Latest news with #AFRICOM
The Hill
2 days ago
- Politics
- The Hill
The US needs a foothold in the Sahel, and Togo is here to help
As Congress prepares to mark up the fiscal 2026 National Defense Authorization Act, the U.S. has a critical opportunity to strengthen its strategic partnerships in Africa — partnerships that will shape regional stability for years to come. Nowhere is this more urgent than in West Africa. Earlier this year, General Michael Langley, Commander of AFRICOM, warned that terrorist groups are actively seeking access to the West African coastline — an objective that 'puts not just African nations at risk, but also increases the chance of threats reaching the U.S. shores.' Terrorist attacks in northern Togo, once unthinkable, are now tragically real. To counter extremism and support governance in vulnerable states, the U.S. must act with urgency and with trusted partners. It must act with Togo. Togo is the United States' most engaged and capable defense partner in coastal West Africa. Over the past decade, Togo and the United States have built a strong foundation of security cooperation — from joint military training and intelligence sharing to maritime patrols and regional counterterrorism efforts. Our armed forces regularly participate in U.S.-led exercises like Flintlock, which strengthens special operations and counterterror capabilities across the Sahel, and Obangame Express, which enhances maritime security coordination in the Gulf of Guinea. These efforts do more than build capacity and interoperability — they forge real operational trust. At home, Togo has prioritized national security by increasing its defense budget from 8.7 percent of total government spending in 2017 to 17.5 percent in 2022 — an investment aimed at modernizing our military and enhancing readiness. These efforts have made our relationship a model of partnership and a cornerstone of regional stability. As U.S. Air Force Major General Kenneth Ekman, Director of the AFRICOM Coordination Element, emphasized in November 2024, 'The partnership between AFRICOM and the Togolese military is essential in promoting peace and security across the West African region. By strengthening this relationship, we not only enhance Togo's defense capabilities but also ensure a united and effective approach to addressing the complex security challenges we face together.' This partnership aligns with the Trump administration's strategic shift toward a leaner U.S. defense footprint in Africa, built around empowering reliable regional partners to take the lead in addressing transnational threats. Togo has embraced this approach — stepping up its operational capabilities and committing to greater regional responsibility. As General Langley noted in front of the House Armed Services Committee, 'Strengthening the capacity of African partners to address security challenges and enhance regional stability reduces the long-term need for U.S. security assistance.' Togo is demonstrating exactly that model of sustainable, partner-led security cooperation. While U.S. law restricts certain forms of direct assistance to Sahelian countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, information sharing remains both legal and vital. Section 7008 of annual appropriations legislation bars most security assistance, but these restrictions do not apply to partners like Togo. Nor do they prevent the U.S. from sharing actionable intelligence with Togo, which can in turn serve as a critical conduit for relaying threat information to frontline states across the Sahel. With the right mechanisms in place, Togo can act as a trusted channel for coordination, helping to ensure that U.S. intelligence reaches those best positioned to act on it — even in countries where direct U.S. engagement is limited by law. The threat posed by terrorist networks in the Sahel cannot be overstated. According to the 2025 Global Terrorism Index, the region now accounts for over half of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide. Lethal and organized groups such as al-Qaeda affiliate Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara continue to exploit porous borders, local grievances, and weak governance to expand their reach. These extremist networks are no longer confined to the Sahel's core — they are steadily advancing southward into Togo, Ghana, Benin, and Côte d'Ivoire, where they are actively seeking access to ports and transit corridors to support smuggling, arms trafficking, and illicit finance. The implications for regional security — and for international partners with strategic interests in West Africa — are profound. Regional security is a prerequisite for economic growth and trade across Africa. The Gulf of Guinea, including Togo's Port of Lomé — the deepest-water port on the West African coast — is a lifeline for inland economies and a vital logistics hub for landlocked countries in the Sahel, a corridor that would be threatened with heightened terrorist activity. The U.S. cannot afford to retreat from the Sahel. Nor should it allow extremist groups to expand their influence unchecked. By strengthening cooperation with capable, willing partners like Togo, and by leveraging Togo as a hub for regional intelligence coordination, the U.S. can regain strategic momentum and help stem the tide of extremist and criminal networks. The road ahead will be difficult. But with the right tools, partners, and political will, we can contain this crisis before it escalates further. The rise of terrorism in the Sahel is not just a regional issue — it is a direct threat to global stability and U.S. national security. Unchecked, these networks will expand, radicalize, and export violence far beyond Africa's borders. Togo stands ready to confront this threat alongside the U.S. — not only to defend peace, but to secure prosperity across the continent.
