'Why only carriers face music in narcotics case?'
The observations came in a 17-page written judgment authored by Justice Athar Minallah, in which the court acquitted two individuals who had earlier been sentenced to life imprisonment in a narcotics case.
The ruling was issued by a three-member bench headed by Justice Minallah, and comprising Justice Irfan Saadat Khan and Justice Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan.
"There are several law-enforcement agencies vested with powers to apprehend and prosecute those who are involved in the crimes relating to narcotic drugs, including a special agency, the Anti-Narcotics Force established under the Act of 1997," the verdict notes.
The judgment calls into question the effectiveness of these institutions, particularly when viewed against the scale and pervasiveness of the drug menace.
"The people of Pakistan have to bear the financial burden for maintaining these law enforcement agencies entrusted with the onerous task to eradicate the menace of narcotic drugs from the society. Have they achieved their designated goal? The answer is an emphatic 'No'," it reads.
The court further lamented the growing spread of narcotics across the country, stating: "The evil of narcotic drugs has spread throughout the country and it cannot be disputed that it has reached the educational institutions where they are freely accessible."
The bench pointed out that even in the few cases where arrests are made, prosecutions often do not result in convictions, raising further doubts about the integrity and professionalism of investigative processes.
"The law enforcement agencies have not gone beyond arresting carriers and then, in many cases, failing to prove the guilt even to their extent. If the society has to be freed from the evil of narcotic drugs then each law enforcement agency has to perform effectively and in the most professional manner."
"They have to be held accountable for their omissions and lapses committed during the investigations or while prosecuting a case. The future generations cannot be exposed to the menace of narcotic drugs merely because the several law enforcement agencies entrusted with the onerous duty to free the society from this evil fail to perform effectively or are seen as complicit.
"The buck stops with the Federal and Provincial Governments, as the case may be, because they are ultimately responsible for the overall and general supervision of the law enforcement agencies. The responsibility does not end with the Executive branch of the State because the Judicial branch is also equally responsible in ensuring that the trial is conducted fairly and that a just decision is reached.
"This case also shows that the trial court had failed in exercising its powers vested under the law.
"We, therefore, expect that the Government of Sindh which, according to section 5 (1) of the Act of 2009, exercises general superintendence over the Prosecution Service and is responsible for ensuring achievement of the objectives of the Act of 2009, will take effective steps so that cases involving crimes relating to narcotic substances are dealt with effectively and in accordance with the duties and responsibilities of the investigators and Prosecutors.
"The Prosecutor General Sindh is expected to examine this case and take appropriate action so that the omissions observed in this case are not repeated. The prosecutor General is further advised to consider issuing guidelines in exercise of its functions under section 9-A (1) of the Act of 2009 for the Prosecutors and officers responsible for investigations relating to effective and efficient prosecution.
The High Court is also expected to consider laying down a policy of regular training of judicial officers relating to conducting of criminal trials. The order also said that this case has emanated from the province of Sindh where the Provincial Assembly of Sindh has promulgated and enacted the Sindh Criminal Prosecution Service (Constitution Functions and Powers) Act 2009.
"The Criminal Prosecution Service of Sindh has been established under this legislation. The Act of 2009 sets out the powers, functions and responsibilities of the prosecution service in conducting prosecutions on behalf of the Government.
"The administration of this service vests in the Government. Section 9 (1) explicitly provides that the Prosecutors shall be responsible for the conducting of prosecutions on behalf of the Government. The Prosecutor General is empowered under section 9-A (1) to issue general guidelines for the Prosecutors or officers responsible for investigation for effective and efficient prosecution.
