Panasonic starts mass production at EV battery plant in US
Panasonic Energy held a ceremony on Monday. The company has invested 4 billion dollars to build the plant, its second in the US.
The facility's annual output capacity is expected to be enough to power 450,000 electric vehicles. There are plans to hire up to 4,000 workers.
But the full production that was initially targeted by the end of March 2027 has been effectively postponed. That's partly due to falling sales at the company's key customer, Tesla.
Another unfavorable factor for Panasonic is that US tax breaks for EV purchases are set to expire in September. This will likely mean a challenging business climate just as the company is trying to diversify its customer base.
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Japan Times
4 hours ago
- Japan Times
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The Diplomat
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It exposes the ideological gulf between its promises and the lived experience of Chinese workers. If party leaders deny the existence of labor exploitation, they are telling an outright lie that will anger many workers; if they address the issue, it legitimizes that reality is at odds with the CCP's charter. This is precisely why labor advocates are treated with suspicion and often repression – but also some degree of caution. During the 2015 '709 Crackdown,' China jailed dozens of human rights lawyers, but took a softer approach with labor activists, quietly releasing them or assigning them jobs after detention to avoid international attention further escalating the issue. The goal was clear: to suppress attention and not provoke an international firestorm. A similar pattern played out in 2025, when Brazil sued BYD for alleged forced labor. Instead of lashing out at international critics, as it often does in response to human rights issues, China responded discreetly and promised an investigation. These examples reflect the nuance and sensitivity that the government applies to labor issues, as compared to human rights issues that it often rebuts. This different approach underscores the potential for labor issues to compel government action and, in turn, how international labor standards can be used as a tool for change. In other words, for the Chinese government, labor conditions resonate where abstract human rights appeals do not. From factory workers to office employees, the majority of China's workforce faces long hours, low wages, and little social protection. Labor violations aren't theoretical; they are everyday realities that could fuel domestic pressure and policy reform if exposed. Tools to address these problems already exist. In the United States, the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) and Section 307 of the Tariff Act have led to meaningful enforcement actions, even if many Uyghur workers are rarely found in primary factories supplying to the U.S. In the future, as additions to the UFLPA entity list are expected to slow, U.S. enforcement could shift toward broader supply chain interventions through the Withhold Release Orders (WROs), further expanding to address forced labor issues in supply chains, using enforcement to promote fairer labor standards. Yet despite the tools at Washington's disposal, labor concerns remain sidelined in mainstream trade discussions, drowned out by debates over tariffs, trade deficits, and subsidies. These traditional tools have struggled to move the needle on Chinese economic policy, which is largely built upon China's persistent low labor cost advantage. Labor, by contrast, is a pressure point the Chinese government is less prepared to resist, precisely because it implicates both the CCP's legitimacy and its economic model. Labor issues directly affect the immediate interests of the Chinese people, which concerns the government, and international labor standards can thus serve as an effective mechanism to expose the deeply rooted structural flaws in China's governance model. This is the moment for the United States and its allies in Europe to unite around labor standards as a strategic pillar of trade policy. As China-EU tensions continue to simmer, a coordinated, transatlantic approach, through shared standards, trade mechanisms, and enforcement frameworks, could significantly increase leverage over China's labor practices. This strategy not only advances sustainable global supply chains but also balances immediate commercial interests with long-term labor equity, benefiting workers in both the United States and China. Yes, there will be obstacles: political division among allies, corporate resistance, and China's likely counterattacks. But the stakes are too high to ignore. Fair labor standards not only strengthen global supply chains; they offer a pathway to a more just global economy, one where competitiveness does not rely on exploitation. Reshaping the rules of global trade will require more than rhetoric. It will require placing workers – American, Chinese, and others – at the center of policy. And that begins with recognizing that labor is not a side issue. It is the issue.
