
It Is Necessary To Discuss How The West's Relations With Russia Will Be Built After Putin
This deep conviction is the result of many years of targeted work by the Russian propaganda machine, which has significantly strengthened its positions and methods of influence in recent years. State media and high-ranking officials tirelessly broadcast anti-American and anti-European rhetoric, turning it into a powerful tool for internal mobilization and legitimization of the Kremlin's actions. Any statement, even the most insignificant, by Western politicians, any careless utterance, is instantly seized upon and used as evidence of Western hostility and as justification for Russia's aggressive policies.
Elvira Kikhareva
"The Transition To Pragmatic Relations Is Possible Only If The West Offers Specific Mechanisms For Interaction"
A classic example of such manipulation is the statement by former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, now the head of European diplomacy, about the potential for Russia's disintegration.[1] Regardless of the context and Kallas' true intentions, this statement was instantly seized upon by Russian propaganda and presented as irrefutable evidence of Western plans to destroy Russia. Such statements, even if they do not reflect the real policies of the West, strengthen the conviction of Russian citizens in the inevitability of conflict, the inevitability of confrontation and the complete impossibility of any compromise.
This creates an extremely difficult situation in which the question of future relations between the West and Russia after Vladimir Putin's departure becomes especially relevant and acute. A simple containment strategy based on the accumulation of military power and sanctions pressure is unlikely to be effective in the long term. On the contrary, it may strengthen the sense among Russians of inhabiting a besieged fortress and further strengthen support for the authorities, who appear in the eyes of the population as the only defenders from a hostile outside world. It is necessary to take into account that Russian society is now highly polarized. There are groups of the population for whom anti-Western sentiments are not simply a consequence of propaganda, but deeply rooted convictions formed over decades.
Changing these convictions will take a long time and will require not only political but also socio-economic transformations within Russia. Any attempt by the West to impose its conditions on Russia without taking these internal processes into account risks leading to even greater isolation and confrontation.
Any actions require pre-prepared ground for a change in the course of the future Russian government. The transition to pragmatic relations is possible only if the West offers specific mechanisms for interaction.
Three years of rash decisions not only provoked unprecedented Western sanctions, but also radically changed the Kremlin's geopolitical priorities.
From a strategy focused on partial integration into the Western system, Russia made a sharp turn to building an alternative, primarily Eastern, vector of development. The three pillars of the new Russian foreign policy were strengthening allied ties with irreconcilable opponents of the West, strengthening economic cooperation with the states of the "Global South" and, finally, unprecedented rapprochement with China.
Sanctions pressure pushed for active building of relations with states that traditionally have tense relations with the West. Partnership with Iran, North Korea, and Yemen, although not clear to many, pragmatically pursues several goals: gaining access to technology, bypassing Western sanctions, and demonstrating readiness to resist Western dominance. At the same time, Moscow is actively increasing its presence in Africa, Latin America, South Asia, and the post-Soviet space, offering these countries an alternative to the Western development model.
Here, Russia is counting not only on expanding markets for its goods, but also on access to cheap resources. However, the effectiveness of this tactic remains questionable, given Russia's own limited economic capabilities and competition from other global players.
"Thanks To Cooperation With China, Russia Has Gained Access To Alternative Financial Systems"
The most significant change in Russian foreign policy has been the unprecedented rapprochement with China. If before 2022, relations between the two countries were rather pragmatic, now the Kremlin is demonstrating a readiness to significantly increase economic and political dependence on Beijing. China, the largest consumer of Russian energy, has become a real lifeline for the Russian economy under the blow of sanctions. Thanks to cooperation with China, Russia has gained access to alternative financial systems, bypassing the restrictions imposed by the West. This cooperation extends not only to energy, but also to other areas: technology, investment, infrastructure projects. However, this dependence is fraught with significant risks: economic vulnerability to China can limit the country's sovereignty and lead to unequal relations in the long term. Although the Kremlin views this dependence as an investment in confronting the United States and strengthening its influence on the world stage, the long-term consequences of this choice remain unpredictable.
There have also been major changes in the circles of the Russian elite influencing the "climate" within the country. Those close to Putin increasingly understand that 2022 was a real disaster, and many officials want to gradually move away from the president's mistakes. The main thing for them is to be sure that the West will react positively to this. But it will be difficult for the West to change its tone and develop a common opinion on Russia – because the views in different European capitals differ greatly. Nevertheless, Western politicians dissatisfied with Trump's policies could begin to develop at least a new security concept for relations with Russia. One possible step is to conclude arms-control agreements and establish communication channels that will help avoid conflicts. In such agreements, arms restrictions, a ban on tactical intervention, and the creation of coordination mechanisms are important.
