced scrutiny and misuse in Europe for several years prior. In 2022, airline Ryanair sparked controversy by administering a test in Afrikaans to validate South African passports – drawing global backlash. While the test was scrapped, questions over passport integrity remained. The visa requirement aligns Ireland with UK immigration policies, but has sparked criticism from both travellers and stakeholders in the travel and tourism sector. Despite current frustrations, Irish officials insist the visa measures are not permanent and could be re-evaluated once security risks are resolved and application volumes stabilise. In the meantime, thousands of South Africans are left navigating long waits and bureaucratic hurdles, a sharp contrast to the ease of travel they once enjoyed. Let us know by leaving a comment below, or send a WhatsApp to 060 011 021 1 Subscribe to The South African website's newsletters and follow us on WhatsApp, Facebook, X and Bluesky for the latest news.


The South African
2 hours ago
- The South African
Power: The truth behind Africa's longest-serving presidents
Human Rights Watch (HRW) confirms that several African presidents with lengthy tenures first came to power through freedom movements. Over time, many used harsh tactics to secure their authority and silence civil rights, dissent, and opposition. Their extended tenure in office is a reflection of Cold War alliances to secure the Western geopolitical agenda, post-colonial trauma, and structural weaknesses inherited from colonialism. These trends impede democratic transformation and peaceful leadership transitions in many authoritarian African countries. According to historians, including the Kenyan Ali Mazrui, colonial powers drew the borders of Africa with little regard for linguistic, cultural, or ethnic reality. Furthermore, the African Union's Border Program (AUBP) recognises the effects of colonial borders. The AUBP maintains border integrity, promotes demarcation, and fosters regional cooperation. For 23 years (1885–1908), King Leopold II of Belgium owned the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), also called the Congo Free State. Leopold II ended his ownership on 15 November 1908, when the Belgian government took over direct colonial governance. Known as the Belgian Congo, the period of direct Belgian colonial rule continued until the DRC gained independence on 30 June 1960. Belgian rule ended in 1960, leaving the DRC unstable, divided along ethnic and regional lines. That same year, Belgian mining companies, concerned about the nationalisation of natural resources, played a role in influencing the Katanga province to secede from the DRC's new government and become its own country. Katanga contained minerals such as uranium, cobalt, and copper that were vital to Cold War nuclear projects and Western industry. To protect mining interests, Katanga's leader, Moïse Tshombe, declared independence with the support of Belgian troops and mercenaries. The secession movement in Katanga and South Kasai triggered a civil war, split the Congo, and weakened the national government of former Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. To regain Katanga, Lumumba sought Soviet support, which worried the West and increased Cold War concerns. The United States and Belgium supported Lumumba's removal. The head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station, Larry Devlin, admitted receiving an order to kill Lumumba, even though the CIA did not carry out the murder. With Belgian help, Katangan soldiers executed Lumumba on 17 January 1961. Then-Army Chief Joseph Mobutu seized power in a military coup on 24 November 1965, promising to maintain stability, fight communism, and bring about order. Former President Mobutu ruled the DRC, which he renamed Zaire, as its official president from 1965 to 1997. Using Law No. 001/67, he outlawed multiparty politics in 1967, citing national unity as justification. Between 1967 and 1974, Zaire's (DRC's) economy flourished due to high copper prices and export revenue. Mobutu's centralised government built dams and highways, set up colleges, and expanded civil service employment during this prosperous period. He initiated 'Zairianisation,' replacing colonial names and symbols with African identities, language, and dress. Mobutu grew increasingly authoritarian as he became concerned about outside threats, civil unrest, and elite plots to overthrow him. After 1974, the economy deteriorated due to unsustainable government debt, corruption, and falling copper prices. Mobutu continued to receive financial support from Western countries to maintain Cold War allegiance and challenge Soviet hegemony in Central Africa. Mobutu used military loyalty, foreign aid, and a personality cult to maintain his rule through tyranny and patronage. A 1994 report by Amnesty International (AI) detailed how Mobutu imprisoned opponents and made peaceful political opposition illegal. In 1991, Mobutu regularly imprisoned former prime minister Étienne Tshisekedi for challenging his authority. Mobutu is estimated by Transparency