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Iran asks Taliban for ‘kill list' so it can hunt down MI6 spies

Iran asks Taliban for ‘kill list' so it can hunt down MI6 spies

Yahoo12 hours ago
Leaders of Iran's Revolutionary Guards have asked the Taliban for access to a leaked list of Afghans who helped Britain so they can hunt down MI6 spies.
The Tehran regime hopes to examine the list of nearly 25,000 Afghans who worked with British forces as they seek leverage with the West ahead of nuclear negotiations this autumn.
The so-called 'kill list' contains the names of Afghans who were applying for asylum, including soldiers who had worked with the British Army, intelligence assets and special forces. Some are believed to have subsequently fled to Iran.
In a sign that the two sides are already collaborating, at least one Afghan whose name was allegedly on the list has been deported from Iran to Kabul in the past few days.
A senior Iranian official in Tehran confirmed that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had formally requested that the Taliban government share the leaked list. It is understood that MI6 intelligence assets will take priority in the search.
He said: 'On the Iranian side, there are also efforts to find the list, with a special committee assigned for it. There have been discussions on cooperation between Tehran and Kabul on this issue as it can help both countries for negotiations with the West.'
The Telegraph understands that Taliban leadership in Kandahar has also ordered officers in Kabul to arrest as many individuals as possible from the leaked document to use them as leverage in exerting diplomatic pressure on London.
The database was accidentally leaked in February 2022 when a Royal Marine emailed the complete file to Afghan contacts in Britain instead of sending a small extract.
The spreadsheet contained names, telephone numbers and email addresses of Afghan soldiers, government workers and family members who applied to relocate to Britain under the Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy after the 2021 Western military withdrawal.
The list also included identities of more than 100 British special forces personnel and MI6 operatives who had vouched for Afghan applicants.
A Taliban government official told The Telegraph that they obtained the spreadsheet in 2022.
Speaking to this newspaper last month, he said: 'After the reports were published in England, it became clear how significant this leak was. The order is to arrest as many individuals as possible to use them as a tool of diplomatic pressure against England.'
The IRGC's demand comes after Britain, France and Germany threatened Tehran with a so-called snapback mechanism, which would restore UN Security Council resolutions against Iran, if no progress is made on negotiations over its nuclear programme by August 30.
The most significant resolution that would return is 1929, adopted in June 2010, which expanded sanctions beyond technical nuclear restrictions to target Iran's broader economy.
The resolution required all UN members to take 'all necessary measures' to enforce Iran's enrichment ban and ballistic missile restrictions.
Iran has refused to abandon uranium enrichment that could ultimately lead to a nuclear weapon, despite a bombing campaign by Israel and the US last month.
Iranian authorities want to check borders and detain Afghans in Iran whose names appear on the list, with particular focus on those who worked as intelligence operatives, according to the Iranian official.
He said: 'There is an urgency to find as many of them as possible before the snapback deadlines arrive to use them as backdoor bargaining tools.'
A Ministry of Defence spokesperson said: 'We take the safety of our personnel very seriously and personnel, particularly those in sensitive positions, always have appropriate measures in place to protect their security.
'The independent Rimmer Review concluded that it is highly unlikely that merely being on the spreadsheet means an individual is more likely to be targeted, and this is the basis on which the court lifted its super-injunction.'
David Lammy, the Foreign Secretary, is prepared to trigger sanctions against Iran to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons, The Telegraph revealed last year.
The UK remains a participant in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and can unilaterally force a return to sanctions if it considers Iran has violated the deal's terms.
At least one Afghan whose name appeared on the leaked list, and who had escaped to Iran after the leak, was detained for deportation on Friday.
His son was ill, and his wife and two daughters remained in Iran, the deported man said, 'unable even to go out and buy bread.'
'They arrested me on the street, handcuffed me, and sent me to a deportation camp,' he told The Telegraph from Kabul.
'I pleaded with them. I told them my life would be in danger in Afghanistan. I shouted, 'Where are human rights?' But they didn't care. They sent me straight to the border.'
'They can come and kill me any moment'
He questioned whether the Government was truly unaware of what was happening in Iran.
'There are many people like me there – being deported, being arrested,' he said. 'The British know all of this. If they wanted to help, they would've done it already. But they don't want to.'
Now in Kabul, he said he was constantly on the move, hiding in a different place each night, afraid for his own safety and for his family left behind in Iran.
'They can come and kill me any moment,' he said. 'But it doesn't matter to anyone any more. That's just my life now.'
He expressed bitter frustration over the UK's resettlement priorities.
'I hope the Brits are happy – they took cooks and masseurs to Britain, but those who lost their eyes serving British forces, and many more are left behind,' he said.
'Maybe that's what they wanted. I just regret not realising it sooner.'
He asked how it was possible that the Government – 'once rulers of half the world – could remain blind to the situation'.
'They took cooks, but left behind generals and colonels,' he said. 'What kind of logic is that?'
The Telegraph has revealed that former Taliban members were brought to the UK on British evacuation flights from Afghanistan after the leak.
The individuals were flown out for their safety, but among them were suspected jihadists, sex offenders, corrupt officials, and people previously jailed by US-led forces – raising concerns over poor vetting.
Insiders say some Afghans are also exploiting a family reunion scheme set up after the leak and are using it to enter the UK under false pretences.
The Telegraph understands that evacuated migrants are offering people in Afghanistan help to get to Britain, including fake family links for up to £20,000 per person.
Iran is using espionage allegations against Afghans as a pretext for the mass arrests and deportations following the recent conflict with Israel.
The Telegraph spoke to Afghans in Iran, at the border, and in Afghanistan, who said the regime in Tehran was targeting them to divert public attention from its 'humiliation' by Israel in last month's 12-day war.
During the conflict, daily deportations jumped from 2,000 to over 30,000 as Iranian authorities turned public anger toward the vulnerable minority.
Those persecuted by the regime also reported suffering widespread abuses including beatings and arbitrary detention.
The Government imposed a super-injunction in September 2023 preventing media coverage of the data breach, which has been described as one of the most damaging intelligence leaks in recent history.
The injunction was extended before last year's election, despite a judge's decision to lift it in May 2024.
Johnny Mercer, the former Conservative veterans minister who served in Afghanistan, called the leak 'gut-wrenching.'
The Government established an emergency scheme called the Afghanistan Response Route in March 2024 to airlift people named in the breach to the UK.
The total relocation program for Afghans could cost up to £7bn of taxpayers' money.
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Analysis: Gaza seems hopeless. Here's a potential pathway for a 90-day solution
Analysis: Gaza seems hopeless. Here's a potential pathway for a 90-day solution