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Express Tribune
13 hours ago
- Express Tribune
Doval Doctrine: India's trail of terror
Over the past decade, India has barely made the effort to conceal its insatiable appetite for destabilising Pakistan. That ambition has pulsated beneath every wave of anti-Pakistan vitriol — a chorus that has only grown more pronounced with time. But its most obvious display surfaced in 2014, shortly after the inauguration of Narendra Modi, when his newly appointed National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, laid out the cards in a speech at Sastra University that left little to the imagination. 'Pakistan's vulnerability is many, many times higher than (that of India's). Once they know India has shifted to defensive offense, they will find it is unaffordable for them,' he cautioned. 'You can do one Mumbai, you may lose Balochistan.' Doval spoke without mincing words. 'There is no nuclear war involved in that. There is no engagement of troops,' he added, his tone laced with hubris. 'They know the tricks. We know the tricks better.' That speech would come to define what is now known as the Doval Doctrine — India's muscular reimagination of its policy toward its nuclear-armed neighbour, Pakistan. It reclassified terrorism as an existential national security threat and cast Pakistan not just as a rival, but as the epicentre of that threat. The battlefield, however, was no longer confined to traditional war zones. This was the language of covert operations, information warfare, and calibrated destabilisation. What Doval hinted at — almost with disdain — was India's willingness to stir unrest within Pakistan. His reference to Balochistan served as a smoking gun, exposing New Delhi's role in exploiting the fault lines of Pakistan's underbelly through a covert war pursued for strategic ends. For Islamabad, this was an open admission of a clandestine conflict that had long been suspected. In the years that followed, Islamabad compiled a trove of intelligence — some shared publicly, some through backchannels, and some privately with The Express Tribune — tracing a pattern of sabotage, psy-ops, and support for insurgent groups. At the heart of these claims sits India's spy agency RAW. While the Indian government never admitted to any of this officially, behind the scenes the Doval Doctrine had already taken root — a new phase in its hardline agenda against Pakistan was taking shape, waged not with tanks and battalions, but with proxy fighters, digital manipulation, and plausible deniability. What is Doval Doctrine? According to Pakistan's former National Security Adviser Moeed Yusuf — arguably the official most familiar with his Indian counterpart's mindset — the doctrine rests on a false premise -- first, that India has the right to hegemonise the region, and, second, that it has the capacity to do so. 'This doctrine has a deep and dangerous ideological underpinning,' Yusuf warned, adding that both assumptions are flawed. 'As we've seen in the most recent crisis, all of India's neighbours harbour misgivings about how it has sought to impose its ideology — or its vision of what the region should look like.' Initial signs of India's covert maneuvers came to the fore in 2016, following the arrest of Kulbhushan Jadhav — an Indian spy and serving naval officer — from Mashkel, a remote town in the Washuk district of Balochistan, near the Iran border. Jadhav confessed to being an operative of Delhi's espionage engine, orchestrating sabotage operations inside Pakistan. Operating as 'Hussein Mubarak Patel,' Jadhav was responsible for dozens of terrorist attacks, including the ones on Mehran Naval base and Sui gas pipelines, and assassination of senior counterterrorism police officer SSP Aslam Chaudhary, according to officials. 'Jadhav was assisted by Sub Inspector Rakesh, alias Shaikh Rizwan Hussain, and handled by former RAW joint secretaries Anil Kumar Gupta and Alok Joshi.' China's interests in crosshairs Pakistan's deepening strategic alliance with China has long been a thorn in India's side — economically, geopolitically, and ideologically. If anything, this became even more apparent during a recent briefing by India's deputy army chief, who in May accused China of using Pakistan as a proxy — just as the two nuclear-armed rivals edged dangerously close to the brink. That said, nothing irks New Delhi more than the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a cornerstone of Beijing's massive Belt and Road Initiative. In 2015, RAW set up a covert operations cell with an initial funding of $500 million to sabotage CPEC, according to intelligence sources. The cell, which functions under the direct supervision of the Indian Prime Minister's Office, has been involved in destabilising Pakistan by supporting terrorist activities, particularly in Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. The operation, previously facilitated through Indian diplomatic missions in Afghan in the Afghan cities of Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif, provided weapons, training, and financial support to insurgents, reveal intelligence sources. The primary objectives of the cell included exploiting political divisions, targeting key CPEC infrastructure such as power plants and economic zones, and disrupting digital networks in Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Terrorist groups, including Baloch sub-nationalists and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), were reportedly recruited to carry out attacks. Details gathered