EV maker Xpeng to test autonomous driving software in Hong Kong to support go-global drive
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He Xiaopeng, co-founder and CEO of the Guangzhou-based company, said on Tuesday that tests of its autonomous driving system, known as Xpeng Navigation Guided Pilot (X NGP), would be conducted in Hong Kong soon, according to the Hong Kong Economic Journal. He spoke ahead of the opening of the National People's Congress, which begins Wednesday and is expected to run through next Tuesday. He is an NPC delegate.
The AI-powered technology, which competes with
Tesla's Full Self-Driving (FSD) driver-assistance software, will be introduced in right-hand drive markets like Thailand, he added. He did not provide a specific time frame for the company's Hong Kong testing.
In a statement to the Post, Xpeng confirmed the CEO's remarks. It added that the advanced driver assistance system, which enables cars to navigate on streets and conduct self-parking, would be promoted worldwide in 2026.
'We hope that with better development and testing in the future, we can bring Xpeng's top smart driving capabilities to the world, including Thailand, other Southeast Asian markets and more countries in 2026,' it said.
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Xpeng primarily builds left-hand drive models for its customers on the mainland, but it started to assemble right-hand drive models last year to compete in markets like Hong Kong and Southeast Asia.
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AllAfrica
15 minutes ago
- AllAfrica
Deflation dimming China's market allure
Disinflation in China is not being driven by weak household appetite alone. The more decisive factor is a sustained mismatch between policy-driven industrial output and actual market absorption. The country's price weakness, where the Consumer Price Index (CPI) was in deflation territory from February to May and up a mere 0.1% in June, is the outcome of a long-running expansion of capacity across several sectors that were never disciplined by global demand signals. For two decades, the model emphasized investment over consumption. Policymakers championed capacity-building in industries they viewed as nationally strategic. These included electric vehicles, solar components, steel, semiconductors, and shipping — all seen as future export engines. What followed was a flood of credit, coordination between local authorities and state-linked firms, and price competition aimed more at dominance than efficiency. Today, China's economy is saturated with surplus. Manufacturers are under pressure to maintain volumes, even at the expense of margins. Incentives at the provincial level still reward production benchmarks. Banks, facing limited profitable lending options, continue to support large state-linked corporates. These factors generate output levels that no longer match demand — domestically or globally. This is no longer just a domestic phenomenon. Chinese firms are now offloading excess supply into global markets, forcing down prices across multiple categories. For example, Europe's auto sector, particularly its electric vehicle producers, has already flagged this trend as commercially unsustainable. American policymakers, too, have raised concerns over underpriced Chinese exports in solar technology and green infrastructure inputs. Investor confidence in China remains under pressure. Deflation is not a cyclical hiccup. It's the logical result of an economic model that continues to treat output growth as a policy goal in itself. When domestic demand underdelivers, the default response is to lean harder into supply. As that supply grows, prices weaken further. Markets have stopped giving China the benefit of the doubt. Previous slowdowns were treated as tactical pauses. This one appears to be different. Price weakness now comes with questions about whether the country's growth model can adapt to changed conditions. International investors, particularly long-term institutions, have scaled back exposure to China's broad equity indices. Capital allocation is now selective, with a preference for names that are either deeply export-competitive or exposed to high-end consumption trends. The pricing effect is now visible in upstream materials, manufacturing inputs, and final consumer goods. The pass-through may seem marginal, but the cumulative effect is to put pressure on profitability far beyond China's borders. This is not a temporary fluctuation in trade flows. It's a result of persistent policy preferences that reward volume regardless of return. For global investors, this shift alters the map. Exposure to China no longer delivers predictable diversification or scale-based upside. Instead, it perhaps presents a complex mix of risk: deflationary drag on pricing power, geopolitical friction in key sectors, and weakening margins among global firms that compete head-on with Chinese oversupply. Passive capital is at particular risk in this environment; broad exposure is not a reliable strategy when entire segments are moving against price discipline. Allocations need to be more forensic. Portfolios should distinguish between companies benefitting from China's demand for upstream inputs — including energy and advanced capital goods — and those being undercut by its outbound overcapacity. Multinationals relying on high-margin exports to China may face a softer environment, while firms exposed to its export aggression will encounter tighter spreads and squeezed pricing. Global capital flows are already responding. There is less appetite for blanket Asia exposure. Investors are tilting toward India, ASEAN, and reshoring beneficiaries in North America and Europe. Manufacturing investment is being pulled into jurisdictions that offer pricing transparency, enforceable competition rules, and protection from subsidy distortion. Within China itself, attention is turning to segments that are better aligned with domestic services, premium consumer preferences, or tech sub-sectors that are not yet overbuilt. But this is no longer a momentum story; it appears to be a precision play. Back in developed markets, the deflationary spillover has implications for policy. Central banks will face a more uneven global pricing environment. Sectors competing with Chinese exports may see depressed margins and weaker inflation prints. Others, shielded by trade barriers or domestic scale, will remain under pressure from wage and input cost dynamics. For macro investors, that divergence offers opportunity, but only with close attention to exposure mapping. The assumption that China remains a global engine of demand now looks increasingly flawed. It remains a large, fast-moving economy, but one whose internal dynamics are now as much a source of risk as reward. What's missing is a pivot away from the metrics that drove past performance. An economy of this scale cannot operate on the same assumptions that shaped its breakout phase. Market realities now require restraint, precision and pricing discipline. Without these, disinflation will continue to weigh on corporate earnings and asset valuations. Consumption, while vital, cannot absorb the overhang created by a decade of supply-led ambition. Even aggressive fiscal support is unlikely to rebalance the equation while incentives remain fixed on production volumes. The longer Beijing postpones meaningful correction, the more the investment case shifts elsewhere. Price trends are not the story; they are the evidence.