CNN

timean hour ago

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Analysis: Gaza seems hopeless. Here's a potential pathway for a 90-day solution

The Middle East Israel-Hamas warFacebookTweetLink Follow Brett McGurk is a CNN global affairs analyst who served in senior national security positions under Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joe Biden. Even as someone who helped negotiate the only two ceasefires of the terrible war in Gaza, including the release of nearly 150 hostages, the situation today seems hopeless and destined to simply continue with no clear end in sight. That is not acceptable. This war must end. The hostages must come home. Humanitarian aid must surge. Gaza needs a multiyear recovery without Hamas in charge. This all needs to start now. So, how? To answer, let's review what happened over the last two weeks, some of the options that are now being proposed, and what might work to finally bring this to an end. Only two weeks ago, there was hope that Israel and Hamas — through US, Qatari, and Egyptian mediation — were on the brink of a 60-day ceasefire. That deal entailed the release of half the living hostages Hamas still holds, thought to be ten people, in exchange for Palestinian prisoners, including more than one hundred now serving life sentences, together with a 60-day ceasefire and withdrawal of Israeli forces from populated areas, daily surges of humanitarian aid, and a commitment by Israel, backed by Trump, to negotiate over those 60 days the conditions to end the war. These promising talks reportedly broke down after Hamas leaders living comfortably in Qatar accepted its terms, but Hamas terrorists holding the keys to the hostages inside Gaza said no or demanded new terms. Israel and the US walked out of the talks, leading to their collapse. In the days that followed, reports emerged of an unprecedented humanitarian crisis unfolding in Gaza — due largely, it appears, to Israel's decision in March to blockade Gaza and allow no assistance to enter at all over nearly 80 days. Israel now faces a crisis of its own making with the world's attention focused on its misguided humanitarian decisions, as opposed to focusing on Hamas as the obstacle to a ceasefire. Meanwhile, France responded with an initiative to recognize the establishment of a Palestinian state next month without demanding anything up front from Hamas or explaining how such an initiative might help end the Gaza crisis anytime soon. The UK went a step further and said it will also recognize a Palestinian state next month unless there is a ceasefire in Gaza, thereby guaranteeing that Hamas will not accept one. Hamas in turn welcomed these initiatives and released images of an emaciated hostage digging his own grave, thereby making clear that it now has no intent to cut a deal. Before discussing ways out of this impasse, let's stipulate that the delivery of assistance to the people of Gaza is non-negotiable and must continue no matter what. This is not only moral, but strategic, because Hamas views civilian suffering as a component of its strategy. Israel's blockade, a tactic the Biden administration never allowed, was a trap for itself, allowing Hamas to turn the tables even as the group obstructs the ceasefire needed to bring immediate and sustained relief to the population it purports to represent. Israel has since declared humanitarian pauses in fighting and restored delivery of UN aid, even with risk of some diversion to Hamas. This is the right move, and it must continue no matter what option is chosen going forward to secure the release of hostages. The options now being discussed can broadly be categorized into five outlines: 1. Military Victory: Proponents of this option, including inside the Israeli government, claim that Hamas's leaders inside Gaza will never accept a deal. Therefore, Israel has no choice but to further intensify its military campaign, including to find and eliminate those few remaining leaders of Hamas inside Gaza. The hope is that Hamas' control in Gaza will crack, and Israel can then establish a new Palestinian entity to secure and govern the strip, one that is not Hamas or the existing Palestinian Authority. But Israel has been doing precisely this since May, intensifying its military campaign with five divisions deployed into Gaza. This operation, called Gideon's Chariots, did help eliminate Mohammed Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza at the time, and seize 70% of the strip. but Israel also lost over forty soldiers, tragically killed civilians, and did not fundamentally change the