ANC top brass set to meet following serious corruption allegations against police miniter
Last week, KwaZulu-Natal police commissioner Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi made damning claims of political interference in the SAPS task team investigating political killings.
Mkhwanazi named Mchunu among those he believes interfered, accusing him of disbanding the unit to protect controversial businessman Vusumuzi Matlala.
Speaking to reporters in Mpumalanga on Friday, ANC secretary general Fikile Mbalula said the party would place this issue on the agenda.
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Daily Maverick
an hour ago
- Daily Maverick
Regional trade could focus South Africa's muddled foreign policy
Coalition governance is messy, but parties should be able to agree on prioritising economic growth and trade into Africa. South Africa's government of national unity (GNU) has just staggered past the one-year mark. Its foreign policy reflects continuity, some change, a steady mismatch between ambition and resources and little focus on national growth priorities. Disagreements on foreign policy and strained relations, particularly regarding Western partners, highlight the challenges when the two largest GNU parties – the ANC and the DA – come from such different backgrounds. The 2024 GNU statement of intent includes only one catch-all sentence on foreign policy among its basic minimum priorities: the country will pursue 'human rights, constitutionalism, the national interest, solidarity, peaceful resolution of conflicts, to achieve the African Agenda 2063, South-South, North-South and African cooperation, multilateralism and a just, peaceful and equitable world'. Everything and therefore nothing. The sum effect is a foreign policy adrift. The International Relations and Cooperation Department rarely pursues the country's developmental priorities (growth, poverty reduction and equity). It also has a selective approach to democracy and human rights issues in the region. The defence force's humiliation in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo also shows that South Africa does not have the military means to support its peacemaking ambitions in Africa. Foreign policy largely takes the form of a commitment by the ANC to its traditional partners and issues such as Palestine, Cuba, Western Sahara, China and Russia. Regarding Russia, it's ironic that US President Donald Trump's tilt towards that country has reduced European (and US) criticisms of the ANC's tacit support of Russia. Some fresh air came into a stale debate when the uMkhonto Wesizwe (MK) party stood back from the ANC's commitment to the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic's independence from Morocco. The DA hasn't taken a formal position, but is less passionate about Western Sahara than the ANC, and would probably agree with MK. South Africa's active role in international forums and advocacy for human rights on Israel's genocide in Gaza has been commendable. However, Pretoria seems to take a principled stance only when it has no real influence on an issue that is suitably far away (such as Western Sahara) – shrinking back on matters in its own neighbourhood. The ANC's hostility towards Western partners is readily evident to anyone on the diplomatic circuit in Pretoria and Cape Town. BRICS partner events attract many government officials, whereas high-level events such as the European Union's (EU) Europe Day struggle to attract even one, despite EU trade being more important. The future of South Africa's trade and manufacturing growth doesn't lie in Europe, China or the US, it lies in Africa. South Africa is particularly enthusiastic about BRICS' expansion, emerging as a leader of the Global South – although without any substantially associated trade benefits. Unlike trade with China, where South Africa exports commodities and imports manufactured goods, EU-South Africa export values roughly match imports, and have higher-value content. EU countries also have much larger investments in South Africa, and many European companies have long-standing domestic operations. Between 1,000 and 2,000 EU companies are active in South Africa, collectively holding almost half of the total foreign direct investment (FDI) into the country and supporting more than 500,000 jobs. South Africa has a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China (as do many other African countries), and the number of Chinese-invested companies in South Africa has increased. And while the stock of Chinese FDI has grown, it is still below 4% of China's total stock, compared with 48% in the EU 's case. China presents South Africa with two existential challenges. The first is the imbalance created by South Africa largely exporting commodities and importing manufactured and other higher-value items from China. Second, China is South Africa's largest regional competitor, and the flood of Chinese goods has been key to South African and regional deindustrialisation. The Institute for Security Studies' African Futures and Innovation has modelled the comparative contribution that growth in different sectors could make to increasing incomes and reducing poverty in South Africa. The forecasts find that manufacturing has the largest potential impact on these two crucial indicators of progress. Yet, after peaking at 25%, manufacturers' contribution to gross domestic product has declined to below 13%. South Africa is deindustrialising. Reversing that trend requires a hard-nosed assessment of partners and future markets. However, the future of South Africa's trade and manufacturing growth doesn't lie in Europe, China or the US – which the American Chamber of