But not only defense security, but also the transformation of economic relations will move the dead point. Without serious economic changes, it is unlikely that trade with Russia will be restored quickly. But if this happens, both sides will win: Russia will reduce its excessive dependence on China, and relations with the West will become more balanced. However, cooperation is possible only after the hostilities cease. Arms control is possible when the situation in eastern Ukraine stabilizes.
In addition to the steps listed, it is important to establish a dialogue with Russian society and the elite, to show that the Kremlin, not the West, initiated the isolation. Those officials, scientists, AND representatives of culture and sports who are not engaged in propaganda should be allowed free entry to Europe, lifting visa restrictions. It also needs to be explained to Europeans that the responsibility for the breakdown in peaceful relations lies not with all Russians, but with the specific actions of the leadership, which brought the country to such a difficult situation.
"The Lack Of A Common Plan To Prepare For The Future"
It is necessary to discuss now how relations with Russia will be built after Putin, although Europe is currently experiencing a serious crisis. It may seem that it is too early to think about the post-war order – after all, there is a war going on. But preparing for the future and thinking through different scenarios is very important in order to prevent further escalation of the conflict.
Finally, Putin has not appointed a successor for himself – most likely, he wants to retain power for himself. Most likely, the next leader will be weaker, thus starting a struggle between political groups within the country. It will be similar to the period after Stalin's death, when power passed to a group of experienced politicians who gradually moved the country towards pragmatism and greater freedoms.
The main problem now is the lack of a common plan to prepare for the future.
The crisis in the United States showed that rapid changes are possible, and the same could happen in Russia after Putin. If nothing is discussed, the conflict between Russia and the West will continue.
The idea of reconsidering the approach to relations with Russia is not just theoretical reasoning. Regardless of how the authorities in Moscow are currently behaving, the presence of specific proposals from the West could influence the situation inside the country right now and increase the chances of softening the tough policy.
*Elvira Vikhareva is a renowned Russian opposition politician based in Russia. In 2023, she was poisoned with heavy metal salts.

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On July 2, 2025, the Russian bailiff service officers raided a private Bombardier Global 5000 business jet ready to take off from Chelyabinsk airport for Turkey,[1] preventing its owner, the billionaire politician Konstantin Strukov, from escaping the country. Strukov, the major stakeholder in one of Russia's largest gold producers, YuzhUralZoloto and a longtime member of the United Russia party, has been a deputy of Chelyabinsk regional legislature since 2000 and holds the position of deputy chairman of the body since 2020.[2] Earlier that day, the court in Chelyabinsk issued a ruling banning him from leaving Russia and seized his assets following an order from the office of from Russia's Prosecutor-General's Office.[3] Strukov is accused of amassing his fortune (he is listed in Russia's most recent Forbes list as No. 78 with assets valued at $1.9 billion)[4] via scam schemes that involved corruption and misuse of his administrative position. This looks like another case for confiscating the assets of a Russian businessman in favor of the state, which looks quite "normal" these days as more than 400 enterprises valued at at least 2.6 trillion rubles, formerly belonging to the Russian owners,[5] had already changed hands since 2022. I should mention from the outset that I am not talking about squeezing out investors from the so-called "unfriendly" countries, a process has been underway since the start of Russia's full-scale assault on Ukraine and which I had called "the robbery of the century" as it deprived Western companies of more than $100 billion in assets, handing them to Russian oligarchs close to the Kremlin – the acquisition of Russian business of Société Générale by Vladimir Potatin, who himself had sold his Rosbank to the French financiers for $2 billion several years earlier, or appropriation of Danone's Russian factories by Ramzan Kadyrov's proxies are most notable examples of these confiscations.[6] Unlike these cases, the pressure on the Russian businesses that has been mounting since 2023 is, to my mind, less driven by the wish to "redistribute" valuable assets from one group of oligarchs to others – the underlying mechanics looks at least somewhat different this time. Confiscations Are Politically Motivated First, it should be noted that almost every single case of what I would call "nationalization" applies to companies that were at some time bought by their current owners from the Russian state or from regional authorities (therefore one may also use the term "de-privatization").[7] Even while Russian President Vladimir Putin has been saying for years that the Russian government has no intention of depriving "well-behaving" and "law-abiding" proprietors of their assets,[8] the prosecutor-general reiterated many times that his entity is doing a lot for "returning to the State what belongs to it." This looks like a serious claim since there are few cases of the confiscation of companies that were started and developed without any state-owned assets.