Gulf Insider
7 days ago
- Politics
- Gulf Insider
US Has Launched Over 50 Airstrikes In Somalia In 2025
US Africa Command has announced that it launched two separate airstrikes in Somalia on Sunday, as the Trump administration is continuing to bomb the country at a record pace, an air war that is receiving virtually no coverage in US media. AFRICOM said that the strikes targeted the ISIS affiliate in Somalia's northeastern Puntland region, to the southeast of the port city of Bossaso. The command offered no further details, as it has stopped sharing estimates of casualties or assessments of potential civilian harm. AFRICOM confirmed to in an email that the latest attack marked the 51st US airstrike in Somalia of the year, putting the Trump administration on track to easily break the annual record, which President Trump set at 63 in 2019. is also seeking details on casualties from AFRICOM, but so far hasn't received a figure. The US has been backing local Puntland forces against ISIS in battles in the Cal Miskaad mountains in Puntland's Bari region. Puntland Counter-Terrorism Operations announced on Sunday — the day the US launched two airstrikes — that it was conducting a 'clearance operation' against ISIS remnants in the mountains and said the area being targeted was 'last used by terrorists as a hideout with their foreign women and children.' Puntland's forces announced a new military operation on June 30 against ISIS-affiliated militants, and since then, the US has launched at least four airstrikes in the area. The ISIS affiliate in Somalia started in 2015 as an offshoot of al-Shabaab, a group the US has also been bombing in southern and central Somalia. In the war against al-Shabaab, the US is backing the Mogadishu-based Federal Government, which controls little territory inside Somalia's internationally recognized borders. Somali media reported on Tuesday that government forces killed 15 al-Shabaab fighters in the central Hiraan region, an operation that was supported by 'international partners,' likely a reference to US AFRICOM. Al-Shabaab has been making significant gains against the government and reportedly captured a town in the Hiraan region on Monday. Fighting has also been ongoing in the southern Jubaland region, where the US carried out multiple airstrikes from June 27 to June 30 to support a battle that the government claimed killed 50 al-Shabaab fighters. Al-Shabaab's offensive has been successful enough that US officials recently discussed the possibility of Mogadishu falling to the militant group. The New York Times reported on April 10 that State Department officials suggested closing down the US embassy in Mogadishu and evacuating most US personnel due to the threat. But other officials, including Sebastian Gorka, the top counterterrorism official on the National Security Council, called for the US to escalate in Somalia and double down on its policy of propping up the government, and they appear to have won the internal debate. Hawks who favor continued intervention in Somalia portray al-Shabaab as a major threat to the US due to its size and al-Qaeda affiliation, but it's widely believed the group does not have ambitions outside of Somalia. Al-Shabaab was born out of a US-backed Ethiopian invasion in 2006 that toppled the Islamic Courts Union, a coalition of Muslim groups that briefly held power in Mogadishu after ousting CIA-backed warlords. Al-Shabaab was the radical offshoot of the Islamic Courts Union. The group's first recorded attack was in 2007, and it wasn't until 2012 that al-Shabaab pledged loyalty to al-Qaeda. Also read: Military Aircraft's Mysterious Crash Sparks UFO Speculation In U.S. Airspace
Russia Today
12-07-2025
- Politics
- Russia Today
The Americans are leaving — and the post-colonial world is fine with that
A shift appears to be underway in US-Africa relations, judging by the remarks of Vice President J.D. Vance and AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley. Speaking to new US naval graduates on May 23, Vance talked about re-evaluating the American military role around the world and declared that 'The era of uncontested US dominance is over" and that open-ended military engagements 'belong to the past.' Four days later General Langley, while attending an African defense chiefs' meeting in Gaborone, Botswana, suggested that the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) might be integrated into Central Command (CENTCOM). 'If we're [AFRICOM] that important to (you), you need to communicate that and we'll see,' Langley said, adding that the US is 'reassessing' its military role in the continent. This sends a clear signal that Washington may dismantle or repurpose AFRICOM as part of broader cuts to US global military posture. The statements, in line with President Donald Trump's 'America first' mantra, reflect Washington's growing impatience with costly foreign entanglements, while hinting at a fundamental transformation of how the US engages with Africa's complex security landscape. Since its creation in 2008, AFRICOM has served as the centrepiece of US military strategy on the continent. Over nearly two decades, the command has expanded its reach and budget significantly, shaping security partnerships and playing a pivotal role in regional conflicts. Yet today, AFRICOM's future is uncertain, caught at the crossroads of shifting US priorities, rising African assertiveness, and intensifying competition from rival powers such as Russia and China. Africa has long figured into the broader framework of US global military and political strategy. During the continent's era of anti-colonial struggle and liberation movements, Washington, obsessed with countering Soviet influence, viewed nearly every liberation movement through the narrow