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In battle of the delegations, real story lies in what went unsaid

In battle of the delegations, real story lies in what went unsaid

Time of India14-06-2025

In the aftermath of their recent military clash, rival delegations from Delhi and Islamabad converged on various global capitals, each aiming to shape elite opinion, win sympathy, and control the post-crisis narrative. Having witnessed some of the exchanges in London firsthand, the diplomatic duel across briefing rooms, think tanks, and diaspora events was as revealing for what was unsaid as for what was spoken.
Messaging starts with messengers
The difference in delegation profiles was notable. India's all-party parliamentary mission carried symbolic weight and cross-party legitimacy, including senior figures like Ravi Shankar Prasad and Pankaj Saran. Pakistan's team leaned more on technocrats and veteran advocates of global engagement, such as Sherry Rehman and Bilawal Bhutto Zardari. India's group projected cohesion and resolve; Pakistan's aimed to influence narratives and broaden appeal.
India's cautious case
India's delegation framed
Operation Sindoor
as part of a broader shift: limited cross-border retaliation to terrorist acts as policy, not aberration. They emphasized terrorism as a global threat whose response merits international understanding—not moral equivalence. The delegation linked India's counterterrorism struggle to challenges faced by Western democracies, with Pakistan as a common denominator.
In my observation, Indian representatives appeared quietly frustrated that while many countries expressed sympathy after Pahalgam and tacitly accepted India's right to act, few explicitly condemned Pakistan. Though confident in their message, their delivery often felt restrained. In think tanks, the tone was formal, even stiff; diaspora engagements were reportedly more fiery.
Though most accepted the delegation's basic premise, some observers noted the irony in Delhi resisting calls to frame Russia's invasion of Ukraine as a shared threat but now seeking solidarity on Pakistani-based terrorism.
Crucially, the delegation faltered when pressed on domestic radicalization. Two of the Pahalgam suspects were reportedly Indian nationals. Asked how New Delhi planned to prevent disillusionment turning to violence, the only response was that 'things today are better than in the 1990s.' This was a missed chance to demonstrate nuanced understanding of the challenge.
Other inconsistencies emerged. India's representatives rejected 're-hyphenation' with Pakistan, yet much of their messaging focused on Islamabad. While stressing the quarrel was with Pakistan's military, not its people, questions about suspending the
Indus Waters Treaty
complicated that distinction.Many briefings took place inside the High Commission, with diaspora members complaining to me that they thought too much political outreach was aimed at UK politicians of Indian heritage. Playing it safe has a certain logic, but may have limited engagement with new or skeptical audiences.
Pak's polished—but problematic—pitch
If India played it safe, Pakistan opted for smooth. Their delegation turned up at major think tanks eager to engage and keen to appear misunderstood. With assistance from lobbying professionals, their narrative was tightly crafted for European audiences: Pakistan sought peace through dialogue, emphasising Kashmir as the 'unfinished legacy of Partition,' terrorism, and water. Pakistan said it wanted talks, a neutral investigation into Pahalgam, and accused India of refusing cooperation or prove culpability.
This narrative of peace sat uneasily beside claims of military success and personal attacks on Indian leaders. Critique of Indian media spin might have bolstered believability had it not been accompanied by other factual distortions: legal sleight-of-hand over Kashmir, misreadings of UN resolutions, and claims that India admitted culpability for terrorism in Balochistan.The most convincing moment came on the Indus Waters Treaty, where the stark picture painted of the consequences struck a chord, even if significant action has yet to follow.
A key question remains: what was the objective? If persuasion abroad was the objective, the reliance on longstanding misrepresentations made it a difficult sell to informed audiences. If the goal was domestic signaling, that focus likely came at the expense of deeper foreign engagement.
Simpler sell, harder ask
Ultimately, the Indian delegation framed all terrorism as emanating from Pakistan; Pakistan framed it as emerging from Kashmir. The narratives didn't just clash—they barely shared the same terms of reference. As performative exercises providing content for domestic media, both probably succeeded on their own terms.
In the battle to move international opinion, outcomes were uneven. India may have achieved more, but it also had the easier task — framing terrorism as a universal threat aligns with European security narratives. Pakistan, by contrast, asked outside actors to invest political capital in corralling New Delhi back to the negotiating table — a much harder sell. Yet neither side escaped contradiction. India's claim to strategic clarity was weakened by deflection on domestic aspects of terrorism in Kashmir. Pakistan's message of peace was blunted by triumphalism and tired tropes.
In diplomacy, silence often speaks louder than words. In London last week, the most telling signals were what each side omitted, ignored, or performed for the audience they believed mattered most.
Ladwig III is a senior lecturer at the department of War Studies, King's College London

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