How international schools are preparing students to make the right financial decisions
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While the Cambridge research is firmly rooted in British contexts, there are lessons for children across the world.
Murray Forest, Western co-principal of primary at Yew Chung International School of Hong Kong (YCIS), explains financial literacy as 'children having the language to be able to understand how money is used, and how it can apply to themselves'.
Jeremy Power, head of Grade 11 and teacher of humanities, theory of knowledge and career studies at Canadian International School of Hong Kong (CDNIS), echoes this definition, explaining that he sees adequate financial literacy as 'preparing individuals to make informed decisions around their finances and plan for their future in order to make sound financial decisions'.
Creative approaches to learning about financial literacy range from singing to storytelling and crafts. Photo: Blend Images
At YCIS, students are introduced to the concept of money in early childhood education. 'Once in primary school, students begin to explore global currencies, earning and spending of money, balancing budgets, and forward-thinking financial planning,' explains Forest.
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