India plans $230m drone incentive
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India will launch a $234 million incentive programme for civil and military drone makers to reduce their reliance on imported components and counter rival Pakistan's programme built on support from China and Turkey, three sources told Reuters.
New Delhi will launch a 20 billion Indian rupees ($234 million) programme for three years that will cover manufacturing of drones, components, software, counter drone systems, and services, two government and one industry source, who did not want to be named, told Reuters.
Through the incentives, India is aiming to have at least 40% of key drone components made in the country by the end of fiscal year 2028 (April-March), the two government sources said.
Reuters previously reported that India plans to invest heavily in local industry and could spend as much as $470 million on unmanned aerial vehicles over the next 12 to 24 months, in what government and military officers said would be a staggered approach.
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Express Tribune
an hour ago
- Express Tribune
Can uniform law survive a plural society?
Pakistan's parliament has passed the eagerly awaited Islamabad Capital Territory Child Marriage Restraint Act, 2025 restricting marriage below 18 years of age, meanwhile, the Council of Islamic Ideology and conservative parties have challenged the bill publically and in the Federal Sharia Court. Similar developments are seen in neighbouring India, which endangers the enforcement of rights in a completely different way. India's Uniform Civil Code (UCC) is a bill pending in the Indian national assembly (Lok Sabha) which has long been a constitutional aspiration to standardise religious groups' personal laws in India. A version of it has been already passed in the Uttarakhand state assembly in 2024. Nevertheless, passing it is proving legally and politically difficult. At stake are not only questions of legal consistency and gender justice, but also deeper concerns about religious freedom, state overreach, and democratic erosion. In India, personal laws for Muslims, Christians, Jews and Parsis exist separately from the Hindu Code which governs personal laws for Buddhists, Hindus, Jains and Sikhs. Naturally, laws governing marriage and inheritance comply with religious edicts of these groups. This has occasionally brought conflict between state and religion – with the Indian Supreme Court's rulings nudging the country toward a UCC. An oft cited ruling is Shah Bano v Muhammad Ahmad Khan where a Muslim woman was given the right to marital support against Islamic custom. Essentially this allowed the state to interject in the personal matters of this Muslim couple to provide them protection, although later a law was passed to circumvent it – this was a cause for anxiety for minorities and aggravation for the majority who felt discriminated against for their own customs. Proponents of the UCC suggest that it would streamline and simplify personal laws across various spheres such as marriage, succession, guardianship and inheritance. The UCC is also popular with groups vying for gender equality, suggesting that UCC would protect women in cases of inheritance and ensure children are supported in cases of marriage dissolution or wedlock. Religious rights groups have argued that any such bill would intrude on the Freedom of Religion of citizens, especially the Muslim minority. Individuals are also concerned about the effects of eroding democratic institutions and breaking away from the secular tradition of India. Uttarakhand became the first state in India's modern history to enact a UCC. Its version sets minimum marriage ages, standardises divorce and inheritance rules, and, controversially, mandates registration of live-in relationships. Supporters argue that the law protects women and strengthens legal clarity. But petitions have already been filed challenging the law's constitutionality, and activists fear it could open the door to surveillance and moral policing. Several BJP-led states — including Gujarat, Assam, Telangana, and Uttar Pradesh — intend to follow suit. Gujarat formed a high-level committee to draft its own version of a UCC, with assurances that the drafting process would include public consultation. Khalid Anwar, a member of the legislative council and the BJP-ally Janata Dal party, spoke to the media, stating that 'We will never allow the UCC to be implemented in Bihar.' At the same time, opposition-ruled states like Kerala and West Bengal have rejected the UCC on the grounds that it would infringe on religious freedom and fail to accommodate local cultural diversity. In 2023, Kerala's legislative assembly passed a resolution opposing the proposed UCC, criticising the lack of public consultation. At the heart of the UCC debate is a question of uniformity versus pluralism. The legal foundations of state-level UCCs remain