DeepSeek and China's AI power move
The interesting thing about it is that the company built their model really cheap and that has called into question this narrative that you need an endless supply of chips and data centres and money to develop AI.
On today's show we're speaking to WIRED's senior tech writer Zeyi Yang about the deepening AI cold war between the US and China and the lingering questions about where AI is headed and what it's good for?
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Winnipeg Free Press
4 hours ago
- Winnipeg Free Press
China pushes back at US demands to stop buying Russian and Iranian oil
WASHINGTON (AP) — U.S. and Chinese officials may be able to settle many of their differences to reach a trade deal and avert punishing tariffs, but they remain far apart on one issue: the U.S. demand that China stop purchasing oil from Iran and Russia. 'China will always ensure its energy supply in ways that serve our national interests,' China's Foreign Ministry posted on X on Wednesday following two days of trade negotiations in Stockholm, responding to the U.S. threat of a 100% tariff. 'Coercion and pressuring will not achieve anything. China will firmly defend its sovereignty, security and development interests,' the ministry said. The response is notable at a time when both Beijing and Washington are signaling optimism and goodwill about reaching a deal to keep commercial ties between the world's two largest economies stable — after climbing down from sky-high tariffs and harsh trade restrictions. It underscores China's confidence in playing hardball when dealing with the Trump administration, especially when trade is linked to its energy and foreign policies. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, emerging from the talks, told reporters that when it comes to Russian oil purchases, the 'Chinese take their sovereignty very seriously.' 'We don't want to impede on their sovereignty, so they would like to pay a 100% tariff,' Bessent said. On Thursday, he called the Chinese 'tough' negotiators, but said China's pushback hasn't stalled the negotiations. 'I believe that we have the makings of a deal,' Bessent told CNBC. Gabriel Wildau, managing director of the consultancy Teneo, said he doubts President Donald Trump would actually deploy the 100% tariff. 'Realizing those threats would derail all the recent progress and probably kill any chance' for Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping to announce a trade deal if they should meet this fall, Wildau said. In seeking to restrict oil sales by Russia and Iran, a major source of revenue for both countries, the U.S. wants to reduce the funding available for their militaries, as Moscow pursues its war against Ukraine and Tehran funds militant groups across the Middle East. China plays hardball When Trump unveiled a sweeping plan for tariffs on dozens of countries in April, China was the only country that retaliated. It refused to give in to U.S. pressure. 'If the U.S. is bent on imposing tariffs, China will fight to the end, and this is China's consistent official stance,' said Tu Xinquan, director of the China Institute for WTO Studies at the University of International Business and Economics in Beijing. WTO is the acronym for the World Trade Organization. Negotiating tactics aside, China may also suspect that the U.S. won't follow through on its threat, questioning the importance Trump places on countering Russia, Tu said. Scott Kennedy, senior adviser and trustee chair in Chinese Business and Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said Beijing is unlikely to change its posture when it sees inconsistencies in U.S. foreign policy goals toward Russia and Iran, whereas Beijing's policy support for Moscow is consistent and clear. It's also possible that Beijing may want to use it as another negotiating tool to extract more concessions from Trump, Kennedy said. Danny Russel, a distinguished fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute, said Beijing now sees itself as 'the one holding the cards in its struggle with Washington.' He said Trump has made it clear he wants a 'headline-grabbing deal' with Xi, 'so rejecting a U.S. demand to stop buying oil from Iran or Russia is probably not seen as a deal‑breaker, even if it generates friction and a delay.' Continuing to buy oil from Russia preserves Xi's 'strategic solidarity' with Russian President Vladimir Putin and significantly reduces the economic costs for China, Russel said. 'Beijing simply can't afford to walk away from the oil from Russia and Iran,' he said. 'It's too important a strategic energy supply, and Beijing is buying it at fire‑sale prices.' China depends on oil from Russia and Iran A 2024 report by the U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that roughly 80% to 90% of the oil exported by Iran went to China. The Chinese economy benefits from the more than 1 million barrels of Iranian oil it imports per day. After the Iranian parliament floated a plan to shut down the Strait of Hormuz in June following U.S. strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities, China spoke out against closing the critical oil transit route. China also is an important customer for Russia, but is second to India in buying Russian seaborne crude oil exports. In April, Chinese imports of Russian oil rose 20% over the previous month to more than 1.3 million barrels per day, according to the KSE Institute, an analytical center at the Kyiv School of Economics. This past week, Trump said the U.S. will impose a 25% tariff on goods from India, plus an additional import tax because of India's purchasing of Russian oil. India's Foreign Ministry said Friday its relationship with Russia was 'steady and time-tested.' Stephen Miller, White House deputy chief of staff and a top policy adviser, said Trump has been clear that it is 'not acceptable' for India to continue financing the Ukraine war by purchasing oil from Russia. 'People will be shocked to learn that India is basically tied with China in purchasing Russian oil,' Miller said on Fox News Channel's 'Sunday Morning Futures.' He said the U.S. needs 'to get real about dealing with the financing of this war.' Congress demands action Sen. Lindsey Graham, a Republican from South Carolina, is pushing for sanctions and tariffs on Russia and its financial backers. In April, he introduced a bill that would authorize the president to impose tariffs as high as 500% not only on Russia but on any country that 'knowingly' buys oil, uranium, natural gas, petroleum products or petrochemical products from Russia. Monday Mornings The latest local business news and a lookahead to the coming week. 'The purpose of this legislation is to break the cycle of China — a communist dictatorship — buying oil below market price from Putin's Russia, which empowers his war machine to kill innocent Ukrainian civilians,' Graham said in a June statement. The bill has 84 co-sponsors in the 100-seat Senate. A corresponding House version has been introduced, also with bipartisan support. Republicans say they stand ready to move on the sanctions legislation if Trump asks them to do so, but the bill is on hold for now. ___ Associated Press writers David McHugh in Frankfurt and Rajesh Roy in New Delhi and researcher Yu Bing in Beijing contributed to the report.
