
Australia and China call for more dialogue, cooperation at leaders' meeting
By Lewis Jackson
By Lewis Jackson
BEIJING (Reuters) -China is ready to work with Australia to deepen bilateral ties, President Xi Jinping said during a meeting with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese on Tuesday in Beijing.
The meeting between the two leaders comes as China tries to capitalise on U.S. President Donald Trump's sweeping trade tariffs by presenting itself as a stable and reliable partner. Chinese officials have expressed interest in expanding a decade-old free trade deal and cooperating in artificial intelligence.
China was willing to "promote further development in the China-Australia relationship," Xi said in remarks at the start of the meeting.
Australia valued its ties to China, its largest trading partner, and welcomed "progress on cooperation" under the free trade deal, Albanese said in response, adding that Australia's national interest would guide Canberra's approach to the relationship.
"Dialogue needs to be at the centre of our relationship," the prime minister said. "I welcome the opportunity to set out Australia's views and interests and our thinking on how we can maintain peace, security, stability and prosperity in our region."
Albanese is expected to meet Chinese Premier Li Qiang later on Tuesday. He has previously said resources trade, energy transition and security tensions would be key topics for discussions in Beijing.
Australia, which regards the United States its major security ally, has pursued a China policy of "cooperate where we can, disagree where we must" under Albanese.
In the run-up to the visit, China signalled repeatedly it was open to deeper cooperation. On Tuesday, the state-owned China Daily newspaper published a glowing opinion piece about the visit and said it showed countries with different political systems could still cooperate.
However, any cooperation is likely to be constrained by long-standing Australian concerns around China's military build-up and the jailing of Australian writer Yang Hengjun.
Beijing has also separately criticised Canberra's increased screening of foreign investment in critical minerals and Albanese's pledge to return a Chinese-leased port to Australian ownership.
Australia's exports to China, its largest trading partner, span agriculture and energy but are dominated by iron ore, and Albanese has travelled with executives from mining giants Rio Tinto, BHP, and Fortescue, who met Chinese steel industry officials on Monday, at the start of the six-day visit.
Bran Black, CEO of the Business Council of Australia, said Australia's Bluescope Steel would also be at Tuesday's business roundtable, along with China's electric vehicle giant BYD, Chinese banking executives, Baosteel and state-run food group COFCO.
"First and foremost we use fixtures such as this to send a signal that business-to-business engagement should be welcomed and encouraged," Black told Reuters on Tuesday.
© (c) Copyright Thomson Reuters 2025.
Hashtags

Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles

Nikkei Asia
an hour ago
- Nikkei Asia
Apple inks $500m deal with MP Materials for rare earth magnets
(Reuters) -- Apple has signed a $500-million deal with Pentagon-backed MP Materials for the supply of rare earth magnets, an agreement underscoring corporate America's growing alignment with U.S. industrial policy support for critical minerals projects. MP shares jumped 19% on Tuesday morning to an all-time high, while Apple's stock gained just under 1%. The multi-year supply deal, announced on Tuesday, is part of a broader push by Apple to bring iPhone production to the United States amid a push from the Trump administration to produce fewer electronics in China. MP last week agreed to a multibillion-dollar deal with the U.S. Department of Defense that will see the Pentagon become MP's largest shareholder and financial backstop. Rare earths are a group of 17 metals used to make magnets that turn power into motion, including the devices that make cellphones vibrate. They are also used to make weapons, electric vehicles, and many other electronics. China halted rare earths exports in March following a trade spat with U.S. President Donald Trump that showed some signs of easing late last month, even as broader tensions underscored demand for non-Chinese supply. As part of the agreement, Apple will pre-pay Las Vegas-based MP Materials $200 million for a supply of magnets slated to begin in 2027. The magnets will be produced at MP's Fort Worth, Texas, facility using magnets recycled at MP's Mountain Pass, California, mining complex, the companies said. "Rare earth materials are essential for making advanced technology, and this partnership will help strengthen the supply of these vital materials here in the United States," Apple CEO Tim Cook said in a statement. Bob O'Donnell, president at market research firm TECHnalysis Research, said Tuesday's move "makes complete sense" given that Apple requires significant amounts of rare earth magnets for its devices. "Plus, by focusing on a U.S.-based supplier, it does help position Apple more positively in Washington," he said. Apple, which said the deal is part of its $500-billion four-year investment commitment to the U.S., has faced threats from Trump over iPhones not made in the U.S. But many analysts have said making the iPhone in the U.S. is not possible, given labor costs and the existing smartphone supply chain. MP already produces mined and processed rare earths and has said it expects to start commercial magnet production in its Texas facility by the end of this year. Last week's deal with the U.S. government includes a price floor for rare earths designed to spur investment in domestic mines and processing plants, which has been lagging partly due to low prices set in China.


