Newark air traffic control briefly loses radar access 2nd time in 2 weeks
The FAA said the telecommunications outage impacted communications and radar displays at Philadelphia Terminal Radar Approach Control that guides aircraft in and out of Newark Liberty around 3:55 a.m. ET on Friday and lasted approximately 90 seconds.
WABC reported air traffic controllers could be heard on a radio transmission telling a FedEx plane that their screens went dark.
The latest incident highlights the air traffic control network's aging infrastructure and comes a day after Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy proposed spending billions of dollars to fix it over the next three to four years.
1:48
Staff shortages at Air Traffic Control could impact travel
The FAA said Wednesday it was taking immediate steps to address ongoing problems that have disrupted hundreds of flights at Newark since April 28 especially from United Airlines UAL.O, the largest carrier at the airport located just outside New York City.
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The FAA said it is increasing air traffic controller staffing, adding three new, high-bandwidth telecommunications connections and deploying a temporary backup system to the Philadelphia TRACON during the switch to a more reliable fiber-optic network.
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Duffy said Thursday that the FAA had two redundant lines 'both are up and working now' at Philadelphia.
The FAA did not immediately answer why the backup did not prevent Friday's incident.
Newark has been hit by runway construction, FAA equipment outages and air traffic control staffing shortages that prompted urgent calls from lawmakers for investigations and new funding.
FlightAware said Newark on Friday is experiencing inbound flights delayed averaging more than four hours and departure delays averaging 1 hour or more.
Duffy said Thursday controllers overseeing planes at the busy airport lost contact with aircraft on April 28 for 30 to 90 seconds, an incident that raised serious alarm.
The FAA last year relocated control of the Newark airspace to Philadelphia to address staffing and congested New York City area traffic.
(Reporting by David Shepardson; Additional reporting by Doyinsola Oladipo and Rajesh Kumar Singh Editing by Chizu Nomiyama)
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CTV News
19 hours ago
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National Transportation Safety Board Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy, on monitor left, swears-in the witnesses from left: Dan Cooper, Sikorsky Aircraft, Lance Gant, Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. Army CW4 Kylene Lewis, Steve Braddom, U.S. Army, and Scott Rosengren, U.S. Army, during the NTSB fact-finding hearing on the DCA midair collision accident, at the National Transportation and Safety Board boardroom, Wednesday, July 30, 2025, in Washington. Over three days of sometimes contentious hearings this week, the National Transportation Safety Board interrogated Federal Aviation Administration and Army officials about a list of things that went wrong and contributed to a Black Hawk helicopter and a passenger jet colliding over Washington, D.C., killing 67 people. The biggest revelations: The helicopter's altimeter gauge was broken, and controllers warned the FAA years earlier about the dangers that helicopters presented. At one point NTSB Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy scolded the FAA for not addressing safety concerns. 'Are you kidding me? Sixty-seven people are dead! How do you explain that? Our bureaucratic process?' she said. 'Fix it. Do better.' Victims of the January crash included a group of elite young figure skaters, their parents and coaches and four union steamfitters from the Washington area. Here is a look at the major takeaways from the hearings about the collision, which alarmed travelers before a string of other crashes and close calls this year added to their worries about flying: The helicopter's altimeter was wrong The helicopter was flying at 278 feet (85 metres) — well above the 200-foot (61-metre) ceiling on that route — when it collided with the airliner. But investigators said the pilots might not have realized that because the barometric altimeter they were relying on was reading 80 to 100 feet (24 to 30 metres) lower than the altitude registered by the flight data recorder. 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When a helicopter route like the one the Black Hawk was flying that night includes an altitude limit, Dressler said, his pilots consider that a hard ceiling. FAA and Army defend actions, shift blame Both tried to deflect responsibility for the crash, but the testimony highlighted plenty of things that might have been done differently. The NTSB's final report will be done next year, but there likely will not be one single cause identified for the crash. 'I think it was a week of reckoning for the FAA and the U.S. Army in this accident,' aviation safety consultant and former crash investigator Jeff Guzzetti said. Army officials said the greater concern is that the FAA approved routes around Ronald Reagan International Airport with separation distances as small as 75 feet (23 metres) between helicopters and planes when planes are landing on a certain runway at Reagan. 