International to have embezzled approximately US$5 billion (roughly R92.5 billion) between 1965 and 1997. Several African leaders were able to control political affairs through post-colonial heroics without being held accountable or subject to institutional scrutiny. Liberation credentials bestowed significant moral power, enabling leaders to rule unchallenged for decades without adhering to democratic standards. With significant support from Western nations, Félix Houphouët-Boigny served as Côte d'Ivoire's first president from 1960 to 1993. Former President Houphouët-Boigny suppressed dissent in 1963 by detaining dozens of people, including members of his party, on suspicion of plotting. He also received substantial support in the 1970s in exchange for his commitment to a pro-Western foreign policy, though the exact amounts of French assistance are classified. In 1982, authorities arrested academic activist Laurent Gbagbo for organising strikes and student-led demonstrations. In Jeune Afrique and other journals, Gbagbo criticised Houphouët-Boigny's repression and censorship. Through the development of infrastructure, international investor relationships, and cocoa exports, he transformed Côte d'Ivoire into the economic hub of West Africa. His Cold War connections, local unrest, and fears of internal coup attempts and disintegration were the root causes of his authoritarianism. From 1980 until 2017, former President Robert Mugabe ruled Zimbabwe, turning anti-colonial recognition into a consolidation and repression of authoritarian power. Political persecution, economic collapse, and deliberate manipulation of Zimbabwe's constitution all contributed to his decline in popularity. After independence, he initially made investments in rural development and improved healthcare and education for Black Zimbabweans. Elite corruption, economic mismanagement, and land expropriation sparked the collapse post-2000, and international isolation exacerbated it further. Superpowers backed African dictators during the Cold War, prioritising ideology over democracy, as US archives consistently confirm. The US National Security Archive documents Cold War tactics that funded autocracies for anti-communist ends. The French-backed economic continuity and political stability were upheld during Omar Bongo's tenure as Gabon's president from 1967 to 2009. Former President Bongo supported Gabon's oil-based economy and made investments in initiatives like Université Omar Bongo, but infrastructure development was uneven, and education received insufficient funding, which sparked protests. Le Monde claims that Bongo was heavily reliant on Elf Aquitaine, which exchanged political funding for access to oil. Elf secretly financed Bongo's government in exchange for oil contracts, as Le Monde Diplomatique (1999) exposed. While Bongo's prolonged rule concentrated power and wealth, it also encouraged institutional dependence on foreign-controlled oil profits. During her corruption investigation, Eva Joly found that Bongo's family had lavish real estate, expensive cars, and suspicious Swiss bank accounts. Watchdog groups claim that the Bongo dictatorship embezzled several hundred million US dollars. Between 1993 and 2005, Pierre Mamboundou led the resistance and was regularly arrested for political dissent. He wrote to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), denouncing monitoring and torture. Bongo remained relatively calm, but his opponents faced violence, censorship, and systematic exclusion from political life. In 1994, Paul Kagame became the de facto leader of Rwanda, and in 2000, he was formally elected president. After the genocide, he restored security, rebuilt Kigali, made healthcare investments, and led Rwanda toward economic growth. His administration improved Rwanda's digital infrastructure, promoted gender equality in parliament, and carried out peacekeeping missions. Human Rights Watch (HRW) documented cases of dissenter arrests, torture, and disappearances in Rwanda and abroad from 2021 to 2023. Global human rights organisations have widely denounced President Kagame's intolerance for dissent, overshadowing his advocacy for control and progress. In African countries with weak civilian institutions, military takeovers have cemented authoritarianism, according to the Institute for Security Studies. According to scholars of African governance, military regimes flourish when democratic oversight and institutions are lacking or ineffective. After a guerrilla campaign against the government of former President Milton Obote, President Yoweri Museveni came to power in 1986. By issuing Legal Notice No. 1, he put an end to multiparty operations and established Uganda's no-party Movement political system. During his early years in office, Museveni stabilised Uganda's economy and expanded healthcare and education. However, repression of dissenters, electoral fraud, and the lifting of the presidential age limit have gradually compromised progress towards democracy. Former Museveni advisor Dr Kizza Besigye was arrested more than ten times between 2001 and 