Commerce says accounts for about 5.3% of South Africa's FDI stock. Rather, it lies in Africa. Intra-African trade strategically aligns with South Africa's industrial and geopolitical goals. Already, trade with African nations accounts for much of South Africa's exports, emphasising the country's role in regional commerce. With the African Continental Free Trade Area, there's potential for growth. During the most recent budget vote, Trade, Industry and Competition Minister Parks Tau made the appropriate noises, but still referred to the tired butterfly strategy of the 1990s – with a wing each in Asia and the Americas. Instead, the vision should be of South Africa's own Belt and Road Initiative into Africa. The country should build the infrastructure to benefit from the regional market. Regional trade must be the pillar of South Africa's trade strategy, especially in promoting value-added exports and expanding its influence across Africa. While not as large in absolute terms as trade with Asia or Europe, intra-African trade strategically aligns with South Africa's industrial and geopolitical goals. The Southern African Development Community region accounts for about 20% to 25% of South Africa's total exports, and South Africa enjoys a significant trade surplus with most African countries. Regional trade is also heavily weighted towards value-added exports, such that vehicles, machinery, processed foods, construction materials and petrochemicals dominate exports to African countries. Trade into Africa helps support local South African manufacturing and industrial employment. Meanwhile, the end of the African Growth and Opportunity Act and Trump's punitive approach to trade with South Africa (and other countries), will inevitably galvanise the search for alternative markets, particularly in Africa. That is good news. Under the GNU, South Africa's foreign policy operates within a more complex domestic political landscape. But the one thing parties should agree on is to prioritise South Africa's economic growth and trade into Africa. DM
The South African
3 hours ago
- The South African
IEC blocks 'Sharia law' party's registration
The Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) has confirmed that the application for registration of the Islamic State of Africa (ISA) as a political party has been rejected. IEC spokesperson Kate Bapela said the chief electoral officer (CEO), Sy Mamabolo, rejected the application by ISA on three grounds: The first is that the party failed to meet the threshold of prescribed details of registered voters who support the formation of the party. The prescribed details are the signatures of 300 registered voters, together with their full names and signatures. Secondly, the party published the notice of its application in a newspaper which enjoys circulation only in parts of the municipal area. The publication in only some parts of the municipal area is not sufficient to create awareness of the application. 'The purpose of publishing the application is to alert persons in the geographic area linked to the sphere of registration the party is applying for. In the present case, the area of eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality,' Bapela explained. The third reason is that the IEC CEO received over 200 objections from individuals and organisations who argued that the constitution of ISA espouses 'the intention to develop policies based on Sharia law'. 'It is the submission of the objectors that part of ISA's constitution is 'antithetical to the secular and inclusive nature of the principles underpinning the South African constitutional order and registering ISA would cause serious offence to a section of the population,' she added. Furthermore, Bapela said the Islamic State of Africa may, within 30 days, appeal the decision of the CEO not to register it as a party to the IEC. Let us know by leaving a comment below, or send a WhatsApp to 060 011 021 1. Subscribe to The South African website's newsletters and follow us on WhatsApp, Facebook, X, and Bluesky for the latest news.
IOL News
3 hours ago
- IOL News
Turning declarations into deliverables: South Africa's BRICS 2025 Challenge
For South Africa, the BRICS 2030 horizon offers not just hope, but a promising future, writes Ayanda Holo. Image: IOL / AI By Ayanda Holo Beneath the glittering chandeliers of the Bank of China building in Johannesburg, Chinese Ambassador Wu Peng addressed a gathering of investors, policymakers, and technocrats. At his side sat South Africa's Deputy Finance Minister Dr David Masondo, a key architect of the government's economic recovery and structural reform agenda. The occasion marked the release of the Chinese Investor Survey, a moment that revealed not only the depth of Sino-South African relations but also the lingering bottlenecks that continue to hinder what could be a transformative partnership. Ambassador Wu's tone was both celebratory and cautionary. Over 200 Chinese enterprises have injected more than $11 billion into South Africa, creating jobs, taxes, and valuable industrialisation footprints. Yet, despite this progress, the Ambassador pointedly highlighted recurring frustrations: the slow and sometimes opaque processing of work visas for essential engineers and managers and the heightened security threats to Chinese nationals. These issues, he suggested, could jeopardise investor confidence unless addressed with urgency and sincerity. At the heart of his speech was a subtle but potent reference to Declaration 42 of the BRICS 2025 Strategy, which states: "We welcome the results of the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025… and look forward to the conclusion and implementation of