US or China? 2 Philippine provinces show the local face of a global power struggle
Philippines , with provincial support for national security strategies often shaped by economic ties and exposure to Chinese activities in the South China Sea.
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The report by the University of the Philippines, titled 'Localization of the United States–China Rivalry: Cases from the Philippines', examined the influence of both superpowers in Cagayan and Palawan, two provinces that host sites accessible to
American forces under the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA).
'Big-power influence in the Philippines trickles down to the local government level because national foreign policy preferences are not diffused equally across the country,' the study said. It added that political, economic, diplomatic and military benefits from either side served as 'powerful incentives for local leaders'.
Cagayan lies in the far north, facing Taiwan across the Luzon Strait, while Palawan is the westernmost province, near the West Philippine Sea – Manila's term for its exclusive economic zone within the contested
South China Sea
Though both provinces host EDCA sites, researchers observed stark differences in how they viewed
China 's role. In Cagayan, a long history of welcoming Chinese investment – dating back to the 1990s – has shaped political attitudes, while Palawan's stance is strongly influenced by on-the-ground encounters with Chinese vessels in disputed waters.
A US Army CH-47 helicopter flies over Cagayan during a joint military exercise in May last year. The province hosts US military sites under the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement. Photo: AP
A key difference between the two lies in how closely their leaders align with national policy, according to Aletheia Valenciano, an assistant professor of political science at the University of the Philippines and a co-author of the study.
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