2022. He was accused of orchestrating unlawful protests in well-known Ugandan cities, causing civil unrest, and contesting election results. Besigye submitted documents to Uganda's Supreme Court in 2016 claiming evidence of electoral fraud and torture. In Africa, personal rule endures because weak institutions enable leaders to solidify their power through repression and loyalty. Equatorial Guinean state institutions were converted into networks of patronage loyal to President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo. According to academic sources such as Oxford Academic, Equatorial Guinea is a personalist system where elite co-optation and patronage are essential for political survival. Obiang, who has been in office since 1979, significantly raised GDP in the early 2000s by using GEPetrol to manage oil revenues. Petrodollars enabled the construction of urban roads, infrastructure, electrical access, and luxurious developments in the coastal cities of Bata and Malabo. Yet, the concentration of wealth made inequality worse, and people outside of cities had limited access to basic services. The U.S. Department of Justice made public offshore accounts linked to senior officials involved in the laundering of oil profits and illegal transactions. Hundreds of millions of dollars were seized as a result of the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) forfeiture cases involving the ostentatious possessions of the wealthy elite. The conviction of Teodorín Obiang for embezzlement and money laundering was formally upheld by the Court of Cassation in France in 2021. French authorities seized approximately a hundred million euros in estates and upscale goods purchased with embezzled public funds. Agustín Esono Nsogo, a journalist who documented human rights abuses by the government, was tortured at Black Beach jail. Findings from Amnesty International show that Equatorial Guinea's security forces engaged in widespread censorship, incommunicado detentions, and systematic torture. Obiang's long-term rule led to economic growth, but corruption, repression, and nepotism seriously jeopardised national development goals. Long-serving African presidents often use rigged elections and politicised courts to retain power and suppress opposition. The International Crisis Group's (ICG's) 2023 publications highlight trends in election manipulation across Africa, but they don't focus solely on this problem. Since taking office in 1982, President Paul Biya has led Cameroon, frequently winning elections despite widespread allegations of voter intimidation and fraud. Significant irregularities were noted in Cameroon's elections in 2004, 2011, and 2018 by Commonwealth, European Union, and NDI observers. Biya changed Article 6 of the Cameroonian Constitution in 2008, eliminating term limits for presidents. Against strong public opposition, the Biya parliament passed the amendment, which the Constitutional Council later approved. Maurice Kamto, the leader of the Cameroon Renaissance Movement, was arrested after he challenged Biya's victory in the 2018 election. Maurice Kamto contested the 2018 election results at Cameroon's constitutional council, but the council made no decision based on concrete evidence of meddling. Biya improved the accessibility of telecommunications and maintained regional links, but road infrastructure was still insufficient and underwent little structural change. But after 2016, his administration's suppression of opposition, delay in decentralisation, and poor handling of Anglophone concerns sparked a deadly separatist struggle. Many African regimes invoke national security to restrict civil rights and consolidate indefinite political power. As the President of Chad from 1991 to 2021, Idriss Déby Itno established himself as a crucial ally in the fight against terrorism. He led Chad's military actions against Boko Haram and made significant contributions to G5 Sahel initiatives. Former President Déby became well-known throughout the world as a strongman by professionalising the Chadian military and expanding regional power. Yet, military priorities diverted funds from civic, educational, and health services, making rural neglect worse. Déby's government frequently invoked security rationales, such as Boko Haram threats, to implement emergency measures that restricted people's freedoms. Under Déby, the Constitutional Council of Chad was largely inactive and rarely opposed presidential actions that restricted civil liberties. Les Transformateurs, led by Dr Succès Masra, advocates for inclusive political representation and nonviolent change in Chad. Particularly in 2021, security forces brutally put an end to Masra-organised rallies, sparking both domestic outrage and global concern. According to Amnesty International, mass arrests and harsh repression of protesters are commonplace in Chad. Amnesty's report confirms that political activists frequently suffered abuse, even though it does not name Masra as a victim of torture. Ethnic divide-and-rule tactics are employed to weaken opposition and prolong control. From 1967 