unsettled. Although the Supreme Court of India has occasionally given opinion in favour of a common civil code, legal scholars warn that multiple state-level UCCs may violate the spirit of Article 44 which envisions a uniform civil code for all citizens. This also invites questions about territoriality of the UCC, Article 245 of the constitution restricts states from making laws about the whole of India. India's Muslim leadership, rights activists, and tribal representatives argue that the UCC could be selectively enforced or used as a pretext for surveillance and control. Due to the registration requirements, vulnerable segments will be hesitant to accept the UCC. The targeting of practices such as polygamy and triple talaq, they argue, reinforces stereotypes about Muslim communities while sparing similar customs among tribal or Hindu populations. Critics note that polygamy is banned under the UCC for Muslims, yet Adivasi communities, who also practice polygamy, would be exempt. The BJP has positioned the UCC as a tool for gender equality, as a protector of women's rights. However, critics argue that these reforms are selectively framed and politically motivated. They point to a broader pattern of neglect and active hostility toward the Muslim community, casting doubt on the sincerity of the BJP's gender justice rhetoric. While some welcome the UCC's promise of equal rights in inheritance and marriage, many argue that reforms must empower women to choose — whether that means adhering to religious tradition or entering civil unions. Activists such as Adv Dr Shalu Nigam have called for a more inclusive approach that does not impose uniformity from above but rather expands the choices for marriage laws available to women across communities. The Uniform Civil Code in theory, offers a pathway toward standardising personal law and enhancing gender equality. In practice, its rollout has exposed the legal, political, and social complexities that must be examined. For India, the road is uncertain. The fragmented approach —where BJP-led states adopt state-level UCCs while opposition-ruled or minority-heavy states resist — raises difficult constitutional questions. The risk is not merely legal inconsistency, but broader social and political polarisation. By touching on personal matters, the UCC has already caused national debates on secularism, federalism, and minority rights. For Pakistanis, the UCC is a familiar echo. Questions of minority rights, majoritarian nationalism, and state overreach resonate deeply in a region where religion and politics often intertwine. Pakistan has been long criticised for its human rights record however the recent legislation to stop child marriages are encouraging and show the government's inclination towards protecting the rights of women. In India, the UCC represents both promise and peril: it could be a vehicle for greater legal equality or a flashpoint for division and unrest. Its success depends on whether it can be implemented without alienating vast segments of the population. The US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has flagged concerns about India's treatment of minorities, including the UCC. Moreover, religious freedom and democratic governance remain key pillars of India's soft power abroad —and the UCC being used to hinder human rights may complicate India's reputation as a leader internationally. The success of the UCC project will depend on legislative momentum, whether it can be implemented in a way that safeguards constitutional rights and respects India's pluralistic fabric. Without inclusivity, legal clarity, and social consensus, the law risks becoming a symbol of division. For both India and its democratic partners, the question is not just whether the UCC can be passed but whether it can be made just. A common civil code may promise equality, but in India, many — especially Muslims — see its implementation under the BJP as politically motivated. In Pakistan, orthodox forces openly block reforms in the name of faith. Though the dynamics differ, both countries reveal how personal law remains a battleground where religion, politics, and rights collide. As India moves forward with the UCC and Pakistan stalls on its own reforms, the region shows that legal equality cannot be achieved through legislation alone. It requires trust — and trust, once lost, is hard to legislate back. Sachal Jacob is a PhD candidate at the Georgia State University who has worked with various human rights platforms. He can be reached at sachaljacob95@ All facts and information are the sole responsibility of the author
Express Tribune
an hour ago
- Express Tribune
Doval Doctrine: India's trail of terror