Calgary Herald
8 hours ago
- Calgary Herald
OPEC+ agrees big output hike as focus shifts to its next move
Article content Russia's Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak made a rare visit to Riyadh on Thursday to discuss 'cooperation between the countries' with Saudi Arabian Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman. The two countries have jointly led OPEC+ since its creation almost a decade ago. Article content The meeting was intended for Saudi Arabia to show unity with Russia and bridge any gaps in their points of view ahead of the meeting, one of the delegates said. Article content Price Crash Article content OPEC+ sent oil prices crashing to a four-year low in early April when it announced a sudden acceleration in its plan to unwind the current tranche of cuts, with markets still reeling in the wake of Trump's dramatic 'Liberation Day' tariff announcements. Article content The alliance has followed with a series of bumper monthly increases, and sped up even further in July as it sought to capitalize on strong summer demand. Bloomberg reported at the time that the group had a provisional plan to complete the current supply revival with the September hike. Article content Article content The latest decision was taken 'in view of a steady global economic outlook and current healthy market fundamentals, as reflected in the low oil inventories,' OPEC said in a statement on Sunday. Article content Crude prices have clawed back losses in recent months, with Brent futures in London trading just below $70 a barrel on Friday — down 6.7% this year. Article content The market's resilience was partly driven by the fact that OPEC+ supply increases — at least in their initial stages — fell short of the amounts promised, as the Saudis pushed countries that had previously over-produced to forgo their allotted hikes in compensation. Article content However, analysts have warned the market faces a mounting surplus later this year, when seasonal consumption weakens and as supplies increase and slowing global growth weighs on demand. Article content World oil markets face a surplus of 2 million barrels a day in the fourth quarter as Chinese consumption cools and new supplies swell in the US, Canada, Brazil and Guyana, according to the International Energy Agency in Paris. Forecasters on Wall Street, including JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Goldman Sachs Group Inc., expect prices will sink towards $60 a barrel by the end of the year. Article content Article content OPEC+ officials have offered a range of explanations for the accelerated supply revival, from punishing the group's over-producing members to placating Trump. Article content People familiar with the matter have said Saudi Arabia's main objective is to recoup the market share OPEC+ has ceded to rivals like US shale drillers during years of output cutbacks. Riyadh's OPEC+ quota for August, at 9.756 million barrels a day, would roughly put its production at the highest level in two years. Article content The pivot in oil strategy by Saudi Arabia and its partners, which had spent much of the past decade laboring to shore up crude prices, has also come at a cost for the cartel. Downward pressure on prices stands to widen an already-soaring budget deficit in the kingdom, which needs oil above $90 a barrel to cover government spending, the International Monetary Fund estimates.