until 2005, former President Gnassingbé Eyadéma led Togo in a combination of prolonged authoritarian rule and socioeconomic advancements. He nationalised Togo's phosphate industry in 1974, boosting revenue and funding infrastructure at the height of the 1970s economy. However, by the 1990s, phosphate exports had collapsed due to corruption and poor management, which sparked a national debt crisis and economic decline. Eyadéma invested funds in public buildings and road construction, strengthening regional ties across central and northern Togo. He relied heavily on the Kabyé ethnic minority to dominate government institutions and exercise control over the military. Southern and minority groups become polarised and enraged as a result of this ongoing ethnic isolation. Eyadéma's government was accused by opposition leader Gilchrist Olympio of repression, which included media censorship, torture, and arrests. The UN and Amnesty International documented torture, censorship, and political persecution in Togo in their 1990s reports. Former President Daniel Arap Moi governed Kenya from 1978 to 2002, enhancing education and rural infrastructure during his initial years in power. He implemented a free milk programme in schools, increased primary enrolment, and constructed roads connecting remote agricultural areas. He centralised authorities, suppressed opposition, and relied on ethnic patronage to maintain national political dominance. According to human rights reports, state-sponsored violence between 1992 and 1997 uprooted thousands, particularly in the Rift Valley. Between 1991 and 1997, the Kenyan government used ethnic violence to weaken opposition during the country's multiparty electoral reforms. The Goldenberg scam, which involved false gold export reimbursements, embezzled millions of Kenyan dollars during Moi's administration. Ultimately, Moi consolidated his power through force, nepotism, and financial mismanagement, despite his initial perceived stabilising role. Authoritarian African presidents frequently amend their constitutions to remove term limits, eroding legal standards to give themselves more authority. Except for the political transitions in 1992 and 1997, President Denis Sassou Nguesso has been in power in Congo since 1979. He held a referendum in 2015 that eliminated age and term limits, allowing for continued presidential rule. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and Amnesty International reported fatalities during protests in October 2015 over the term extension. Before his death, opposition leader Guy Brice Parfait Kolélas spoke out against persecution and electoral fraud during the Congo's 2021 election. Before his passing, Kolélas released a video in which he accused Sassou Nguesso's government of vote fraud and intimidation. He promoted election transparency and coalition building, which enhanced the appeal of the opposition. In addition to ongoing urban infrastructure projects, the Sassou Nguesso administration opened Université Denis Sassou-Nguesso in 2021. Although there are numerous efforts, Congo's healthcare system faces challenges, with notable disparities in access between rural and urban areas. Despite its achievements, the administration faces accusations of inequality, corruption, and institutional decay, particularly in the southern provinces. Beyond term limits, authoritarian African dictators use institutional brutality, disintegration, and oppression to cause widespread suffering to anyone who opposes them. Authorities have overseen killings, torture, and economic collapse from Uganda to Chad, with tragic human consequences. Amnesty International confirmed numerous violations, and Hissène Habré's dictatorship alone saw the execution of 40,000 people in Chad's prisons. These actions violate both Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Articles 4 and 5 of the African Charter. Such regimes threaten opponents with violence and arrest, destroy institutions, and eliminate term limits. Leaders like Sassou Nguesso and Museveni advocate for rule extensions as a defence against external threats and instability. They fear prosecution, retaliation, or exile if political rivals take control and investigate past wrongdoings by the government. Foreign funders continue to support them, prioritising regional stability, economic access, and counterterrorism over their human rights pledges. Despite the African Union (AU) and UN resolutions, long-standing authoritarian governments continue to practice mass killings, torture, and censorship. The African Charter, the UN Torture Convention, and the African Union (AU) Constitutive Act all contain democratic and legal norms that these governments violate. An estimated 210,000 civilians were killed under the leadership of four former presidents: Macías Nguema (Equatorial Guinea), Idi Amin (Uganda), Siad Barre (Somalia), and Hissène Habré (Chad). Let us know by leaving a comment below, or send a WhatsApp to 060 011 021 11. Subscribe to The South African website's newsletters and follow us on WhatsApp, Facebook, X and Bluesky for the latest news.

