logo
Over 14 million people could die from US foreign aid cuts: study

Over 14 million people could die from US foreign aid cuts: study

IOL Newsa day ago
The study in the prestigious Lancet journal was published as world and business leaders gather for a UN conference in Spain this week hoping to bolster the reeling aid sector.
Image: File
More than 14 million of the world's most vulnerable people, a third of them small children, could die because of the Trump administration's dismantling of US foreign aid, research projected on Tuesday.
The study in the prestigious Lancet journal was published as world and business leaders gather for a UN conference in Spain this week hoping to bolster the reeling aid sector.
The US Agency for International Development (USAID) had provided over 40 percent of global humanitarian funding until Donald Trump returned to the White House in January.
Two weeks later, Trump's then-close advisor -- and world's richest man -- Elon Musk boasted of having put the agency "through the woodchipper".
The funding cuts "risk abruptly halting -- and even reversing -- two decades of progress in health among vulnerable populations," warned study co-author Davide Rasella, a researcher at the Barcelona Institute for Global Health (ISGlobal).
"For many low- and middle-income countries, the resulting shock would be comparable in scale to a global pandemic or a major armed conflict," he said in a statement.
Looking back over data from 133 nations, the international team of researchers estimated that USAID funding had prevented 91 million deaths in developing countries between 2001 and 2021.
They also used modelling to project how funding being slashed by 83 percent -- the figure announced by the US government earlier this year -- could affect death rates.
The cuts could lead to more than 14 million avoidable deaths by 2030, the projections found. That number included over 4.5 million children under the age of five -- or around 700,000 child deaths a year.
For comparison, around 10 million soldiers are estimated to have been killed during World War I.
Programmes supported by USAID were linked to a 15-percent decrease in deaths from all causes, the researchers found. For children under five, the drop in deaths was twice as steep at 32 percent.
USAID funding was found to be particularly effective at staving off preventable deaths from disease.
There were 65 percent fewer deaths from HIV/AIDS in countries receiving a high level of support compared to those with little or no USAID funding, the study found. Deaths from malaria and neglected tropical diseases were similarly cut in half. 'Time to scale up'
After USAID was gutted, several other major donors including Germany, the UK and France followed suit in announcing plans to slash their foreign aid budgets.
These aid reductions, particularly in the European Union, could lead to "even more additional deaths in the coming years," study co-author Caterina Monti of ISGlobal said.
But the grim projections for deaths were based on the current amount of pledged aid, so could rapidly come down if the situation changes, the researchers emphasised.
Dozens of world leaders are meeting in the Spanish city of Seville this week for the biggest aid conference in a decade. The US, however, will not attend.
"Now is the time to scale up, not scale back," Rasella said.
Before its funding was slashed, USAID represented 0.3 percent of all US federal spending.
"US citizens contribute about 17 cents per day to USAID, around $64 per year," said study co-author James Macinko of the University of California, Los Angeles.
"I think most people would support continued USAID funding if they knew just how effective such a small contribution can be to saving millions of lives."
AFP
Orange background

Try Our AI Features

Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:

Comments

No comments yet...

Related Articles

Legacy of Uganda's end-of-life 'grandmother' lives on
Legacy of Uganda's end-of-life 'grandmother' lives on

IOL News

timean hour ago

  • IOL News

Legacy of Uganda's end-of-life 'grandmother' lives on

Josephine Namwanjje (right), 28, prays while holding a Bible for her brother Jonathan Luzige, a colon cancer patient, at their home in Nabbingo. Hospice Africa Uganda, founded in 1993 by Dr Anne Merriman, brought holistic end-of-life care to Uganda at a time when it was offered in only three African countries Image: Badru Katumba / AFP In a small home in Uganda's capital, Jane Mwesige, a nurse with a hospice that has transformed African end-of-life care, breaks into a gospel song about surrendering to God, a favourite of her patient Jonathan Luzige. These home visits, combining affordable medical care and spiritual support, are part of Mwesige's routine with Hospice Africa Uganda. Founded in 1993 by Dr Anne Merriman, it brought holistic end-of-life care to Uganda at a time when it was offered in only three African countries. By the time Merriman died this May, aged 90, she had treated more than 40,000 Ugandans and her model had spread to 37 countries on the continent. In his worn-brick home, Luzige's colon cancer makes it difficult to move, but he eagerly joins in the singing. "I feel very happy, and it made me feel stronger knowing there are people who are able to care for me," said Luzige, 30. Jane Mwesige (Centre), a nurse at Hospice Africa Uganda, knocks the door of patient Jonathan Luzige's home while carrying morphine and other medicines for a home visit in Nabbingo. Image: Badru Katumba / AFP "Palliative care is all about taking care of patients," said Mwesige. "Every one of us, or one of our relatives, may need the service." Born in Britain to Irish parents, Merriman trained as a doctor and became a nun before leaving her order to help establish palliative care in Singapore. When she arrived in Uganda, it was in the grips of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and she had raised only enough charitable funding for three months of work and a skeleton crew. The famously persuasive Merriman convinced Uganda's government to allow the import of morphine powder, which she used to make an oral solution she had developed in Singapore. Simple enough to make in a bucket over her kitchen sink, it became invaluable to thousands. Hospice Africa Uganda, which now runs from a mix of NGO and charitable funding, distributes the solution in recycled plastic bottles for free to hospitals and clinicians. Mary Nakaliika, 24, an adopted daughter of Dr. Anne Merriman and nurse who treated her in her last days in Kampala. By the time Merriman died in May 2025, aged 90, she had treated more than 40 000 patients in Uganda and her model had spread to 37 African countries. Image: Badru Katumba / AFP