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The controller acknowledged in an interview that the plane's pilots were never warned when the helicopter was on a collision path, but controllers did not think telling the plane would have made a difference at that point. The plane was descending to land and tried to pull up at the last second after getting a warning in the cockpit, but it was too late. FAA was warned about the dangers of helicopter traffic in D.C. An FAA working group tried to get a warning added to helicopter charts back in 2022 urging pilots to use caution whenever the secondary runway was in use, but the agency refused. The working group said 'helicopter operations are occurring in a proximity that has triggered safety events. These events have been trending in the wrong direction and increasing year over year.' Separately, a different group at the airport discussed moving the helicopter route, but those discussions did not go anywhere. And a manager at a regional radar facility in the area urged the FAA in writing to reduce the number of planes taking off and landing at Reagan because of safety concerns. The NTSB has also said the FAA failed to recognize a troubling history of 85 near misses around Reagan in the three years before the collision, NTSB Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy said 'every sign was there that there was a safety risk and the tower was telling you that.' But after the accident, the FAA transferred managers out of the airport instead of acknowledging that they had been warned. 'What you did is you transferred people out instead of taking ownership over the fact that everybody in FAA in the tower was saying there was a problem,' Homendy said. 'But you guys are pointing out, 'Welp, our bureaucratic process. Somebody should have brought it up at some other symposium.'' Associated Press writer Leah Askarinam contributed. Josh Funk, The Associated Press
Winnipeg Free Press
19 hours ago
- Winnipeg Free Press
Broken altimeter, ignored warnings: Hearings reveal what went wrong in DC crash that killed 67
Over three days of sometimes contentious hearings this week, the National Transportation Safety Board interrogated Federal Aviation Administration and Army officials about a list of things that went wrong and contributed to a Black Hawk helicopter and a passenger jet colliding over Washington, D.C., killing 67 people. The biggest revelations: The helicopter's altimeter gauge was broken, and controllers warned the FAA years earlier about the dangers that helicopters presented. At one point NTSB Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy scolded the FAA for not addressing safety concerns. 'Are you kidding me? Sixty-seven people are dead! How do you explain that? Our bureaucratic process?' she said. 'Fix it. Do better.' Victims of the January crash included a group of elite young figure skaters, their parents and coaches and four union steamfitters from the Washington area. 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Army Chief Warrant Officer Kylene Lewis told the board that an 80- to 100-foot (24- to 30-meter) discrepancy between the different altimeters on a helicopter would not be alarming, because at lower altitudes she would be relying more on the radar altimeter than the barometric altimeter. Plus Army pilots strive to stay within 100 feet (30 meters) of target altitude on flights, so they could still do that even with their altimeters that far off. But Rick Dressler of medevac operator Metro Aviation told the NTSB that imprecision would not fly with his helicopters. When a helicopter route like the one the Black Hawk was flying that night includes an altitude limit, Dressler said, his pilots consider that a hard ceiling. FAA and Army defend actions, shift blame Both tried to deflect responsibility for the crash, but the testimony highlighted plenty of things that might have been done differently. 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Van Vechten said he was never allowed to fly under a landing plane as the Black Hawk did, but only a handful of the hundreds of times he flew that route involved planes landing on that runway. Other pilots in the unit told crash investigators it was routine to be directed to fly under landing planes, and they believed that was safe if they stuck to the approved route. Frank McIntosh, the head of the FAA's air traffic control organization, said he thinks controllers at Reagan 'were really dependent upon the use of visual separation' to keep traffic moving through the busy airspace. The NTSB said controllers repeatedly said they would just 'make it work.' They sometimes used 'squeeze plays' to land planes with minimal separation. On the night of the crash, a controller twice asked the helicopter pilots whether they had the jet in sight, and the pilots said they did and asked for visual separation approval so they could use their own eyes to maintain distance. 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Separately, a different group at the airport discussed moving the helicopter route, but those discussions did not go anywhere. And a manager at a regional radar facility in the area urged the FAA in writing to reduce the number of planes taking off and landing at Reagan because of safety concerns. Monday Mornings The latest local business news and a lookahead to the coming week. The NTSB has also said the FAA failed to recognize a troubling history of 85 near misses around Reagan in the three years before the collision, NTSB Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy said 'every sign was there that there was a safety risk and the tower was telling you that.' But after the accident, the FAA transferred managers out of the airport instead of acknowledging that they had been warned. 'What you did is you transferred people out instead of taking ownership over the fact that everybody in FAA in the tower was saying there was a problem,' Homendy said. 'But you guys are pointing out, 'Welp, our bureaucratic process. Somebody should have brought it up at some other symposium.'' ___ Associated Press writer Leah Askarinam contributed.
