Israeli captive kisses Al-Qassam fighters during release, sparking global reactions
ALBAWABA - A viral video capturing Israeli captive Omer Shem Tov kissing the heads of Hamas' Al-Qassam Brigades fighters during his release in the seventh prisoner exchange deal has triggered widespread reactions on social media and in the media.
The footage, filled with symbolic and emotional undertones, showcased the humane treatment of Israeli captives while in Gaza, a point that has been widely discussed in recent prisoner exchanges.
A Remarkable Scene: Israeli Soldier Kisses Two Al-Qassam Fighters
In another striking moment during the exchange, an Israeli captive kissed the heads of two Al-Qassam fighters while standing on the handover platform in Al-Nuseirat refugee camp in central Gaza.
As part of the seventh prisoner exchange, Hamas' military wing, Al-Qassam Brigades, handed over three Israeli captives to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Al-Nuseirat. Earlier in the day, two other captives were transferred in Rafah, bringing the total to five before the final captive was released later.
Amid crowds of Gaza residents, the released Israeli captives greeted the audience with victory signs, which were met with cheers and celebration from the gathered crowd.
Meanwhile, Israeli reports suggested that freed Israeli captives were under the influence of sedatives, downplaying the significance of the gesture.
أحد الجنود الأسرى الإسرائيليين يُقبّل رأس الشرفاء، رأس المقاومين، أمام الحاضنة الشعبية لحظة إطلاق سراحهم في عملية التبادل.
حتى العدو ينحني أمام الكبرياء والعزة. pic.twitter.com/0EE78Z93pl
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