NATO's Defence Spending: Washington's Political Will Trumps Brussels' Consensus Diplomacy
NATO's Defence Spending: Washington's Political Will Trumps Brussels' Consensus Diplomacy

IOL News

timean hour ago

  • IOL News

NATO's Defence Spending: Washington's Political Will Trumps Brussels' Consensus Diplomacy

US President Donald Trump (C) flanked by US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth (L) and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio at a press conference during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in The Hague on June 25, 2025. Image: AFP Clyde N.S. Ramalaine The June 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague produced a landmark decision: member states, except for Spain, agreed to increase defence spending to 5% of GDP by 2035. This bold move, which marks a significant departure from the long-standing 2% benchmark agreed at the 2014 Wales Summit, represents more than a fiscal adjustment; it signals a seismic shift in the alliance's strategic orientation. At the heart of this recalibration is the reasserted influence of U.S. President Donald Trump, whose longstanding critiques of NATO burden-sharing have now crystallised into formal policy. This article explores the rationale, implications, and geopolitical consequences of NATO's spending leap, assessing whether this shift reflects authentic alliance consensus or a recalibration driven by American political will. When NATO's 32 member states gathered in The Hague for the June 2025 summit, few anticipated the alliance would break with over a decade of precedent. But they did, agreeing to a bold, controversial, and for some, economically staggering commitment: to spend 5% of their national GDP on defence by 2035. However, NATO did not shift this policy direction out of its own conviction or internal consensus; rather, it was compelled to do so, with U.S. President Donald Trump standing at the heart of this strategic pivot, having since his first stint advocated for greater burden-sharing among member states. Trump's framing was blunt: 'Why should the U.S. keep subsidising European security when Europe can afford to pay?' In many ways, this new 5% target represents the realisation of Trump's foreign policy worldview: as it relates to NATO, a five tenet blend of transactional diplomacy, fiscal pressure, nationalist recalibration, readiness and modernisation, and geopolitical deterrence. Trump's foreign policy is often described as transactional, meaning it treats international alliances less as values-based partnerships and more as quid pro quo arrangements. NATO, in this view, is not a sacred pillar of post-WWII order but a cost-benefit enterprise. Applied politically, fiscal pressure can describe the tactic of urging or coercing other member states to increase their defence budgets to meet alliance commitments, such as Trump urging NATO allies to spend 5% of GDP. The implicit threat: fail to meet spending demands, and U.S. protection may no longer be guaranteed. Under this logic, NATO is only worthwhile if the U.S. is not carrying a disproportionate share of the financial burden. Trump repeatedly framed the alliance as an economic deal, where allies were "delinquent" in their obligations. He demanded that U.S. support be conditional on financial commitments, reducing mutual defence to a pay-to-play system. Video Player is loading. Play Video Play Unmute Current Time 0:00 / Duration -:- Loaded : 0% Stream Type LIVE Seek to live, currently behind live LIVE Remaining Time - 0:00 This is a modal window. Beginning of dialog window. Escape will cancel and close the window. Text Color White Black Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Transparent Window Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Transparent Semi-Transparent Opaque Font Size 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 300% 400% Text Edge Style None Raised Depressed Uniform Dropshadow Font Family Proportional Sans-Serif Monospace Sans-Serif Proportional Serif Monospace Serif Casual Script Small Caps Reset restore all settings to the default values Done Close Modal Dialog End of dialog window. Advertisement Next Stay Close ✕ This further aligns with Trump's broader nationalist recalibration "America First" doctrine. This interpretation is reinforced by Trump's domestic base, which is increasingly wary of foreign entanglements. According to analysis from the Peterson Institute for International Economics, the U.S. accounted for roughly 68.7% of total NATO military spending in 2023, meaning that nearly seven in ten dollars spent by NATO members were American. With the U.S. contributing nearly 70% of NATO's total defence spending, Trump argued the arrangement was fiscally unjust. Requiring allies to spend more would redistribute responsibility and ease pressure on U.S. taxpayers. By pushing for the 2% target, and now 5%, Trump used fiscal pressure to compel policy alignment. His administration hinted that failure to meet the spending floor could lead to reduced U.S. commitment, threatening the alliance's coherence. Another component of Trump's rationale lies in readiness and modernisation. Higher spending is linked to greater military capability. Trump's advisers highlighted ageing equipment, low deployability, and interoperability challenges as evidence that current budgets were insufficient. NATO states lacked