equation or lead to a deal. There is no reason to believe that more of the same will deliver a different result, and to further intensify the war now as international support reaches its nadir carries strategic risks to Israel far greater than any potential tactical military gain. 2. Comprehensive Deal: Proponents of this option claim the obstacle to the 60-day ceasefire deal is its phasing since Hamas demands a permanent end to the war upfront. Thus, Israel should now propose the return of all hostages living and dead in exchange for a full withdrawal from Gaza, the establishment of a new governance structure that is not Hamas, and a large-scale release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails. I call this the 'have it all' option because it suggests there is a magic key to free all hostages, end the war, and remove Hamas from any significant role in Gaza. In my experience negotiating with Hamas, however, this proposal likely leads to an even more intractable negotiation upfront. Hamas will haggle over every name on a proposed governing council, demand guarantees such as a UN Security Council resolution against future Israeli operations, refuse under any circumstances to disarm or relinquish security control, and demand the release of all Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails. So, this is unlikely a faster path to a deal that brings a ceasefire or returns hostages than the phased deal that was nearly agreed to only two weeks ago. No doubt, Israel and the US missed an opportunity earlier this year to maintain the deal it inherited from the Biden administration, a deal backed by the UN Security Council and one that could have been extended through talks on these issues with a ceasefire in place. The point of this essay is not to argue what might have been, but rather what to do now — and the fastest path to stopping the war and freeing hostages. Opening an entirely new negotiation on a new deal would not achieve either, anytime soon. 3. Stick to a 60-day Proposal: Proponents of this option, and I have been one, believe the fastest path to stop the war and ultimately end it altogether remains the existing phased proposal. Hamas is divided within its ranks and the US could press the three countries with influence — Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey — to demand that Hamas take the deal, release ten hostages, and begin the 60-day pause. The 'or else' for Hamas and its leaders might include exile from Doha, together with requests for extradition to the United States for their role in killing Americans, and new sanctions to ensure they do not set up shop elsewhere, other than perhaps Iran, where they would be less effective and vulnerable to Israeli targeting. This pressure together with international support for the deal would help influence the holdouts inside Hamas. In my experience negotiating these deals, international pressure matters to Hamas as much as military pressure. The problem with this option now is that the French and UK initiatives have removed any such pressure or incentive from Hamas to close any deal, as a Palestinian state has been promised in September no matter what happens with the hostages. Hamas views creation of a Palestinian state not as an end goal but as a stepping stone to ending Israel's existence. Its leaders have deemed the French initiative 'one of the fruits of October 7,' and Hamas has since shown no readiness to renew talks on the 60-day deal, a point brought home with its grotesque displays of hostages starving in tunnels. 4. Unilateral Humanitarian Pause: An outlier option could see Israel declare a 30-day pause on major combat operations to alleviate the humanitarian situation in Gaza. Israel would not withdraw its forces from present positions, and retain the right to respond in self-defense, but it would immediately shift international focus back on Hamas while also allowing the Israeli military forces to rest and refit. True, this would also allow Hamas to rest and refit with no hope of a near-term hostage release, but by alleviating the aid situation, Israel might benefit strategically by taking this card away from Hamas and demonstrating that Israel is now correcting for its own mistakes. It might also demand International Red Cross access to the hostages as a condition for the pause, an issue of urgency given the horrific images Hamas released of hostages in recent days. The problem with this option is that it says nothing about what happens after the pause, further removes pressure from Hamas, and would be extremely unpopular in Israel, both within the rightwing Israeli government but also the broader population, to include most hostage families that rightly demand a process leading to a deal – not a unilateral move by Israel that might benefit Hamas with nothing in return. 