AllAfrica
an hour ago
- AllAfrica
Is Xi holding China back from its potential greatness?
During the Biden years, a lot of us thought that the next era of world history would be defined, in large part, by economic and geostrategic competition between the US and China. That's looking a little less likely these days. Donald Trump still makes the occasional aggressive noise toward China, but his approach has become much more conciliatory. Slowly or quickly, he's walking away from most of the policies the Biden administration was using to stand up to China — canceling export controls, canceling industrial policy, putting tariffs on key allies, defunding research, and so on. Meanwhile, China is reaching the zenith of its power. Its share of world manufacturing1 has rocketed up to levels similar to what the US enjoyed in the mid-20th century, when it was the planet's undisputed industrial colossus: Source: Jonathon P. Sine China's cities feel like the future to people who go there — their infrastructure is gargantuan and newly built, they're filled with robots and electric vehicles and futuristic payment systems, and the buildings are covered in LEDs. China's innovation system is producing fewer world-changing breakthroughs than America did at its peak, but has nevertheless managed to put the country at the forefront of science and technology2 through an accumulation of incremental discoveries. The world's electric cars, drones, ships, industrial machines, and robots are made in China, and — thanks in part to Trump's surrender — its semiconductors and aircraft may soon be made there as well. But being the world's most advanced and powerful country is a relative thing. In an absolute sense, I think it's very possible that the Chinese Century — or the Chinese Half-Century, or whatever it turns out to be — will underwhelm. Technologically, most rising countries transition from making things better to making new things, but China may remain mostly a fast follower. Economically, China will have the most global heft, but its living standards may remain below those of the US and Europe. Socially, China may remain repressive and stifled, without the kind of efflorescence of art and culture that came out of Japan, the US, and the UK in their heyday. Geopolitically, China may remain inward-focused and never transform the global system the way other powers did (though given its repressive politics, this will probably be a plus for the rest of the world). I'm not going to claim, of course, that all of China's shortcomings will be due to the actions of a single leader; that would be absurd. Every country has major limitations, even at the height of its power. China's cities sprawl too much, for reasons that have nothing to do with Xi Jinping. Xi didn't create the real estate bubble whose aftermath is now slowing Chinese growth. Nor did Xi cause the low fertility rates that will weigh heavily on China's economy in the latter half of this century. And yet I think there are many ways in which Xi's overwhelming power and personal limitations are combining to hold China back from its potential greatness. Powerful leaders are a risky strategy for any country. Mao Zedong's rule was an economic and humanitarian disaster that left China far behind in the development race. Deng Xiaoping, in contrast, was the true Great Man of modern Chinese history, unleashing rapid economic growth through economic liberalization, while appointing successors (Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao) who would largely stay that course. This is hardly a phenomenon unique to China, of course. But the Communist Party's system tends to concentrate power in the hands of a single man, because succession and consolidation of power are based on backroom machinations and use of the legal system to imprison rivals. This became apparent once the country ran out of Deng's chosen successors, and control of the Party became a free-for-all. Xi Jinping consolidated his power by ruthlessly crushing his rivals, including Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang, as part of an extensive 'anti-corruption' campaign.3 Xi then gave himself power far exceeding what Deng, Jiang, or Hu had enjoyed. He personally led many of the organs of the Chinese party-state, and started appointing loyal cronies instead of technocrats to positions of authority. He has cultivated a personality cult, inserting himself and his writings into every corner of Chinese life. For detailed explanations of how this happened, and what it entails, I recommend Chun Han Wong's book 'Party of One ' and Cai Xia's 2020 article in Foreign Affairs. In fact, Xi's approach to dominating his party and his country somewhat resembles that of a famous 20th-century leader: Joseph Stalin. Some will bristle at this comparison because Stalin's name is now most closely associated with the millions of murders he committed; Xi has been repressive, but hasn't done anything close to Stalin's atrocities. Instead, the similarity is in their leadership style. Xi and Stalin both muscled their way to the top of an existing Communist Party by appointing loyalists to every position of importance and purging rivals in a ruthless and paranoid manner. The best articulation I've seen of this parallel is in this conversation between Victor Shih and Dwarkesh Patel: When you have a leader that strong, it creates a lot of big risks for