Over the past decade, India has barely made the effort to conceal its insatiable appetite for destabilising Pakistan. That ambition has pulsated beneath every wave of anti-Pakistan vitriol — a chorus that has only grown more pronounced with time. But its most obvious display surfaced in 2014, shortly after the inauguration of Narendra Modi, when his newly appointed National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, laid out the cards in a speech at Sastra University that left little to the imagination. 'Pakistan's vulnerability is many, many times higher than (that of India's). Once they know India has shifted to defensive offense, they will find it is unaffordable for them,' he cautioned. 'You can do one Mumbai, you may lose Balochistan.' Doval spoke without mincing words. 'There is no nuclear war involved in that. There is no engagement of troops,' he added, his tone laced with hubris. 'They know the tricks. We know the tricks better.' That speech would come to define what is now known as the Doval Doctrine — India's muscular reimagination of its policy toward its nuclear-armed neighbour, Pakistan. It reclassified terrorism as an existential national security threat and cast Pakistan not just as a rival, but as the epicentre of that threat. The battlefield, however, was no longer confined to traditional war zones. This was the language of covert operations, information warfare, and calibrated destabilisation. What Doval hinted at — almost with disdain — was India's willingness to stir unrest within Pakistan. His reference to Balochistan served as a smoking gun, exposing New Delhi's role in exploiting the fault lines of Pakistan's underbelly through a covert war pursued for strategic ends. For Islamabad, this was an open admission of a clandestine conflict that had long been suspected. In the years that followed, Islamabad compiled a trove of intelligence — some shared publicly, some through backchannels, and some privately with The Express Tribune — tracing a pattern of sabotage, psy-ops, and support for insurgent groups. At the heart of these claims sits India's spy agency RAW. While the Indian government never admitted to any of this officially, behind the scenes the Doval Doctrine had already taken root — a new phase in its hardline agenda against Pakistan was taking shape, waged not with tanks and battalions, but with proxy fighters, digital manipulation, and plausible deniability. What is Doval Doctrine? According to Pakistan's former National Security Adviser Moeed Yusuf — arguably the official most familiar with his Indian counterpart's mindset — the doctrine rests on a false premise -- first, that India has the right to hegemonise the region, and, second, that it has the capacity to do so. 'This doctrine has a deep and dangerous ideological underpinning,' Yusuf warned, adding that both assumptions are flawed. 'As we've seen in the most recent crisis, all of India's neighbours harbour misgivings about how it has sought to impose its ideology — or its vision of what the region should look like.' Initial signs of India's covert maneuvers came to the fore in 2016, following the arrest of Kulbhushan Jadhav — an Indian spy and serving naval officer — from Mashkel, a remote town in the Washuk district of Balochistan, near the Iran border. Jadhav confessed to being an operative of Delhi's espionage engine, orchestrating sabotage operations inside Pakistan. Operating as 'Hussein Mubarak Patel,' Jadhav was responsible for dozens of terrorist attacks, including the ones on Mehran Naval base and Sui gas pipelines, and assassination of senior counterterrorism police officer SSP Aslam Chaudhary, according to officials. 'Jadhav was assisted by Sub Inspector Rakesh, alias Shaikh Rizwan Hussain, and handled by former RAW joint secretaries Anil Kumar Gupta and Alok Joshi.' China's interests in crosshairs Pakistan's deepening strategic alliance with China has long been a thorn in India's side — economically, geopolitically, and ideologically. If anything, this became even more apparent during a recent briefing by India's deputy army chief, who in May accused China of using Pakistan as a proxy — just as the two nuclear-armed rivals edged dangerously close to the brink. That said, nothing irks New Delhi more than the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a cornerstone of Beijing's massive Belt and Road Initiative. In 2015, RAW set up a covert operations cell with an initial funding of $500 million to sabotage CPEC, according to intelligence sources. The cell, which functions under the direct supervision of the Indian Prime Minister's Office, has been involved in destabilising Pakistan by supporting terrorist activities, particularly in Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. The operation, previously facilitated through Indian diplomatic missions in Afghan in the Afghan cities of Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif, provided weapons, training, and financial support to insurgents, reveal intelligence sources. The primary objectives of the cell included exploiting political divisions, targeting key CPEC infrastructure such as power plants and economic zones, and disrupting digital networks in Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Terrorist groups, including Baloch sub-nationalists and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), were reportedly recruited to carry out attacks. Details gathered by security officials indicate that RAW's support includes providing refuge, financial assistance, and operational coordination to terrorist outfits targeting Pakistani interests. The Indian spy agency has set up several hideouts for Baloch groups in Chasma Garm, Chitral, Kalat, and Jekigor, serving as springboards for attacks. In 2019, RAW intensified ties with separatist leaders, facilitating a merger of key groups like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Baloch Republican Army (BRA), resulting in the creation of the Baloch Raaji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS) — a united front for terrorist and political activities. New Delhi's spy apparatus also mobilised self-exiled Baloch leaders, including Brahamdagh Bugti, Harbiyar Marri, and Javed Mengal, to orchestrate anti-Pakistan campaigns abroad, supported through Indian funding and logistics. On Jan 29, 2020, BRAS launched 'Operation Aas-Rech' against Pakistani forces. India allocated $60 million to fund a 700-man militia in Balochistan, reveal security officials. A 24-member commission, including 10 RAW operatives, oversaw operations. Separately, $9 million was paid to Baloch groups and Afghan collaborators, with financial transactions reportedly acknowledged by RAW-linked facilitators and the Indian Embassy in Kabul. Aslam, alias Achu, commander of the BLA's deadly Majeed Brigade, masterminded the 2018 attack on the Chinese Consulate in Karachi which was claimed by the group's spokesperson Jeeyand Baloch. The attackers were found to be in direct contact with Aslam Achu and Bashir Zeb from overseas, while Aslam was located in Afghanistan and later treated in India's Max Hospital with RAW's assistance. Moreover, ex-BLA leader Ghulzar Imam Shambay confirmed in his confessional statement the consulate attack was carried out on RAW's instructions. Achu also co-masterminded the 2019 Gwadar PC Hotel attack with BLF leader Dr Allah Nazar, planned by RAW handler Anurag Singh with $0.5 million in funding. Nazar had traveled to India under a fake identity created by RAW. Other BLF leaders, including Khalil Chairman and Muqaddam Marri, alias Jalat, also received medical cover in India while coordinating attacks. Similarly, BRA leader Brahamdagh Bugti visited India on an Afghan passport under a false identity to seek asylum. In 2022, a suicide bombing at Karachi University targeted a van carrying Chinese nationals, killing three Chinese citizens and one Pakistani. The attacker, Shari Baloch, was radicalised by BLA women trainers and her husband, Dr Haibtan, acted as the facilitator, while Bashir Zeb prepared the suicide vest and oversaw the attack with RAW's backing from overseas. Officials say the attack was a coordinated effort by RAW and BLA to drive a wedge between Pakistan and China. 'The loss of lives of Chinese citizens is deeply worrying for Pakistan which continues to take unprecedented measures to ensure their security,' says Hassan Akbar, former Pakistan Fellow at the Wilson Center. However, he adds that the bilateral relationship between both countries is deep, enduring and strategic, insulated from any attempts by adversaries to create disruption in ties. Officials say the hijacking of the Jaffar Express passenger train earlier this year was carried out by Majeed Brigade with RAW's support. 'Prior to the attack, BLA commanders Bashir Zeb and Fazal Sher met two RAW agents in a neighbouring country on Feb 21, followed by another meeting on Feb 26 with Indian officials in a third country, where the plan was finalised,' one official revealed. 'During the operation, the attackers maintained a direct contact with RAW handlers.' After the cinematically staged hijacking, Indian media amplified BLA propaganda by featuring its spokespersons Jeeyand Baloch and Bahot Baloch, who publicly celebrated the terrorist act. Officials also claim to have unearthed BLA-RAW nexus behind the May 21, 2025, deadly suicide car bomb attack on a school bus in Khuzdar. Just two months ago, during the Pakistan-India escalation, the BLA publicly declared its support for India, calling itself a willing 'military arm' in the confrontation. Experts believe this alignment of narratives and escalation of attacks during the standoff reflects a coordinated hybrid warfare strategy aimed at destabilising Pakistan. India's strategic calculus India's use of proxy warfare is neither a recent development nor confined to Pakistan. 'India began employing proxy tactics to advance its strategic objectives as early as the 1970s, by actively creating and supporting groups such as the Mukti Bahini in East Pakistan and the LTTE in Sri Lanka,' says Akbar. Some analysts speculate that Balochistan could be the new East Pakistan in India's strategic calculus. 