Emergency mock drill at airport to evaluate preparedness, response coordination
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Pune airport director Santosh Dhoke said the drill was successful.
The simulated situation involved the detection of smoke in the cockpit of a dummy incoming aircraft. Upon receiving this information, the Airport Emergency Plan (AEP) was immediately activated and alerts were disseminated to all relevant stakeholders.
Multiple emergency centres were swiftly established to manage the incident. These included an emergency control centre, emergency operations centre, emergency control room, survivors reception centre, crew reception centre, friends and relatives reception centre, reunion area, rendezvous point and a dedicated media centre.
A passenger coach was stationed to simulate the aircraft, ensuring realism in the response efforts.
Following the alert, firefighting units from the Indian Air Force (IAF) Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) services, along with fire brigades from Pune Municipal Corporation (PMC), Pune Metropolitan Region Development Authority (PMRDA) and Pimpri Chinchwad Municipal Corporation (PCMC) responded immediately to the scene.
The simulated flames were extinguished efficiently and rescue operations were carried out to evacuate dummy passengers.
Medical teams from the Airport Health Organization (APHO), district medical services and local hospitals administered first aid on-site and transported the "injured" to designated hospitals. Simulated survivors were guided to the appropriate reception centres for further care and support.
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Indian Express
20 hours ago
- Indian Express
Man with most flying hours on MIG-21 wants one last sortie as it flies into the sunset
When it comes to MIG-21s, there is no one more knowledgeable than Air Commodore Surendra Singh Tyagi (retd), who has a record-breaking 4,306 hours flying the aircraft–a feat acknowledged by the Russians themselves–and a staggering 6316 sorties in total. So when he speaks about the pros and cons of the Russian aircraft, everyone listens. And now, when the departure of MIG-21 BISON from the Indian Air Force (IAF) is imminent, all that the 83-year-old veteran fighter pilot wants is one last take-off roll down the runway in the power-packed aircraft before it bids adieu. 'This is one request which I will be making to the Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal A P Singh, whom I shall be meeting very soon,' says Air Marshal Tyagi in a freewheeling conversation with this reporter over the phone from his home in Jamnagar, Gujarat. The intrepid fighter pilot who flew almost every fighter aircraft in IAF's inventory till he retired in 1996 made Jamnagar his home after multiple tenures there and finally retiring as the air officer commanding of the Jamnagar air base. 'I would also be presenting my logbook, which I have meticulously maintained throughout my service from the first day to the last to the air chief with the request that it may be placed in the IAF museum, where it could serve as an inspiration for future generations,' says Air Commodore Tyagi. Air Commodore Tyagi has flown aircraft ranging from Vampires, Hunters, Gnat, Ajeet, Jaguar, Canberra, MIG-23, MIG-29, and Mirage during his service in the IAF from 1965 to 1996. Air Commodore Tyagi's first operational unit was 27 Squadron flying Hunters before he moved to MIGs. Initially he flew Vampires. In 1968 he trained on MIG-21s in the No. 45 Squadron in Chandigarh, where pilots were given operational conversion training on MIG-21 FL. 'Hunter was a docile aircraft. We never thought of MIG-21s as a problem aircraft, though it was very different. We never felt any problem. It was definitely fast handling, and the challenge was of a kind that you were always busy in the cockpit,' recalls Tyagi. He says the MIG-21 FL type 77 had a fixed gunsight while the Hunter had a gyro sight. 'In firing from a MIG-21, you have to cater for a lot of things. Also, Hunter used to turn very well, and we initially thought it turned better than MIGs. Later, after flying MIGs, I found that the vertical manoeuvring of the aircraft was very good. However, the aircraft would not react instantly, whatever the pilot demanded of it, and the pilot had to understand what the aircraft wanted,' he says. In those early days of MIG-21 in the IAF, the pilots used to wear pressurised spacesuits of the same kind that Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin had worn into space. 'Actually, when MIG-21 came to India, it was considered to be an interceptor aircraft. It was very agile at great heights, going up to 24 km at times at speeds close to 2.4 mach. You would be really climbing like a rocket. Then we modified it into the ground attack role with rocket pods and external guns, 500 kg bombs on either side, which we used extensively in the 1971 war. We used to get reasonably good results,' Air Commodore Tyagi says. Tyagi says that in the MIG-21 Type 96, the drag increased, and they were not as fast in the ground attack role. But with time came the MIG21 BIS upgrade, and it had a powerful engine. We flew to 12.3 km height in two minutes and 40 seconds. The Type 96 MIG 21 M was also very stable for air-to-ground firing,' he says. Having seen 24 postings in his operational service, Air Commodore Tyagi served in a number of MIG-21 squadrons and went on to command No. 35 and No. 32 squadrons besides serving a tenure in Iraq as an instructor. Air Commodore Tyagi underwent no ejection from MIG-21 but went through a crash landing on the runway in Pathankot in October 1978 and was very lucky to walk away alive. 