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Hindustan Times
10 hours ago
- Politics
- Hindustan Times
Grand Strategy: It's about Trump, not about India
A recent article by noted Indian-American author Ashley Tellis in Foreign Affairs, titled 'India's Great-Power Delusions,' argues that India's utility to the United States has diminished for three key reasons: First, India's shift towards domestic illiberalism has eroded its soft power and its ability to be a great power espousing liberal values; second, India undermines American unipolarity by advocating for multipolarity; and third, Delhi has been reluctant in supporting Washington in countering China's rise. I agree that Washington's new regional approach has suddenly complicated India's regional and global strategies. However, attributing India's sticky geopolitical situation today solely to its own choices or domestic political issues is a misdiagnosis of the larger systemic causes. Let's examine these arguments in two separate categories: the general American approach to India and the Trump administration's approach. These two are largely distinct, as Trump's foreign policy stands in direct contrast to the traditional American foreign policy prior to his second tenure. Let's first examine American policy towards India before Trump. Was the Biden administration's approach towards India deeply influenced by a liberal decline in Indian politics? Of course, Americans occasionally commented on media curbs, the rise of right-wing politics, and growing anti-minority policies, among others. However, I have found little evidence suggesting that the U.S. was losing interest in India due to these issues, or that India's moral standing internationally was being compromised to the extent that it affected its ability to rise as a great power. In any case, great powers do not rise on the basis of domestic liberal values. Imperial Britain, 20th-century America, Bolshevik Russia, Nazi Germany, and Communist China did not become great or superpowers by serving as moral exemplars for the rest of the world. Most of them bothered little about how others thought of their moral standing. In fact, I cannot think of a single great power that followed such a path. The argument here is not that being illiberal is acceptable, but that liberal values do not determine whether a country becomes a great power or not. Has Delhi's dalliance with multipolarity and its refusal to align as an American ally prevented the U.S. from supporting India's rise as a great power? To begin with, could the U.S. have over the past two decades truly facilitated India's ascent as a great power? I doubt it. Becoming a great power is a far more serious endeavour both historically and today; military or diplomatic support from another power alone cannot make a country a great power. In fact, how many countries around the world has the United States actually elevated to great power status—except perhaps indirectly helping China by accommodating it into the U.S-led global order? If India today is not yet a great power, it is because we Indians have not unleashed the necessary reforms and have not undertaken the much-needed military modernisation. Let's not credit the Americans for our own inadequacies. Has India's pursuit of multipolarity alienated the Americans? Perhaps yes, but the decline of American unipolarity is not India's doing—it's due to America's own actions or other powers catching up. Let's not accept any credit for American inadequacies. That said, much of India's multipolar rhetoric remains just that—feel good rhetoric. What exactly is India doing to promote multipolarity beyond participating in forums like the BRICS and SCO (former is expanding to irrelevance and the latter becoming a Chinese shop)? Thirdly, let's closely examine the argument that India's decision not to become Washington's foot soldier in Asia to curb China's rise has upset the United States. In other words, would India have been better off if it had joined the American alliance to counter China? For one, there is little doubt that an India that teamed up with the U.S. to check China might have been worse off today. Surely, when it comes to China, India is not in a sweet spot, but given how U.S. allies today often find themselves high and dry, there is no guarantee that Washington would have been willing to support India against China. If so, a country sitting next to China (India) that chose to be an American ally or partner to contain China's rise would have been worse off in the era of Trump. Secondly, I have not seen, heard, or read any invitation from the Americans for India to join their military alliance. At best, India might have been a country outsourced with the loyal duty of resisting China's rise in the region on behalf of the US, with the hope that eventually the US would support India's emergence as a great power (while China looks on passively?). Thirdly, it is not as if India has been bandwagoning China or not trying to balance China at all (even if not doing enough) within its current capacity. In any case, a next-door India will need to think carefully before jumping into a distant superpower's grand strategy to contain China, especially when it is caught between a far more powerful China and a Pakistan that it arms—who, incidentally, is also armed by the US. All this was before Trump arrived on the scene. Now what does Trump's