lens of Cold War anti-communism. AFRICOM was established by President George W. Bush, who emphasized its importance by stating that it would 'strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners.' AFRICOM was intended to centralize US military operations on the continent, replacing the fragmented structure inherited from the Cold War era, when Africa was divided among three different US military commands. Then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates described the move as a long-overdue correction to an 'outdated arrangement left over from the Cold War.' Between 2008 and 2025, the cost of sustaining AFRICOM and financing its activities is estimated to have risen from around $50 million to between $275 million and $300 million. It is not a huge amount because the command borrows personnel and equipment from other US military commands, meaning the cost is accounted for anyway. This is likely to draw scrutiny from President Trump, who has made slashing federal spending a key priority. His administration has launched a dedicated initiative within the Office of Management and Budget – dubbed DOGE (Department of Government Efficiency) – to identify and eliminate what it considers excessive international and domestic expenditures. Trump's return to office in 2025 marked a clear strategic pivot: a retreat from costly overseas commitments in favor of a narrow, transactional approach to foreign policy. The Sahel region illustrates the consequences of America's retrenchment in Africa. Once a central focus of US counterterrorism efforts, countries such as Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have witnessed the gradual reduction of American military presence amid growing local resistance. Coupled with political upheavals and anti-French sentiment, US forces have faced mounting pressure to leave or scale back operations. The withdrawal has left a security vacuum that regional powers and international actors struggle to fill, fueling instability and humanitarian crises. This retreat highlights the limits of America's influence and the complexities of African geopolitics in an era of shifting alliances. A stark example of the US pullback is Niger, where the military coup in 2023 prompted the expulsion of American forces and the shutdown of a $100-million drone base critical to regional surveillance and counterterrorism. The abrupt exit underscored the fragility of US military footholds amid shifting political dynamics. Meanwhile, Russia has swiftly moved to fill this security vacuum, leveraging military cooperation, renewed political ties with the region and arms deals to become a preferred partner for several African states. Moscow's approach – often perceived as less conditional and more respectful of sovereignty – has resonated with governments disillusioned by Western interference and demands, accelerating realignment in Africa's security landscape. African nations approach foreign military partnerships with a mix of pragmatism, skepticism, and growing assertiveness. Many governments are wary of traditional Western powers, associating them with a legacy of colonialism, exploitative aid, and conditional alliances that undermine sovereignty. In contrast, Russia's more transactional and less intrusive engagement style appeals to some leaders seeking security support without political strings attached. However, this trust is far from uniform – some African civil society groups and international observers often warn against swapping one form of dependency for another, emphasizing the need for genuine partnerships that respect African agency and prioritize long-term stability over geopolitical rivalry. African countries' relative trust in Russia compared to the US or former European colonial powers stems from historical and ideological factors. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union supported numerous African liberation movements, often standing in opposition to Western-backed regimes and colonial interests. Unlike Western powers, Russia's approach has often emphasized non-intervention in internal politics, focusing primarily on military cooperation and economic deals without pressing for political reforms. This contrasts sharply with Western demands for governance changes as a precondition for aid or security support. As Malian analyst Amina Traore noted, 'Russia does not come with lectures or conditions; it offers partnership based on mutual respect and shared interests.' Similarly, Senegalese former defense official Cheikh Diop remarked, 'African countries want security partners who respect their sovereignty and do not drag them into endless conflicts or political battles.' These sentiments underscore why Russia has gained ground as a preferred security ally, even as questions linger about the long-term implications of this pivot. The possible disappearance or transformation of AFRICOM signals a shift in US military engagement across Africa. Whether integrated into other commands or scaled back significantly, this change reflects Washington's recalibration of its global military priorities amid domestic pressures and evolving international dynamics. For Africa, the retreat of a long-standing security partner opens a strategic vacuum – one increasingly filled by Russia and other global actors eager to expand their influence. The shift challenges US policymakers to rethink their approach beyond military presence, emphasizing genuine partnerships based on respect, shared interests, and support for African-led security solutions. Ultimately, the future of US-Africa relations will depend on Washington's ability to adapt to a multipolar world where influence is no longer guaranteed by military might alone, but by diplomacy, economic engagement, and mutual respect.