5. US Breaks with Israel: Proponents of this option believe the United States should announce a halt on all further arms sales to Israel and demand that Israel end the war unilaterally even with Hamas remaining in control of Gaza. Some go further and claim this should happen even without hostages being freed. Their argument is that the overwhelming priority is to stop the war and only the United States has leverage against Israel to force it into doing so. As for the hostages, proponents of this argument claim that Netanyahu, not Hamas, is the primary obstacle to a deal and that by halting US military support, the Israelis might make concessions needed to conclude a deal. These arguments are appealing to those appalled by the images from Gaza and wishing for a quick fix. But they would do nothing to stop, let alone end, the war. Hamas has shown no serious indication that it will release all the hostages if Israel simply gives up, and if Hamas remains in charge of Gaza there is no chance whatsoever for longer-term peace or an internationally backed relief plan that the strip so badly requires. In any case, this is a politically motivated and not realistic option for those who truly aim to stop the war. It's also highly unlikely to ever happen. Trump is unlikely to break with Israel, and Israel is unlikely to simply withdraw from Gaza without all the Israeli hostages and a deal that helps to ensure Hamas cannot retain its control there. In total, that is a depressing summary — it suggests that every broad option now being discussed is either unlikely to succeed or might make the situation even worse. So, what would I recommend? Senior officials do not have the luxury of admiring a problem or analyzing impractical or politically motivated options. They must think seriously about the best of the bad, or meld options together to chart a new path. That is what I might propose: Because, combining options two, three, and four offers an immediate path to alleviating the humanitarian crisis, returning the focus squarely on Hamas, and parlaying the unconstructive proposals coming from Paris, London, and other capitals. This new path — call it Option 6 — would combine a unilateral 30-day pause in Israeli military operations to alleviate the humanitarian situation with an ultimatum that by the end of the 30 days, Hamas must free half the living hostages to extend the ceasefire by 60 days under the existing proposal. From there, you could proceed with a firm, US-backed commitment to negotiate over those 60-days a comprehensive deal to end the war with a new governance structure in Gaza and the release of all remaining hostages. If Hamas refuses to release half the remaining hostages after 30 days, then Israel's unilateral pause would end. Israel could return to military operations but after its military has refit and with the legitimacy for its objectives somewhat restored internationally. This might also parry the French initiative to recognize Palestinian statehood at the UN general assembly next month: If, following Israel's unilateral pause, Hamas has not released ten hostages, then the obstacle to peace would clearly be Hamas. On the other hand, if Hamas does release the ten hostages and we are entering a 60-day window for negotiations to end the war, then it would not make sense to declare Palestinian statehood at the start of that process, as opposed to an incentive towards its conclusion. At bottom, this is an opportunity for Israel and the United States to flip the script entirely, urgently address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, and place the onus for ending the crisis more squarely on Hamas where it belongs. Trump and Netanyahu may not favor such an option as it takes pressure off Hamas on the front end, but it would dramatically increase such pressure — strategic pressure, not just tactical pressure — on the back end. It's also the only viable option at this moment that is likely to achieve what we all want to see: assistance distributed throughout Gaza, hostages coming out of Gaza, and an end to the war with Hamas no longer governing or in control of Gaza. The alternatives might score rhetorical points, but they won't help anyone in Gaza, not the civilians trapped in this awful war, nor the hostages now in tunnels for over 600 days. It's time indeed to flip the script. That means Option 6.