track record of abandoning Ukraine after leading it on the garden path, forsaking its longstanding NATO allies in Europe, striking deals with its 'archenemy' China, and courting Pakistan - especially after Rawalpindi helped the Taliban humiliate and force the U.S. and its allies out of Afghanistan - say about his approach to international commitments and alliances? Do you believe that if India had been more liberal, did not entertain any multipolar aspirations, or actively helped Washington contain China in the past, Trump would have been more positively disposed towards India? I will let you answer that question for yourself. Trump's America doesn't care whether India is illiberal, seeks multipolarity or assists Washington in balancing China. Trump would likely have behaved exactly the same with a liberal India supporting a U.S.-led world order and assisting in checking China's rise in Asia as he does now. Simply put, Trump's policy towards the region is not because of what India is, but because of who Trump is. Happymon Jacob is the Founder and Director of the Council for Strategic and Defense Research and the Editor of INDIA'S WORLD magazine
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First Post
16-07-2025
- Politics
- First Post
Not America's protégé: Rebutting Ashley Tellis' US-India analysis
Ashley Tellis, in his article 'How New Delhi's Grand Strategy Thwarts Its Grand Ambitions,' published on June 17, 2025, in Foreign Affairs, outlines a perspective on US-India relations that is rooted in an outdated and somewhat condescending strategic framework. His argument, though detailed and data-backed, reflects assumptions, predictions, and a tone that portrays India as a subordinate actor rather than an autonomous, civilisational power charting its own course in the international system. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Tellis writes, 'Since the turn of the century, the United States has sought to help India rise as a great power.' He begins by recounting how the US, since the turn of the century, has supported India's rise: from the civil nuclear deal under George W Bush to defence industrial cooperation under Obama to intelligence sharing and advanced technology access under Donald Trump and the jet engine tech transfer under Joe Biden. This chronological account is framed in a way that suggests the US has done India a series of favours. But the reality is that none of these moves were altruistic. The US does not support or arm nations unless it serves its own strategic interests. These engagements were mutually beneficial, and portraying them as one-sided largesse from the US ignores the realist, Kissingerian logic that drives American foreign policy. He criticises India for not aligning fully with the US, especially because it champions a multipolar world rather than endorsing US primacy. But complete alignment is neither possible nor necessary. History offers no example of two sovereign countries—even allies—being perfectly aligned on every issue. Moreover, India's support for multipolarity is not an ideological or anti-US stance; rather, it is a strategic calculation. India sees multipolarity not as an end in itself but as a means to better protect and promote its interests. As the international system transitions—from the unipolarity of the post–Cold War era to a more fluid and fragmented order—India is responding to changes it neither initiated nor can halt. World order was never static: it was multipolar before the First World War, then bipolar during the Cold War, followed by a unipolar moment. The world is once again shifting, and India can neither halt this process nor afford to ignore it. Tellis' observation that India 'obsessively guards its strategic autonomy… maintaining ties with Western adversaries such as Iran and Russia' is presented almost as a flaw. Yet strategic autonomy is a hallmark of every sovereign state's foreign policy. The very structure of the international system, as per realism, is anarchic. If the US guards its freedom to act by engaging with whomever it wants—even adversaries—why should India be expected to surrender that same agency? The notion that India should align with US preferences on Russia or Iran or abandon its membership in forums like Brics or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation smacks of a colonial hangover, where the West reserves the right to moralise and dictate. Ashley Tellis seems stuck in the early 2000s Bush strategic mindset, when the US pursued a balance-of-power approach to Asia and listed India as a strategic partner. The US has changed significantly since then. Under Trump, it became more transactional and less committed to alliances, often showing open disregard for them. It expects allies to shoulder more responsibility, even in Nato. If the US itself is withdrawing from global commitments, why is India being told to 'do more'? The US is not the same strategic anchor it once claimed to be. Tomorrow, Trump could make a deal with China even at the expense of Taiwan, and everything Tellis projects would collapse. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Tellis also overestimates his ability to predict long-term outcomes. He assumes India will rise, but not fast enough to match China or the US, and that multipolarity will remain elusive. These are speculative claims. History is filled with surprises. Karl Marx misjudged the inevitability of communism. No one predicted the First World War or the collapse of the Soviet Union. History is non-linear and unpredictable. India's trajectory, like that of any major power, is contingent and evolutionary. Assuming static futures and prescribing fixed alignments is intellectually limiting. The assumption that by 2050 only the US and China will matter is deterministic and reflects more of Tellis' strategic bias than grounded foresight. Just as Fukuyama's End of History thesis was challenged by resurgent nationalism and conflict, Tellis' vision of a binary future overlooks the inherent unpredictability of global politics. He also claims that because India won't form alliances, it might struggle to secure external support as the US grows more transactional. But if the US becomes transactional, why should India not act the same? Strategic alignment must be mutual, not one-sided compliance. It is unfair to demand India subordinate its policies to US preferences. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Moreover, the US is no longer the same power that once believed in the hub-and-spoke alliance system. Today, it wants its allies to shoulder more responsibility. American society has changed—there is growing resistance to spending taxpayer money on foreign wars or propping up other countries. Trump is not an aberration; he is a clear reflection of this shift in American public sentiment. The US no longer seeks formal alliances—it prefers loose, informal partnerships where others are expected to do more and not be seen as burdens on American taxpayers. Moreover, Ashley argues that India doesn't do enough on China, that it won't support the U.S. in a Taiwan contingency, and that its desire for multipolarity is inconvenient. This has been his central argument across many of his past writings. But what exactly is the US doing to contain China? If Beijing is expanding its influence, the blame doesn't lie solely with India. It is primarily the failure of the US, which hasn't done enough itself. The US has more direct strategic allies in the region—Japan, South Korea, and Australia—yet its own contradictions (like supporting Pakistan for tactical reasons) weaken its position. If Washington wants India to be a balancer, it must itself be consistent in both the Indo-Pacific and South Asia. The recent Trump outreach to Pakistan undermines India's regional standing. That's not India's failure—it's America's strategic incoherence. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD He asserts that India plays other powers against each other—claiming, 'India played the Soviet Union against the United States to benefit itself' during the Cold War—and implies this as a negative trait. But every nation maximises its options. That is the essence of diplomacy. The US engages China, Russia, and even adversaries when it suits its interests. Why deny India the same strategic space? He also says that India's membership in non-Western institutions like Brics and SCO could become liabilities if the US grows less tolerant. This again suggests that India must seek approval from Washington before charting independent global pathways. He warns that 'a more jaundiced government, like Trump's, might penalise India' for its decisions. This tone resembles a colonial master issuing ultimatums. The very idea that India could be 'penalised' for trading in local currencies or preserving ties with Iran and Russia reflects an alarming tendency to see the US as a global disciplinarian. This is not a partnership—it's a hierarchy. He further says the US 'deliberately overlooked' India's behaviour—implying that India must now repay that favour. But the US pursued the civil nuclear deal and other engagements to serve its own interests. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Tellis suggests that India may drift closer to China. He writes, 'India may edge closer to China as circumstances demand.' This ignores the geopolitical and security realities of India's position—its border disputes, strategic rivalry, and civilisational contrast with China. India balances China not because Washington wants it to, but because it must. Its engagement with non-Western forums like Brics and SCO stems from strategic hedging, not ideological alignment. Moreover, he asserts that shared democratic values held the relationship together. But during the Cold War, both were democracies and still adversaries. Values alone never drove US-India ties—strategic interests did. The US has supported numerous non-democracies for decades. Let us not whitewash American foreign policy. His conclusion warns India to be 'wary of multipolarity' because it might have to assume more burdens and lose US-supplied global goods like maritime security. He argues, 'India would benefit less from the collective goods the United States supplies… such as protecting sea-lanes.' But sovereignty comes with responsibility. If India wants to be a leading power, it will bear costs. Yet the suggestion that these burdens are too heavy, or that India is incapable of carrying them, reveals a lack of faith in Indian capacity and vision. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Even in his treatment of Indian democracy, Tellis credits the Constitution but strategically downplays India's civilisational ethos. Democracy thrived in India not only because of institutions but also because of ingrained cultural values: tolerance, pluralism, and civilisational continuity. Other post-colonial states had constitutions too— many failed. India's success lies in its long-standing civilisational political culture, not merely its legal frameworks. Ultimately, Tellis' article is built on selective assumptions and strategic nostalgia. He ignores how the US has transformed under Trump and how the world order itself is shifting. He indirectly praises China while telling India to 'do more.' He frames India's choices as selfish but ignores America's own self-serving behaviour. This is not scholarship—it is strategic sermonising. Conclusion India is a civilisational state—confident, capable, and clear-eyed about its place in the world. It does not take dictation. It will align with the United States when interests converge and stand alone when they don't. That is the essence of strategic autonomy—not a hurdle to partnership, but its most stable foundation. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Ashley Tellis, in his critique, makes too many assumptions, adopts a prescriptive tone, and promotes a worldview in which India is expected to subordinate its priorities to those of the US. He seeks to shape India's trajectory in a particular direction and comes across as authoritarian and dominating in the language of the article. India's independent stance on Ukraine has especially troubled Western thinkers. The geopolitical agenda becomes evident when one reads between the lines—this is a piece marked by an assertive, almost coercive tone. India of today is not a postcolonial appendage. It will engage with the US as a partner, not as a client. A true India-US relationship must rest on mutual respect—not on expectations of alignment or veiled warnings of 'penalties'. As Karl Popper reminded us, all knowledge is provisional. Predictions in international politics often fail. India's choices will be shaped by its national interest, and no amount of moralising can change that fundamental principle. Imran Khurshid is a visiting research fellow at the International Centre for Peace Studies, New Delhi. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.
The Print
08-07-2025
- Politics
- The Print
Why is South Asia strategic studies declining in US? All alignment, no depth
'The discipline is undergoing decline since the days of Stephen Cohen, which is unfortunate because such a voice is most needed now,' he said. Despite a hint of intellectual nostalgia, this characterisation is plausible. But it may also be part of a larger story, and a somewhat complicated one at that. And the real story is this: South Asia studies (with special emphasis on India studies for this argument) is suffering from the narrow confines of the pursuit of 'strategic convergence'. Is South Asia studies in the United States in a state of decline? This question was posed to me recently by an Indian scholar while reflecting on the perceived lack of insightful or thought-provoking commentary from American scholars of South Asia. The present state of dialogue between American India watchers and the Indian strategic community appears somewhat broken. It is marked by 'hot takes' and 'I told you so-isms', rather than a sustained strategic conversation that bridges understanding gaps over time. The democratic abilities of X have certainly vitiated the atmosphere. The emotional overhang of 'You just don't understand' hovers strongly over most conversations. Operation Sindoor has been only the latest 'episode' to bring this element to the surface. And within a month of the ceasefire, Ashley Tellis—the most notable India hand in the US academic and strategic community—fired yet another shot. In his piece, 'India's Great-Power Delusions' for Foreign Affairs, he placed 'multipolarity' as India's main foreign policy driver and source of divergence from Washington. Finding India a lot more 'inscrutable' since the last few years, the prevailing sense in Washington is that 'We got India wrong. Where do we go from here?' And it has only been strengthening. A tightrope walk Reflecting on the state of South Asia studies in the US at present as well as the strategic conversation between Indians and Americans, a former diplomat demurred to me: 'Why is there nothing interesting or original coming out of South Asia studies regarding the latest India-Pakistan conflict?' While I was content to simply nod while trying to think at the time, the question did follow me around for a few days. There was indeed something to the statement. A review of a wide array of articles published by South Asian scholars revealed that they were mostly well-curated backgrounders and historically sensitive summaries of the four-day crisis. In many ways, both good and bad, the recent conflict upends many strategic assumptions that we have all held for many years. Has Pakistan been able to establish some form of parity? Does the crisis alter India's strategy toward China? Was the near-war conflict foreseeable? What were Pakistan's likely motivations going into the conflict? What does the crisis say about civil-military relations in India and the state of civilian morale? What did the military exchange reveal about the broader conventional military balance in the region? Most tellingly, the impact of the crisis on the nature and scope of India-US strategic ties has been largely absent. These broader questions were left broadly