Indian rupee a ‘strong tool for savings' in Russia
'In Russia, Sber allows you to make transactions in rupees, which is something a lot of our Indian staff do,' he said. 'But beyond that you can also open a rupee deposit or carry out other operations, just like you would with any other foreign currency.'
Vedyakhin added that the bank was 'deliberately opening up space for the rupee,' because it saw the currency as a 'strong tool for savings inside Russia.' He said that a significant share of payments between Russia and India goes through Sber with many such payments being made in national currencies. Sber handles payments for up to 70% of all Russian exports to India.Vedyakhin also noted that Sber's business in India, which started in 2010, is actively expanding. 'India is a very friendly market for Russia,' Vedyakhin said, adding that he found the people of Delhi and Mumbai to be 'incredibly positive' during a recent visit. 'It's a great thing that we are welcome in India, they want us there,' he added. 'Our business with India is going well.'
Sber has offices in Delhi and Mumbai, as well as an IT center in Bengaluru, with plans to hire 300 IT personnel.Vedyakhin expressed happiness that the issue of what to do with an excess amount of rupees has been resolved. 'There is now a stable high demand for rupees, and rupee transactions are flowing smoothly,' he said. 'Commissions on rupee payments have dropped significantly, which directly benefits our clients.'
You Can Always Bank on Friends: 🇷🇺 Sber Expanding in India, National Currency Payments Flourishing 🇮🇳 - Alexander Vedyakhin, Top Exec for Russia's Largest Bank pic.twitter.com/xZUzPSAKOv
In addition to its existing range of hedging tools, including forwards and options, Sber is expanding its product lineup, which now features rupee-denominated loans for Russian businesses at interest rates substantially lower than those available in Russia, a Reuters report said last year.
Due to Western sanctions, Sber is restricted from conducting transactions in US dollars and euros, and is also unable to utilize the SWIFT system for making international transfers. India, which chose not to join sanctions on Russia, has been one of the largest purchasers of Russian oil since 2022 and continues to foster a friendly relationship with the country.
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