BRICS+ in the New World Order: Japan's Strategic Stake

Japan Forward

13 hours ago

As the 17th BRICS Summit convenes in Rio de Janeiro on July 6-7, the West — especially its policy architects in Washington, Brussels, and Tokyo — must take serious stock of a shifting global tide. The expansion of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), now BRICS+, is not a diplomatic curiosity. It is a response to a world order in transition, one that increasingly mirrors the demands of a multipolar age.
What began as an acronym describing high-growth leading economies has matured into a balancing force in global governance. With its expansion into BRICS+, the bloc now encompasses a more diverse group of emerging economies seeking to reassert agency over their development paths and global positioning.
The inclusion of countries such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the UAE speaks to a critical truth: the center of gravity in international politics is tilting, especially at a time when two major wars, between Russia and Ukraine, and Iran and Israel, are still off. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing (©Kyodo)
These BRICS+ states, while internally diverse, are unified in their desire to disrupt the monopoly of Western-led institutions like the Group of Seven advanced economies (G7), the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. In doing so, BRICS+ is evolving into a platform where geopolitical diversity meets developmental solidarity and reflects multipolarism in practice.
The rise of BRICS+ also needs to be seen against the backdrop of growing frustration with American unilateralism, particularly during the [Donald] Trump years. When the United States withdrew from global commitments — be it the Paris Agreement or multilateral trade frameworks — it created a leadership vacuum. BRICS+ has, to some extent, stepped into that void.
Unlike Western alliances that often tie participation to ideological conformity, BRICS+ presents an alternative vision rooted in inclusivity and shared developmental goals, if not completely sovereign respect. Its open-door policy makes it attractive to many in the Global South seeking to hedge their geopolitical bets.
Indeed, four of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations known as ASEAN (Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand) are reportedly seeking possible BRICS membership or staying engaged as active partners. This reflects a broader geopolitical calculus: countries in the Indo-Pacific are reluctant to be forced into binary choices between Washington and Beijing, and perhaps prefer a more multipolar character of order. A revitalized BRICS+ may provide them with a strategic middle ground, a platform that neither isolates them totally from the West nor binds them completely to China's orbit. PM Ishiba arrives in Vientiane for meetings with the ASEAN leaders. (Courtesy of the Prime Minister's office)
Japan, as ASEAN's most trusted partner, is uniquely positioned to offer a "third way." But it must tread carefully. Rather than echoing the West's ideological messaging that it has pursued for many years blindly as an alliance partner of the United States, Tokyo should adopt a pragmatic approach, one that respects local contexts while reinforcing a rules-based international order that is rapidly witnessing a decline with Trump 2.0.
Tokyo's leadership in finalizing the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) in 2018 demonstrated its potential to lead pragmatic, inclusive regional initiatives, even without the United States. Such a bold strategic endeavour that (late Prime Minister) Shinzo Abe envisioned, without the United States, must be repeated at various levels with a fresh vision and partnership with critical actors like the ASEAN, India, the European Union, and a few other countries in the Global South. Moreover, the largely positive reception in ASEAN to Japan's remilitarization signals growing regional support for a more assertive, yet balanced, Japanese foreign policy in the post-Shinzo Abe era.
However, Japan must go further. Rather than opposing BRICS+ from the outside, Tokyo should adopt a more nuanced and open engagement strategy: maintaining close ties with the West, while building constructive partnerships with key BRICS+ members like India, Brazil, South Africa, and even the newer entrants such as Egypt and the UAE. This "dual engagement" model can help preserve stability in the Indo-Pacific and beyond, and position itself between American overreach and Chinese dominance.
At the heart of BRICS' institutional architecture lies the New Development Bank (NDB), launched in 2015 as a practical alternative to the Bretton Woods institutions. Unlike the IMF and World Bank, the NDB offers more flexible terms, grounded in mutual appreciation, mutual benefits, and developmental pragmatism. In a world increasingly shaped by debt distress, climate vulnerability, and infrastructure shortfalls, the Global South needs development finance that is swift, unconditional, and context-sensitive.
The NDB, alongside the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, offers precisely that. Together, they form a financial safety net that is less moralizing and more responsive to the actual needs of member states. With projects in renewable energy, infrastructure, and digital connectivity, the NDB reflects an emerging consensus in the Global South: development finance must be depoliticized and democratized.
This presents a quiet challenge to the Asian Development Bank, where Japan traditionally wields outsized influence. For the ADB to remain relevant, it must now evolve and think openly and constructively. That means revisiting loan conditionalities, enhancing co-financing with non-Western institutions like the NDB (and perhaps the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank), and incorporating Southern-led governance models should not be overlooked.
Japan, as the ADB's largest contributor alongside the United States, is uniquely positioned to drive this internal reform and ensure the ADB remains a relevant and influential institution. Chinese President Xi Jinping at the BRICS summit in Kazan on October 23 (©Reuters)
For all its promise, BRICS+ is not without internal contradictions. Xi Jinping's non-transparent transactional governance model via Belt and Road initiatives, and China's aim to dominate various BRICS+ mechanisms cast doubt over the precision and credibility of this multilateral body. Besides, the bloc's members vary widely in political systems, economic models, and foreign policy goals. These divergences may blunt BRICS+'s coherence and strategic impact in the short term.
Still, the West would do well to resist the urge to contain BRICS+ or treat it as a threat. Many of its new members are not joining out of ideological zeal, but from a desire for leverage and flexibility. Europe, the United States, and Japan must recognize this nuance and respond accordingly.
Rather than isolate these states, the West should engage them bilaterally, regionally, and thematically. Strategic partnerships based on mutual appreciation and economic opportunity will determine the contours of future cooperation.
The EU, in particular, must overcome its outdated protectionism and offer Global South countries real "win-win" prospects, especially in trade, energy, and technology, factoring in partners such as Japan and India.
Japan can play a central role in this, offering a vision of inclusive modernization and infrastructure-led development that complements, rather than competes with, BRICS+ initiatives.
BRICS+ is still finding its voice and falls short at present as a credible platform. Its expansion raises difficult questions about coherence, strategy, and global leadership. But one thing is clear: the countries in the 'Global South' are no longer content to be rule-takers, as Donald Trump (or Xi Jinping in that regard) would like them to be. It wants a seat at the table — and in some cases, its own table entirely.
It is becoming harder to ignore that a post-Western order is no longer a theoretical possibility. And BRICS+, for all its flaws, is the clearest articulation yet of this new global consciousness. For a post-Abe Japan, this is not a moment for hesitation, but a chance to bridge divides, foster balance, and shape a truly multipolar world.
Author: Dr Jagannath Panda
Dr Jagannath Panda is the Head of the Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs at the ISDP, Sweden, and a Professor at the University of Warsaw.