Russia Today
11-07-2025
- Politics
- Russia Today
Not wanted here: Why Africa is turning away from US military might
A shift appears to be underway in US-Africa relations, judging by the remarks of Vice President J.D. Vance and AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley. Speaking to new US naval graduates on May 23, Vance talked about re-evaluating the American military role around the world and declared that 'The era of uncontested US dominance is over" and that open-ended military engagements 'belong to the past.' Four days later General Langley, while attending an African defense chiefs' meeting in Gaborone, Botswana, suggested that the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) might be integrated into Central Command (CENTCOM). 'If we're [AFRICOM] that important to (you), you need to communicate that and we'll see,' Langley said, adding that the US is 'reassessing' its military role in the continent. This sends a clear signal that Washington may dismantle or repurpose AFRICOM as part of broader cuts to US global military posture. The statements, in line with President Donald Trump's 'America first' mantra, reflect Washington's growing impatience with costly foreign entanglements, while hinting at a fundamental transformation of how the US engages with Africa's complex security landscape. Since its creation in 2008, AFRICOM has served as the centrepiece of US military strategy on the continent. Over nearly two decades, the command has expanded its reach and budget significantly, shaping security partnerships and playing a pivotal role in regional conflicts. Yet today, AFRICOM's future is uncertain, caught at the crossroads of shifting US priorities, rising African assertiveness, and intensifying competition from rival powers such as Russia and China. Africa has long figured into the broader framework of US global military and political strategy. During the continent's era of anti-colonial struggle and liberation movements, Washington, obsessed with countering Soviet influence, viewed nearly every liberation movement through the narrow lens of Cold War anti-communism. AFRICOM was established by President George W. Bush, who emphasized its importance by stating that it would 'strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners.' AFRICOM was intended to centralize US military operations on the continent, replacing the fragmented structure inherited from the Cold War era, when Africa was divided among three different US military commands. Then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates described the move as a long-overdue correction to an 'outdated arrangement left over from the Cold War.' Between 2008 and 2025, the cost of sustaining AFRICOM and financing its activities is estimated to have risen from around $50 million to between $275 million and $300 million. It is not a huge amount because the command borrows personnel and equipment from other US military commands, meaning the cost is accounted for anyway. This is likely to draw scrutiny from President Trump, who has made slashing federal spending a key priority. His administration has launched a dedicated initiative within the Office of Management and Budget – dubbed DOGE (Department of Government Efficiency) – to identify and eliminate what it considers excessive international and domestic expenditures. Trump's return to office in 2025 marked a clear strategic pivot: a retreat from costly overseas commitments in favor of a narrow, transactional approach to foreign policy. The Sahel region illustrates the consequences of America's retrenchment in Africa. Once a central focus of US counterterrorism efforts, countries such as Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have witnessed the gradual reduction of American military presence amid growing local resistance. Coupled with political upheavals and anti-French sentiment, US forces have faced mounting pressure to leave or scale back operations. The withdrawal has left a security