'I had two rocket pods and three tanks on my aircraft. On short finals, I was asked to go around because of a dog on the runway. I raised my nose, opened maximum power, and started climbing. At around 150 m, the nozzle failed, the cone failed, the engine thrust went down, and the engine flamed out. As part of the ejection sequence which I initiated, the canopy flew off. But I saw that I was too low to continue the ejection within safety margins. The aircraft landed on its belly as the undercarriage was retracted for the go around. On the other side of the runway, there were five aircraft of the No. 3 Squadron waiting to fly, and I was in danger of piling into them. It was a Tuesday, and as I used to fast for Hanuman, I felt nothing would go wrong. The aircraft lurched to a halt well past these, and I unstrapped and ran out. I have never run so hard in my life, and the aircraft exploded behind me. Later, I flew more MIG-21s after the crash than I flew before. 'In 2013, the Russian ambassador gave me a trophy for the maximum hours on MIG-21. Earlier, in 1993, then PM Narasimha Rao called me and felicitated me. I never flew for myself. You flew for the people with you, and you gave them whatever positive things you learnt. The then chief presented me with a golden plaque,' says Air Commodore Tyagi. The veteran pilot says the growth of the IAF is related to the growth of MIG-21 in the country. 'Modernising gradually and slowly now we have reached the fourth generation. At one time, 70-75 per cent of IAF squadrons had MIG-21. When you calculate the rate of accidents, it is not alarming. But when you calculate the number, it is alarming,' he says. Air Commodore Tyagi says an IAF fighter pilot is a 'soldier pilot' because he puts his country ahead of his safety. 'In earlier MIG-21s, we used to see it written on the nose that 'this aircraft costs Rs 47 lakh'. Our pay at the time used to be Rs 1,200-1,400. You used to be conscious that India cannot afford to lose the aircraft. 'Later, when low-level sorties started and we went into the ground attack role, we used to have bird hits. The brief was to pull up, gain height and reheat the engine. But an engine with turbine damage will not relight. Our pilots tried to relight and were so low that ejection was not possible, and they used to crash with aircraft. Abroad, no pilot waits, he ejects,' he says. Air Commodore Tyagi says the fatalities went down when the procedures were amended. 'This is one of the best aircraft ever produced. Every fighter pilot in the world wants to fly a MIG 21,' he says.
NDTV
20 hours ago
- NDTV
MiG-21's Final Flight: Why Training, Not The Jet, Failed Air Force Pilots
The Indian Air Force (IAF) is preparing to retire its fleet of Russian-origin MiG-21 fighter jets in September. The aircraft, which played a key role in India's military campaigns, including the 1971 war against Pakistan, has been both celebrated as a formidable war machine and stigmatised as the "flying coffin" due to its high accident rate. With just two months until the final flight on September 19, historian and Indian Air Force expert Anchit Gupta joined NDTV to provide a detailed perspective on the MiG-21's legacy, dissecting its triumphs, challenges, and the reasons behind its controversial nickname. Introduced to the IAF in 1963, the MiG-21 was initially acquired for a specific role: as a high-altitude interceptor designed to counter aircraft like the American U-2 spy plane. Mr Gupta, whose father flew the MiG-21 during his service, recalled the aircraft's distinct roar as a morning alarm at airbases. "The MiG-21 is extremely close to my heart. And I saw my father fly it. We used to live at the bases. That was our alarm in the morning to wake up. I remember 1986 Operation Brasstacks. My father was in Bhuj, going into the trenches and counting the aircraft coming back to the base. So there is an emotion to MiG-21 for all of us," Mr Gupta told NDTV. MiG-21F-13, designated Type 74 from 1963 The IAF operated around 800 to 1,000 MiG-21s over six decades, a scale unmatched by most air forces. Of these, approximately 300 were lost in accidents. "That is a very sobering statistic. But there's no time lapse to that statistic, and therefore, people struggle to make sense of it. I think the answer very much lies in what we did with the aircraft. The aircraft was acquired for a very, very limited role, to be honest. It was a high-altitude interceptor. The original design of the MIG was to intercept the U-2," Mr Gupta said. The aircraft's role evolved far beyond its original design, encompassing ground attack, fighter reconnaissance, air defence, and, critically, jet training -- a role, Mr Gupta said, it was never intended to fulfil. "Flying Coffin" Label: A Misnomer? The MiG-21's reputation as a "flying coffin" stems from its high crash rate. Mr Gupta challenged this label, arguing that the aircraft's accident record