by security officials indicate that RAW's support includes providing refuge, financial assistance, and operational coordination to terrorist outfits targeting Pakistani interests. The Indian spy agency has set up several hideouts for Baloch groups in Chasma Garm, Chitral, Kalat, and Jekigor, serving as springboards for attacks. In 2019, RAW intensified ties with separatist leaders, facilitating a merger of key groups like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Baloch Republican Army (BRA), resulting in the creation of the Baloch Raaji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS) — a united front for terrorist and political activities. New Delhi's spy apparatus also mobilised self-exiled Baloch leaders, including Brahamdagh Bugti, Harbiyar Marri, and Javed Mengal, to orchestrate anti-Pakistan campaigns abroad, supported through Indian funding and logistics. On Jan 29, 2020, BRAS launched 'Operation Aas-Rech' against Pakistani forces. India allocated $60 million to fund a 700-man militia in Balochistan, reveal security officials. A 24-member commission, including 10 RAW operatives, oversaw operations. Separately, $9 million was paid to Baloch groups and Afghan collaborators, with financial transactions reportedly acknowledged by RAW-linked facilitators and the Indian Embassy in Kabul. Aslam, alias Achu, commander of the BLA's deadly Majeed Brigade, masterminded the 2018 attack on the Chinese Consulate in Karachi which was claimed by the group's spokesperson Jeeyand Baloch. The attackers were found to be in direct contact with Aslam Achu and Bashir Zeb from overseas, while Aslam was located in Afghanistan and later treated in India's Max Hospital with RAW's assistance. Moreover, ex-BLA leader Ghulzar Imam Shambay confirmed in his confessional statement the consulate attack was carried out on RAW's instructions. Achu also co-masterminded the 2019 Gwadar PC Hotel attack with BLF leader Dr Allah Nazar, planned by RAW handler Anurag Singh with $0.5 million in funding. Nazar had traveled to India under a fake identity created by RAW. Other BLF leaders, including Khalil Chairman and Muqaddam Marri, alias Jalat, also received medical cover in India while coordinating attacks. Similarly, BRA leader Brahamdagh Bugti visited India on an Afghan passport under a false identity to seek asylum. In 2022, a suicide bombing at Karachi University targeted a van carrying Chinese nationals, killing three Chinese citizens and one Pakistani. The attacker, Shari Baloch, was radicalised by BLA women trainers and her husband, Dr Haibtan, acted as the facilitator, while Bashir Zeb prepared the suicide vest and oversaw the attack with RAW's backing from overseas. Officials say the attack was a coordinated effort by RAW and BLA to drive a wedge between Pakistan and China. 'The loss of lives of Chinese citizens is deeply worrying for Pakistan which continues to take unprecedented measures to ensure their security,' says Hassan Akbar, former Pakistan Fellow at the Wilson Center. However, he adds that the bilateral relationship between both countries is deep, enduring and strategic, insulated from any attempts by adversaries to create disruption in ties. Officials say the hijacking of the Jaffar Express passenger train earlier this year was carried out by Majeed Brigade with RAW's support. 'Prior to the attack, BLA commanders Bashir Zeb and Fazal Sher met two RAW agents in a neighbouring country on Feb 21, followed by another meeting on Feb 26 with Indian officials in a third country, where the plan was finalised,' one official revealed. 'During the operation, the attackers maintained a direct contact with RAW handlers.' After the cinematically staged hijacking, Indian media amplified BLA propaganda by featuring its spokespersons Jeeyand Baloch and Bahot Baloch, who publicly celebrated the terrorist act. Officials also claim to have unearthed BLA-RAW nexus behind the May 21, 2025, deadly suicide car bomb attack on a school bus in Khuzdar. Just two months ago, during the Pakistan-India escalation, the BLA publicly declared its support for India, calling itself a willing 'military arm' in the confrontation. Experts believe this alignment of narratives and escalation of attacks during the standoff reflects a coordinated hybrid warfare strategy aimed at destabilising Pakistan. India's strategic calculus India's use of proxy warfare is neither a recent development nor confined to Pakistan. 'India began employing proxy tactics to advance its strategic objectives as early as the 1970s, by actively creating and supporting groups such as the Mukti Bahini in East Pakistan and the LTTE in Sri Lanka,' says Akbar. Some analysts speculate that Balochistan could be the new East Pakistan in India's strategic calculus. 'I really do not see how a comparison could be drawn between West and East Pakistan and Balochistan, because demographic realities are different and Balochistan doesn't border India,' says Abdul Basit, Pakistan's former ambassador in New Delhi. Akbar echoes that view. 