Nato and the G7 — global power fractures that Africa must watch
Two major summits in June could expedite one of the most significant strategic realignments in the international system. The Group of Seven (G7) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) summits may determine how deep current political fractures run.
Their outcomes will also suggest the extent to which certain actors are willing to pivot away from a collective Western bloc identity. This could see the locus of power becoming more evenly spread across either side of the Atlantic.
The implications will be profound, and although Africa is not at the table, it will be affected. A more hard-nosed understanding of global power shifts and their effect on African countries' shared security and developmental agenda is needed.
The G7 wields an outsized degree of influence on global governance. Its members represent more than half of the world's economic output, account for 55% of global military expenditure, and play a central role in trade with more than 90% of global foreign exchange reserves held in G7 currencies.
More importantly, this group of leading market economies and liberal democracies has influenced the global order for nearly half a century. All its members, barring Japan, are also part of Nato – a cornerstone of the post-World War 2 international system with a shared commitment to collective defence.
Broad policy consensus within both groupings has given credibility to a US-led international order and Western bloc identity, which has wielded considerable authority over the world's agenda.
The West's cohesion and influence have increased in recent years, with its members united by a desire to counter a revanchist Russia and a rising China. However, this upward trend evaporated after US President Donald Trump's January inauguration.
Nato's current pressure points relate to military expenditure. Topping this year's agenda will be elevated defence spending targets, which new secretary-general Mark Rutte has proposed at 3.5% of annual GDP by 2032. The Trump administration had called for 5%, despite most alliance members falling short of 2% over the past decade.
Nato will also be concerned about the US' commitment to 'collective defence' and the alliance's long-term viability. Washington's stance on Russia's Ukraine invasion, its wide-ranging trade tariffs, 'America First' approach to macroeconomics and right-wing turn on social policy issues have soured relations among its G7 and Nato allies.
Traditional US partners face three general scenarios. First is appeasement and acquiescence to the US continuing to lead the Western alliance. Second is paralysis under the weight of contradictions needed to find a workable middle ground with the US. Third is greater strategic autonomy from the US overall or within smaller coalitions of states across Europe, Japan and other like-minded actors.
Course-correcting won't be easy. The US accounts for more than half of the G7's combined GDP, just under 16% of Nato's budget, and surpasses all other alliance members in annual military expenditure. Accordingly, the horse-trading and foreign policy recalibration needed to speak with one voice will take time, diluting the G7 and Nato's potency in the short term.
For African countries, this presents a moment of profound opportunity and challenge in equal measure. Four key issues warrant greater attention by the continent's policymakers.
First, the surge in global defence spending will continue, particularly among Nato members. This will happen across all three scenarios above and is likely to reduce budgets for aid, official development assistance and other financial support to Africa.
Rough calculations based on Nato members spending 3.5% of their GDP on military expenditure amount to nearly $2-trillion a year, which could otherwise be allocated to social, climate and economic development initiatives. Initiatives like the G7's Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment and the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative could lose momentum due to budget cuts, or be used to champion greater private sector financing.
Second, a narrower security agenda may be pursued, linking issues such as migration and critical mineral supply chains to Western interventions in African conflicts. While specific conflicts such as in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Libya and the Sahel may receive attention, Africa likely won't feature as a collective geostrategic concern for the West like the Indo-Pacific does.
Third, the global military expenditure surge, knock-on effects in the arms industry and shifting political priorities could mean more ad hoc, militarised responses to African conflicts. Support for these direct, politically expedient and less-costly interventions may grow as the effectiveness of multilateral peacekeeping wanes along with political appetites for long-term conflict prevention and peace-building.
Finally, a more fractured Western alliance will enable other major international actors to continue expanding their influence in Africa. China, Turkey, the Gulf States, India and Russia will look to expand into gaps left by Western interests, particularly regarding security cooperation.
For Russia, Africa will remain central to consolidating the activities of military contractors and state-controlled paramilitaries in countries like Mali, Libya, Burkina Faso, Niger and the Central African Republic. For China, Africa represents a testing ground for its increased power projection capabilities, pointing to a greater role as a security guarantor.
The Gulf countries and Turkey have also ramped up their military influence in Africa. They now play central roles in security initiatives and facilitating negotiations from the Horn to north Africa, the Sahel and even the DRC.
Similarly, India has increasingly looked towards Africa to raise its profile as a security partner. This has been buoyed by India's need to safeguard its maritime domain while providing joint field training exercises and hosting coordination meetings with African defence ministers.
African policymakers must identify how these four issues are related and will affect the continent's security and development agenda. Responding to these geopolitical headwinds will require bold leadership, particularly from regional anchor states, including South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and Ethiopia.
Leaders must strengthen the resilience of the African Union and regional economic communities. They should also seek new opportunities with emerging powers, while keeping a close eye on the storm brewing further north. DM
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