Japan chipmaker Renesas postpones achieving 2030 sales goal by 5 years
Japanese chipmaker Renesas Electronics Corp said Thursday it will push back its target of achieving sales of over $20 billion in 2030 by five years in the face of stiff competition from Chinese rivals.
The goal is to more than double its sales of 1.35 trillion yen in 2024.
Also, Renesas, a major maker of automobile chips, now aims to boost its market capitalization sixfold by 2035, instead of the previously targeted 2030, Renesas CEO Hidetoshi Shibata said at a meeting with investors.
"The environment surrounding us has significantly changed. It is not easy now to face off squarely against Chinese firms and beat them," Shibata said.
Renesas sees Chinese companies improving their manufacturing skills and technology as they have been facing U.S. export restrictions amid the U.S.-China chip war.
On Monday, the company said it expects a loss of about 250 billion yen in the first six months of this year, related to its restructuring support for a U.S. business partner, Wolfspeed Inc.
Wolfspeed has suspended the development of silicon carbide wafers for next-generation power semiconductors, which will be used in electric vehicles, among others, even as the U.S. company agreed to supply the wafers to Renesas.
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