'Comparing Balochistan with East Pakistan would be inaccurate due to differences in geography, demography, and political history. India has been involved in fomenting unrest in Balochistan in one way or another since the 1970s. Their objective is to destabilise Pakistan,' he says. Yusuf agrees that the bottom line is a clear and conscious policy decision led by India's NSA's office, in which destabilising Balochistan is a deliberate strategic objective. RAW-TTP nexus According to security officials, India's spy agency operated joint cells with Afghanistan's former intelligence service, the National Directorate of Security (NDS), coordinating cross-border attacks until the Taliban's takeover in 2021. Former NDS handlers — now either in hiding or rebranded under the Taliban regime — are said to continue collaborating with RAW in supporting TTP factions. A striking example came in Feb 2022, when the BLA launched coordinated attacks on Frontier Corps camps in Panjgur and Noshki. Officials cite the use of Afghan-origin weaponry and encrypted communications as evidence of cross-border involvement. Intelligence reports suggest that India dished out $820,000 to reunite splinter groups of the TTP and arm them via supply routes from Afghanistan's Herat province. This support, officials claim, has fueled a rise in IED attacks and targeted killings, particularly in North Waziristan tribal district. The 2023 assassination of ISI's Brigadier Mustafa Kamal Barki near Angoor Adda in North Waziristan was linked to RAW-enabled TTP elements. Moreover, the TTP's evolving propaganda campaign, including online platforms like Ummat-e-Islamiya, receives technical backing from Indian cyber operatives, according to the findings of the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA). A 2025 UN report exposed the growing collaboration between the BLA, TTP, and Islamic State Khorasan (ISK), facilitated by networks operating out of Afghanistan. The report further notes that Afghan territory continues to serve as a coordination hub for TTP and BLA activities, identifying training camps in Spin Boldak and Nimroz allegedly used to prepare operatives in arms and explosives. The hijacking of the Jaffar Express stands out as the most brazen example of this RAW–TTP–BLA nexus. According to Pakistani intelligence, RAW employs a network of smuggling operations, offshore shell companies, and cryptocurrency transactions to fund these groups. The use of Afghan nationals, including people like Hazrat Ali, alias Ramzan, has also been flagged. He was accused of facilitating IED attacks in Quetta. Complicating counter strategy Bolstered by its nexus with RAW, TTP's operational and strategic profile has evolved in recent years. Once largely confined to Pakistan's western border regions, the group's footprint has now expanded into major urban centres, including Peshawar, Karachi, and Quetta, signaling a more coordinated and far-reaching threat landscape. Defence experts describe this evolution as not merely geographic, but also tactical. Where the group once relied on traditional guerrilla warfare, it has now adopted urban terrorism, employing advanced tactics such as drone reconnaissance and coordinated attacks in densely populated areas. Security officials interpret this shift as evidence of increased training, planning, and technological support — facilitated by external actors. TTP's funding stream has also shifted significantly. Earlier reliant on local extortion and informal funding methods, the group now reportedly taps into cryptocurrency channels and receives support from foreign intelligence networks, particularly via Afghan-based operatives allegedly linked to RAW. Another alarming development lies in the group's recruitment strategy. Where the TTP once drew fighters primarily from local tribal populations, it has now turned to digital radicalisation, targeting urban youth through encrypted apps and online propaganda. This shift has broadened its recruitment pool while making detection significantly more difficult. Moreover, the group has adopted a decentralised structure, enhancing its resilience. In contrast to previous years when the leadership was more vulnerable to counterterrorism operations, the current setup allows the TTP to operate from Afghan sanctuaries with greater freedom, making leadership decapitation far less effective. Together, these changes paint a troubling picture of a terror outfit that is not only surviving but adapting — both structurally and operationally — amid an evolving regional security environment. Pakistan's response Pakistan has intensified its counterterrorism efforts across multiple fronts — ranging from cross-border precision operations and internal crackdowns to cyber surveillance and financial disruption — aimed at dismantling RAW's coordinated hybrid warfare campaign. Security forces, in coordination with regional partners, have stepped up offensive measures against terrorist groups operating along the Pak-Iran border. Last year, they carried out targeted strikes on BLA safehouses in Iranian border towns, reportedly serving as logistical hubs. On the domestic front, Operation Green Bolan — launched in the aftermath of the Jaffar Express hijacking — resulted in the killing of 33 BLA terrorists. Simultaneously, a major arms cache was seized in Panjgur, while a media propaganda cell was dismantled in Turbat, disrupting the group's communication and logistics chain. The government has also moved to curtail financial channels allegedly fueling terrorist operations. Investigations revealed that several cryptocurrency wallets traced on Binance were linked to BLA operatives and coordinated from abroad. A massive clampdown on oil smuggling also bore fruit in 2024, when security forces intercepted 2.8 billion litres of smuggled Iranian oil, valued at around $800 million. Intelligence sources claim the proceeds were channeled into financing subversive activities. Following disclosures related to the Jadhav case, Pakistan has urged the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to closely monitor Indian-linked NGOs and shell companies