Global News
a day ago
- Global News
Ceremony held for RCAF pilot killed in Cape Breton crash while training in 1944
According to his Royal Canadian Air Force service records, 21-year-old Pilot Officer Bill Bennet was a fine airman. Described as tall and wiry, his commanding officer noted in March 1944 that the Montreal man was also 'enthusiastic and intelligent.' And as the Second World War in Europe entered its final phase that summer, Bennet was made a staff pilot at the RCAF station in Summerside, P.E.I., where he started training to fly reconnaissance aircraft or bombers. On Aug. 6, 1944, Bennet was tasked with flying a twin-engine Avro Anson V training aircraft carrying two navigators and one radio operator. Their routine mission that Sunday was to fly east from Summerside to a point over the Gulf of St. Lawrence north of Cape Breton in Nova Scotia and then return. But something went wrong over the water. The aircraft was well south of where it should have been. And as it entered a thick bank of fog, Bennett began a descent that he hoped would bring the plane below the haze. Story continues below advertisement Instead of emerging above the vast gulf, the aircraft suddenly plowed through a stand of small trees. Its wings, tail and one engine were torn off as it slammed into the side of Jerome Mountain on the western edge of Cape Breton Highlands National Park. Bennet was badly injured, having suffered a fractured skull. Incredibly, the other three men had only minor wounds. Given the steep, rough terrain, it wasn't until the next afternoon that a search party reached the remote crash site northeast of the Acadian village of Cheticamp, N.S. The searchers were told Bennet had died during the night. 2:26 RCAF celebrates 100 years in the sky The three survivors — 20-year-old navigator John Robert Ogilvie and 22-year-old navigator William John Astle, both of Edmonton, and 22-year-old communications officer Jack Roy Burke of Wallaceburg, Ont. — managed to hike down the mountain by late Monday. But it would take another day before Bennet's body could be recovered. Story continues below advertisement Jeff Noakes, Second World War historian at the Canadian War Museum in Ottawa, said an RCAF inquiry later found the plane's compass wasn't working properly. As well, he said investigators determined the navigators and the pilot weren't communicating as well as they should have been. Get daily National news Get the day's top news, political, economic, and current affairs headlines, delivered to your inbox once a day. Sign up for daily National newsletter Sign Up By providing your email address, you have read and agree to Global News' Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy 'The RCAF ultimately concluded that they weren't 100 per cent sure why there was an error in the navigation,' Noakes said in an interview. On Saturday, more than 80 years after the crash, a non-profit group based in Cheticamp — Les Amis du Plein Air — held a public ceremony to unveil two commemorative panels at a campsite in the shadow of the mountain. Among those in the crowd of about 50 people was one of Bennet's nephews, 63-year-old Bill Bennet of Ottawa, who was named after his late uncle. He said it was important for him and his two children, Liam and Nora, to travel to Cape Breton to be part of the unveiling. 'My son is 21,' Bill Bennet said, his voice cracking with emotion as he recalled his uncle was the same age when he died. 'I want to make them aware of our family's connection to the war and what that means. It's also a chance to connect with the people of Cheticamp … about the efforts (their ancestors) made to rescue these men in this very rugged terrain …. I think of the sacrifice of my uncle, but there are so many more people involved in this whole story.' Story continues below advertisement 2:52 Remembering the Canadian general who helped secure Dutch freedom during WWII Bill Bennet's 65-year-old brother Doug, who travelled from Toronto with his wife Nancy and their children Nathan and Eliza, said his uncle's tragic story illustrates the sacrifices made by those who took part in the British Commonwealth Air Training Program, often described as among Canada's most important contributions to the war effort. By the end of the war, the program had graduated more than 131,000 pilots, observers, flight engineers and other aircrew for the air forces of Canada, Britain, Australia and New Zealand. More than half joined the RCAF. It was often dangerous work. In all, 856 trainees were killed, though some sources suggest the number is much higher. 'It was a huge cost,' Doug Bennet said before the ceremony began. 'And they were almost all in their late teens and early 20s.' Story continues below advertisement Erin Gregory, curator at the Canadian Aviation and Space Museum in Ottawa, said most Canadians are more familiar with the sacrifices made overseas during the Second World War. 'It's important to mark this moment of service and sacrifice at home, which is at least as important as what happened overseas,' Gregory said. 'As part of the war effort, it was extremely important and it was dangerous.'