a country — even one as large, productive, and technologically advanced as China. These fall into two basic categories: A strong leader making bad choices with no one to restrain him A strong leader doing destructive things in order to remain in control The most obvious risk of having a supreme leader just isn't that competent — that his skill at dealing with policy challenges doesn't match his skill at consolidating power. In a democracy, the people can vote a bad leader out. In a bureaucratic oligarchy, elders can remove an incompetent leader. But in a dictatorship, you're pretty much stuck with whatever the dictator wants to do, unless you want to take the extreme risk of removing him by force. Throughout most of the 2010s, as China grew steadily in strength and technological acumen, there was a general feeling — at least, outside the country's borders — that Xi Jinping was probably an effective leader. But in the years during and after the pandemic, it became very apparent that he was making a lot of big mistakes. The most obvious and spectacular one was Zero Covid, of course. Long past the point when it was clear that the virus had mutated into a more contagious form that couldn't be contained, Xi persisted — often personally overruling China's party elders. This ended up hurting China's economy, and probably touched off the real estate crash. The Zero Covid debacle sparked a general realization among China's elite that their most powerful leader since Mao was not the genius he made himself out to be. But it was hardly the first big mistake Xi had made; in fact, stumbles and blunders accumulated for years, and continued after Zero Covid. I wrote about these in a post in 2021, which I updated in 2023. Here are some excerpts from what I wrote: Xi didn't create China's [real estate] dilemma, [but] he didn't do much to fix it either…Daniel H. Rosen of Rhodium Group wrote out a long litany of hesitant, half-cocked [real estate] reform efforts Xi has undertaken, only to reverse course each time… Meanwhile, there's the strong possibility that Xi's crackdown on industries he doesn't like will turn out to have been a mistake… [D]iplomatically, he has put China in a worse position…Xi's pressure on Southeast Asian nations over control of the South China Sea has led to strong negative attitudes toward China in Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and other countries…As in other Asian countries, Indian public opinion has become sharply more anti-China… Then there's the case of Belt and Road. Xi's big plan to build infrastructure in other nations in order to secure diplomatic fealty, access to natural resources, and pork for Chinese companies ended up being mostly a debacle. From a port in Sri Lanka to rail projects in Africa to a whole host of projects in Malaysia, partner countries found themselves owing money to China without reaping the promised economic benefits. Even in China's faithful ally Pakistan, things didn't work out so well. The whole project is losing momentum… His 'wolf warrior' diplomacy — basically turning the Chinese diplomatic corps into swaggering, bellicose bullies — has backfired spectacularly, giving China a bad reputation around the world…Finally, Xi's crackdown on video games, LGBT people, pop culture fandoms, and other freedoms has reinforced the country's totalitarian reputation. Starting around 2023, in a seeming attempt to right the ship, Xi made a major policy pivot. Chinese banks (which are all effectively state-controlled if not state-owned) were instructed to stop lending to property developers and real estate-related companies, and instead to lend huge amounts of money to manufacturers. Along with the flood of bank loans, Xi dished out a truly massive amount of subsidies for manufacturing industries — the most expensive industrial policy that any country has ever undertaken. The idea was to make China the world's supreme manufacturing power — an idea that Xi Jinping has long cherished as a route to Chinese national strength and security. Naughton, Xiao, and Xu (2023) write about how the imperative toward national power and national security lies at the center of Xi's policy program. This new industrial policy has had some spectacular successes. Chinese EVs increasingly dominate the global auto industry, and it's achieving similar successes in industries like robots and drones that use a similar suite of technologies. China is also continuing to free itself of dependence on foreign-made components, which would help it to fight a hypothetical war, and which has led to large trade surpluses. However, Xi's big success here may prove short-lived. The industrial lending boom is already slowing: Source: Bloomberg The reason is falling profitability. Contrary to popular belief, China isn't a very export-intensive economy — it consumes most of what it makes. And that means that when China's government pays its companies to produce more and more and more, it ends up competing their profits to zero, or even forcing many producers to take a loss. I wrote about this in a recent post. The problem is only getting worse: China's industrial earnings fell for a second straight month, with authorities set to intensify their drive to rein in excessive competition that's dragging down prices…Industrial profits dropped 4.3% last month from a year earlier, after a contraction of 9.1% in May…The extended earnings