Israel risks overplaying its hand in Syria amid Druze-Bedouin conflicts

Yahoo

19-07-2025

The longer al-Sharaa acts on big issues and Israel intervenes in questionable matters not clearly threatening Israeli interests, the faster Israel may lose the key cards it holds in Syria.
These are wild times between Israel and Syria.
And in these wild times it is unclear whether Israel's attacks on Syrian regime forces on Monday and Tuesday - even if it is to protect some Syrian-Druze who the Jewish state has good relations with and even if the Syrian forces are in part of Israel's self-declared buffer zone – will stand unchallenged or lead to major strategic fallout.
Only a few months ago, every top Israeli political official in public statements and pretty much all top Israeli defense officials in private statements, including some exclusive statements to the Jerusalem Post, were warning that Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa is a "wolf in sheep's clothing."
Their point was to caution that though he now wears suits and ties and speaks in measured tones about peace that the West loves to hear, that underneath it all, he remains the same dangerous al-Qaeda jihadist which he once openly was in the not-so-distant past.
But then US President Donald Trump decided that al-Sharaa was a legitimate partner, repealed all American sanctions, and told Jerusalem to get with the program and make nice with him.
Trump did this based on his own judgment of character, but also under pressure from the Saudis who want to strengthen al-Sharaa's rule so as to prevent any Alawite-Syrian or Iranian resurgence.
There are also concerns about al-Sharaa's connections with Islamist Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and concerns about the massacre of as many as 1,500 ethnic minority Alawites (some of his security forces were also killed and are part of the tally), which he allowed to occur in Syria in the Latakia area in March.
But Trump knew about these issues and gave al-Sharaa a clean slate anyway.
Israel did eventually get on board, and Mossad Director David Barnea, the IDF, Foreign Minister Gideon Saar, and National Security Council Chief Tzahi Hanegbi have communicated with Syria, with both sides talking about a possible new armistice deal and maybe eventual normalization.
Several top American officials have met with al-Sharaa and declared their support for him as a reformed man who will bring about peace with Israel.
All of this could mean Israel needing to withdraw, even if it might be gradual over an extended period, from its buffer security zone it created in southern Syria in December 2024 upon the fall of the Assad regime.
One of the big questions is how long Israel can convince Trump to allow it to stay in the Syrian buffer zone.
The question is relevant both as a matter of addressing security concerns with whether al-Sharaa can restrain some of his jihadists from invading Israel as well as using the bargaining chip of withdrawing from those areas to get normalization with Syria or at least promises of a large demilitarized zone.
If in December 2024 and the early months of this year, the IDF could take almost any action it wanted to in Syria against perceived security threats because al-Sharaa was still in the sanctions dog-house, all of that has either already changed or could change soon.
Imminently or in the medium term, Trump may bar Israel from such actions, or worse, such continued actions could eventually lead Trump to demand Israel leave its Syrian buffer zone sooner, undermining its strategic leverage.
Part of how all of this will turn out depends on how one views the latest incident.
From the outside, it seems like a minor incident of some Bedouin-Syrians kidnapping one Druze-Syrian led to rival tribes falling into a much larger multi-village conflict.
However, all of this was still a local Syrian affair, which would not seem to implicate Israeli security or justify Jerusalem ordering an intervention.
Unclear if IDF supports current intervention in Syria
In fact, it is unclear whether the IDF supports the current intervention or may view it as an error strategically, but is following orders from the cabinet.
What brought Israeli interest was when the government forces announced they would intervene in order to end the tribal gang fighting which has already led to between 30-100 deaths.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz said they were worried that the government forces, with more serious weaponry like tanks, would overpower and start slaughtering the Druze-Syrians.
They also said that Syrian forces could not enter the buffer zone.
But if al-Sharaa is becoming accepted, how often can Israel prevent the current Syrian regime from intervening to resolve internal chaotic conflicts between tribes?
Eighth months into his rule, there has been no hint that al-Sharaa would threaten Israel, let alone any concrete move to do so.
Of course, all of this could be just because he has been too weak to do so to date, and given a few years to build his power, he could be a true threat down the line.
But al-Sharaa and Trump may tire sooner of giving Israel a free hand in Syria on issues that really matter if it continues to intervene on so many gray issues, which could easily be reframed as an "occupying" power denying a legitimate government from restoring order in its territory.
If al-Sharaa or his government forces really do start to oppress the Druze-Syrians or try to creep closer to the border with Israel, then Jerusalem might get a more sympathetic hearing in Washington.
But the longer al-Sharaa behaves on the big issues and the more Israel intervenes on issues which could be framed as questionable and not clearly threatening Israeli interests, the quicker the Jewish state may lose the cards it holds in Syria, which really matter.
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