Company earns ₹44 lakh from ‘desperate' parents for fake kids' fashion show, uses luxury brand names like Dior, Gucci
The company charged 6,000 yuan ( ₹ 71,000) per child to walk the ramp and even organised events where parents joined their kids. It collected 367,000 yuan ( ₹ 44 lakh) from parents as registration fees. The scam ran shows in Shanghai, Paris and Toronto, The South China Morning Post reported.
The Shanghai Market Regulatory Bureau confirmed it was a fraud after Gucci's office had complained in 2023. The firm had also used fake logos like Gucc100 and Gucc101. The company has now been fined 600,000 yuan ( ₹ 71 lakh).
During the investigation, a staff member revealed the company charged over 10,000 yuan ( ₹ 1.20 lakh approx) for each costume children wore. But, many of those clothes were fake, SCMP added.
The owner, Huang, admitted buying fake clothes online but said they were only used for photo shoots, not sold. Still, the authorities found this was trademark misuse.
A legal officer in Shanghai said this wasn't the first time the company was fined, yet it didn't stop.
Their social media pages still remain active. When digged further, we found such social media pages on platforms like Instagram and Facebook. However, the pages had very little engagement. The last posts on those pages were shared back in 2023.
The South China Morning Post shared how Chinese social media users reacted to the scam.
'Such phenomena are quite common these days. Many art and sports training centres also charge parents a big sum of money to send their kids to unauthorised contests,' wrote one user.
'The company was exploiting the desperate need of parents to make their kids successful and famous,' came from another.
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First Post
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