All eyes, in India and China, on Dalai Lama's 90th
KULLU: All eyes will be on the
when he turns 90 next week on July 6, as he may announce his successor that day. The year-long birthday celebrations of the
will kick off on July 6 in Mcleodganj in Dharamshala, the headquarters of the Tibetan govt-in-exile, and conclude on July 5, 2026.
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A number of ministers in the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), including Penpa Tsering, Sikyong or the elected head of the CTA, and deputy speaker Dolma Tsering, have said that the Dalai Lama may reveal his successor when he turns 90.
Khenpo Sonam Tenphel, speaker of the Tibetan govt-in-exile, told TOI that a three-day religious conference, beginning on July 2 in Mcleodganj, was also likely to discuss the successor of the Dalai Lama.
"Even though this topic is not part of the conference agenda, there is a strong likelihood that the question of the Dalai Lama's successor would be discussed and we may even get the answer too," said Tenphel.
"The Dalai Lama's successor must be from the free world outside of China, as our holy leader has said. In any case, the Tibetans would accept only the one revealed by the Dalai Lama himself," added Tenphel.
In his new book, 'Voice for the Voiceless', published in March earlier this year, the Dalai Lama specified for the first time that his successor would be born in the 'free world', and outside China.
The Dalai Lama's statement is significant because China insists that it will choose the successor in an attempt to gain religious control over Tibet. But Tibetans, especially those in exile, will not accept one chosen by China. The Dalai Lama has said that any successor named by China will not be accepted by the Tibetans. More than 300 dignitaries from around the world are expected to reach Dharamshala on July 6 to attend the birthday celebrations of the Dalai Lama.
The Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), the representative body of Tibetan people, wants a smooth transition of the present Dalai Lama's spiritual authority to his successor in the face of the Chinese claim to name the successor.
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