The Diplomat
2 hours ago
- The Diplomat
China's Cultural Offensive: How Beijing Is Quietly Reshaping North Korea
As the United States steps back from promoting democracy in North Korea through information campaigns, China is seizing this strategic opportunity to fill the void. Through a sophisticated approach spanning technology, media, education, and economic integration, Beijing is quietly working to reshape North Korean society and bring it under Chinese cultural influence. The 'Cultural Development and Cooperation' Program At the heart of China's strategy lies a secretive initiative called the 'program for mutual cultural development and cooperation,' developed between late 2023 and early 2024. This program, spearheaded by China's propaganda departments in the northeastern provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang, represents far more than simple cultural exchange. According to Daily NK sources familiar with the program, its true purpose is to foster pro-Chinese sentiment and spread Chinese culture in North Korea, building a foundation for a shared identity between the two countries. The program was formalized following a visit by a cultural delegation from Liaoning province, led by Liu Huiyan, director of the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party's Liaoning Provincial Committee. While publicly framed as 'cultural exchange,' the initiative's actual objective is creating what sources describe as 'an ideologically and psychologically friendly environment in North Korea.' As one Daily NK source explained, 'China believes there is no means of control as important as culture.' This philosophy drives a comprehensive strategy targeting multiple segments of North Korean society, including ordinary citizens, young people, regional officials, those with overseas experience, and border region residents. The program also focuses on North Korean students, trade officials, workers, trainees, and diplomatic families already present in China. Technology as a Trojan Horse China's approach cleverly leverages technology to penetrate North Korean society. A striking example is the popularity of Chinese-made MP7 and MP8 media players among North Korean teenagers. These devices, produced by Chinese small and medium enterprises, appear to be simple educational tools but provide access to foreign media content including movies, TV shows, and music. What makes these devices particularly effective is their design sophistication. They allow users to disable FM radio and Wi-Fi functions to avoid detection by North Korean authorities, demonstrating that their Chinese designers clearly understand the realities inside North Korea. Ironically, these devices have become a pathway for South Korean media to reach North Korean audiences – with South Korean content essentially hitchhiking on Chinese hardware. Building on this success, China plans to actively distribute Chinese-made MP5 players and Enhanced Versatile Discs throughout North Korea. The strategy involves continuously feeding audiovisual materials that emphasize 'socialist civilization' into North Korea, including documentaries about the founding of the People's Republic of China, films about the anti-Japanese struggle, and contemporary dramas. China also plans to translate content showcasing Chinese lifestyles and culture into Korean, specifically using the North Korean dialect to respect the North Korean government's desire to preserve the 'Pyongyang Cultural Language.' The 'Culture Bomb' Strategy China's media penetration strategy is both sophisticated and overwhelming. Rather than attempting to measure North Korean responses to specific content, China has adopted what can be described as a 'culture bomb' strategy – overwhelming through sheer volume. The Chinese believe that since any Chinese media will seem fresh to North Koreans, what matters isn't what they watch, but how frequently they watch it. This approach capitalizes on North Korea's current media environment. According to a 2024 survey by the Unification Media Group of 100 North Koreans, 88.4 percent of respondents identified 'China' as the source of the foreign cultural content they consumed. Beijing recognizes that North Koreans feel less threatened by Chinese media than by content from South Korea or the United States, viewing Chinese cultural content as relatively safe. The delivery methods are varied and discreet. China explores multiple channels to get media content into North Korea, including sending USB drives, SD cards, and MP5 video players through traders or other North Koreans traveling to China. The goal isn't just for North Koreans to consume Chinese content, but for them to become familiar with Chinese culture and view it as part of their daily lives. Educational and Economic Integration China's influence extends beyond media into education and economics. At Pyongyang University of Science and Technology, China maintains rotating faculty positions for Chinese professors and helps shape the curriculum. China is also developing an online education platform focused on advanced fields like smart agriculture, applied