[9] The most telling case was that of Lesta Games, a company that acquired a Russian subsidiary of the famous Wargaming, the developer of the realistic online game, World of Tanks.[10] The Russian owners were declared extremists for their alleged support for Ukraine and their holdings were confiscated.[11] In all other cases, the Russian prosecutors cite either irregularities with privatization or corruption and conflict of interest issues for claiming the property. To facilitate the process, Russian lawmakers eventually annulled the statutes of limitation on the "wrongdoings" linked to privatization deals (formally, they are still in place, but several court rulings, including one by the Constitutional Court, say that this term should now start not from the day of sell-off but from the one the prosecutors found out it was illegal).[12] Therefore, any privatization deal may now be disputed, as the company may have been merged with another, or sold, or transformed into limited liability companies and made public.[13] If one looks carefully at the ongoing confiscation processes, one can find out that they are initiated mostly against those who can be accused of privatizing the initial assets for pennies (but this applies to almost all of those who participated in the 1990s sell-off since the asset prices were then extremely low),[14] who are combining their business activities with administrative and elected positions (it seems to be linked to attempts to "fight corruption") and who used off-shore holdings for their business operations and/or hold foreign citizenships and foreign residence permits (this seems to be a continuation of the famous "nationalization of the elites" proclaimed by Putin as early as in 2013).[15] The latter issue has seemingly become one of the most crucial in recent months (both Konstantin Strukov and Dmitry Kamenshchik, the famous owner of the Domodedovo Airport, which was confiscated by the government this June, were called "influenced from abroad").[16] So there is no doubt that confiscations are politically motivated and therefore inspired more by the state itself, rather than by some oligarchic groups. It may be noted that for a long time both in the Russian independent media and in foreign sources a popular concept has been disseminated, linking this "new nationalization" to the Rotenberg brothers, Arkady and Boris, who are longtime friends of Putin.[17] The main rationale beyond it was the fact that, since 2020, the Kremlin has initiated several cases for stripping Russian businessmen of their assets – and some of the properties ended up in the Rotenbergs' hands. In August 2020, President Putin called the Prosecutor-General's Office to investigate the 1992 privatization of the Bashkir Caustic Company. In December of the same year a Russian court ordered its shares to be returned to the state and transferred to Rosimuschestvo, or the Federal Property Management Agency.[18] Four years later, the company was excluded from the strategic enterprises' list, and the majority stake was sold to a company called Roskhim, allegedly owned by the Rotenbergs.[19] The same, but a bit earlier, happened to Metafrax Chemicals, Russia's largest methanol manufacturer, which was also nationalized due to 1992 privatization irregularities and soon resold to Roskhim together with some other companies, including the Kuchuksulfat factory, based in the Altai region.[20] I would not exclude some influence that the Rotenbergs brothers may have on the current confiscations (many insiders claim that they were the people behind the long-lasting attacks on the Domodedovo airport), but to my mind one should take into consideration the changing nature of current Russian "nationalizations." This change seems to be manifested by the fact that – unlike the Western companies handed to new Russian owners in 2022-2023 – most of the assets currently retributed by the state either remain in the state's possession or are transferred to companies and banks that belong to the state. For example, in nine of the 12 largest cases recorded in 2023-2025, the assets were either transferred to the balance sheet of Rosimuschestvo, or went to corporations and banks that are in state ownership (for example, FESCO and the Solikamsk magnesium plant were granted to Rosatom, the Makfa pasta factory went to Rosselkhozbank, and the Pokrovsky meat holding to VTB).[21] In all these cases, it can hardly be said that the enterprises passed to some oligarchic companies on the basis of ownership – the maximum that can be asserted is that certain people close to the authorities may in the future benefit from their work, but this also needs to be proven. I would add that the concentration of industrial assets in state ownership might be accelerated also by the ongoing crisis in some industries – for example, coal production faces incredible pressures from the global market,[22] and the aviation industry might increase its operational losses, as the disruptions mount in the Russian air traffic caused by the ongoing drone war with Ukraine,[23] so I would not exclude developments that may cause a state takeover of these industries allowing their direct financing from the federal budget. The Kremlin Believes Time For Russian Big Private Business Is Largely Over The main result of the current "deprivatization" seems to be not so much the redistribution of property among the oligarchs as the consolidation of new assets for the state. Of 2.4 trillion rubles at which the companies that the Prosecutor-General's