South Koreans frustrated with constant leadership churn: ‘I stopped caring'
In the American drama Designated Survivor, the US secretary of housing and urban development unexpectedly assumes the presidency after 12 officials ahead of him in the line of succession are wiped out.
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A less dramatic but equally surreal scenario unfolded in
South Korea on Friday, though the presidential line of succession did not make it to No 13.
On Thursday, former acting president and Prime Minister
Han Duck-soo resigned to run for president, while former Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Choi Sang-mok stepped down following an impeachment push in the National Assembly by the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK).
Now, with the snap presidential election set for June 3, Education Minister Lee Ju-ho is serving as acting president.
With former president
Yoon Suk-yeol impeached last month and the nation's No 2 and No 3 officials no longer in power, South Korea is facing an unprecedented leadership vacuum, intensifying public concerns over the uncertainty of its political future.
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'Seriously? Even the education minister is acting president now? That was my first thought when I saw the news,' Song Hyun-woo, a 26-year-old preparing to become a navy officer, said.
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