modern infrastructure, weaponry, and rapid deployment capacity. Chronic incompatibility in systems and doctrines undermined joint operations. The 5% target is not merely a financial benchmark but a demand for measurable improvements: mobile, modern, integrated forces ready for cyber warfare, space militarisation, and asymmetric threats. Trump saw increased spending as essential to transforming NATO into a technologically dominant and operationally agile force. The 5% target also serves a function of geopolitical deterrence. Trump argued that a wealthier, well-armed NATO would send a strong message to adversaries like Russia and China about the alliance's resolve. Defence spending becomes a litmus test of political will. Trump emphasised that deterrence is achieved not through communiqués but through visible military capability. By urging allies to raise spending, he sought to eliminate ambiguity that adversaries might exploit, especially in light of Russian aggression and China's assertiveness. The outcome of the Hague Summit marks an undeniable strategic win for Trump, validating his ideology for a reshaped NATO. What was once dismissed as provocative rhetoric is now policy. The agreement to move toward 5% signals not just a funding shift, but a transformation in the alliance's operational ethos. Trump hailed it as a "monumental win for the United States and the free world." This also underscores a broader realignment: NATO's direction is now synchronised with Washington's political will rather than Brussels' consensus-building. The U.S. model is assertive and top-down, driven by strategic imperatives. Brussels, by contrast, has favoured inclusive, deliberative processes. The Hague Summit reflects a power shift, where American momentum overrides European caution, reconfiguring NATO into a more hierarchical, pressure-sensitive alliance. Trump's assertiveness demonstrated that America is not only NATO's military backbone but also its ideological compass. The 5% target reflects Trump's insistence on fairness and strategic necessity. Under his leadership, burden-sharing has become a requirement, not a polite suggestion. In this context, Trump is not merely influencing NATO; he is directing it. He has repositioned the U.S. as the alliance's strategic lodestar, with the 5% threshold symbolising his imprint on NATO's long-term trajectory. Why then did the majority of NATO states agree to such an ambitious spending goal? A plausible argument is that European powers accepted the 5% benchmark not out of ideological alignment with Trump, but to ensure continued U.S. commitment to NATO—and, crucially, to Ukraine and their security. Given Trump's scepticism towards multilateral institutions and his past threats to withdraw from NATO, European leaders may have regarded the target as a calculated concession to keep the U.S. engaged. It constitutes a form of strategic appeasement: if meeting Trump's demands secures American support, then it is a price worth paying. Compounding this urgency is the perception, real or manufactured, of a renewed Russian threat. Remarks by former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who recently referred to EU leaders as 'Brusselian cockroaches,' signal rhetorical escalation and reinforce NATO's view of Russia as an enduring adversary. Whether grounded in imminent threat assessments or strategic messaging, this antagonism sustains European anxiety and justifies increased military expenditure as a deterrent and necessity. By meeting Trump's demands, European leaders also give him political cover to maintain U.S. support for Ukraine's war effort. In this light, the 5% commitment becomes a tool to secure U.S. leadership for Europe's collective security. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte's effusive praise of Trump reinforces this reading. His remarks lauding Trump's 'decisive action in Iran' and describing him as a 'man of peace' who is also willing to use force appeared more choreographed than spontaneous. Given NATO's growing reliance on U.S. leadership, Rutte's comments may have been a tactical gesture—an effort to affirm Trump's primacy while ensuring his continued commitment without conceding institutional authority. This shift could also enable strategic rebalancing. As Europe assumes more of the defence burden, the U.S. can reallocate resources to the Indo-Pacific, where China's rise poses a growing challenge. A more self-sufficient Europe gives Washington the bandwidth to pursue its global agenda while challenging perceptions of NATO as U.S.-dependent. With more skin in the game, Europe may gain strategic credibility and a stronger voice within the alliance. Nonetheless, challenges remain. Public sentiment in Europe remains cautious about large-scale military expansion. Polls in Germany, France, and Spain indicate a preference for diplomacy over deterrence. The political cost of sustaining 5% defence spending may prove substantial. If NATO states deliver, the Hague Summit may be remembered as the dawn of a fortified, globally relevant alliance. If not, it risks becoming another episode in summit theatre—where leaders agree in principle, delay in practice, and dilute in execution. For Trump, however, the optics are already favourable. He has altered how NATO operates, and with the 5% pledge, he has inscribed his foreign policy legacy into the alliance's future.