is less about inherent flaws and more about systemic issues in pilot training and aircraft acquisition. "It's very much linked to our procurement. Our combat squadron strength went from eight squadrons in 1947 to nearly 40 squadrons in 1965. Now you have sanctioned it, how do you acquire? And so we were huffing and puffing to acquire more aircraft, and MiG-21 came out of nowhere with the USSR saying, 'Listen, I'll do technology transfer, you manufacture it locally.' It was something that really fell into our laps," Mr Gupta told NDTV. The MiG-21 When the MiG-21 entered service, only the IAF's most experienced pilots were assigned to it due to its demanding flight characteristics. The aircraft's small size, limited cockpit visibility, and high landing speed of over 300 km/h made it unforgiving, particularly for novices. The MiG-21U trainer variant was ill-suited for training. The IAF relied on subsonic trainers like the Kiran and Iskra, which were inadequate for preparing pilots for the MiG-21's supersonic performance. The gap between basic trainers and the MiG-21 widened as the fleet expanded from eight squadrons in 1963 to nearly half the IAF's strength by the 1980s. "The biggest difference is speed. The speed at which you are performing the manoeuvres, the actions that you are doing, dramatically changes. That is the biggest difference, whether it is mid-air manoeuvres, whether it is landing or whether it is taking off,' Mr Gupta said. The "Human Error" Factor The IAF's attribution of many MiG-21 crashes to "human error" has often been misunderstood, he added. Mr Gupta explained that human error, in aviation terms, does not necessarily blame the pilot. "Air Force doesn't mean 'human error' in the way people interpret it," Mr Gupta said. "In the simplest form it means that when you've done an accident investigation, you've realised that the accident happened because the pilot in control made a mistake. Now that mistake has a cause behind it. That cause could be training. You have not trained the pilot appropriately. That cause could be inexperience. "That cause could be psychological, that cause could be disorientation, tons of causes behind it." For young pilots transitioning from subsonic trainers to the MiG-21, the lack of adequate preparation was a significant contributor. The stigma of "human error" often compounds the pain for families, who perceive it as blaming the pilot rather than acknowledging systemic issues. "I haven't met a single MiG-21 pilot who said he didn't love the jet," Mr Gupta said. "It's a big regret. They love the aircraft, but they love their colleagues more. And every life lost is a story that remains etched on the psyche forever. I think the human element is actually made worse off by how we categorise the loss. To the family or to a civilian, it sounds like we're blaming the pilot, and then the emotion comes out. The guy had barely started flying. This is an unforgiving aircraft, the aircraft has problems, and now you have the audacity to blame the pilot and say 'human error,'" he added. The MiG-21's Combat Record Despite its challenges, the MiG-21's combat record is formidable. During the 1971 India-Pakistan war, the MiG-21FL (Type 77) earned the moniker "runway buster" for its ground attack role, with 240 units manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). The aircraft was instrumental in India's victory. In 1999, during the Kargil conflict, MiG-21s performed admirably, though the war also saw the loss of Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja in a crash. Post-Kargil, Squadron Leader Prashant Kumar Bundela shot down a Pakistani Atlantique maritime patrol aircraft. In 2019, Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, flying a MiG-21 Bison, engaged Pakistani aircraft during the Balakot operation, downing an F-16 despite facing advanced adversaries like AMRAAM-armed F-16s and JF-17s. The Bison variant, introduced in the early 2000s, remains contemporary, equipped with an Israeli jammer, Russian R-77 and R-73 missiles, a partial glass cockpit, and a helmet-mounted sight. Its short scramble time makes it ideal for forward bases like Srinagar, where it outperformed alternatives like the MiG-29. "There's a very interesting point around the 2019 incident. You know, there's a lens people wear which says, 'Why was the MiG-21 there? Why didn't we have the MiG-29? Why didn't we have the Su-30?' People don't know that there was no other aircraft capable of being at Srinagar at that time other than the MiG-21. It has the shortest scramble time to date," Mr Gupta said. The MiG-29 "We have replaced it with a MiG-29 in Srinagar. I hate to say this, but it is not ideal for Srinagar, even today. A MiG-21 today is more ideal than the units we have there because you don't have a gyro, you have a single engine, light it, off you go, and therefore even today in the last 8 to 10 years or longer, MIG-21 has been our Operational Readiness Platform (ORP) guardian. It is the jet that scrambles. You put small detachments across all our forward bases. Imagine with the MIG-21 going away, who's supposed to fill that shoe? Who is supposed to fill that shoe? It's supposed to be the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA). It is supposed to be the LCA. I hope it does," he added.