decrease underscored the urgency to curb cutthroat competition among companies — dubbed 'involution' in China…The smaller haul hurts business confidence and could make companies more reluctant to invest and hire. In principle, this isn't too hard of a problem to solve. Just cut off subsidies, restrict bank loans, and encourage the successful companies to buy the unsuccessful ones. Industries will consolidate, profitability will be restored, and China will have a set of healthy national champions. That's how industrial policy is supposed to work. But there are two problems with this. First, there's the political problem — if you spend several years telling everyone they're going to get a job in a car factory, and then you start closing down all the car factories, people get mad. Companies in China tend to be highly localized, with strong support from one regional government or another. A lot of them are basically regional champions. So if China's central government starts killing a lot of regional champions, it could lead to anger in the provinces. A bigger problem, though, might simply be Xi's personal idea of what makes a good and powerful economy. He's less focused on GDP growth numbers than raw output, because his main focus is national security; even if companies are so unprofitable that they're destroying economic value rather than creating it, Xi might think it's worth it, in order to make more cars, more chips, more drones, more batteries, and so on. Whoever makes the most stuff, after all, can make the most military stuff, especially in the case of a war. If China does start a big war, that'll be bad. But if it doesn't start a war, then all this preparation, in the form of structuring the whole economy around industrial overproduction, will also be bad, because it'll make Chinese people poorer than they ought to be. Naughton, Xiao and Xu write: Despite the incorporation of market mechanisms into [Xi's industrial policies], it is certain that [they] represent a substantial expansion of direct government intervention and even control. They will be expensive, they will distort market forces, and they will create new opportunities for moral hazard and even corruption. However, this is the price paid for absolute security: it is in line with the maxim 'millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute,'…The complex of policies adopted after 2020 clearly demonstrate the triumph of national security over all other policy objectives…. China, in other words, is getting better at running industrial policy, even as the objectives of that industrial policy become less beneficial to China and the world. Put in plain terms, Xi Jinping is reorienting China's economy around producing a bunch of stuff that Chinese people don't want or need, because this fits with his idea of what makes a country strong. Eventually, if the economic effects get bad enough, Xi will probably temper those policies, just as he canceled Zero Covid and tried to reverse his crackdown on the Chinese software industry. He is stubborn, but not infinitely stubborn. But by then, the damage may be done. China's banking system may be saddled with a huge pile of nonperforming loans to manufacturing companies, on top of the pile of nonperforming loans to real estate companies that already sit on their books. China's total debt-to-GDP ratio — including both public and private — is now well ahead of Western countries. A wave of industrial bad debt would add to the general financial and economic malaise in China. It would basically be like Korea's 1997 industrial debt bust, added on top of Japan's 1991 real estate bubble, but scaled up to China's size. And if banks responded by keeping failing manufacturers afloat through infinite cheap loans, China really could start to look like 1990s Japan — but worse, since China's subsidies were more lavish and inefficient to begin with. In other words, Xi's big idea for China's economy may end up being just as bad as his big ideas for Covid, the tech industry, real estate, diplomacy, and international development. Just as China's economy reaches the zenith of its potential, it might be brought back to Earth by one man's unorthodox ideas. Xi's ability to deal with external challenges may be wobbly, but up until now at least, he has always been able to deal swiftly and effectively with internal challenges to his own rule. But that could change over time, as Xi ages into the winter of his political career. Xi is 72 years old. That's not exactly superannuated — Donald Trump is seven years older, and Deng Xiaoping ruled effectively throughout his 80s. But 72 is old enough where everyone starts thinking about who the successor is going to be. In a liberal democratic regime, this is less of a high-stakes question because the parties are going to alternate in power anyway. But in a brutal, winner-take-all autocracy like China has once again become under Xi, the succession could literally be the difference between life and death — and certainly between riches and poverty — for a vast number of Chinese elites. Remember that many of Xi's enemies ended up in prison. Xi hasn't yet chosen a successor. He has recently delegated some of his policy authority to a trio of loyalists — Cai Qi, Li Qiang and Ding Xuexiang, all of whom are in their 60s — but none of them has emerged as a clear successor, and none seems to have their own independent power