Office seized from their owners were valued, Rosimuschestvo retains assets worth almost one trillion, and more than 800 billion were transferred to various state companies or state banks, while the new private owners received no more than one-fourth of what was confiscated. Of course, there are certain expectations that Rosimuschestvo will not end up as the final owner of the confiscated assets, but I think that, given the logic of the current regime's actions, most of the assets will still end this part of their journey in the hands of state structures, so this is clearly not so much a redistribution as nationalization. Moreover, the initiative to open the new cases on the basis of which property can be seized and then converted into state revenue belongs not so much to the president, but it is now almost entirely in prosecutors' hands (97 percent of cases are opened by Prosecutor-General's Office and about two percent by the Investigative Committee). Hence, I would say that those who argue that the 50-year-old Prosecutor-General Igor Krasnov is the main (and autonomous) figure behind all this, who thereby strengthens his reputation among the aging leading security officials and accustoms business and officials to recognize his powers and authority, might be right. Some insiders even began to treat him as a potential successor to President Putin, which, I would say, cannot be proved by any means. However, all such rumors confirm my opinion that "de-privatization" is not a process of inter-oligarchic redistribution, but something much more political in nature. The latter, of course, does not exclude the material interest of both the security officials and many of Putin's friends – but most likely they intend to profit from financial flows provided by using the new assets under state ownership than to formally become their owners. This is a much more familiar way of earning money for officials, who rarely want to turn themselves into classic entrepreneurs. What one may see now in Russia looks like a profound change is government's policies. It seems that for years, the Kremlin had opted for a "soft management" of the national economy based on manipulations with taxes or "corporate responsibility," meaning the exchange of some entrepreneurial freedoms for loyalty and cooperation. The businesses were expected to limit their offshore activities, to re-register in Russia, to pay taxes, and comply with their increases (in some cases predictable, in some, as in 2023-2024, unexpected), etc.[24] Those who violated these terms faced pressure, and, under some conditions, confiscation of their assets – primarily in case of open disloyalty, stealing funds or engaged in acute conflict of interests. Under such a regime, the redistribution was familiar, with more loyals rewarded by the assets that formerly belonged to less loyal ones (the attitude to the foreign investors that resulted in massive confiscations of 2022-2023 and in continuing attempts to prevent their return to Russia were driven by the same rationale).[25] Now, it looks like the main logic has changed – the state wants not to tax successful and profitable large enterprises but rather to own them. I would not say whether it wants either to maximize its own revenues or just to increase its control over the economy – but the drive is clear: the Kremlin believes the time for Russian big private business is largely over. The entrepreneurship should become limited to the mid-sized and small business that would dominate the logistics, retail, and service sectors while the industrial sector must, more-or-less, return to state ownership to meet the state's demand and promulgate its interests. The exceptions may remain – but they nevertheless will be just the exceptions that prove the rule. Some time ago President Putin had one more time called for not taking the ongoing process for nationalization – pretending that "nationalization is a process that is prescribed by law, [but] we do not apply this law, these norms."[26] Of course, the president lied as he does most of the time: I would say that there is still no law in Russia that would clearly regulate the nationalization process (there is only Art. 306 of the Civil Code, which refers to the possibility of its adoption),[27] but the distinct law that might be applied was never deliberated. Moreover, according to the Civil Code norms, any case of nationalization must be accompanied by the redemption of the asset's value (presumably based on market-driven estimates), and not its requisition. Lenin's "New Economic Policy" Yet, looking on what is going on in Russia, it is hard to agree with Putin: One may call the process as "etatization," emphasizing that the Russian state has little to do with the Russian people, but the essence remains the same – Russia is turning back to something resembling Lenin's "New Economic Policy" (NEP): a regime that allows private business to operate on the lower level, reserving the large productive enterprises to the state's sphere of interest. The problem, nevertheless, resides in a fact that no one can properly fix the dividing line between big and small, crucial and unimportant – and this opens a broad perspective for an overall increase of state influence. In the Soviet times, it took less than ten years to dismantle the NEP regime, and, it might be that a decade from now looks like a realistic timeframe for the complete destruction of Russia's big business. *Dr. Vladislav Inozemtsev is the MEMRI Russian Media Studies Project Special Advisor, and founder and director of the Moscow-based Center for Post-Industrial Studies.