First female director general of MI5 Dame Stella Rimington dies aged 90
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THE first female MI5 director general has sadly died aged 89.
Dame Stella Rimington died "surrounded by her beloved family and dogs and determinedly held on to the life she loved until her last breath", her family announced.
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The 89-year-old was appointed director general of MI5 in 1992, and the first woman to ever hold the position.
After her retirement in 1996, she became a non-executive director of Marks & Spencer and the BG Group.
She leaves behind two daughters.
Dame Stella previously told the Telegraph how she became a spy.
"In 1965 my then-husband John, a treasury official, was offered a posting to the British High Commission in New Delhi," she said.
"In the summer of 1967, I was walking through the compound there when someone tapped me on the shoulder and said, 'Psst... Do you want to be a spy?'
"It transpired this man was MI5's liaison officer in New Delhi and he offered me a job as a clerical assistant on £5 a week."
She said her role mainly consisted of typing out his reports.
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Dame Stella Rimington was the first female director general of MI5
Credit: EPA
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