'I really do not see how a comparison could be drawn between West and East Pakistan and Balochistan, because demographic realities are different and Balochistan doesn't border India,' says Abdul Basit, Pakistan's former ambassador in New Delhi. Akbar echoes that view. 'Comparing Balochistan with East Pakistan would be inaccurate due to differences in geography, demography, and political history. India has been involved in fomenting unrest in Balochistan in one way or another since the 1970s. Their objective is to destabilise Pakistan,' he says. Yusuf agrees that the bottom line is a clear and conscious policy decision led by India's NSA's office, in which destabilising Balochistan is a deliberate strategic objective. RAW-TTP nexus According to security officials, India's spy agency operated joint cells with Afghanistan's former intelligence service, the National Directorate of Security (NDS), coordinating cross-border attacks until the Taliban's takeover in 2021. Former NDS handlers — now either in hiding or rebranded under the Taliban regime — are said to continue collaborating with RAW in supporting TTP factions. A striking example came in Feb 2022, when the BLA launched coordinated attacks on Frontier Corps camps in Panjgur and Noshki. Officials cite the use of Afghan-origin weaponry and encrypted communications as evidence of cross-border involvement. Intelligence reports suggest that India dished out $820,000 to reunite splinter groups of the TTP and arm them via supply routes from Afghanistan's Herat province. This support, officials claim, has fueled a rise in IED attacks and targeted killings, particularly in North Waziristan tribal district. The 2023 assassination of ISI's Brigadier Mustafa Kamal Barki near Angoor Adda in North Waziristan was linked to RAW-enabled TTP elements. Moreover, the TTP's evolving propaganda campaign, including online platforms like Ummat-e-Islamiya, receives technical backing from Indian cyber operatives, according to the findings of the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA). A 2025 UN report exposed the growing collaboration between the BLA, TTP, and Islamic State Khorasan (ISK), facilitated by networks operating out of Afghanistan. The report further notes that Afghan territory continues to serve as a coordination hub for TTP and BLA activities, identifying training camps in Spin Boldak and Nimroz allegedly used to prepare operatives in arms and explosives. The hijacking of the Jaffar Express stands out as the most brazen example of this RAW–TTP–BLA nexus. According to Pakistani intelligence, RAW employs a network of smuggling operations, offshore shell companies, and cryptocurrency transactions to fund these groups. The use of Afghan nationals, including people like Hazrat Ali, alias Ramzan, has also been flagged. He was accused of facilitating IED attacks in Quetta. Complicating counter strategy Bolstered by its nexus with RAW, TTP's operational and strategic profile has evolved in recent years. Once largely confined to Pakistan's western border regions, the group's footprint has now expanded into major urban centres, including Peshawar, Karachi, and Quetta, signaling a more coordinated and far-reaching threat landscape. Defence experts describe this evolution as not merely geographic, but also tactical. Where the group once relied on traditional guerrilla warfare, it has now adopted urban terrorism, employing advanced tactics such as drone reconnaissance and coordinated attacks in densely populated areas. Security officials interpret this shift as evidence of increased training, planning, and technological support — facilitated by external actors. TTP's funding stream has also shifted significantly. Earlier reliant on local extortion and informal funding methods, the group now reportedly taps into cryptocurrency channels and receives support from foreign intelligence networks, particularly via Afghan-based operatives allegedly linked to RAW. Another alarming development lies in the group's recruitment strategy. Where the TTP once drew fighters primarily from local tribal populations, it has now turned to digital radicalisation, targeting urban youth through encrypted apps and online propaganda. This shift has broadened its recruitment pool while making detection significantly more difficult. Moreover, the group has adopted a decentralised structure, enhancing its resilience. In contrast to previous years when the leadership was more vulnerable to counterterrorism operations, the current setup allows the TTP to operate from Afghan sanctuaries with greater freedom, making leadership decapitation far less effective. Together, these changes paint a troubling picture of a terror outfit that is not only surviving but adapting — both structurally and operationally — amid an evolving regional security environment. Pakistan's response Pakistan has intensified its counterterrorism efforts across multiple fronts — ranging from