Analysis: Gaza seems hopeless. Here's a potential pathway for a 90-day solution
Analysis: Gaza seems hopeless. Here's a potential pathway for a 90-day solution

CNN

timean hour ago

  • CNN

Analysis: Gaza seems hopeless. Here's a potential pathway for a 90-day solution

The Middle East Israel-Hamas warFacebookTweetLink Follow Brett McGurk is a CNN global affairs analyst who served in senior national security positions under Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joe Biden. Even as someone who helped negotiate the only two ceasefires of the terrible war in Gaza, including the release of nearly 150 hostages, the situation today seems hopeless and destined to simply continue with no clear end in sight. That is not acceptable. This war must end. The hostages must come home. Humanitarian aid must surge. Gaza needs a multiyear recovery without Hamas in charge. This all needs to start now. So, how? To answer, let's review what happened over the last two weeks, some of the options that are now being proposed, and what might work to finally bring this to an end. Only two weeks ago, there was hope that Israel and Hamas — through US, Qatari, and Egyptian mediation — were on the brink of a 60-day ceasefire. That deal entailed the release of half the living hostages Hamas still holds, thought to be ten people, in exchange for Palestinian prisoners, including more than one hundred now serving life sentences, together with a 60-day ceasefire and withdrawal of Israeli forces from populated areas, daily surges of humanitarian aid, and a commitment by Israel, backed by Trump, to negotiate over those 60 days the conditions to end the war. These promising talks reportedly broke down after Hamas leaders living comfortably in Qatar accepted its terms, but Hamas terrorists holding the keys to the hostages inside Gaza said no or demanded new terms. Israel and the US walked out of the talks, leading to their collapse. In the days that followed, reports emerged of an unprecedented humanitarian crisis unfolding in Gaza — due largely, it appears, to Israel's decision in March to blockade Gaza and allow no assistance to enter at all over nearly 80 days. Israel now faces a crisis of its own making with the world's attention focused on its misguided humanitarian decisions, as opposed to focusing on Hamas as the obstacle to a ceasefire. Meanwhile, France responded with an initiative to recognize the establishment of a Palestinian state next month without demanding anything up front from Hamas or explaining how such an initiative might help end the Gaza crisis anytime soon. The UK went a step further and said it will also recognize a Palestinian state next month unless there is a ceasefire in Gaza, thereby guaranteeing that Hamas will not accept one. Hamas in turn welcomed these initiatives and released images of an emaciated hostage digging his own grave, thereby making clear that it now has no intent to cut a deal. Before discussing ways out of this impasse, let's stipulate that the delivery of assistance to the people of Gaza is non-negotiable and must continue no matter what. This is not only moral, but strategic, because Hamas views civilian suffering as a component of its strategy. Israel's blockade, a tactic the Biden administration never allowed, was a trap for itself, allowing Hamas to turn the tables even as the group obstructs the ceasefire needed to bring immediate and sustained relief to the population it purports to represent. Israel has since declared humanitarian pauses in fighting and restored delivery of UN aid, even with risk of some diversion to Hamas. This is the right move, and it must continue no matter what option is chosen going forward to secure the release of hostages. The options now being discussed can broadly be categorized into five outlines: 1. Military Victory: Proponents of this option, including inside the Israeli government, claim that Hamas's leaders inside Gaza will never accept a deal. Therefore, Israel has no choice but to further intensify its military campaign, including to find and eliminate those few remaining leaders of Hamas inside Gaza. The hope is that Hamas' control in Gaza will crack, and Israel can then establish a new Palestinian entity to secure and govern the strip, one that is not Hamas or the existing Palestinian Authority. But Israel has been doing precisely this since May, intensifying its military campaign with five divisions deployed into Gaza. This operation, called Gideon's Chariots, did help eliminate Mohammed Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza at the time, and seize 70% of the strip. but Israel also lost over forty soldiers, tragically