suspected of laundering funds for destabilisation operations. In addition to this, Islamabad has presented fresh dossiers to the United Nations, International Court of Justice, and FATF, detailing evidence of RAW's alleged financing of terror groups and sabotage activities within Pakistan. To bolster border security, Pakistani officials have engaged both the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and Iranian authorities in intelligence sharing — particularly between 2024 and 2025 — focused on curbing militant mobility across porous frontiers. On the digital front, officials say that agencies have shut down several media cells and enhanced surveillance on encrypted platforms such as Telegram and Signal. While officials insist these steps are critical to national security, civil liberties groups have criticised the internet blackouts and privacy intrusions. Security along CPEC has also been tightened, with over 15,000 troops now deployed to guard critical infrastructure across restive regions. Meanwhile, officials have launched outreach efforts to engage non-violent Baloch political leaders in a bid to address longstanding grievances. Disinfo campaign Hybrid warfare isn't a distant, abstract strategy anymore — it's here, unfolding on Pakistan's soil in the form of cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, covert assassinations, and steady destabilisation of national institutions. It's a conflict waged and fought without formal declarations, through proxies, pixels, and propaganda. In a speech at PMA Kakul, former army chief Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa cautioned about this emerging reality: 'Our enemies know that they cannot beat us fair and square and have thus subjected us to a cruel, evil and protracted hybrid war. They are trying to weaken our resolve by weakening us from within.' In 2020, EU DisinfoLab exposed India's 15-year-long disinformation campaign involving over 750 fake media outlets and dozens of NGOs, designed to malign Pakistan on international platforms like the UN and EU. The Brussels-based civil‑society watchdog's report revealed that fabricated events, forged identities, and manipulated media were deployed to shape Western narratives, especially around Kashmir and Balochistan. That same year, Pakistan's Foreign Office was targeted in cyberattacks traced to Indian IPs. These weren't isolated incidents. Intelligence officials observed sharp spikes in propaganda ahead of FATF reviews and periods of military tension. India also hired lobbying firms such as Cornerstone Government Affairs to manufacture diplomatic momentum abroad. The campaign points to a deliberate and coordinated hybrid warfare strategy aimed at undermining Pakistan's global standing — diplomatically, economically, and politically. Violation of international law At the heart of this operation is Doval Doctrine — a strategy of pre-emptive and offensive subversion targeting states India perceives as security threats. This posture has led to Indian footprints not just in disinformation, but in terrorist activities in Pakistan and beyond. The 2023 assassination of Sikh activist Hardeep Singh Nijjar in Canada, and a foiled plot to kill Gurpatwant Singh Pannun in the US — both attributed to RAW operatives — have lent further credibility to Pakistan's longstanding claims. According to intelligence sources, RAW's so-called 'death squads' have carried out nearly two dozen extrajudicial assassinations of dissidents, activists, and political opponents, including on Pakistani soil. These targeted killings abroad and support for foreign terrorist groups violate international law and the sovereignty of other states. 'The Indian government's support and financing of terrorist activities constitutes a clear violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,' says international law expert Ahmer Bilal Soofi. 'Post-1945, any unauthorised intervention or support that undermines another country's sovereignty constitutes a serious breach of international law. Respect for territorial integrity, sovereignty, and non-intervention is not just a legal norm — it is a moral imperative,' he adds. According to Soofi, two legal principles flow from Article 2(4): the principle of non-intervention, and the principle of non-interference. India's material and operational support for terrorists and subnational armed groups constitutes a violation of both. The arrest of Kulbhushan Jadhav — a serving Indian naval officer and admitted intelligence operative — represents a direct breach of the principle of non-intervention. Financial trails, intercepted communications, and field evidence linking Indian handlers to acts of terror in Pakistan point to persistent violations of the principle of non-interference, says Soofi, who is also the founding President of the Research Society of International Law. 'Incidents such as the Jaffar Express attack, for which Pakistan has presented concrete and specific evidence of external involvement, constitute a blatant and unacceptable violation of international norms.' According to Soofi, there are several diplomatic and judicial forums available to Pakistan, including the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee and mechanisms under UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which obligates states to prevent and criminalise terrorism financing and support. 