IOL News
3 hours ago
- IOL News
CYRIL DARES DA TO BOYCOTT NATIONAL DIALOGUE
DA MINISTERS intending to boycott the National Dialogue will have to provide President Cyril Ramaphosa with valid reasons for their non-attendance or their absence will be regarded as insubordination, says the Presidency. The Inter-Ministerial Committee(IMC) on the National Dialogue appointed by President Cyril Ramaphosa includes DA leader John Steenhuisen as Agriculture Minister. Other members of the 12-member committee are its chair, Deputy President Paul Mashatile, Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs Velenkosini Hlabisa (IFP), Sport, Arts and Culture Minister Gayton McKenzie (Patriotic Alliance) and Land Reform Minister Mzwanele Nyhontso (PAC). 'Any member of Cabinet who wishes to no longer participate in the IMC will have to provide reasons to the President. Hopefully, they'll also think about the consequences of such insubordination. Because that's how the President will regard any non-participation as insubordination," said Presidency spokesperson Vincent Magwenya said. The National Dialogue aims to address South Africa's ongoing challenges, such as poverty, crime, inequality and unemployment, which continue despite 30 years of democracy. The DA announced its withdrawal after Ramaphosa refused to reverse his decision to fire its member Andrew Whitfield as Deputy Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition for traveling abroad without permission. On Saturday, Steenhuisen described the National Dialogue as an electioneering ploy, at taxpayer expense, to gloss over the serious crises that the ANC has plunged South Africa into. 'The Dialogue also has no constitutional standing whatsoever to take or impose decisions. Frankly, the President cannot even dialogue meaningfully with his own coalition partners, so there is little point in pretending there is any substance to an ANC-run National Dialogue.' Magwenya said the DA's boycott of the National Dialogue was immaterial because the initiative was not a party political exercise. 'It's an initiative for all South Africans and the DA is not all South Africans. Ministers who have been appointed to the National Dialogue IMC are expected to participate fully in the IMC, anything to the contrary will have to be explained to the President and non participation in the IMC as the President has directed will certainly constitute insubordination,' Magwenya added. Video Player is loading. Play Video Play Unmute Current Time 0:00 / Duration -:- Loaded : 0% Stream Type LIVE Seek to live, currently behind live LIVE Remaining Time - 0:00 This is a modal window. Beginning of dialog window. Escape will cancel and close the window. Text Color White Black Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Transparent Window Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Transparent Semi-Transparent Opaque Font Size 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 300% 400% Text Edge Style None Raised Depressed Uniform Dropshadow Font Family Proportional Sans-Serif Monospace Sans-Serif Proportional Serif Monospace Serif Casual Script Small Caps Reset restore all settings to the default values Done Close Modal Dialog End of dialog window. Advertisement Next Stay Close ✕ Ad loading The ANC has weighed in on the DA's latest move, saying: "This response speaks volumes about the DA's character, they are willing to undermine national interests in pursuit of their narrow partisan agenda. The ANC firmly believes that this dialogue is not merely an event, it is a critical process in pursuit of social compacting, unity, and national renewal. At this juncture, it is imperative for the DA to clarify its stance: is it a genuine and principled partner in the GNU, or is it positioning itself as a quasi-opposition within the executive.' The GOOD Party, a member of the GNU, said the DA's decision to withdraw from the National Dialogue 'reflects a deep unwillingness to prioritise South Africa's collective future over party posturing'. 'This latest tantrum, triggered by the President's refusal to yield to an artificial 48-hour ultimatum, is not a principled stand - it is political theatre. The DA's ultimatum was exposed as inconsequential and their frequent tantrums are quite frankly embarrassing. South Africa does not need parties walking away from dialogue. It needs leadership that can engage with complexity, manage disagreement maturely, and stay the course. The DA's decision to abandon the National Dialogue, while clinging to its GNU positions, exposes the contradiction in its stance,' said GOOD secretary-general, Brett Herron. AL JAMA-AH, another member of the coalition government, said: 'The GNU has a clearing house to deal with disputes and infringes of the "statement of intent'. The GNU also has a Leaders Forum which AL JAMA-AH President Honourable Ganief Hendricks serves on. The Leader's Forum agreed to have a breakaway. It is within this structure, whereby the responsibility to resolve the DA's disputes has to be addressed. This includes whether or not by withdrawing from the National Dialogue the DA, is declaring itself outside of government or not. Nevertheless the DA has insulted the integrity of the most respected thought leaders in the country, clearly stating that their counsel is not welcome.' University of the Free Political Studies and Governance lecturer Sanet Solomon said the DA's moves in the GNU could damage its supporter base. "The DAs decision to withdraw itself from the National Dialogue sends a message to its supporters that it is 'actively standing up' against the ANC and that it is not passively going along with all its decisions. This display of ' showmanship' is just a facade as the party cannot leave the GNU without damaging its support base. 'Post May-2024 it (the DA) tried convincing voters that allying with the GNU would result in better governance and a reduction in corruption. Should it leave the GNU now, its voting base might revert to the FF+, the Good Party, the Patriotic Alliance and others as they may believe that the DA cannot co-govern with others. Should the DA stay, it would be stuck trying to convince its supporters that it has influence in the GNU's decision-making. Either way, they are stuck in a catch-22," said Solomon. Cape Times