China allows visa-free entry for 5 Latin American nations to boost ties
BEIJING--China will allow visa-free entry for nationals of five Latin American countries for one year to boost closer connections with the region.
Starting June 1, citizens of Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru and Uruguay will be allowed to enter China for up to 30 days without a visa, China's Foreign Ministry announced Thursday. The trial program will be in effect for one year.
'We welcome more foreign friends to visit China, to experience the colorful and vibrant China,' Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said at a daily briefing.
Beijing hosted the China-CELAC, or Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, Forum earlier this week, aiming at strengthening its alliances in the region as a counterweight to U.S. influence.
China has been opening up to dozens of countries including most of the European nations, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Malaysia to boost the economy after strict pandemic travel measures. China and Uzbekistan will also begin mutual visa-free entry for up to 30 days starting June 1, according to China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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Japan Times
an hour ago
- Japan Times
China struggles to capitalize on record renewables build-out as grid work lags
China's breakneck expansion of renewable power continues to set records — but an increasing amount of that wind and solar energy is being wasted because the grid isn't up to scratch. In the first half, the curtailment rate for solar rose to 5.7%, from 3% in the same period last year, according to the National Energy Administration. For wind, it was 6.6%, versus 3.9% in the first six months of 2024. Curtailments measure how much electricity was generated without finding its way to customers. That happens when supply overwhelms demand, or bottlenecks in the grid interfere with power transmission — particularly over distance. As a result, the worst offenders are the biggest renewables hubs in the sparsely populated interior, which rely on power lines stretching thousands of kilometers to the major cities of the east. "The reason why curtailment has become an issue in China is simply because renewable power installation is too strong, far exceeding the growth rate of the power grid and energy storage,' said Diana Xia, an analyst at Fitch Ratings. "As a result, electricity generated by the additional capacity can't be consumed.' China has raised its tolerance for curtailments to 10% from 5% to account for the lag between developing projects and connecting them to the grid. But the rates for western regions including Tibet, Xinjiang and Qinghai have blown past those limits, which could ultimately threaten the investment case for any further expansion unless the grid can quickly catch up. To be sure, even the worst curtailment rates this year pale in comparison to those faced during China's earlier renewables booms. In 2016, for example, Gansu was forced to ditch nearly half the wind power generated in the province for six months. And grid operators have praised the huge build-out of renewables for helping the country meet a summer surge in demand. But China's scaling up of clean energy is also posing a new set of challenges. In each of the last two years, the country has installed record amounts, including 277 gigawatts of solar last year. In May this year, it added more solar capacity in a single month than any other country did over the whole of 2024, according to BloombergNEF. Upgrading the power network to cope involves enormous sums. The main operator, State Grid of China, said its spending will exceed 650 billion yuan ($90 billion) for the first time this year, with ultrahigh-voltage lines one of its biggest investments. China currently has 43 of those in operation. For provinces such as Qinghai, home to a renewables park that's roughly the size of Singapore, the network can't be built fast enough. Local demand from a population of only 6 million is completely insufficient to mop up all the power generated. Photovoltaic panels at a solar plant in Beijing | Bloomberg The province has one UHV line connecting to Henan province, and another two are planned to Guangxi and Guangdong, Zhu Yuanqing, a director with the local energy bureau, said in an interview in the capital Xining earlier in the summer. But the lead times are daunting. It usually takes about five years to build a UHV line, said Fitch's Xia. Although a number of new lines should be operational in the next couple of years, it means there's unlikely to be a significant decrease in curtailment rates before 2027, she said. The government's other measures to reduce waste include promoting the build-out of transmission lines that directly link companies with renewables projects. Regions like Qinghai are also constructing massive data centers to take advantage of their abundant clean energy supplies and cooler weather. The NEA wants the grid to accommodate annual expansions of over 200 gigawatts of renewable power through 2027. But meeting that target while keeping curtailments below 10% will be challenging. The coming months will test whether regulators can fast-track grid upgrades and accelerate power market reforms to keep renewable energy absorption stable, consultancy Trivium China said last month in a note. "If these efforts fail, deteriorating renewable project returns from rising curtailment and plummeting power prices may lead to a significant investment slowdown,' said Trivium.