'But most important, Pakistan should register FIRs in cases where they have the evidence and they should undertake investigation and use mutual legal assistance framework internationally available and also under their own laws to send requests for taking statements from the Indian officials regarding their involvement and that is how they can make it clearer to the international community,' he says. The footprint of India, Soofi adds, will ultimately be converted into admissible evidence through documented police investigations. Muted global response While Pakistan has submitted multiple dossiers — addressed to the UN Secretary General, the OIC, FATF, and key international allies — laying out detailed evidence of India's support for terrorist activities, its appeals for accountability have largely fallen on deaf ears. Countries like China, Iran, and Turkey have voiced concern, but the West continues to maintain a strategic and telling silence. 'The international community is impervious because, a.) we have not been able to put up our case in a consistent and coherent manner; b.) India's clout is a reason states have [their own] interest [which] they pursue. So, they will not like to embarrass [India] or put their interest at the stake for Pakistan. It is as simple as that,' says Ambassador Basit. Yusuf believes India has banked on the fact that the Western world did not accept Pakistan's position on this issue for the longest period. 'I think Pakistan also got it wrong by not putting out dividends more forcefully for a number of years, even though this has been a concern for well over multiple years,' he says while referring to the 2009 Sharm el-Sheikh joint statement between Pakistan in India in which Balochistan was mentioned. 'This is a very deliberate strategy to keep Pakistan unstable and destabilised. It has managed to continue it because the Western world, because of its own problems with Pakistan, has bought India's position on terrorism, and because of this idea or illusion of India being a counterweight to China, etc,' he adds. Akbar agrees with Yusuf, saying that the international community is increasingly becoming aware of India's malign actions in Pakistan and other countries but because of its economic clout and centrality in Western attempts at containing China, international observers are reluctant to publicly call out India for its destabilising actions. 'This should not dissuade Pakistan, which should continue to call out India's active support for terrorism inside Pakistan and share evidence with global capitals,' he adds. Ambassador Basit stresses the need for a sustained diplomatic campaign. 'The problem with us is that we prepare dossiers, present them to the world, and then forget about them. Perhaps we lack the institutional capacity to sustain any long-term effort — and that, in my view, is the real issue.' Way forward Fault lines are a fact of geopolitics — and adversaries have always tried to exploit them. In Balochistan, those cracks are visible and widening. If Pakistan is to deny India the space to destabilise the region, it must address internal grievances rather than simply shield against external threats. That means rethinking its strategy — one that balances kinetic force with political outreach, governance reform, and a sharper media counter-narrative. The challenge is not just one of territorial control, but of winning hearts and rebuilding trust in a province long scarred by neglect and insurgency. 'Pakistan should never take its eye off the ball and continue to work on whatever can be done to address the issue in Balochistan, [I mean] the political aspect of the issue in Balochistan through dialogue and politically,' notes Yusuf. 'There is definitely a kinetic element to what is happening, but the stronger Balochistan is internally the more difficult it becomes for the enemy to do what it is doing. So, that has to be part of the parallel strategy and we should never overlook that.' Concurring with Yusuf's assessment, Ambassador Basit says: 'Deterrence, in fact, is internal. Deterrence in the sense that we need to focus on socio-economic development and do not allow space to these terrorist groups. We crack hard on them, ensure that more and more people do not join them, expose them to the people of Balochistan, and expose them internationally.' Ironically, BLA and BRA are proscribed terrorist groups, but their leaders have been granted political asylum in European countries where they live comfortably, while their groups perpetrate terrorist violence in Pakistan. 'Their leadership, like Brahamdagh Bugti, Harbiyar Marri, and many others, are sitting in the UK and Switzerland. We can build pressure on these countries to extradite them to Pakistan,' adds Ambassador Basit. 'But for that to happen, we need to build a strong case because these people have taken political asylum in these countries and these countries also use them [as] their assets to promote their interests in Pakistan.' The right time Amid shifting geopolitical currents, New Delhi's position is becoming increasingly tenuous, particularly in the wake of revelations about RAW's global assassination campaign, its ambivalent stance on the Ukraine conflict, and recent military setbacks against Pakistan. This presents a window of opportunity for Islamabad to assert its narrative with strategic precision and diplomatic finesse. By exposing India's hybrid warfare tactics and the broader implications of the dangerous Doval Doctrine, Pakistan has a chance to recalibrate global perceptions. With growing receptivity in the West — including from US President Donald Trump — this moment calls for a consistent, coherent, and deftly executed foreign policy anchored in long-term strategic vision.
