Israel Aid Blockage Making Gaza 'Hungriest Region on Earth', UN Office Says
Spokesperson Jens Laerke said only 600 of 900 aid trucks had been authorized to get to Israel's border with Gaza, and from there a mixture of bureaucratic and security obstacles made it all but impossible to safely carry aid into the region, Reuters reported.
"What we have been able to bring in is flour," he told a regular news conference on Friday. "That's not ready to eat, right? It needs to be cooked... 100% of the population of Gaza is at risk of famine."
Tommaso della Longa, a spokesperson for the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, added that half of its medical facilities in the region were out of action for lack of fuel or medical equipment.
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Arab News
an hour ago
- Arab News
Camp David meeting 25 years on: Could the Middle East plan have worked?
LONDON: Emerging from lush woodland, amid birdsong and with wide smiles, it was a scene that could not have been further from the slaughter currently unfolding in Gaza. Yet through the quarter of a century that has passed since the Palestinian and Israeli leaders joined President Bill Clinton for talks at Camp David, a direct line can be drawn to the daily massacres Palestinians are now facing. What began with cautious optimism to make major headway toward a final status peace agreement ended in failure on July 25, 2000. Clinton solemnly 'concluded with regret' that after 14 days of talks, the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat had not been able to 'reach an agreement at this time.' Israel and the US media perpetuated a myth that Arafat had turned down a generous offer of a Palestinian state. Palestinians and other diplomats involved say Israel was offering nothing of the sort. Within weeks of the talks ending, the right-wing Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon visited Haram Al-Sharif, the site of Al-Aqsa Mosque, in Jerusalem, igniting the Second Palestinian Intifada uprising against Israeli occupation. While the talks have gone down in history as a failure, the six months that followed culminated in what many believe was the closest the two sides have come to a final status agreement. But by the start of 2001, with Clinton out of office, Israeli elections looming, and violence escalating, the window of political timing slipped away. Many were left to wonder whether the mistakes made during the Camp David meeting resulted in a missed opportunity that could have led to an agreement, thus altering the course of Middle East history. Perhaps decades of episodes of bloodshed and occupation could have been averted. With hindsight aside, is there anything that can be learned from those two weeks of negotiations that brought together the leaders from either side? The talks at Camp David convened eight years after the first of the two Oslo Accords was famously signed in 1993 between Arafat and the then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin at the White House. The agreement was designed as an interim deal and the start of a process that aimed to secure a final status agreement within five years. Under Oslo, Israel recognized the Palestinian Liberation Organization as the representative of the Palestinian people, and the Palestinian side recognized Israel. The agreement led to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority to have limited governance over parts of the West Bank and Gaza, which Israel had annexed in 1967 along with East Jerusalem. A phased Israeli military withdrawal from occupied Palestinian territories was also meant to take place. By the year 2000 it was clear that the Oslo process had stalled with Palestinians deeply unhappy about the lack of progress and that the Israeli occupation had become more entrenched since the agreement. The building of Israeli settlements on occupied Palestinian land had accelerated, restrictions against Palestinians had increased, and violence continued. Clinton, who was in the final year of his presidency, was determined to push for a blockbuster agreement to secure his legacy. Arafat, on the other hand, was strongly against the talks taking place on the grounds that the 'conditions were not yet ripe,' according to The Camp David Papers, a detailed firsthand account of the talks by Akram Hanieh, editor of Al-Ayyam newspaper and close adviser to the Palestinian leader. 