The Diplomat
2 hours ago
- The Diplomat
China's Political Calendar as a Guide to Leadership Succession
Discussion about personnel issues within Chinese politics has been rampant of late. In Japan, the media has been reporting on President Xi Jinping's supposed health issues and has even suggested that he may step down 2027, with Ding Xuexiang, a member of the Standing Committee, as his successor. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has meanwhile been rocked by leadership instability over the past few years, accompanied by rumors of a rift between Xi Jinping, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Zhang Youxia, his number two. Ultimately, it is impossible for outside observers to confirm these rumors. Many rely on media outlets and YouTube pundits to come up with what is, after all, mere speculation. There are other sources, however. For instance, we can gain some insight into what is currently happening by consulting China's political calendar. The most important years ahead for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are 2027, when the 21st Party Congress convenes, 2032, when the 22nd Party Congress convenes, and 2035, the year Xi himself has set to achieve 'socialist modernization.' The white paper on 'National Security in a New Era,' released in May 2025, outlines construction plans for Chinese national security over the next decade and has made 2035 the target for completion for the national security system, further underscoring the importance of that year. Another, somewhat less important year is 2029, which will mark the 80th anniversary of the founding of the communist nation. Born in 1953, Xi will be 74 in 2027, 79 in 2032, and 82 in 2035. At present, Xi's administration is in the third year of its third term and will enter its fourth year this autumn. With speculation swirling about his health, Xi has yet to name a successor, and so most expect him to embark on a fourth term in 2027. That term would end in 2032, but given that his administration has emphasized 2035 as a key milestone, there is reason to believe that he plans to remain in power through that year. In 2035, Xi will be 82, the age at which Mao Zedong died, making it entirely possible that he will remain in office into the mid-2030s. However, by his fifth term beginning in 2032, he will surely need to have a clear successor in place. That means that even if the individual is not one of the top seven (members of the Politburo Standing Committee) during Xi's fourth term, a successor is likely to at least be selected from the current 24 members of the Politburo Standing Committee and brought in beginning in 2027. Of course, there is always the possibility that this won't happen until sometime after 2027, but that has not stopped predictions in China that Xi will in fact soon begin the task of choosing who will follow him. In fact, Xi's succession is one of the biggest concerns in Chinese politics, and the recent speculation about his health and his grip on power will surely intensify as 2027 approaches. The Chinese public naturally has a strong interest in the transition of power. In considering this transition of power, it's worth noting that apart from Ding Xuexiang (born 1962), all of the seven Standing Committee members were born in the 1950s, and will thus be in their mid-70s by the time Xi's fourth term ends in 2032. Even Ding Xuexiang will be 70 by then. The fact that he is the youngest of the top seven is one of the main reasons why he is often mentioned as a possible successor to Xi Jinping. Nor are any of the current 24-member Politburo particularly young, with the youngest four born in 1964. It is worth noting here that Chinese born in the late 1960s would have been university students during the Tiananmen Square protests and massacre in 1989. Looking elsewhere, Zhou Zuyi, Secretary of the Fujian Provincial Communist Party Committee, was born in 1965, with all other provincial and municipal secretaries having been born before 1964. Thus, since Xi Jinping came to power, the CCP leadership has aged rapidly. This can be seen as reflecting the aging of Chinese society itself, but one might also conclude that Xi's administration has an aversion to people born in the late 1960s, who would have come of age at a time when Western culture was having a strong influence on Chinese society. There is even speculation that this generation may be bypassed entirely in the succession process. To counter that, we might note that some deputy provincial and municipal secretaries were born in the late 1960s, with Xiong Maoping a prime example, having been appointed deputy secretary of the Liaoning Provincial Communist Party Committee in July 2025. Yet many officials born in the late 1960s have not moved up the party ranks, and increasingly the focus is now on the growing number of appointments of deputy secretaries who were born in the 1970s. The list includes Zhuge Yujie (Hubei Province), Shi Guanghui (Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region), Zhu Zhongming (Shanghai), Yang Jinbai (Hainan Province), Liu Xiaotao (Jiangsu Province), Guo Ningning (Fujian Province), and Lu Dongliang (Shanxi Province). Some of these figures are expected to be made members of the Politburo or even Standing Committee by 2027. In the meantime, the PLA's leadership is even older, with Xi's childhood friend and ally, Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of CCP, born in 1950. Zhang is three years older than Xi, and will turn 77 in 2027. Having made the unusual decision to stay on at the age of 72 in 2022, many expect him to retire in 2027. Who will be his successor? This is an immediate concern for the PLA, where a number of high-ranking officials have been appointed, only to then be purged. That turnover has left it unclear if a successor will be determined by 2027. Its personnel issues notwithstanding, the PLA has been able to maintain its expansionist path under its top two leaders, Xi and Zhang, despite rumors about their health. Still, the instability within the military leadership shows how difficult it will be for the Central Committee of CCP to identify a successor for Xi. Time is the great equalizer. Moving forward, the most significant challenge for Chinese politics will be in the realm of personnel. For outside observers, insight may well come from monitoring developments in the context of the political calendar discussed here. KAWASHIMA Shin is a professor at the University of Tokyo.
The Mainichi
2 hours ago
- The Mainichi
Taiwan's Lai reaffirms defense spending hike above 3% of GDP
TAIPEI (Kyodo) -- Taiwan President Lai Ching-te on Tuesday reaffirmed that next year's defense budget is set to exceed 3 percent of gross domestic product, as part of efforts to strengthen the island's self-defense capabilities amid rising tensions with mainland China. Taiwan has allocated about 2.45 percent of its GDP for defense in 2025. Speaking at a regional security forum in Taipei, Lai warned that China's growing military activities in the Taiwan Strait as well as the East and South China seas pose "an unprecedented challenge to the rules-based international order." "As authoritarianism continues to expand, democratic nations must join even closer in solidarity to defend our values," Lai said at the Ketagalan Forum, adding that his government remains committed to maintaining the status quo and ensuring peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Cross-strait tensions have been rising since Lai, whom Beijing condemns as a separatist, assumed the presidency in May last year. The mainland considers the self-ruled island as an inalienable part of China's territory and aims to bring it into its fold, by force if necessary. Lai also vowed to advance Taiwan's economic resilience and security by deepening economic and trade cooperation with other countries, including in the sectors of semiconductors and artificial intelligence. Echoing Lai's call for solidarity, former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson told the forum that he hopes the United States, Britain and all European nations will stand with Taiwan and strengthen economic ties as China ramps up pressure on the island. "No one wants war, and certainly no one wants to see Chinese domination of the first island chain," Johnson said, referring to the strategic chain of islands stretching from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. Communist-ruled China and Taiwan have been governed separately since they split in 1949 following a civil war.