killed civilians, and did not fundamentally change the equation or lead to a deal. There is no reason to believe that more of the same will deliver a different result, and to further intensify the war now as international support reaches its nadir carries strategic risks to Israel far greater than any potential tactical military gain. 2. Comprehensive Deal: Proponents of this option claim the obstacle to the 60-day ceasefire deal is its phasing since Hamas demands a permanent end to the war upfront. Thus, Israel should now propose the return of all hostages living and dead in exchange for a full withdrawal from Gaza, the establishment of a new governance structure that is not Hamas, and a large-scale release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails. I call this the 'have it all' option because it suggests there is a magic key to free all hostages, end the war, and remove Hamas from any significant role in Gaza. In my experience negotiating with Hamas, however, this proposal likely leads to an even more intractable negotiation upfront. Hamas will haggle over every name on a proposed governing council, demand guarantees such as a UN Security Council resolution against future Israeli operations, refuse under any circumstances to disarm or relinquish security control, and demand the release of all Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails. So, this is unlikely a faster path to a deal that brings a ceasefire or returns hostages than the phased deal that was nearly agreed to only two weeks ago. No doubt, Israel and the US missed an opportunity earlier this year to maintain the deal it inherited from the Biden administration, a deal backed by the UN Security Council and one that could have been extended through talks on these issues with a ceasefire in place. The point of this essay is not to argue what might have been, but rather what to do now — and the fastest path to stopping the war and freeing hostages. Opening an entirely new negotiation on a new deal would not achieve either, anytime soon. 3. Stick to a 60-day Proposal: Proponents of this option, and I have been one, believe the fastest path to stop the war and ultimately end it altogether remains the existing phased proposal. Hamas is divided within its ranks and the US could press the three countries with influence — Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey — to demand that Hamas take the deal, release ten hostages, and begin the 60-day pause. The 'or else' for Hamas and its leaders might include exile from Doha, together with requests for extradition to the United States for their role in killing Americans, and new sanctions to ensure they do not set up shop elsewhere, other than perhaps Iran, where they would be less effective and vulnerable to Israeli targeting. This pressure together with international support for the deal would help influence the holdouts inside Hamas. In my experience negotiating these deals, international pressure matters to Hamas as much as military pressure. The problem with this option now is that the French and UK initiatives have removed any such pressure or incentive from Hamas to close any deal, as a Palestinian state has been promised in September no matter what happens with the hostages. Hamas views creation of a Palestinian state not as an end goal but as a stepping stone to ending Israel's existence. Its leaders have deemed the French initiative 'one of the fruits of October 7,' and Hamas has since shown no readiness to renew talks on the 60-day deal, a point brought home with its grotesque displays of hostages starving in tunnels. 4. Unilateral Humanitarian Pause: An outlier option could see Israel declare a 30-day pause on major combat operations to alleviate the humanitarian situation in Gaza. Israel would not withdraw its forces from present positions, and retain the right to respond in self-defense, but it would immediately shift international focus back on Hamas while also allowing the Israeli military forces to rest and refit. True, this would also allow Hamas to rest and refit with no hope of a near-term hostage release, but by alleviating the aid situation, Israel might benefit strategically by taking this card away from Hamas and demonstrating that Israel is now correcting for its own mistakes. It might also demand International Red Cross access to the hostages as a condition for the pause, an issue of urgency given the horrific images Hamas released of hostages in recent days. The problem with this option is that it says nothing about what happens after the pause, further removes pressure from Hamas, and would be extremely unpopular in Israel, both within the rightwing Israeli government but also the broader population, to include most hostage families that rightly demand a process leading to a deal – not a unilateral move by Israel that might benefit Hamas with nothing in return. 