'The Palestinians repeatedly warned that the Palestinian problem was too complicated to be resolved in a hastily convened summit,' Hanieh wrote. Barak came to the table also looking to seal a big win that would bolster his ailing governing coalition. He was looking to do away with the incremental approach of Oslo and go for an all-or nothing final agreement. The leaders arrived on July 11 at Camp David, the 125 acre presidential retreat in the Catoctin mountains. The secluded forested location was cut off further with a ban on cell phones and just one phone line provided per delegation to avoid leaks. It was something Clinton joked about when he greeted Arafat and Barak before the press, saying he would not take any questions as part of a media blackout. There was even a lighthearted moment when Arafat and Barak broke into a gentle play fight as they insisted one another entered the lodge first — an image unthinkable in the current climate. But behind the scenes there was less joviality and deep concern grew among the Palestinian camp about how the talks would unfold. The core issues to be discussed included the extent of territory that would be included in a Palestinian state and the positioning of the borders surrounding them. There was also the status and future of Israeli settlements, and the right of return of Palestinian refugees displaced when Israel was founded in 1948. What proved to be the most contentious issue, and the one the US proved to be least prepared for, was the status of Jerusalem, and in particular sovereignty over its holy sites. Palestinians want East Jerusalem to be the capital of their future state with full sovereignty over Haram Al-Sharif — the third holiest site in Islam. The site, known as the Temple Mount by Israelis, is also revered by Jews. Because nothing was presented in writing and there was no working draft of the negotiations, there are differing versions of exactly what the Israelis proposed. Israeli claims that Barak offered 90 percent of the West Bank along with Gaza to the Palestinians turned out to be far less when applied to maps. Israel also wanted to maintain security control over the West Bank. Israel would annex 9 percent of the West Bank, including its major settlements there in exchange for 1 percent of Israeli territory. Israel would keep most of East Jerusalem and only offer some form of custodianship over Haram Al-Sharif, nowhere near Palestinians demands. And there was nothing of substance on returning refugees. While US media interpretations of the talks often claimed the two sides were close to an agreement, Hanieh's account describes big gaps between their positions across the major points of contention. With a sense of foreboding of what was to come, Hanieh wrote: 'The Americans immediately adopted Israel's position on the Haram, seemingly unaware of the fact that they were toying with explosives that could ignite the Middle East and the Islamic world.' The fact the proposals were only presented verbally through US officials meant that nothing was ever formally offered to the Palestinians. Barak's approach meant 'there never was an Israeli offer' Robert Malley, a member of the US negotiating team, said in an article co-written a year later that sought to diffuse the blame placed on Arafat by Israel and the US for the talk's failure. The Israeli leader's approach and failures over implementing Oslo led Arafat to became convinced that Israel was setting a trap to trick him into agreeing major concessions. The Palestinians also increasingly felt the US bias toward Israel's position, and that all the pressure was being applied to Arafat. This undermined the US as an honest broker. 'Backed by the US, Israel negotiated in bad faith, making it impossible for Palestinians to consider these talks a foundation for a just peace,' Ramzy Baroud, the Palestinian-American editor of the Palestine Chronicle, told Arab News. 'The talks were fundamentally designed to skew outcomes in Israel's favor.' Another reason for the failure was the lack of ground work carried out before they started. 'It was not well prepared,' Yossi Mekelberg, associate fellow of the Middle East and North Africa Program at Chatham House, told Arab News. 'They went there with not enough already agreed beforehand, which is very important for a summit.' The US hosting has also been heavily criticized, even by members of its own negotiating teams. 'The Camp David summit — ill-conceived and ill-advised — should probably never have taken place,' Aaron David Miller, another senior negotiator, wrote 20 years later. He highlighted 'numerous mistakes' and a poor performance by the US team that would have made blocked reaching an agreement, even if the two sides had been in a place to reach one. When Arafat held firm and refused to cave to pressure to accept Israel's proposals, the summit drew to a close with little to show toward a final status agreement. 'While they were not able to bridge the gaps and reach an agreement, their negotiations were unprecedented in both scope and detail,' the final statement said. There are various opinions on whether the talks were doomed to failure from the start or whether they can be viewed as a missed opportunity that could have brought peace to the region and averted the decades of bloodshed that followed. The latter viewpoint stems as much from the diplomatic efforts in the months that followed Camp David. Against a backdrop of escalating violence and during Clinton's final months in office, focus shifted to a set of parameters for further final status negotiations. Both sides agreed to the landmark plan in late December but with reservations. The momentum carried over to the Taba summit in Egypt three weeks later but the impending Israeli election meant they ran out of time. In the closing statement, the sides declared they had never been closer to reaching an agreement. With the arrival of President George W Bush in office and Sharon defeating Barak in Israel's election, political support for the process evaporated and the intifada raged on for another four years. 