Express Tribune
17 hours ago
- Express Tribune
SC committee clips wings of acting CJP
Listen to article The committee formed under the Supreme Court Practice and Procedure Act, 2023 has made the office of acting chief justice of Pakistan (CJP) ineffective by adopting a procedure. The committee — led by Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) Yahya Afridi and comprising Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Justice Aminuddin Khan — on May 29 made a new procedure to regulate its business. A notification in this regard has been issued by Supreme Court Registrar Muhammad Saleem Khan. The same notification has also been uploaded on the Supreme Court website this week. The notification said the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 has shifted to the committee the powers of constitution of benches and powers which were earlier exercised by the CJP. It stated that the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 is not comprehensive to deal with many eventualities like emergencies and absence of the CJP for being abroad. 'It is necessary to regulate such voids not covered by the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023'. Therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section 2 of section 2 of the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023, the committee made a procedure to regulate its business. The notification stated that these procedures may be called the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Committee Procedure, 2025 which will come into force at once. Clause 1 of the procedure states that the chairperson, the CJP, shall convene the meeting of the committee as and when necessary, physically or through virtual means, for the purpose of constitution and reconstitution of benches. Clause 2 of procedure states that a minimum two members shall form the quorum of a meeting of the committee. Clause 4 says the committee shall constitute and reconstitute benches when required with regular intervals, preferably monthly or on fortnightly basis. 'Once finalized and issued, no change shall be made, save as provided under these procedures. Any change in the constitution of the committee including change of the chairperson or a member shall not invalidate the constitution of benches finalized by the committee,' it says. Clause 5 says that whenever the chairperson — the CJP — proceeds abroad or is unavailable to chair the meeting, he may constitute a special committee to deal with matters relating to reconstitution of benches if any of the urgent situations arises like sudden illness or absence of a judge, death or recusal of a judge. The special committee will be strictly limited to the urgencies and shall be recorded in writing, indicating reasons. Such temporary alteration shall be reported to the committee at its next meeting. Clause 6 says that SC registrar shall maintain record of all meetings, decisions, and alterations. Clause 7 says that these procedures shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other rules for the time being in force. Clause 8 says the committee may amend these procedures from time to time, as deemed necessary. Some legal experts believe that Clause 5 of newly notified Supreme Court Practice and Procedure Committee Procedure 2025 is contrary to constitutional provision and the purpose of this procedure is to make the office of acting CJP redundant. Former Lahore High Court judge Shahid Jamil said rule 5 of the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Committee Procedure, 2025 is in direct conflict with Article 180, dealing with appointment of acting CJP especially when the incumbent top judge is absent from Pakistan. 'It is incumbent upon the president to appoint the acting CJP, who shall be the most senior judge of the Supreme Court. Most importantly, the acting CJP shall act as the CJP during the absence. Shahid Jamil said Rule 5 is authorizing for consideration of a special committee, if the chairman of the committee is abroad or unavailable. 'The act has not used the word chairman of the committee, only the CJP is made one of the members alongside the Senior Judge of the Supreme Court and Constitutional Bench. In absence of the CJP, the most senior judge would, after appointment as the acting CJP, perform all the functions and exercise all powers of the CJP,' he added. Some legal experts said the committee led by CJP Afridi has exclusive power to decide about the cases which will be referred to constitutional benches for adjudication. However, the committee led by CJP Afridi and comprising Justice Shah and Justice Khan has been redundant as no regular meeting is being held to discuss the constitution of benches. Sources revealed to The Express Tribune that there has been practically no committee meeting since Justice Afridi took charge as the CJP. Perhaps, there was only one committee meeting on May 29 wherein the procedure was approved by the committee members. Sources said that there is no discussion or debate on how cases are being marked and benches made. Some senior lawyers are wondering as to why two senior judges adjudicate as division benches while junior judges are part of three-member benches. It is learnt that only the proposed roster is sent to committee members for approval. During the tenure of CJP Afridi, no minutes of committee meetings were uploaded on the SC website. Talking about the purpose of the procedure, a lawyer said it was done mainly to introduce Clause 5 wherein it is elaborated that the CJP will form a special committee to deal with the matters in his absence. He said the beneficiaries of 26th Constitutional Amendment are very nervous to leave matters in the hands of an acting CJP. 'Under the present Constitution, Justice Syed Masoor Ali Shah will be the acting CJP. They fear that Justice Shah as the acting CJP may do anything which will create trouble for them.' Justice Shah has worked as the acting CJP twice in the recent past. One section of lawyers is questioning why Justice Shah endorsed the procedure, which is contrary to the Constitution. Perhaps he did not react as clause 5 of the procedure is directly related to him, said a lawyer.