5. US Breaks with Israel: Proponents of this option believe the United States should announce a halt on all further arms sales to Israel and demand that Israel end the war unilaterally even with Hamas remaining in control of Gaza. Some go further and claim this should happen even without hostages being freed. Their argument is that the overwhelming priority is to stop the war and only the United States has leverage against Israel to force it into doing so. As for the hostages, proponents of this argument claim that Netanyahu, not Hamas, is the primary obstacle to a deal and that by halting US military support, the Israelis might make concessions needed to conclude a deal. These arguments are appealing to those appalled by the images from Gaza and wishing for a quick fix. But they would do nothing to stop, let alone end, the war. Hamas has shown no serious indication that it will release all the hostages if Israel simply gives up, and if Hamas remains in charge of Gaza there is no chance whatsoever for longer-term peace or an internationally backed relief plan that the strip so badly requires. In any case, this is a politically motivated and not realistic option for those who truly aim to stop the war. It's also highly unlikely to ever happen. Trump is unlikely to break with Israel, and Israel is unlikely to simply withdraw from Gaza without all the Israeli hostages and a deal that helps to ensure Hamas cannot retain its control there. In total, that is a depressing summary — it suggests that every broad option now being discussed is either unlikely to succeed or might make the situation even worse. So, what would I recommend? Senior officials do not have the luxury of admiring a problem or analyzing impractical or politically motivated options. They must think seriously about the best of the bad, or meld options together to chart a new path. That is what I might propose: Because, combining options two, three, and four offers an immediate path to alleviating the humanitarian crisis, returning the focus squarely on Hamas, and parlaying the unconstructive proposals coming from Paris, London, and other capitals. This new path — call it Option 6 — would combine a unilateral 30-day pause in Israeli military operations to alleviate the humanitarian situation with an ultimatum that by the end of the 30 days, Hamas must free half the living hostages to extend the ceasefire by 60 days under the existing proposal. From there, you could proceed with a firm, US-backed commitment to negotiate over those 60-days a comprehensive deal to end the war with a new governance structure in Gaza and the release of all remaining hostages. If Hamas refuses to release half the remaining hostages after 30 days, then Israel's unilateral pause would end. Israel could return to military operations but after its military has refit and with the legitimacy for its objectives somewhat restored internationally. This might also parry the French initiative to recognize Palestinian statehood at the UN general assembly next month: If, following Israel's unilateral pause, Hamas has not released ten hostages, then the obstacle to peace would clearly be Hamas. On the other hand, if Hamas does release the ten hostages and we are entering a 60-day window for negotiations to end the war, then it would not make sense to declare Palestinian statehood at the start of that process, as opposed to an incentive towards its conclusion. At bottom, this is an opportunity for Israel and the United States to flip the script entirely, urgently address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, and place the onus for ending the crisis more squarely on Hamas where it belongs. Trump and Netanyahu may not favor such an option as it takes pressure off Hamas on the front end, but it would dramatically increase such pressure — strategic pressure, not just tactical pressure — on the back end. It's also the only viable option at this moment that is likely to achieve what we all want to see: assistance distributed throughout Gaza, hostages coming out of Gaza, and an end to the war with Hamas no longer governing or in control of Gaza. The alternatives might score rhetorical points, but they won't help anyone in Gaza, not the civilians trapped in this awful war, nor the hostages now in tunnels for over 600 days. It's time indeed to flip the script. That means Option 6.

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