Delay in revealing details about Air India crash is causing anxiety

The Hindu

2 days ago

Two weeks have passed since the fatal crash of Air India flight AI 171 in Ahmedabad on June 12. The vital digital flight data recorder (DFDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) have been recovered. Initial reports mentioned they were damaged and were being sent to the U.S. for the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to decode. Subsequently, authorities announced it was being decoded in India.
With rumours and theories going around, blaming the Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner aircraft, and various YouTube experts dishing out various interpretations, there is fear not only among the passengers but also the operating crew of Air India. The continued procrastination in coming out with information that could put to rest the wild rumours and the silence by the Directorate-General of Civil Aviation (DGCA), as well as the airline, compel me to reassure the public that flying is safe, and it is the system that is at fault.
The only visual clue we have is the CCTV footage released by the airport operator. Though it does not show the first part of the take-off run, it does provide vital clue about the second part, and why 'human error', and not the aircraft, is at fault. If the entire take-off sequence was available in the video, it would have put to rest the rumour that the flight did not use the full length of the runway but took off from an intersection. It was clarified by the flight tracker service provider that the full length was used but a new doubt has sprung up: if the aircraft used the turning pad before the end of the runway to expedite departure. It's hoped that in the interest of Air India and Boeing, the DFDR findings would be released immediately.
Going by the footage, one can see the aircraft emerging from the right at the four-second mark. In that frame, one can see an aircraft taxiing on Taxiway B to turn into the parallel taxi track. The B intersection is approximately 600 feet from runway 23-end. All the main wheels and the nose wheel of AI 171 are on the runway as it passes the B intersection in the seventh second of the video. This is a clear indication that the aircraft has not reached the minimum speed for lift-off. At the eight-second mark, AI 171 is almost at the end of the runway and has not rotated for take-off. Take-off rotation is close to five seconds, and at a speed of 174 knots (as mentioned in some of the radar plots), the aircraft would cover close to 1,500 feet in that period. That would take it well into the overrun area, which is not paved and which will have compacted sand and gravel.
The first sign of rotation appears at the 15-second mark and one can see a cloud of dust rising. A couple of seconds later, one can see the aircraft nose yaw (swing) to the right, indicating right-engine failure. One can see the exhaust from the left engine for the next three seconds, blowing dust and debris away. The left engine also stops, and the aircraft nose-high attitude clearly indicates impending stall. The ingestion of debris into the engine and possible bird ingestion during the flight portion on the overrun area, could have resulted in both engines failing due to foreign object damage. Birds, though not visible in the low-resolution footage, must be there as the runway and the taxiway at the Ahmedabad airport are surrounded by lush growth of grass and weeds. That is visible in the video footage.
Many questions
The questions that arise are: 1) Was a wrong weight and temperature entered in the Flight Management Computer? 2) Did the pilots not use the full length of the runway for take-off, considering the high temperature? 3) Why did the pilots not recognise a slower than normal acceleration? Were they not observing the Speed Trend Vector on the Primary Flight Display Speed Tape? The trend vector would have indicated the estimated speed in 10 seconds, and at 100 knots, it should be showing more than the V2 speed. If they recognised that, why did they not reject the take-off when they still had 3,000 feet of runway left? The aircraft could have safely stopped by the end of the runway. 4) Even when they were approaching B intersection and they recognised insufficient speed, they had 600 feet of runway, 60 metres of paved strip at the end of the runway, and another 240 metres of firm ground as Runway End Safety Area (RESA). This 1,600-feet-plus clear space beyond the boundary wall would have been sufficient for stopping with maximum brakes and max-reversers. The aircraft may have been damaged but a safe stop could have been achieved.
The lack of situational awareness and performance knowledge is an area of concern. The training appears to be deficient when it comes to runway markings. Air India has a history of not recognising the runway markings and touchdown areas.
1) January 20, 1999: VT-EVA Air India B-747-400 at Frankfurt. Probable cause: 'The ground contact about 1,000m in front of the touchdown zone (coming short) was the consequence of an unstabilised final approach which was not discontinued by initiating a go-around procedure in a timely manner. The contributing factors were: 1. The glideslope interception from above; 2. A hydraulic malfunction during the approach requiring to perform the referring checklist; 3. The rapid deterioration of the visibility; 4. The continuation of the manual approach although the flight crew was not qualified for CAT II/III approaches; and 5. Poor crew co-ordination and missing crew resource management.'
2) May 22, 2010: Air India Express 812: High and fast approach and late touch down resulted in overrun and fatal crash
3) January 14, 2014: Air India B 787-800, registration VT-ANM, performing flight AI-301 from Sydney, NS to Melbourne,VI (Australia), was descending towards Melbourne International airport. The aircraft aligned with Melbourne's Essendon Airport's runway 35 (1,500 metres/4,930 feet length) and descended towards that runway when the air traffic controller intervened, instructing the crew to turn left and subsequently telling the crew their runway was in their two o'clock position, they were still cleared for the visual approach runway 34.
4) September 7, 2018: Air India 263 operating on Delhi-Thiruvananthapuram-Male sector, touched down on under construction runway at Male.
5) August 7, 2020: Air India Express 1344 overshot the runway, resulting in 21 fatalities. The approach was high and fast and there was a very late touchdown.
6) December 5, 2024: An Air India flight (AI2592) from Mopa Airport to Hyderabad was involved in a serious incident where the pilots attempted to take off from a taxiway instead of the designated runway. The ATC instructed the pilots to reject the take-off.
All these point to serious deficiencies in training and safety standards. Fatigue and stress, which is adding to human errors, is another area that the airline has to address. So many lives have been lost and there is a fear induced by the lack of human failure understanding. There is no accountability and the Tatas will need to take a very bold stand to correct the drift. A captain returning from take-off point or cabin crew reporting sick due to fear are not healthy trends for portraying a safe airline culture. The Tatas and Boeing have to come out with some positive information as soon as possible to reassure the pilots, crew, and public. Procrastination will cost them a huge price.
Captain A. Ranganathan is a former airline instructor pilot and aviation safety adviser. He is also a former member of the Civil Aviation Safety Advisory Council (CASAC), India.