BP-chartered tanker leaves port of EU sanctioned-Nayara Energy without oil, sources say
The vessel was supposed to load 60,000 metric tons (447,000 barrels) of ultra low sulphur diesel on July 21 with the cargo bound for Africa, LSEG data showed.
Nayara, partly-owned by Russia's largest oil producer Rosneft, and BP did not immediately respond to requests for comment. The sources declined to be named as they were not authorized to speak to the media.
The change in loading plan suggests that European Union sanctions imposed on Nayara on Friday are disrupting refined products exports from the Russia-backed refiner, one of the two private fuel exporters in India.
The vessel, Talara, did not load the cargo after the EU imposed the sanctions, one of the sources said. The EU sanctions package against Russia over its war in Ukraine was aimed at dealing further blows to Russia's oil and energy industry.
BP has since released the ship, making it available for charter within India or Middle East region, two of the sources said.
Nayara said in a statement on Monday it condemned the EU's 'unjust and unilateral' decision to impose sanctions on the company, while India said on Friday it did not support the EU's 'unilateral sanctions.'
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