WSJ editor sparks backlash over claim IDF gave Hamas ‘safe haven' in Gaza
The comment came in the wake of Israel's first evacuation notice issued to residents of Deir Al-Balah, in central Gaza, since the war began on Oct. 7, 2023.
In a post on X, Kaufman wrote: 'For 21 months, Israel has essentially allowed Hamas a safe haven inside Gaza. That's no way to fight a war, but Israel believed hostages were held in this area, and minimizing risk to them has always taken priority.'
The remarks were widely condemned for appearing to overlook the scale of destruction in Gaza, where over 70 percent of buildings have been damaged or destroyed, and humanitarian agencies warn of looming famine due to Israel's blockade of aid.
The Palestinian death toll is nearing 60,000, about half of them women and children, according to Gaza health authorities, fueling global outrage over Israel's ongoing military campaign.
'If Hamas is kept safe, then who are the tens of thousands they have been killing?' one user responded online.
Pro-Palestinian group Writers Against the War in Gaza — which recently published a report criticizing The New York Times for alleged links between its senior staff and pro-Israel lobbying groups — said Kaufman's post reflects the WSJ's 'zero journalistic standards.' The group accused the outlet of allowing 'literal state stenography for Israel with no consequences.'
Does the Wall Street Journal have zero journalistic standards anymore, or are Editorial Board members allowed to do literal state stenography for Israel with no consequences? https://t.co/o7pUwMhJOO
— Writers Against the War on Gaza (@wawog_now) July 20, 2025
Kaufman has faced growing criticism over what some see as his consistent alignment with Israeli policy.
Following Hamas' deadly Oct. 7 attack and Israel's subsequent military response, he has voiced support for the Israeli government's actions and denounced pro-Palestinian activism.
Earlier in July, Kaufman sparked further backlash over an article promoting a so-called peace plan involving a Palestinian sheikh and a proposal to have Hebron break away from the Palestinian Authority, effectively sidestepping any future Palestinian statehood.
Palestinian activist Issa Amro described the piece as a 'dangerous fabrication' and criticized Kaufman for 'shockingly poor journalism or deliberate misinformation.' Kan's Palestinian affairs correspondent Elior Levy dismissed it as nonsense.
'Words come cheap, and these recycled statements have led to nothing (in the past),' Levy wrote on X. 'I advise The Wall Street Journal to focus more on Wall Street and less on Hebron.'
Over the weekend, the WSJ found itself at the centre of the news after US President Donald Trump sued media magnate Rupert Murdoch and the journal for at least $10 billion over publication of a bombshell article on his friendship with the infamous alleged sex trafficker of underage girls, Jeffrey Epstein.
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