Trump was never that interested in Australia. Albanese made sure to keep it that way
The next time around, it took a different tack. Partly that was out of necessity: the 'reciprocal tariffs' went into effect just as Australia entered a federal election campaign.
But there was also a view among Australian officials that there was little value in being one of the first movers. After all, Australia copped the lowest possible rate on April 2 – 10 per cent – so it was difficult to protest too much, even if it seemed unfair. And the risk was that the United States would demand more than we were willing to give.
That view intensified when the United Kingdom became the first country to strike a deal – of sorts – with Trump, but still got lumped with a 10 per cent tariff. The baseline is the baseline; there's not much you can do.
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese was lambasted by his political opponents for failing to secure a face-to-face meeting with Trump, and being stood up at the G7 when Trump left early. And perhaps in the counterfactual, he would have charmed the president and secured the complete tariff reprieve Australia seeks. You never know.
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But the better analysis is probably that lying low paid dividends, and leaves Australia in a position to negotiate down the track – which the White House is open to doing.
Other countries weren't so lucky. New Zealand's tariff was hiked to 15 per cent, from 10 per cent, which its trade minister, Todd McClay, said appeared to be due to the (small) US trade deficit with Wellington.
The US enjoys a trade surplus with Australia, and we have a free-trade deal (supposedly), which is why Canberra feels the tariffs are egregious. But it also means we were never likely to be whacked with a higher tariff, unless everyone else was, too.
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