22 killed in Angola fuel hike unrest since Monday
Sporadic gunfire was heard across Luanda and several other cities on Monday and Tuesday as people looted shops and clashed with police when violence erupted during a taxi strike.
The strike was the latest in a series of protests after the price of fuel was hiked from 300 to 400 kwanzas ($0.33 to $0.43) a liter on July 1, squeezing living costs for the millions of poor in one of Africa's top oil producers.
'We regret 22 deaths, including one police officer,' Interior Minister Manuel Homem told reporters in a press conference on Wednesday.
Nearly 200 people were injured in the violence, he said, and more than 1,200 people had been arrested.
Shops and businesses remained closed in Luanda on Wednesday as security forces patrolled the city.
The streets were largely empty as people stayed home, although there were some queues outside petrol stations and shops, AFP reporters said.
Police in the southern city of Lubango confirmed separately that a police officer had shot and killed a 16-year-old on Tuesday.
The teenager was part of a group attempting to invade the headquarters of the ruling MPLA party, a statement said.
Anger against the price hike was also the focus of a demonstration of around 2,000 people in Luanda on Saturday, with protesters also alleging government corruption.
There had been similar protests the two previous weekends.
Four people were killed on the first day of the unrest on Monday, according to police.
Local media reported other victims on Tuesday.
TV Nzinga showed women weeping over a body in a street in Luanda's central Cazenga area as people ran out of a supermarket carrying food and goods. The report did not say how the person was killed.
In the same area, a young man was killed near a supermarket, apparently by a stray bullet, an AFP reporter said.
Protests and unrest were also reported outside the capital, including in the city of Huambo, around 600 kilometers (370 miles) north of Luanda, police said.
Images on social media also showed protests in the coastal city of Benguela, south of the capital.
The Portuguese-speaking country of more than 36 million has a high inflation rate that neared 20 percent in June, while the unemployment rate hit almost 30 percent, according to the national statistics authority.
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