Canada News.Net
10 hours ago
- Canada News.Net
Heres why the EU keeps losing to China
The summit Brussels-Beijing economic summit spotlighted the blocs mounting strategic confusion and accelerating drift toward isolation The China-EU summit held in Beijing late last month could have been a celebration of 50 years of diplomatic relations between two of the world's largest economic powers. Instead, it served as a sobering reminder of the EU's growing strategic confusion, and its inability to capitalize on the immense opportunities offered by cooperation with China. The summit came at a sensitive moment in global politics. What was once hailed as a mutually beneficial partnership has now become entangled in geopolitics, internal divisions within the EU, and the enduring shadow of Washington's influence. The global turbulence of recent years - the pandemic, and the war in Ukraine - has not only strained relations but also reinforced the EU's dependence on the United States. Rather than renewing a partnership that once stood as a pillar of global economic integration, the EU leaders arrived in Beijing with a familiar agenda: accusations over trade practices, warnings about "security threats," and renewed calls for China to "rein in" Russia. Predictably, no breakthrough was achieved. The deterioration of China-EU relations cannot be understood without revisiting the European Commission's strategic shift in 2019. Under Ursula von der Leyen, Brussels officially categorized China as not just a partner but also a "systemic rival" - a move that introduced suspicion into virtually every area of engagement. Since then, an ideological lens has increasingly shaped EU policy, replacing the pragmatism that once underpinned economic cooperation. The consequences have been stark. Brussels has launched measures to restrict Chinese investment, imposed high tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, and - most recently - barred Chinese firms from public tenders worth over €5 million. Further escalation came when the EU included two Chinese banks in its latest sanctions package against Russia, signaling that Europe is willing to weaponize economic tools for political purposes. These steps are justified by the EU as "de-risking." By pushing for reduced interdependence in strategic sectors - raw materials, high-tech supply chains, and digital infrastructure - Brussels has aligned itself with Washington's containment playbook, even as European leaders publicly insist on independence. In Beijing, von der Leyen struck a conciliatory tone, declaring the EU's openness to Chinese investment and cooperation. But such statements ring hollow when juxtaposed with her recent warnings at the G7 summit about a looming "China shock" and accusations of Beijing "weaponizing trade." Similarly, the head of EU diplomacy, Kaja Kallas - also present in Beijing - has accused China of fueling the war in Ukraine and waging hybrid operations against Europe. These mixed signals undermine credibility and reinforce perceptions in Beijing that the EU lacks a coherent, autonomous China strategy. More fundamentally, Brussels' approach is internally contradictory. The EU dreams of "strategic autonomy," yet ties its foreign policy to transatlantic priorities. It seeks economic resilience, yet undermines its own competitiveness by disrupting supply chains and limiting market access. It aspires to global leadership, yet isolates itself from the rest of the world by clinging to zero-sum geopolitics. By contrast, China's position at the summit was clear: focus on complementarity, promote free trade, and pursue win-win cooperation in areas that matter for global stability - digital transformation, green development, and infrastructure connectivity. Beijing emphasized its willingness to deepen exchanges in artificial intelligence, clean energy, and scientific research, seeing these sectors as essential to both sides' modernization. For China, the EU remains a strategic partner, not an adversary. Beijing has long supported European integration and consistently encourages the EU to play an independent role in global affairs. From China's perspective, a strong, autonomous Europe is a counterweight to unilateralism and an anchor of multipolarity. This vision aligns with Europe's own interests - but diverges sharply from Washington's preference for a subordinate EU within the transatlantic alliance. From Beijing's perspective, the EU's current challenges - economic slowdown, energy insecurity, and geopolitical vulnerability - are not caused by China. Rather, they stem from internal divisions and policy choices that tether Europe to US strategies. China fears that Europe's drift into a hardline camp could destabilize the international order, a scenario contrary to Beijing's vision of stability and connectivity across Eurasia. The single most contentious issue remains the war in Ukraine. Brussels insists that China's ties with Moscow "destabilize" Europe, while Beijing argues that it is maintaining an independent and neutral position aimed at facilitating a peaceful settlement. EU leaders, however, continue to press China to "use its influence" to end Russia's military operations - effectively asking Beijing to abandon a key strategic partnership. This is neither realistic nor conducive to diplomacy. For now, this geopolitical deadlock overshadows other areas of potential cooperation. So long as the EU views the Ukraine conflict through an existential lens - and equates neutrality with complicity - China-EU relations will remain constrained, regardless of shared economic interests. Despite political frictions, economic ties remain robust. The EU is China's largest trading partner, and China ranks second for the EU. Together, they account for over one-third of global GDP and nearly 30% of global trade in goods and services. Chinese investment in Europe has surpassed $100 billion, and annual flows are roughly balanced with EU investment in China. These numbers underscore a basic truth: the China-EU relationship is too significant to be defined by ideological posturing. Global supply chains, green technology cooperation, and digital innovation cannot advance without mutual engagement. The question is whether Brussels will recognize this before further damage is done. The EU portrays its current trajectory as "rebalancing" and "de-risking." In reality, these policies risk strategic isolation. By securitizing economic ties and subordinating its diplomacy to US priorities in relation to China, the EU undermines its own competitiveness and alienates partners across the globe. The result is an inward-looking bloc that struggles to influence global norms as it dreams of geopolitical power. For China, the lesson is clear: The EU is not ready for a genuine reset. Beijing will continue to engage constructively but will not expect rapid progress. In the long run, the revival of a balanced partnership may depend on a political shift within Europe - a leadership willing to replace ideological rigidity with pragmatic cooperation. The Beijing summit, rather than rekindling optimism, has confirmed the structural divergence between China and the EU. However, it also highlighted what remains at stake: two economic giants whose cooperation - or confrontation - will shape global stability for decades to come. China stands ready to pursue a future based on multilateralism, open trade, and shared development. Whether the EU can free itself from delusions and anxieties and rediscover the value of partnership with Beijing remains an open question. Until then, the EU's fixation on "de-risking" may turn into what it fears most: self-inflicted decline.