Express Tribune
21 hours ago
- Express Tribune
No-confidence cloud gathers over Gandapur in K-P
A political storm may be brewing in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as Governor Faisal Karim Kundi confirmed on Saturday that both the ruling alliance and opposition are seriously weighing a no-confidence move against Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur – amid a shifting tide in assembly numbers following the Supreme Court's ruling on reserved seats. In an exclusive conversation, the K-P governor said the opposition reserves the democratic right to bring a no-confidence motion against the provincial government whenever it has a numerical edge in the assembly, saying why would any opposition wait if it has the numbers. Governor Kundi clarified that there has been no formal attempt by the opposition to oust the K-P government yet, but the opposition was actively working to consolidate support. "We (ruling alliance and provincial opposition) are seriously working on it. The numbers have changed in the assembly. The opposition is not in a hurry but it won't wait when the numbers are complete," he said. Governor Kundi said the opposition parties currently hold around 54 seats in the K-P Assembly and see an opening to secure support from nearly 35 independent members. "No opposition party would wait even for a second if it can outnumber the ruling party in any assembly," he said. With the support of the independent MPAs, Governor Kundi, while responding to a question, said that the task of removing the PTI-led K-P government was achievable, as the defection clause would not apply to them. In 2024, the Supreme Court had held that lawmakers who cross the floor will have their votes counted, even if they are subsequently disqualified. This would necessitate by-elections on any seats they vacate. In contrast, if the opposition relies on independent members for support, no by-elections would arise, as their participation does not violate constitutional provisions. Under Article 136 of the Constitution, the chief minister can be removed through a vote of no-confidence supported by a majority of the total membership of the provincial assembly. Alternatively, under Article 130(7), the governor can ask the chief minister to seek a vote of confidence if he believes the leader of the house no longer commands majority support. In both cases, the support of at least 73 MPAs is required in the 145-member assembly, indicating that the opposition is currently short by about 19 to 20 votes. Governor Kundi dismissed the notion that the ruling alliance at the Centre was rushing into any political manoeuvring. "Work is in progress. When the numbers are there, we won't delay," he said. In reference to CM Gandapur's repeated public taunts and warnings, Kundi said: "The chief minister keeps throwing challenges. But we will act when it matters." Drawing a parallel with the political events of April 2022, Kundi recalled that a no-confidence motion against then Prime Minister Imran Khan was successfully executed back then. "At that time too, the PTI government claimed no one could dislodge them. Everyone saw what happened next," he said. Asked whether Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif had instructed him to initiate the move against the K-P government during their recent meeting, the governor clarified that while the matter was discussed, there were no specific directions issued. "Yes, we discussed the situation after the reserved seats decision, but there was no order or specific task given from the prime minister," he said. On a lighter note, Kundi, while referring to CM K-P's repeated challenges that he would quit politics if anyone ousts him, said "we don't want Gandapur to become unemployed or quit politics." Commenting on coordination within the opposition, Kundi acknowledged the political relevance of JUI-F chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman and said interactions take place to discuss different things and the rapidly changing political situation. Kundi said that Maulana is a senior figure with vast political experience, saying meetings and consultations with political leaders like him are routinely held. The recent changes in the reserved seat allocations have altered the political equation in K-P, prompting discussions at the highest level within the ruling coalition. While no formal step has yet been taken, political observers believe the possibility of a no-confidence motion has become significantly possible if independents change sides. They say that the coming days are likely to be decisive in determining whether the PTI retains its grip on the province or faces a repeat of April 2022.