cross-border precision operations and internal crackdowns to cyber surveillance and financial disruption — aimed at dismantling RAW's coordinated hybrid warfare campaign. Security forces, in coordination with regional partners, have stepped up offensive measures against terrorist groups operating along the Pak-Iran border. Last year, they carried out targeted strikes on BLA safehouses in Iranian border towns, reportedly serving as logistical hubs. On the domestic front, Operation Green Bolan — launched in the aftermath of the Jaffar Express hijacking — resulted in the killing of 33 BLA terrorists. Simultaneously, a major arms cache was seized in Panjgur, while a media propaganda cell was dismantled in Turbat, disrupting the group's communication and logistics chain. The government has also moved to curtail financial channels allegedly fueling terrorist operations. Investigations revealed that several cryptocurrency wallets traced on Binance were linked to BLA operatives and coordinated from abroad. A massive clampdown on oil smuggling also bore fruit in 2024, when security forces intercepted 2.8 billion litres of smuggled Iranian oil, valued at around $800 million. Intelligence sources claim the proceeds were channeled into financing subversive activities. Following disclosures related to the Jadhav case, Pakistan has urged the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to closely monitor Indian-linked NGOs and shell companies suspected of laundering funds for destabilisation operations. In addition to this, Islamabad has presented fresh dossiers to the United Nations, International Court of Justice, and FATF, detailing evidence of RAW's alleged financing of terror groups and sabotage activities within Pakistan. To bolster border security, Pakistani officials have engaged both the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and Iranian authorities in intelligence sharing — particularly between 2024 and 2025 — focused on curbing militant mobility across porous frontiers. On the digital front, officials say that agencies have shut down several media cells and enhanced surveillance on encrypted platforms such as Telegram and Signal. While officials insist these steps are critical to national security, civil liberties groups have criticised the internet blackouts and privacy intrusions. Security along CPEC has also been tightened, with over 15,000 troops now deployed to guard critical infrastructure across restive regions. Meanwhile, officials have launched outreach efforts to engage non-violent Baloch political leaders in a bid to address longstanding grievances. Disinfo campaign Hybrid warfare isn't a distant, abstract strategy anymore — it's here, unfolding on Pakistan's soil in the form of cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, covert assassinations, and steady destabilisation of national institutions. It's a conflict waged and fought without formal declarations, through proxies, pixels, and propaganda. In a speech at PMA Kakul, former army chief Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa cautioned about this emerging reality: 'Our enemies know that they cannot beat us fair and square and have thus subjected us to a cruel, evil and protracted hybrid war. They are trying to weaken our resolve by weakening us from within.' In 2020, EU DisinfoLab exposed India's 15-year-long disinformation campaign involving over 750 fake media outlets and dozens of NGOs, designed to malign Pakistan on international platforms like the UN and EU. The Brussels-based civil‑society watchdog's report revealed that fabricated events, forged identities, and manipulated media were deployed to shape Western narratives, especially around Kashmir and Balochistan. That same year, Pakistan's Foreign Office was targeted in cyberattacks traced to Indian IPs. These weren't isolated incidents. Intelligence officials observed sharp spikes in propaganda ahead of FATF reviews and periods of military tension. India also hired lobbying firms such as Cornerstone Government Affairs to manufacture diplomatic momentum abroad. The campaign points to a deliberate and coordinated hybrid warfare strategy aimed at undermining Pakistan's global standing — diplomatically, economically, and politically. Violation of international law At the heart of this operation is Doval Doctrine — a strategy of pre-emptive and offensive subversion targeting states India perceives as security threats. This posture has led to Indian footprints not just in disinformation, but in terrorist activities in Pakistan and beyond. The 2023 assassination of Sikh activist Hardeep Singh Nijjar in Canada, and a foiled plot to kill Gurpatwant Singh Pannun in the US — both attributed to RAW operatives — have lent further credibility to Pakistan's longstanding claims. According to intelligence sources, RAW's so-called 'death squads' have carried out nearly two dozen extrajudicial assassinations of dissidents, activists, and political opponents, including on Pakistani soil. These targeted killings abroad and support for foreign terrorist groups violate international law and the sovereignty of other states. 