statistics, and basic medicine. This approach seems designed to 'sinicize' knowledge production – essentially ensuring that North Korea's next generation of skilled workers are trained within China's intellectual framework. Economic integration represents another crucial pillar of China's strategy. Growing cooperation between North Korea's Mangyongdae Trading Company and Chinese electronics firms on semiconductors and displays demonstrates this integration in action. North Korea provides rare earth materials while China supplies key components. The two sides are also working together on trade infrastructure, optimizing logistics, and implementing encrypted payment systems. This goes beyond simple trade expansion – it's really about realigning North Korea's tech industry with Chinese standards. China aims to gradually integrate North Korea into Northeast Asian industrial and supply chain networks, which would give China greater influence down the road. Additionally, China provides unofficial economic support by overlooking smuggling and allowing North Korean workers to remain in the country, despite international sanctions. Managing Defections and Border Control China employs a sophisticated cultural strategy that serves as both soft power projection and practical border management. This approach reflects Beijing's pragmatic understanding that completely preventing North Korean defections is neither possible nor entirely desirable, given the economic benefits of North Korean labor. Instead, China aims to channel these population movements in ways that serve its strategic interests while maintaining North Korean regime stability. China's cultural campaign works to normalize Chinese society in North Korean minds through widespread distribution of Chinese media content. By improving perceptions of China among North Koreans, Beijing ensures that those who do cross the border are more likely to view China as a permanent destination rather than merely a transit point to South Korea. This cultural influence makes potential defectors more inclined to settle in China rather than continuing their dangerous journey south. China fully understands that exposure to Chinese content leads North Koreans to think 'China is better,' but believes it can manage this through what amounts to controlled aspiration. The implicit message is clear: 'You can see Chinese content, but we control the border – don't try to cross.' Unlike American or South Korean media that promotes freedom and democratization, Chinese content is carefully designed to maintain the status quo while gradually fostering identification with Chinese culture. China's confidence in this approach stems from its belief in its superior border surveillance capabilities. The ultimate goal is ensuring that those North Koreans who do defect remain within China's sphere of influence rather than becoming advocates for Western democratic values elsewhere. This strategy allows China to benefit from North Korean labor while preventing defectors from strengthening pro-democratic movements or providing intelligence to Western nations. The Strategic Moment China views the current moment as strategically important, particularly with the potential for the United States to suspend support for North Korean human rights initiatives under President Donald Trump. As one Daily NK source explained, 'China sees this as a strategically important moment, with the U.S. turning away from information warfare efforts, including the suspension of radio programming into North Korea. They view this as a genuine opportunity to deepen their influence over North Korea.' China may be pleased by signs that the United States is voluntarily abandoning its democracy promotion campaign. If U.S.-backed content dissemination efforts lose momentum, China will become the only significant content provider – an ideal opportunity to spread its own culture. China is also preparing to use this program as a diplomatic tool, recognizing that if North Korean officials and young people develop positive attitudes toward China, that could strengthen pro-China policies. Implications for the Future The real question facing the international community is who will drive social change inside North Korea. If the United States and other Western countries cut democracy promotion funding and abandon this approach, the initiative for genuine change in North Korean society will shift to China. This would inevitably weaken the emotional bonds and cultural ties that come from sharing language and heritage between North and South Korea. China's long-term plan is to cultivate a shared cultural identity between the two countries, believing that over time, Chinese media will begin feeling more familiar and comfortable to North Koreans. As China gradually reshapes North Korea to bring it under Chinese influence, South Korea and the international community haven't responded effectively. If South Korea stops trying to connect with North Korean hearts and minds, China will naturally step into that role. The outcome of this cultural competition may ultimately determine North Korea's future trajectory.


