Japan Steps Up New Security Assistance to Countries Caught Between US and China

The Diplomat

21 hours ago

Japan is expanding its security assistance to strategically located countries across the Indo-Pacific, reflecting Tokyo's embrace of its security role in the region and its desire to provide more options to countries that feel caught between the United States and China.
That aid comes through the Official Security Assistance (OSA) program, which is only in its third year but has grown considerably, from about $13.8 million in 2023 to about $34.6 million in 2024 to about $56 million for the 2025 fiscal year, which began on April 1. The number of recipients has also increased from four in each of the first two years to the eight countries now in discussions with Tokyo, Japanese media reported last month. Those candidates are Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, which have received OSA grants in the past (the Philippines in both years), and Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Tonga, which would be first-time recipients.
Japan has provided some security-related resources through its long-running Official Development Assistance program, but that program is officially for economic and social development and has generally focused on non-military aid. It also hasn't provided aid directly to foreign militaries. OSA is meant to provide equipment, supplies, and support for infrastructure to 'armed forces and related organizations of like-minded countries' to strengthen 'their security and deterrence capabilities,' according to Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which says OSA projects 'are limited to areas not directly related to international conflict.'
OSA was unveiled in Japan's 2022 National Security Strategy, and while it has received less attention than other initiatives announced in that document – most notably the counterstrike missile capability – it is still significant. 'This is an important shift for Japan' because it means official assistance 'is being tied to security issues,' Robert Ward, Japan Chair at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, said at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on May 31.
'Japan is keen, I think, to make sure that that is directed at coast guards and anything that's to do with the maintenance of the rule of law in the region,' Ward said, adding that the OSA was 'an important example of' the broader change in Japanese foreign policy. 'It's worth keeping an eye on OSA,' he added.
'Don't Want to Have to Choose'
OSA has focused on improving recipients' ability to monitor their waters and airspace. In 2023, it funded patrol boats for Fiji's and Bangladesh's navies, rescue boats for Malaysia's military, and coastal radars for the Armed Forces of the Philippines. OSA projects expanded in value and scope in 2024, providing high-speed patrol boats to Indonesia's navy, coastal radars to Djibouti's navy, air-traffic-control systems to Mongolia's air force, and a rigid-hull inflatable boat and coastal radars to the Philippine Navy, as well as equipment for an air-surveillance radar previously sold to the Philippine Air Force.
'There are some priority targeted areas,' including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, Saya Kiba, an expert on Southeast Asian security at Japan's Kobe City University, said at an event hosted by Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok in March. 'It's non-kinetic. It's more for the capacity-building,' Kiba said.
While OSA grants have been modest, Japanese officials hope to increase them as they get a better sense of other countries' needs. Some also see OSA as a step toward future arms deals. 'They can try our defense equipment, and then if they like, probably they can buy the more expensive one from Japan,' Kiba said. OSA serves Tokyo's immediate interests by boosting recipients' military capabilities, contributing to stability in what it sees as a deteriorating security environment and supporting the rule of law, including freedom of navigation at sea.
When it announced the first OSA grants in late 2023, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the recipients were responsible for monitoring 'important sea lanes' and the aid was intended 'to contribute to maintaining and strengthening maritime security.' In its 2024 grant announcements, the ministry said 'enhancing' receiving countries' 'security and deterrence capability' would strengthen their security cooperation with Japan and 'create a desirable security environment' for Tokyo.
Japan also wants to present itself as another option for countries trying to balance their relationships with the U.S. and China. That can be 'difficult' at times because Japan is an official U.S. ally, Ward said, but overall Tokyo 'doesn't want to alienate China, wants to keep relations with the U.S. good, but also wants to provide this sort of center away for countries that don't want to have to choose.'
That combination of motives is visible in the distribution of OSA projects. Djibouti, for instance, overlooks important sea lanes and hosts U.S. and Chinese (and Japanese) military bases. Fiji and other Pacific Island states are also near important sea lanes and are being courted by China and the U.S. and its allies. Other countries, like Sri Lanka, are in a similar situation, but Tokyo is particularly interested in Southeast Asia, an economically dynamic region that sits astride important maritime trade routes and faces a growing challenge from U.S.-China competition.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 'is so strategically critical that Japan hopes that that desire not to antagonize China, to work with China, also resonates within ASEAN,' Ward said. 'Japan has very good, deep economic relations with ASEAN' and is generally trusted by its 10 members, Ward added. That was reflected in the 2025 State of Southeast Asia survey, in which ASEAN respondents ranked Japan as their most trusted major power and as the third-most important ASEAN Dialogue Partner, behind China and the U.S.
Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru has kept up engagement with the region since taking office in October, with visits to Laos, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines, and has used the 2025 Osaka-Kansai Expo to get more face time, including with his counterparts from Laos and Cambodia.
Cambodia is closely aligned with China, but Prime Minister Hun Manet has looked to Japan and others to widen the country's diplomatic circle. Japanese warships were the first to visit Cambodia's Ream Naval Base when it reopened after a controversial Chinese-funded renovation project, and Cambodia recently welcomed the return of a Japanese defense attaché. After meeting at the Expo on May 30, Ishiba and Hun said that they wanted 'to further advance' security ties and expected 'smoother bilateral defense cooperation,' including 'consideration' of future OSA projects.
Such meetings were 'a good opportunity,' Ishiba reportedly said in May. 'We can convey Japan's importance to countries sandwiched between the United States and China.'
'A Very Important Partner'
In late May, Fiji became the first country to receive new equipment funded through OSA when Japan handed over an underwater camera unit, a rescue boat, and a water rescue training doll covered by a grant awarded in December 2023. A Japanese official told The Japan Times in January that the slow pace of delivery was mainly due to the time needed to negotiate, implement tenders and contracts, and build new hardware.
Even with momentum behind OSA, there still appear to be limits on its scope and scale. The program adheres to Japan's 'Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology,' and while those rules have been eased, Tokyo still restricts transfers of lethal weapons. 'They've loosened export constraints, but there are still normative issues, and I'm assuming some legal issues, around what they can send out,' Ward said at the Shangri-La Dialogue.
The OSA budget also limits the value and sophistication of what can be provided – the roughly $104 million allotted so far is only about one-quarter the cost of one of Japan's Mogami-class frigates – and Japan's economic outlook may affect what it's willing to hand over in the future. Japan is also sensitive to how its military activity is perceived abroad, and its leaders 'try to treat the security-related issues, or military-defense kind of issues, very, very carefully,' Kiba, of Kobe City University, said in March. Kiba cited surveys showing Southeast Asian elites generally support Japan's overseas security activity but that opinions differed among general publics, indicating that Tokyo should tailor its messaging to each country.
China, for its part, has criticized Japan's OSA as the 'militarization and weaponization' of foreign aid meant to increase Tokyo's influence and help the U.S. contain China. But countries that are wary of Beijing's influence and worried by shrinking assistance from Washington are likely to welcome more Japanese support.
'Japan is a very important partner for Papua New Guinea, and I would like to say that we do have a lot of trade and relationship with them. Most of the infrastructures in the country have been built by Japan,' Billy Joseph, Papua New Guinea's defense minister, said at the Shangri-La Dialogue on June 1. 'Japan is working with our defense to build capacity, and there are many different levels we are working with that.'