'The Indian government's support and financing of terrorist activities constitutes a clear violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,' says international law expert Ahmer Bilal Soofi. 'Post-1945, any unauthorised intervention or support that undermines another country's sovereignty constitutes a serious breach of international law. Respect for territorial integrity, sovereignty, and non-intervention is not just a legal norm — it is a moral imperative,' he adds. According to Soofi, two legal principles flow from Article 2(4): the principle of non-intervention, and the principle of non-interference. India's material and operational support for terrorists and subnational armed groups constitutes a violation of both. The arrest of Kulbhushan Jadhav — a serving Indian naval officer and admitted intelligence operative — represents a direct breach of the principle of non-intervention. Financial trails, intercepted communications, and field evidence linking Indian handlers to acts of terror in Pakistan point to persistent violations of the principle of non-interference, says Soofi, who is also the founding President of the Research Society of International Law. 'Incidents such as the Jaffar Express attack, for which Pakistan has presented concrete and specific evidence of external involvement, constitute a blatant and unacceptable violation of international norms.' According to Soofi, there are several diplomatic and judicial forums available to Pakistan, including the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee and mechanisms under UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which obligates states to prevent and criminalise terrorism financing and support. 'But most important, Pakistan should register FIRs in cases where they have the evidence and they should undertake investigation and use mutual legal assistance framework internationally available and also under their own laws to send requests for taking statements from the Indian officials regarding their involvement and that is how they can make it clearer to the international community,' he says. The footprint of India, Soofi adds, will ultimately be converted into admissible evidence through documented police investigations. Muted global response While Pakistan has submitted multiple dossiers — addressed to the UN Secretary General, the OIC, FATF, and key international allies — laying out detailed evidence of India's support for terrorist activities, its appeals for accountability have largely fallen on deaf ears. Countries like China, Iran, and Turkey have voiced concern, but the West continues to maintain a strategic and telling silence. 'The international community is impervious because, a.) we have not been able to put up our case in a consistent and coherent manner; b.) India's clout is a reason states have [their own] interest [which] they pursue. So, they will not like to embarrass [India] or put their interest at the stake for Pakistan. It is as simple as that,' says Ambassador Basit. Yusuf believes India has banked on the fact that the Western world did not accept Pakistan's position on this issue for the longest period. 'I think Pakistan also got it wrong by not putting out dividends more forcefully for a number of years, even though this has been a concern for well over multiple years,' he says while referring to the 2009 Sharm el-Sheikh joint statement between Pakistan in India in which Balochistan was mentioned. 'This is a very deliberate strategy to keep Pakistan unstable and destabilised. It has managed to continue it because the Western world, because of its own problems with Pakistan, has bought India's position on terrorism, and because of this idea or illusion of India being a counterweight to China, etc,' he adds. Akbar agrees with Yusuf, saying that the international community is increasingly becoming aware of India's malign actions in Pakistan and other countries but because of its economic clout and centrality in Western attempts at containing China, international observers are reluctant to publicly call out India for its destabilising actions. 'This should not dissuade Pakistan, which should continue to call out India's active support for terrorism inside Pakistan and share evidence with global capitals,' he adds. Ambassador Basit stresses the need for a sustained diplomatic campaign. 'The problem with us is that we prepare dossiers, present them to the world, and then forget about them. Perhaps we lack the institutional capacity to sustain any long-term effort — and that, in my view, is the real issue.' Way forward Fault lines are a fact of geopolitics — and adversaries have always tried to exploit them. In Balochistan, those cracks are visible and widening. If Pakistan is to deny India the space to destabilise the region, it must address internal grievances rather than simply shield against external threats. That means rethinking its strategy — one that balances kinetic force with political outreach, governance reform, and a sharper media counter-narrative. The challenge is not just one of territorial control, but of winning hearts and rebuilding trust in a province long scarred by neglect and insurgency. 