vacuum that regional powers and international actors struggle to fill, fueling instability and humanitarian crises. This retreat highlights the limits of America's influence and the complexities of African geopolitics in an era of shifting alliances. A stark example of the US pullback is Niger, where the military coup in 2023 prompted the expulsion of American forces and the shutdown of a $100-million drone base critical to regional surveillance and counterterrorism. The abrupt exit underscored the fragility of US military footholds amid shifting political dynamics. Meanwhile, Russia has swiftly moved to fill this security vacuum, leveraging military cooperation, renewed political ties with the region and arms deals to become a preferred partner for several African states. Moscow's approach – often perceived as less conditional and more respectful of sovereignty – has resonated with governments disillusioned by Western interference and demands, accelerating realignment in Africa's security landscape. African nations approach foreign military partnerships with a mix of pragmatism, skepticism, and growing assertiveness. Many governments are wary of traditional Western powers, associating them with a legacy of colonialism, exploitative aid, and conditional alliances that undermine sovereignty. In contrast, Russia's more transactional and less intrusive engagement style appeals to some leaders seeking security support without political strings attached. However, this trust is far from uniform – some African civil society groups and international observers often warn against swapping one form of dependency for another, emphasizing the need for genuine partnerships that respect African agency and prioritize long-term stability over geopolitical rivalry. African countries' relative trust in Russia compared to the US or former European colonial powers stems from historical and ideological factors. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union supported numerous African liberation movements, often standing in opposition to Western-backed regimes and colonial interests. Unlike Western powers, Russia's approach has often emphasized non-intervention in internal politics, focusing primarily on military cooperation and economic deals without pressing for political reforms. This contrasts sharply with Western demands for governance changes as a precondition for aid or security support. As Malian analyst Amina Traore noted, 'Russia does not come with lectures or conditions; it offers partnership based on mutual respect and shared interests.' Similarly, Senegalese former defense official Cheikh Diop remarked, 'African countries want security partners who respect their sovereignty and do not drag them into endless conflicts or political battles.' These sentiments underscore why Russia has gained ground as a preferred security ally, even as questions linger about the long-term implications of this pivot. The possible disappearance or transformation of AFRICOM signals a shift in US military engagement across Africa. Whether integrated into other commands or scaled back significantly, this change reflects Washington's recalibration of its global military priorities amid domestic pressures and evolving international dynamics. For Africa, the retreat of a long-standing security partner opens a strategic vacuum – one increasingly filled by Russia and other global actors eager to expand their influence. The shift challenges US policymakers to rethink their approach beyond military presence, emphasizing genuine partnerships based on respect, shared interests, and support for African-led security solutions. Ultimately, the future of US-Africa relations will depend on Washington's ability to adapt to a multipolar world where influence is no longer guaranteed by military might alone, but by diplomacy, economic engagement, and mutual respect.
Al Jazeera
24-06-2025
- Politics
- Al Jazeera
Under Trump, US strikes on Somalia have doubled since last year. Why?