base. They seem like the kind of people a leader appoints when he's getting old but doesn't want to elevate a potential challenger. Xi changed China's rules to remove term limits, so as long as his health holds up, he could rule for another two decades; perhaps he doesn't think he needs to start thinking about a successor yet. But other people in China will definitely be thinking about this all-important question; they'd have to be fools not to be plotting and planning and sharpening their knives right now. Xi, being a consummate master of backroom politicking, undoubtedly knows this. And he also certainly knows that whoever wants to rule China after his passing has an incentive to undermine his power before he's dead or out of office. Like other aging dictators, Xi will have to spend an increasing amount of time fending off such challenges to his power. If leaders become more physically infirm or mentally slow, this only heightens their vulnerability and requires them to be even more ruthlessly paranoid in order to stay on top. Writing in 'The Wire China', Victor Shih explains how this typically goes: An alternative explanation for Xi's absence is that he is beginning a new phase of his administration that is more inward looking, and increasingly preoccupied with internal political issues than external influence… Two factors drive the inward orientation of aging dictatorships. First, as illness compounds their aging, dictators still need to tend to their domestic political survival, while foreign policy increasingly becomes a secondary concern… The second major factor leading aging dictatorships to turn inward is that they typically become increasingly preoccupied with succession issues…This process can at the same time elevate the risks of a challenge to the dictator's power, because potential successors have strong incentives to build up their own power bases. In turn, the aging dictator needs to devote even more time and effort to preventing coups, even as he or she needs to dedicate more time to their own health care. To be clear, there is no sign that there was a credible challenge to Xi's power in late May and early June in China, when he disappeared from public view for close to two weeks…Still, even if his absence was caused by a regular, pre-scheduled medical procedure, such events will likely become more frequent in the coming years. Perceptions of a power vacuum may become a common event; and in turn, this may compel Xi to devote even more of his time to ensuring stability [of his power]. It's notoriously hard to read the tea leaves of Chinese politics, since almost everything happens in secret. But there are some signs that Xi might be starting to enter his 'lion in winter' phase. Shih notes that Xi recently skipped the BRICS summit, which he always used to attend. And the Economist reports that Xi has become more reclusive in recent months: After taking office Mr Xi wielded power through a host of party commissions that permitted him to sidestep the state bureaucracy and other vested interests…But more often he's now sending written instructions to related meetings rather than attending them, says Neil Thomas of the Asia Society, an American think-tank. The number of such meetings appears to be dropping, too. The most important commission, on economic reform, met 38 times in the first five years he was in charge. Since 2022 it has held only six meetings and none has been publicly announced since August 2024. Its communiqués are also shorter, which suggests it is making fewer decisions. Other commissions led by Mr Xi have similarly fallen off, notes Christopher Beddor of Gavekal Dragonomics, a research firm headquartered in Hong Kong. Meanwhile, Xi has stepped up his purges, especially of the military. Some of the generals he has purged were his own appointees. The Asia Society Policy Institute reports: The final months of 2024 witnessed a new wave of purges in Xi Jinping's China. On November 28, the Defense Ministry announced the suspension…of Admiral Miao Hua, the number four military leader below Xi…Miao's ouster makes him the third PLA general in charge of political and organizational work Xi has purged, and the second of the six members of the 20th Central Military Commission…Rumors of more purges have been circulating but they are often impossible to verify, especially when they involve high-ranking PLA officers… The phenomenon is not confined to the military. Purges of civilians have also been numerous…[A]t least 58 high-ranking [Party] cadres lost their positions in the first three quarters of 2024 and 642,000 cadres at various levels were punished over the same time period, according to official statistics. Among 205 full members of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), at least eight were purged…eight seemed to be in trouble given their prolonged, unexplained absence from important meetings among other signals; and three were sidelined. In all, those affected comprise 9.3 percent of the members of China's most powerful body of political authority[.] And The Economist has data showing that investigations of senior officials have tripled since the pandemic. This will also probably have ramifications for the relationship between the state and the private sector in China. Even at the start of his rule, Xi instinctually tried to increase state control over the economy. The 2021 tech crackdown was