The Diplomat
2 hours ago
- The Diplomat
China's Taiwan Message to Israel and the Limits of Pragmatism
Earlier this week, the Chinese Embassy in Israel issued a sharply worded statement condemning what it called 'erroneous words and acts' by a member of the Israeli Knesset following a visit to Taiwan. The rebuke was directed at Member of the Knesset (MK) Boaz Toporovsky, a senior member of the centrist Yesh Atid party, and the chairman of the Israel-Taiwan Friendship Group, who headed a parliamentary delegation to Taipei in late April. In its statement, the embassy accused Toporovsky of 'violating the One China principle,' suggested he 'take some time to study Chinese history,' and offered to have him visit China and see for himself 'that people on both sides of the strait are family bound by blood ties, and that Taiwan belongs to the over 1.4 billion Chinese people, including the 23 million Taiwan compatriots.' Following a post in X by the Chinese ambassador to Israel, Xiao Junzheng, who repeated the statement, Toporosvsky responded that he would be honored to visit China, but 'no one from China found time to talk to me.' He added that he 'always remember who stands with Israel and who support[s] our enemies.' To add insult to injury, Taiwan's Secretary-General of the National Security Council (and former foreign minister) Joseph Wu trolled Xiao on X, writing: 'Hey dude, you talk way too much on @X. Let me sum it up for you: 'I don't respect your freedom & sovereignty. I support terrorism & stand with #Israel's enemies. BTW, the universe belongs to #China.'' For longtime observers of China-Israel-Taiwan triangular relations, this incident is rather common. Indeed, China has long objected to Israeli parliamentary delegations visiting Taiwan, and similar condemnations have been issued in the past. Already in 2006, during the first parliamentary visit since the establishment of the friendship group, the Chinese ambassador condemned the visit and threatened that 'if the event happens again, that matter will be viewed as critical.' In fact, it is not even the first time that Taiwan's Wu has something to say in the context of China-Israel relations. In a 2022 interview with Israel's biggest English-language media outlet, The Jerusalem Post, Wu remarked: 'So don't worry about China getting upset at you. When they get upset at you, that means you are doing something right.' What makes the latest incident puzzling, however, is the timing. Toporovsky's visit to Taiwan occurred in April, yet Beijing's reaction came only now in July. Even more striking is that this rhetoric came on the heels of what appeared to be a Chinese charm offensive in Israel. Since the appointment of Xiao Junzheng as ambassador in late 2024, it seems that the Chinese Foreign Ministry and Xiao have taken some steps to improve Beijing's image in Israel. These include softer public messaging over the Gaza war, increased outreach to Israeli think tanks and journalists, and a more balanced approach to the Palestinian conflict, as well as the Israel-Iran war, in Chinese state media. The goal seemed to be to stabilize ties after a period of deterioration that had begun even before the October 7 Hamas attack, arguably dating back to Trump's first term and his administration's efforts to pressure Israel to reduce Chinese access to sensitive technologies and infrastructure. This makes the delayed condemnation appear out of step with Beijing's recent approach. If China is trying to build goodwill, why would it publicly revive an issue from over two months ago? Several explanations may help make sense of this sudden diplomatic shift. First, Beijing may be sending a calibrated warning to Israel not to deepen its ties with Taiwan, even symbolically. Toporovsky himself praised Taiwan's democracy, spoke of the importance of strengthening bilateral ties, and in a recent tweet expressed concern over reports about Chinese surveillance on Taiwan's then-vice president-elect Hsiao Bi-khim during her trip to Prague. The embassy's message served to reiterate that this type of engagement will not go unnoticed. At the same time, the statement targeted Taipei as well. As President Lai Ching-te seeks to expand Taiwan's international space, China is actively working to limit it. Condemning Israeli MKs acts as a signal to other countries: even