Mogadishu, Somalia – Ending the United States' 'forever wars' was a major slogan of Donald Trump's 2024 election campaign, during which he and many of his supporters spoke out against American resources and lives being put to waste in conflicts across the globe. But on February 1, a mere 10 days after being inaugurated for a second time, President Trump announced that the US had carried out air strikes targeting senior leadership of ISIL (ISIS) in Somalia. 'These killers, who we found hiding in caves, threatened the United States,' his post on X read. This marked Trump's first military action overseas, but it wouldn't be his last. In the time since, the US has provided weapons and support to Israel in its wars in Gaza and across the Middle East; it has launched strikes on Yemen; and even attacked Iran's nuclear facilities. At the same time, in the Horn of Africa, US strikes have more than 'doubled' since last year, according to US Africa Command (AFRICOM). AFRICOM, which oversees US military operations on the continent, has carried out at least 43 air strikes in Somalia in 2025, according to think tank New America, which tracks strikes using AFRICOM data. More than half of those, which are conducted in coordination with Somalia's federal government, targeted IS-Somalia, the ISIL affiliate in northeast Puntland state, while the remainder targeted al-Shabab. The uptick in US air strikes targeting IS-Somalia appears to be linked to growing concerns that the group has become a hub for regional and global ISIL affiliates in terms of financing and attacks, according to US officials. At the same time, experts also note the recent worrying gains being made by al-Shabab in Somalia. But why is this a war the 'Make America Great Again' Trump administration has an increasing hand in – especially given that decades of US policy in Somalia have been marred by controversy, disaster and failure? American intervention in Somalia: A failure since the start? 'Ever since Black Hawk Down, Somalia was a no-go zone for the US,' said Abukar Arman, a Somali analyst and former special envoy to the US, referring to the failed 1993 US military intervention in Somalia during which 18 US troops and thousands of Somali civilians were killed. 'That changed after 9/11 when Somalia became one of the key theatres of so-called GWOT [global war on terror]. That political facade has three objectives: It justifies US sustained lethal drone attacks in the public psyche; it enables the US to guard its geopolitical interests in the Horn of Africa; [and] it enables American predatory capitalists to engage in economic exploitation,' Arman told Al Jazeera. In 2007, Somalia became the first country on the African continent to fall victim to a US air strike in the post 9/11 era as part of its so-called 'war on terror'. In the decades that followed, US aerial bombardment of the country has not only persisted but intensified. During the combined 16 years under former presidents George W Bush and Barack Obama, there were more than 50 US air strikes on Somalia, while Trump's first term alone saw a staggering 219 strikes, according to New America. With dozens more strikes just five months into his second term, analysts say if it continues at this rate, Trump is sure to surpass the 51 strikes the Biden administration conducted during its entire four years in office. Jethro Norman, a senior researcher with the Danish Institute for International Studies, suggests that in Somalia, Trump has made an ideal stage on which to remotely project US power capabilities – as it combines high firepower, low oversight and little US domestic political risk. 'By loosening Obama-era restrictions, he enabled a surge in preemptive strikes with minimal vetting or accountability. The logic wasn't just strategic; it was theatrical: a way to perform toughness, signal contrast with previous administrations, and claim counterterrorism 'wins' without entanglement,' Norman told Al Jazeera. 'So, what you see now is a spike in drone activity, but without any corresponding investment in long-term peacebuilding or governance support,' he explained. Norman also highlighted how infighting within the Trump White House on policy direction in Somalia played a role in the massive uptick in US strikes. 'There were also competing camps within his [Trump's] administration. Some pushed hard for kinetic engagement in Somalia and Yemen, while others argued that counterterrorism was a distraction from great-power rivalry with China. 'That policy push and pull [between spectacle and strategy] helps explain why air strikes surged even as Trump talked about ending forever wars,' he said. Al-Shabab gains Some analysts suggest that another reason for the uptick in US strikes could be al-Shabab's unprecedented counteroffensive this year. In it, the armed group reversed most of the Somali government's territorial gains and seized dozens of towns and villages in the Middle Shabelle region of the semi-autonomous Hirshabelle state – the home base of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. Complicating matters further is that during this counteroffensive, al-Shabab was able to advance on the capital and set up checkpoints on main roads leading in and out of Mogadishu. This shows not only the deep structural weakness within the Somali security forces but also the resilience of the armed group as they inched closer to the seat of power in Mogadishu, experts say. 'These [recent US strikes] appear to relate more closely to conditions on the battlefield – and in particular, the perceived threat from an al-Shabab offensive that has reversed some of the gains of prior Somali government offensives,' said David Sterman, the deputy director of the Future Security programme at New America. 'There may also be other factors, including a greater interest in targeting senior al-Shabab leaders,' he added. As the Trump administration continues its bombing campaign, some argue this will likely only empower the same armed groups it claims to be fighting. 