Indian Express
a day ago
- Indian Express
History Headline: 6 decades ago, how MiGs won out, joined IAF
Sixty-two years after it joined the Indian Air Force (IAF) at Air Force Station Chandigarh, the MiG-21 will fly into history from the same station in a poignant farewell ceremony. It was in March 1963 that the first IAF Squadron equipped with MiG-21s was raised in Chandigarh. The No. 28 Squadron came up with Wing Commander (later Air Chief Marshal and Chief of Air Staff) Dilbagh Singh taking over its command on March 2, 1963. The MiG-21s inducted into the No. 28 Squadron back then were the MiG-21 F-13 type, the older version of the Soviet aircraft. Seven officers had been selected by the IAF headquarters to be sent to Russia for training on the MiG-21s — Wing Commander Dilbagh Singh, Squadron Leaders MSD Wollen and S K Mehra, and Flight Lieutenants A K Mukherjee, H S Gill, A K Sen, Denzil Keelor and B D Jayal. Keelor could not complete the training due to medical reasons while Wollen later succeeded Dilbagh Singh as the Commanding Officer of the squadron and commanded it during the 1965 Indo-Pak war. Incidentally, Wollen and Mukherjee were involved in the first MiG-21 crash near Chandigarh in December 1963 when two of the aircraft collided mid-air while practising for the 1964 Republic Day parade. The two survived the crash. Over the years, the MiG-21 and its variants would be in the news for several crashes, eventually earning it the pejorative sobriquet 'The Flying Coffin'. The first six MiG-21s arrived in Chandigarh in April 1963 after they were flown from No. 2 Equipment Depot Bombay to Chandigarh via Agra. They were earlier received in Bombay in a disassembled condition and had been put together by a team of Soviet engineers and were test flown by their pilots. The No. 28 Squadron rightly earned the name of 'The First Supersonics' with the induction of the MiG-21s and retain that name to date. The unit now flies the MiG-29 aircraft and is stationed in Adampur in Punjab. The induction of the supersonic MiG-21s into the IAF was preceded by some hectic diplomatic manoeuvring by the USA. In 1963, given India's war with China the previous year and continued tensions with Pakistan, a supersonic aircraft in the IAF arsenal was a pressing need. The USA had already supplied one of its newest aircraft, the F-104 Starfighter, to Pakistan and there was considerable anxiety in the minds of the political and military leadership in India. The US F-104 had also been considered by the IAF for induction, but the US was not very keen to supply them in large numbers in order to keep a balance between India and Pakistan. Incidentally, given its high accident rate, the F-104 Starfighter too ended up earning an unflattering reputation as 'The Widowmaker'. Back in the late 1950s and early 1960s, there had been efforts on the part of several US officials posted at the embassy in India as well as the State department in Washington to urge their government to sell F-104s to India in substantial numbers. Their aim was to prevent India from entering into a deal with the Soviet Union as they feared that this would help the Soviets make inroads into the Indian military. They were proven right in the years to come. Declassified records of the US State Department reveal correspondence with the US Embassy in Delhi where the latter pointed out that in the 'absence of a favorable United States policy, India will go to Soviets for military equipment'. The US Ambassador to India at the time, John Kenneth Galbraith, predicted that if India decides to buy MiG-21 and/or other types of major military equipment from the Soviet, it will lead to a large number of Soviet technicians being introduced into the Indian defence establishment. 'Soviet training and technical advisors who would accompany purchase of Soviet equipment will have inevitable influence on younger post-independence Indian military officers now rising to position of prominence,' wrote Galbraith in a telegram to the State Department. A September 1962 paper by the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the US State Department, titled 'Status of Indian Negotiations for MiGs' quotes Galbraith as reporting that 'Nehru has become increasingly cool to the expenditures necessary for a MiG deal and his disposition is to postpone it or scale it down. When asked about the MiG deal by reporters in London on September 9, Nehru said, however, that 'negotiations have gone a good bit further'.' The Soviets, too, had their misgivings. Archival documents of the US State Department talk of indications that the Soviets had their doubts, for both technical and political reasons, about providing India with a manufacturing capability for the MiG-21. 'The Soviets apparently have had some question about Indian ability to handle so complicated a program as manufacturing supersonic fighters. This seems to us to be reasonable caution on the part of the Soviets. Additionally, we have received reports that the Soviet Union has been meeting strong Communist Chinese objections, particularly to the proposal for manufacturing MiG's in India,' says the State Department paper. In order to encourage India to turn down the Soviet offer of MiG-21, US President Kennedy even approved a simultaneous US offer to sell India nine C-130 transport aircraft in Rupees currency. All these efforts came to a naught and India not only went on to induct MiG-21s but also manufactured them on large scale at the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited facility in Ozar near Nashik (Maharashtra) and in Koraput (Odisha), where the engines were manufactured. The writer is Assistant Editor, The Indian Express