partly motivated by Xi's disdain for the consumer internet industry, but the desire to crush alternative centers of ideas and popularity probably figured into the decision as well. Now, as Xi advances into his later years and his hold on power becomes more tenuous, he will be even less tolerant of private companies or entrepreneurs who could challenge him or fund his rivals. The natural response will be to double down on his traditional approach, and exert even more heavy-handed control over the private sector. That's unlikely to be good for the Chinese economy. In other words, even though Xi is only 72, we may already be seeing him go into the 'lion in winter' phase that other aging dictators tend to go through. And that may paralyze, distract, and unsettle China for years to come. For people in China, one or two more decades of increasingly reclusive, paranoid Xi Jinping rule sounds like an unappetizing prospect. Chinese society — its corporations, its cities, its talent — is now robust enough that Xi is unlikely to be a calamity like Mao was. But one or two decades of a slower-growing economy, less individual opportunity, and a more repressive society won't be the optimal way for China to enjoy the zenith of its power. China's people are incredibly talented, hard-working, and creative, and they deserve better than an aging Xi Jinping. But for the rest of the world, Xi's blunders and his increasingly inward focus might provide a temporary reprieve. China's economic and technological power at this moment in history is truly spectacular; if its leaders wanted to turn that power toward conquest and domination, they could. In fact, every other great power did try to use their power to dominate weaker nations to some extent. But if Xi spends the next one or two decades suppressing internal challengers and committing economic blunders, it could save the rest of the world from the threat of Chinese hegemony. An inward-looking, mildly sclerotic China would be a bit of a tragedy, but it would also allow countries like Japan, India, Vietnam, and Korea — and of course the United States — to breathe a sigh of relief. Right now, with Donald Trump busy smashing everything that made the free world such an effective bloc in the first Cold War, Xi and his personal shortcomings might be our best hope to avoid domination by the most powerful autocracy the modern world has ever seen. NOTES 1 Note: I often post the UN's forecast that China will account for 45% of all global manufacturing value added by 2030. But Jonathon P Sine points out that 36% would be a more realistic projection: Source: Jonathon P. Sine 36% is still a hell of a lot, though — it's about where America was in the early 60s. 2 Some measures put China still slightly behind the US, but closing the gap fast. 3 Obviously, Xi's rivals were corrupt, but so was every Chinese leader, including Xi himself. When everyone is corrupt, it's easy to crush your rivals while also actually reducing corruption somewhat.
RTHK
4 hours ago
- RTHK
Shaolin abbot disrobed for 'extremely bad behaviour'
Shaolin abbot disrobed for 'extremely bad behaviour' Shi Yongxin is said to have 'seriously violated Buddhist precepts', including allegedly engaging in 'improper relationships' with women. File photo: Reuters The head of the Chinese temple known as the birthplace of kung fu will be disrobed for "extremely" bad behaviour, Beijing's top Buddhist authority said on Monday, after allegations of embezzlement saw him placed under investigation. The Shaolin Temple said on Sunday that Abbot Shi Yongxin, known as the "CEO monk" for establishing dozens of companies abroad, was suspected of "embezzling project funds and temple assets". It said Shi had "seriously violated Buddhist precepts", including by allegedly engaging in "improper relationships" with multiple women. "Multiple departments" are conducting a joint investigation, it said in a statement on WeChat. The Buddhist Association of China, overseen by the Communist Party, said on Monday it would cancel Shi's certificate of ordination. "Shi Yongxin's actions are of an extremely bad nature, seriously undermining the reputation of the Buddhist community, hurting the image of monks," the association said in an online statement. Shi had previously been accused by former monks of embezzling money from a temple-run company, maintaining a fleet of luxury cars and fathering children with multiple women. China's government exercises authority over the appointment of religious leaders, and "improper" conduct is often grounds for removal from office. A hashtag related to the temple scandal had been viewed more than 560 million times on social media platform Weibo as of Monday morning. The last post to the abbot's personal account on Weibo declared: "when one's own nature is pure, the pure land is here in the present". Shi faced similar allegations in 2015 which the temple called "vicious libel". Shi, 59, took office as abbot in 1999 and in the following decades expanded Shaolin studies and cultural knowledge overseas. He helped the temple establish dozens of companies – but received backlash for commercialising Buddhism. The temple, established in AD 495, is known as the birthplace of Zen Buddhism and Chinese kung fu. Shi was first elected vice-chairman of the Buddhist Association of China in 2002 and has served as a representative to the National People's Congress. (AFP)