'The current drone diplomacy would continue to help al-Shabab. These attacks kill civilians, destroy properties and livestock. Ensuing grievances are utilised by armed groups that take advantage of these sentiments,' said Arman, the Somali analyst, who also noted a 'lack of a comprehensive US-Somalia policy that is based on a strategic partnership that keeps the interest of both countries at heart'. 'It is foolish to think that all problems could be solved with a hammer,' he added, referring to drones and military might. Civilian deaths, 'lack of accountability' During Trump's first term as president, rights groups and media outlets alike reported numerous civilian casualties from US strikes on Somalia. This was further compounded when AFRICOM admitted that civilians died in strikes it carried out. The situation hit its climax in 2019 when Amnesty International accused the US of committing 'possible war crimes' in Somalia as a result of its drone war. None of the victims of US drone strikes were ever compensated despite calls for accountability by rights groups and US lawmakers. 'The consistent lack of accountability for civilian victims of US air strikes, particularly under the previous [Trump] administration, speaks volumes. It reveals a profound lack of transparency that is deeply concerning,' said Eva Buzo, the executive director of Victims Advocacy International, an organisation seeking accountability for victims of human rights abuses in conflict zones across the globe. 'The US acknowledges harm to civilians and has allocated funds yet continues to avoid making these crucial payments,' she said, adding that what's needed is willingness to 'genuinely communicate with impacted communities, to better understand the true consequences drone strikes have on their lives, and what can be done to acknowledge this impact tangibly'. Meanwhile, adding to the complexity in the battle space in Somalia is that groups like al-Shabab often live and operate among the civilian population. This provides concealment but also means those at war with the armed groups rarely differentiate between civilians and fighters when striking targets. US strikes often rely on patchy human intelligence in the rural countryside where al-Shabab is most present and where clan rivalries, informal economies and shifting loyalties are all factors that tend to be overlooked by the US. Experts say this not only complicates accurate targeting but also increases the chance of harming non-combatants. While there isn't an official death toll from US strikes, the years of attacks are believed to have killed anywhere from 33 to 167 civilians in Somalia, according to separate tallies by New America and the nonprofit conflict watchdog, Airwars. These civilian deaths from US air strikes erode US credibility in the region and feed into the narrative that armed groups like al-Shabab thrive on: one of foreign aggression and Somali betrayal, said Norman of the Danish Institute. 'These incidents don't just cause resentment; they offer propaganda gold. When civilians are killed or even just displaced, al-Shabab exploits the aftermath. They move quickly to frame themselves as defenders of Somali lives and sovereignty against a foreign aggressor and a weak federal government,' he said. 'Drone strikes without accountability can actually create the conditions for the very insurgencies they're meant to eliminate to thrive,' he added. Adding fuel to the fire? After nearly two decades of US aerial bombardment, many analysts agree that air strikes alone cannot defeat an armed movement embedded in the fabric of Somali society, its social networks and those who thrive off consecutive foreign interventions. This makes the prospects of taming these armed groups, let alone defeating them, difficult. 'There are interesting parallels to Afghanistan; local forces struggle to hold territory, US strikes fill the vacuum temporarily, but the long-term trajectory remains bleak. Airpower can suppress, but it does not transform,' said Norman. 'That gap between US rhetoric and Somali reality is precisely where al-Shabab thrives. The group actively weaponises these moments, portraying itself as the only actor willing to stand up for Somali lives. 'In this sense, the loss of legitimacy is not abstract; it shapes local decisions, fuels recruitment, and weakens prospects for genuine partnership between Somali civilians and international actors.' If the Trump administration continues its aerial bombardment of Somalia, analysts say it will only add fuel to the fire by empowering the same foe it claims to be fighting. At the same time, they say, the cost of drones and missiles to fight a boogeyman halfway across the globe is a waste of US taxpayer money. Experts on US military and counterterrorism policies say the likelihood of a military solution to armed groups in Somalia is slim. 'It is unlikely that the US and its Somali partners can fully eliminate al-Shabab given its demonstration of resilience over time, and doing so would require a different approach than what these strikes appear to be. IS-Somalia does not have quite the same record of resilience,' said Sterman, the New America deputy director. 'There is, of course, the question of what defeat and destruction actually means for a non-state group,' he noted. 'That said, US objectives are likely more limited than the defeat or destruction of these groups – focusing [more] on containment or the elimination of specific capabilities or network connections.' In the meantime, what is for sure, experts say, is that the more the US leans on drones without investing in local legitimacy and supporting grassroots reconciliation, the more groups like al-Shabab and IS-Somalia will thrive and grow among a new generation of disenfranchised Somalis.
