Watch: What is the Official Secrets Act?
Watch: What is the Official Secrets Act? | Explained
The Official Secrets Act — or OSA — has its roots in the British colonial era.
Its earliest version was the Indian Official Secrets Act of 1889. This was brought in to muzzle Indian-language newspapers that were exposing the policies of the British Raj, fuelling political consciousness, and resisting colonial rule. The law was made even more stringent in 1904, under Viceroy Lord Curzon. And the version we follow today was passed in 1923 — a century ago.
After Independence, India retained the OSA to deal with secrecy and confidentiality in governance, especially in matters of national security.
How does the OSA still shape state secrecy in India today?
Presentation: Sharmada Venkatasubramanian
Video: Thamodharan B
Script and editing: Shikha Kumari A
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