'Pakistan should never take its eye off the ball and continue to work on whatever can be done to address the issue in Balochistan, [I mean] the political aspect of the issue in Balochistan through dialogue and politically,' notes Yusuf. 'There is definitely a kinetic element to what is happening, but the stronger Balochistan is internally the more difficult it becomes for the enemy to do what it is doing. So, that has to be part of the parallel strategy and we should never overlook that.' Concurring with Yusuf's assessment, Ambassador Basit says: 'Deterrence, in fact, is internal. Deterrence in the sense that we need to focus on socio-economic development and do not allow space to these terrorist groups. We crack hard on them, ensure that more and more people do not join them, expose them to the people of Balochistan, and expose them internationally.' Ironically, BLA and BRA are proscribed terrorist groups, but their leaders have been granted political asylum in European countries where they live comfortably, while their groups perpetrate terrorist violence in Pakistan. 'Their leadership, like Brahamdagh Bugti, Harbiyar Marri, and many others, are sitting in the UK and Switzerland. We can build pressure on these countries to extradite them to Pakistan,' adds Ambassador Basit. 'But for that to happen, we need to build a strong case because these people have taken political asylum in these countries and these countries also use them [as] their assets to promote their interests in Pakistan.' The right time Amid shifting geopolitical currents, New Delhi's position is becoming increasingly tenuous, particularly in the wake of revelations about RAW's global assassination campaign, its ambivalent stance on the Ukraine conflict, and recent military setbacks against Pakistan. This presents a window of opportunity for Islamabad to assert its narrative with strategic precision and diplomatic finesse. By exposing India's hybrid warfare tactics and the broader implications of the dangerous Doval Doctrine, Pakistan has a chance to recalibrate global perceptions. With growing receptivity in the West — including from US President Donald Trump — this moment calls for a consistent, coherent, and deftly executed foreign policy anchored in long-term strategic vision.
Business Recorder
an hour ago
- Business Recorder
Canada could financially back aluminum producers if 50% U.S. tariffs persist, trade group says
MONTREAL: Canada has discussed offering financial support to large aluminum producers like Rio Tinto impacted by a U.S.-led trade war, in the event that Washington's 50% tariff on imports of the metal persist in the medium term, the CEO of a key industry trade group said on Saturday. Aluminium Association of Canada CEO Jean Simard told Reuters in an interview that the early talks could help the sector in the event that Ottawa is unable to reach a planned deal with its key trading partner by July 21. 'It's part of a larger discussion where everything is on the table,' Simard said, adding that no decision has been reached. Canada recently canceled a digital service tax on U.S. technology companies in order to preserve trade talks with U.S. President Donald Trump, but another irritant remains in the ongoing negotiations. While the major aluminum producers operating in Canada do not have liquidity problems, Simard said, a 50% U.S. tariff on aluminum imports would inevitably have an impact on finances if it continues longer term. He added that with the 50% tariff in effect since June 4, it's normal that there are discussions about the impact on businesses' cash flow if the situation continues. Around half of all aluminum used in the U.S. is imported, with the vast majority coming from Canada. Simard's comments follow media reports late Friday in which federal industry minister Mélanie Joly said the government is having conversations with Rio Tinto about providing financial assistance due to the crushing U.S. tariffs. Some Japan buyers agree to pay Q3 aluminium premium of $108/T Rio Tinto declined comment on Saturday. A spokesperson for Joly's office said in a statement that Ottawa is in 'active conversations' on how it can best support Canada's aluminum industry in the context of unjustified American tariffs, with the goal to support increased investment in the sector. U.S. President Donald Trump doubled tariffs on steel and aluminum imports to 50% last month, stepping up pressure on global steel producers and deepening his trade war, to support domestic production of the vital materials for construction.