'It was a missed opportunity,' Mekelberg said of Camp David. 'There was a great opportunity there, and had it succeeded, we would not be having all these terrible tragedies that we've seen.' The way that Arafat was blamed for the failure left a particularly bitter aftertaste for Palestinians. 'The most egregious demonstration of Israel's and the US's bad faith was their decision to blame the talks' collapse not on Israel's refusal to adhere to international law, but on Yasser Arafat's alleged stubbornness and disinterest in peace,' Baroud said. The talks were 'unequivocally doomed to failure,' he said because they rested on the false premise that the Oslo Accords were ever a genuine path to peace. 'The exponential growth of illegal settlements, the persistent failure to address core issues, escalating Israeli violence, and the continuous disregard for international principles concerning Palestinian rights all contributed to Camp David's collapse.' He said if any lessons are to be taken by those attempting to negotiate an end to Israel's war on Gaza and implement a wider peace agreement, it would be that 'neither Israel nor the US can be trusted to chart a path to peace without a firm framework rooted in international and humanitarian law.' In the coming days, Saudi Arabia and France will co-chair a conference at the UN on the two-state solution to the conflict, that seeks to plot a course toward a Palestinian state. Perhaps this could help build the sustainable international framework that was lacking in July 2000.
Arab News
2 hours ago
- Arab News
Saudi Arabia rekindles Syria's hopes for economic recovery
Following a directive from Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Minister of Investment Khalid Al-Falih led a delegation of more than 120 Saudi business representatives to the Syrian Arab Republic last week in an attempt to boost cooperation across various investment sectors and promote economic growth, prosperity, and sustainable development. The visit concluded with a series of high-level meetings with Syrian officials and a joint investment forum held under the patronage of Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa, attended by ministers and senior representatives from both sides. The forum resulted in the signing of 47 Saudi-Syrian investment agreements worth nearly SR24 billion ($6.4 billion), covering a wide range of sectors including real estate, infrastructure, finance, CIT, energy, industry, tourism, trade, and healthcare. The forum also highlighted the role of Saudi businessmen and leading companies in supporting Syria's reconstruction and economic revival through strategic partnerships, consultations, and swift, effective sectoral development. On the sidelines of the forum, a ministerial session underscored the deep-rooted economic ties between Saudi Arabia and Syria and reaffirmed the Kingdom's commitment to providing all possible support and facilitation for Syria's recovery and prosperity. Syria-based company Al-Badia Cement announced more than $200 million in investments during the forum to expand its grinding and packaging operations and upgrade its power generation plant, aiming to raise annual production capacity beyond 5 million tonnes. The company also pledged to work with the Syrian government to improve state-owned cement facilities and support market stability. The Saudi leadership's support for Syria's new leadership marks a significant turning point in bilateral relations. It signals a joint effort to accelerate Syria's economic recovery The foundation stone for Al-Fayhaa Cement Factory was laid, with an estimated investment of SR100 million and an annual production capacity of 150,000 tonnes. The foundation stone was also laid for the Al-Jawhara Commercial Tower in Damascus, a Saudi-Syrian project with investment exceeding SR375 million. Underscoring the Kingdom's commitment to fostering investment in Syria, a Saudi-Syrian Business Council was established, chaired by Mohammed Abu Nayan. The council will look to strengthen economic cooperation, promote private-sector partnerships, and expand Saudi investments in Syria. A high-level visit by a Saudi business delegation, led by a senior government official, underscores the Kingdom's commitment to supporting Syria's new leadership in its efforts to move beyond decades of authoritarian rule and toward recovery and stability. The establishment of the council marks the beginning of a new phase of cooperation between businessmen from both countries, at a time when Syria's new government needs strong support to rebuild and achieve security, stability, and prosperity. The council is also expected to play a key role in reshaping Syria's economy and business environment, with the Saudi private sector acting as a strategic partner. Leveraging its