Okinawa police, U.S. military go on joint patrols to prevent crime
OKINAWA, Okinawa Prefecture—Okinawa prefectural police and U.S. service members conducted a joint patrol here near the U.S. Kadena Air Base late on April 18 due to a recent series of sexual assaults involving U.S. military personnel in the prefecture.
Prefectural police and city government officials have been patrolling the area following the incidents. However, this time the U.S. military joined in as well. The last time a joint patrol was held was in 1974, two years after the prefecture was returned to Japanese control.
It has not yet been decided whether the joint patrols will continue.
About 120 people, including police officers from the Okinawa Police Station, city government officials and U.S. soldiers, were divided into three groups. Okinawa Governor Denny Tamaki and Brian Wolford, commanding general of Marine Corps Installations Pacific, joined as well.
The groups patrolled the area around Gate Street, which runs from Kadena Air Base to the downtown area, for about four hours from 10 p.m. on April 18 to 2 a.m. on April 19.
In a ceremony before they departed, Wolford said that this patrol represents a joint effort between Japan and the United States to build local communities where residents can feel more secure.
The patrol is in response to a series of sexual assault cases that have come to light since June last year.
Last year, four sexual assault incidents involving U.S. service members—the highest on record in the last decade—were identified by the prefectural police. In one of these cases the accused was not indicted.
In response, the U.S. military stationed in Japan announced last July that they would conduct joint patrols with Japanese police as one of the countermeasures to prevent further instances of sexual assault by U.S. service members.
Under the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), when both Japanese and U.S. investigative authorities are present at the scene of a crime committed by an U.S. military member, the U.S. authorities will detain the suspect with the possibility that the Japanese police will have a limited right to investigate.
Because of this, the prefectural police didn't immediately try to involve the U.S. military in joint patrols of the area.
However, the joint patrol on April 18 was conducted as a crime prevention measure where participants walk around the main street. So, the prefectural police agreed that the U.S. military could join the patrol.
On the day, no incidents were identified by the U.S. military.
After the patrol, Tamaki told reporters that, 'Issues with the SOFA have not yet been sorted out. However, it is important for related authorities to cooperate like we did here.'
A 67-year-old man who runs a restaurant near Gate Street said, 'Conducting patrols could lead to security, but if it ends up being just for show, similar incidents will occur again.'
The city government said it wants to continue the joint patrols, but no specific schedule has been decided yet.
The U.S. military has said it plans to hold a forum where U.S. military senior officials, prefectural officials and local residents can exchange opinions on the issue. However, this forum has not yet been scheduled.
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