Deal or no deal: What happens with Donald Trump's July tariff deadline?
Deal or no deal: What happens with Donald Trump's July tariff deadline?

The South African

time2 hours ago

  • The South African

Deal or no deal: What happens with Donald Trump's July tariff deadline?

A week before US President Donald Trump reimposes steep tariffs on dozens of economies, including the EU and Japan, many are still scrambling to reach a deal that would protect them from the worst. The tariffs taking effect July 9 are part of a package Trump imposed in April citing a lack of 'reciprocity' in trading ties. He slapped a 10 percent levy on most partners, with higher customised rates to kick in later in countries the United States has major trade deficits with. But these were halted until July to allow room for negotiations. Analysts expect countries will encounter one of three outcomes: They could reach a framework for an agreement; receive an extended pause on higher tariffs; or see levies surge. 'There will be a group of deals that we will land before July 9,' said Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent last Friday on CNBC. Policymakers have not named countries in this group, although Bessent maintains that Washington has been focused on striking deals with about 18 key partners. 'Vietnam, India and Taiwan remain promising candidates for a deal,' Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) vice president Wendy Cutler told AFP. Without a deal, Vietnam's 'reciprocal tariff' rises from the baseline of 10 percent to 46 percent, India's to 26 percent and Taiwan's to 32 percent. Josh Lipsky, international economics chair at the Atlantic Council, cited Indian negotiators' extension of their US trip recently in noting that it 'seems like a frontrunner.' 'Japan was in that category, but things have set back a little,' Lipsky said, referring to Donald Trump's criticism on Monday over what the president called Japan's reluctance to accept US rice exports. The deals, however, will unlikely be full-fledged trade pacts, analysts said, citing complexities in negotiating such agreements. Since April, Washington has only announced a pact with Britain and a deal to temporarily lower tit-for-tat duties with China. Bessent has also said that countries 'negotiating in good faith' can have their tariffs remain at the 10 percent baseline. But extensions of the pause on higher rates would depend on Trump, he added. 'With a new government, (South) Korea looks well positioned to secure an extension,' Cutler of ASPI said. Lipsky expects many countries to fall into this bucket, receiving an extended halt on higher tariffs that could last until Labor Day, which falls on September 1. Bessent earlier said that Washington could wrap up its agenda for trade deals by Labor Day, a signal that more agreements could be concluded but with talks likely to extend past July. For countries that the United States finds 'recalcitrant,' however, tariffs could spring back to the higher levels Trump previously announced, Bessent has warned. These range from 11 percent to 50 percent. Cutler warned that 'Japan's refusal to open its rice market, coupled with the US resistance to lowering automotive tariffs, may lead to the reimposition of Japan's 24 percent reciprocal tariff.' Trump himself said on Tuesday that a trade deal was unlikely with Japan and the country could pay a tariff of '30 percent, 35 percent, or whatever the number is that we determine.' Lipsky believes the European Union is at risk of having tariffs snap back to steeper levels too – to the 20 percent unveiled in April or the 50 percent Trump more recently threatened. An area of tension could be Europe's approach to digital regulation. Donald Trump recently said he would terminate trade talks with Canada – which is not impacted by the July 9 deadline – in retaliation for the country's digital services tax, which Ottawa eventually said it would rescind. This week, EU trade chief Maros Sefcovic is in Washington in a push to seal a trade deal, with the EU commission having received early drafts of proposals that officials are working on. Let us know by leaving a comment below, or send a WhatsApp to 060 011 021 1 Subscribe to The South African website's newsletters and follow us on WhatsApp, Facebook, X and Bluesky for the latest news. By Garrin Lambley © Agence France-Presse

DOWNLOAD THE APP

Get Started Now: Download the App

Ready to dive into a world of global content with local flavor? Download Daily8 app today from your preferred app store and start exploring.
app-storeplay-store