the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2030, which will… guide cooperation on issues relating to the Multilateral Trading System, Digital Economy, International Trade, Financial Cooperation and Sustainable Development." This strategy is not just a document, but a roadmap to our future. This forward-looking blueprint aims to deepen the ties that bind BRICS nations, with South Africa poised to benefit as a regional gateway for Asia–Africa trade. But such ambitions rest precariously on domestic execution. Video Player is loading. Play Video Play Unmute Current Time 0:00 / Duration -:- Loaded : 0% Stream Type LIVE Seek to live, currently behind live LIVE Remaining Time - 0:00 This is a modal window. Beginning of dialog window. Escape will cancel and close the window. Text Color White Black Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Transparent Window Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Transparent Semi-Transparent Opaque Font Size 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 300% 400% Text Edge Style None Raised Depressed Uniform Dropshadow Font Family Proportional Sans-Serif Monospace Sans-Serif Proportional Serif Monospace Serif Casual Script Small Caps Reset restore all settings to the default values Done Close Modal Dialog End of dialog window. Advertisement Next Stay Close ✕ Ad loading The Visa Conundrum: When Policy Fails Practice A compelling case in point emerged from a significant $200 million investment project in the Eastern Cape, a region with great potential for economic growth. The project procured high-grade industrial equipment from Yangzhou Metal Forming Machine Tool Co. The firm dispatched three highly skilled engineers to oversee installation and training. Despite submitting complete documentation to VFS Global, including verified invitation letters from their South African host, the engineers were denied work visas for several months. This delay was not only an administrative embarrassment but also a tangible blow to investor confidence. The engineers were essential to commissioning a production line that was central to the project's ROI timeline. The months-long delay undermined the "open the way" vision of Operation Vulindlela, a flagship reform programme by the South African Presidency and Treasury designed to reduce red tape for investors. Is Operation Vulindlela truly living up to its name? According to a recent SA Government News release dated March 2025, the Department of Home Affairs has introduced improvements to fast-track visa applications for investors and critical skills workers. A new "Trusted Employer Scheme" was also piloted with large multinationals and BRICS-partner firms in mind. Yet the Eastern Cape incident underscores a gap between policy and implementation, a chasm where projects stall, costs rise, and goodwill wanes. From Zero-Tariffs to Zero-Tolerance on Inefficiency China's recent announcement to provide zero-tariff treatment to 53 African countries via the Framework Agreement on Economic Partnership for Shared Development is a tectonic shift in global trade patterns. It gives African manufacturers and agricultural producers unprecedented access to the world's second-largest economy. And South Africa, with its mature logistics, industrial base, and financial institutions, is uniquely positioned to lead this integration. But it must not allow procedural inertia to squander strategic advantages. This is particularly critical in sectors like automotive components, green energy infrastructure, and advanced manufacturing, where Chinese investment has surged. Each of these sectors requires the temporary importation of technical personnel, often on tight deadlines to transfer knowledge and integrate systems. Ambassador Wu's call for smoother visa processes is therefore not a favour to China, but a necessary step if South Africa is serious about its BRICS role. It's not just about accommodating Chinese investors, but about creating an environment where all BRICS nations can thrive, boosting South Africa's economy and global influence. A Catalogue of Cooperation It is worth reminding readers of the many bilateral and multilateral agreements that underpin this evolving relationship. These include: The China-South Africa Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement (2010).The FOCAC Beijing Action Plan 2019–2025 The Belt and Road MOU, signed in 2015, focuses on infrastructure Investment Treaties and Double Taxation Agreements, protecting investor rights The Annual SA-China High-Level People-to-People Exchange Mechanism, encouraging cultural, academic, and tech innovation links. Each of these frameworks, including the 2025 BRICS Economic Strategy, calls for the removal of administrative and logistical barriers that impede the flow of capital, of people, of ideas. What Must Change? If Pretoria is to maintain credibility within BRICS and its reform agenda, several actions are urgent: Mandate real-time escalation channels for work visa cases tied to investment projects over R50 and enforce the Trusted Employer Scheme beyond pilot status. Include a BRICS Investor Fast Lane under the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (DTIC).Publish quarterly Operation Vulindlela scorecards, with measurable impact on investor facilitation. As Ambassador Wu concluded, "Challenges are part of development." But challenges left unaddressed become liabilities. For South Africa, the BRICS 2030 horizon offers not just hope, but a promising future. Whether that promise becomes reality depends not on declarations from abroad, but on decisions made at home. * Ayanda Holo is the President of TV BRICS AFRICA ** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.