informal parliamentary exchanges will draw pushback. Second, the timing may be tied to China's strategic deepening of ties with Iran. Recently, media reports have surfaced indicating that Beijing may supply Tehran with HQ-9B air defense systems and J-10C fighter jets, two advanced systems that could significantly improve Iran's military capabilities. If these transfers proceed, they would mark a notable escalation in China's role in regional military affairs and a direct challenge to Israeli (as well as U.S.) security interests. By reviving the Taiwan issue, Beijing may be seeking to preempt Israeli criticism or shift the diplomatic narrative, portraying Israel as the actor causing friction. In this view, the Taiwan condemnation becomes a form of strategic hedging: asserting pressure on one front while deflecting attention from another. Third, the statement could also reflect growing Chinese frustration over Israel's shifting China policy. Israel has come under increasing U.S. pressure to reduce its economic and technological exposure to China. This includes growing scrutiny over Chinese investments, especially in critical infrastructure, and more recently, over the supply and use of Chinese electric vehicles (EVs) in the Israeli market and within the Israeli Defense Forces. Indeed, Israeli policymakers have begun signaling a shift, driven in part by national security considerations and closer alignment with U.S. regulatory trends. From Beijing's perspective, this could be seen as part of a broader pattern of Israeli drift toward the U.S.-led containment posture. The embassy's statement, then, may serve as a proxy for expressing broader dissatisfaction with the trajectory of the bilateral relationship. A fourth possibility related to Israel's expanding ties with India and its potential participation in the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), a U.S-backed infrastructure initiative. IMEC aims to link India to Europe via the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel, creating a strategic land-and-sea route that rivals China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China is deeply wary of IMEC, which it sees as part of a broader Western effort to dilute its influence across Eurasia. Israel's role in this corridor, alongside its growing interest in strengthening ties with India, could be viewed in Beijing as further evidence of Israel distancing itself from Chinese strategic frameworks. The Taiwan rebuke may thus reflect a broader geoeconomic concern: that Israel is helping build the very alternatives that China seeks to blunt. Yet, notwithstanding all the aforementioned possibilities, perhaps we are overcomplicating things. Maybe there is no deep geopolitical rationale behind Beijing's recent move, no clear linkage to Iran, India, or economic pressure. Perhaps the statement was simply the result of bureaucratic inertia, or a routine effort to enforce the One China principle without much strategic thought. Maybe, there is nothing behind it at all. And that, in itself, is telling. Beijing is juggling a fragile diplomatic posture in the Middle East: courting Iran militarily, losing influence in Israel, competing with India, and watching the United States regain its foothold in the region. For years, Chinese foreign policy was portrayed as calculated and pragmatic, a reliable contrast to the erratic turns of U.S. diplomacy under President Donald Trump. One could argue that Trump simply does what is good for him at any given moment, guided more by instinct and domestic political calculus than strategic consistency. By contrast, Beijing cultivated an image of being deliberate, long-term in outlook, and strategically composed. Yet episodes like this one suggest something else: not pragmatism, but indecision. As the Middle East slides back into open conflict, U.S. regional dominance reasserts itself, and economic incentives lose their leverage, China appears increasingly unsure of how to position itself. Symbolic rebukes, charm offensives, and military hedging may buy time, but they do not add up to a coherent regional strategy. In this context, deciphering Beijing's intentions has become more difficult than ever – not because its strategy is subtle or sophisticated, but because it increasingly lacks the consistency and clarity it once projected.