significant capabilities and resources, the Saudi private sector is well-positioned to tap into emerging opportunities in the Syrian market. I believe the council is well-positioned to succeed in its mission to help rebuild the Syrian economy in the coming years, particularly as it has already begun developing an action plan for 2025–2030, which should strengthen sustainable economic cooperation between the Kingdom and Syria, identify investment opportunities, support strategic partnerships, and streamline trade and logistics procedures for Saudi exports. Syria also stands to benefit significantly from Saudi Vision 2030 by aligning with its strategic pathways, allowing the Syrian government to prioritize private-sector development in both countries, attract investment in reconstruction and sustainable development, support exports, simplify procedures, and establish good governance practices to protect investors. It is important to note that Syria's business environment is beginning to show signs of change under the new leadership, which has demonstrated a willingness to re-engage with regional and international investors — particularly from countries like Saudi Arabia, which played a major role in lifting economic sanctions. Finally, the Saudi leadership's support for Syria's new leadership marks a significant turning point in bilateral relations. It signals a joint effort to accelerate Syria's economic recovery and transition from a state-dominated model to a more open, participatory system guided by forward-looking and responsible leadership. • Talat Zaki Hafiz is an economist and financial analyst. X: @TalatHafiz
Arab News
2 hours ago
- Arab News
Famine, starvation: challenges in defining Gaza's plight
PARIS: The UN and NGOs are warning of an imminent famine in the Gaza Strip — a designation based on strict criteria and scientific evidence. But the difficulty of getting to the most affected areas in the Palestinian territory, besieged by Israel, means there are huge challenges in gathering the required data. The internationally agreed definition for famine is outlined by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, or IPC, an initiative of 21 organizations and institutions including UN agencies and aid groups. The IPC definition has three elements. Firstly, at least 20 percent of households must have an extreme lack of food and face starvation or destitution. Second, acute malnutrition in children under five exceeds 30 percent. Almost a third of people in Gaza are not eating for days and malnutrition is surging. UN's World Food Programme And third, there is an excess mortality threshold of two in 10,000 people dying per day. Once these criteria are met, governments and UN agencies can declare a famine. Available indicators are alarming regarding the food situation in Gaza. 'A large proportion of the population of Gaza is starving,' according to the World Health Organization's chief, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus. Food deliveries are 'far below what is needed for the survival of the population,' he said, calling it 'man-made ... mass starvation.' Doctors Without Borders, or MSF, said on Friday that a quarter of all young children and pregnant or breastfeeding women screened at its clinics in Gaza last week were malnourished, blaming Israel's 'deliberate use of starvation as a weapon.' Almost a third of people in Gaza are 'not eating for days' and malnutrition is surging, the UN's World Food Programme said Friday. The head of Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on Tuesday said that 21 children had died across the Palestinian territory in the previous 72 hours 'due to malnutrition and starvation.' The very few foodstuffs in the markets are inaccessible, with a kg of flour reaching the exorbitant price of $100, while the Gaza Strip's agricultural land has been ravaged by the war. According to humanitarian organizations, the 20 or so aid trucks that enter the territory each day — vastly insufficient for more than 2 million hungry people — are systematically looted. 'It's become a technical point to explain that we're in acute food insecurity, IPC4, which affects almost the entire population. It doesn't resonate with people,' said Amande Bazerolle, in charge of MSF's emergency response in Gaza. 'Yet we're hurtling toward famine — that's a certainty.' NGOs and the WHO concede that gathering the evidence required for a famine declaration is extremely difficult. 'Currently, we are unable to conduct the surveys that would allow us to formally classify famine,' said Bazerolle. She said it was 'impossible' for them to screen children, take their measurements, or assess their weight-to-height ratio. Jean-Raphael Poitou, Middle East program director for the NGO Action Against Hunger, said the 'continuous displacements' of Gazans ordered by the Israeli military, along with restrictions on movement in the most affected regions, 'complicate things enormously.' Nabil Tabbal, incident manager at the WHO's emergency program, said there were 'challenges regarding data, regarding access to information.'