unengaged. However, this could be explained by the phenomenon of 'market demand' and the value in providing a 'just good enough' explainer to a Western audience already befuddled by a season of crises all over the world. The drivers could be structural rather than individual. Similarly, American analysts' long-form reports and articles on the India-China-US triangular relationship have acquired a certain pattern over the last few years. Earlier (2005-2019), the commentary was marked by optimism about the prospect of a strategic partnership between India and the US. Then, the literature moved toward greater and in-depth enumeration of India's political hesitancy in balancing China in cooperation with the US. It also discussed India's continuing military, bureaucratic, and economic weaknesses that strongly inhibit the advancement of the above strategic trajectory. The analysis is now characterised by a tightrope walk between maintaining forward momentum in India-US ties and conveying to Washington that India is, in many senses, still not ready. A recent thoughtful essay navigates this seeming incongruity by explaining three roadblocks to 'deterrence coproduction'. It still ends on a much-needed optimistic note, suggesting that all three roadblocks are 'surmountable'—but not quite convincingly so. Also read: All-party delegation isn't failure of Indian missions abroad. Diplomats work behind the camera Stephen Cohen's time Known as the doyen of South Asia studies, Stephen Cohen was the mentor of many leading scholars in the US as well as the subcontinent. It is hard to fully understand the US-India relationship without factoring in his influence on ideas, frameworks, and policies. (The relationship has been strongly shaped by ideation, after all.) Cohen's influence continues through his peers, students, and proteges, including Dinshaw Mistry, Sumit Ganguly, Christine Fair, Dhruva Jaishankar, Tanvi Madan, Anit Mukherjee, and Trump's recent pick for Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, S Paul Kapur. Cohen had two great advantages that contemporary South Asia scholars don't. First, he had the first-mover advantage. In the 1970s, India's geopolitical importance with regard to the Cold War was on the wane, and most governments did not consider New Delhi 'important' enough. This allowed Cohen to study India 'as it is', unencumbered by the imperative of urgent analysis and aligning research interests with immediate policy needs. He could move slowly and patiently, cultivating friendships, building networks, mentoring future scholars, and bringing together distinct worlds such as strategic analysis and journalism. Most remarkably, he did all this when the Indian state and society were strongly hostile toward the US as well as its scholars and researchers. At the very least, it required a great deal of patience. Second, Cohen had the privilege and opportunity of deciding what approach to take in studying the country and the region. He undertook a broad and rich approach that drew upon reflections related to Indian society, strategic culture, religion, caste, postcolonial identity, the nature of bureaucracy, and the Indian military as an institution. Even as his core output was related to Indian strategic culture and foreign policy choices, his starting point of analysis was always wide and context-focused. Given that India was once famously described as a place where every true statement is immediately met with an opposite statement that is equally true, perhaps Cohen stumbled upon a useful approach. His ability to 'interpret' India using a broad canvas allowed him to occupy the position of an intellectual mediator, translating Indian intent and motivations to American policymakers and vice versa. His ability to understand both India and Pakistan 'as they are', and then as adversaries to each other, allowed him to guide a relatively ill-informed Washington in its South Asia policy and helped constitute the crisis playbook that various administrations would employ—from Kargil to Pulwama. The present Trump administration's side-stepping of this playbook during the latest crisis only points to the dangers that necessarily follow a more ad hoc and 'play it by the ear' approach. Cohen inhabited a time in American academia that was still closer to classical approaches toward the humanities and liberal arts. This approach emphasised the 'human element' in the social sciences, acknowledging that the centre of inquiry is human behaviour in all its complexity, rather than the discovery of social 'laws' and 'regularities'. The former emphasised the interplay of human motivation and action in a context and with all its vagaries, while the latter sought to emulate mechanical laws that could then help to organise and generalise 'knowledge' and 'expectations'. This sounds like esoteric, ivory tower-speak, but it is important. For one, it meant that Cohen never sought to explain India-US estrangement as simply a function of the Cold War—an analysis that has strong policy implications. It is also notable that this distinction was emphasised at some length by former NSA Shivshankar Menon when describing Cohen's legacy in December 2019. Understanding India and its future choices is, after all, more than the sum of factoring in its patterns of GDP growth, defence spending, and bureaucratic adaptations. Also read: BRICS leaders slam Trump tariffs & unilateral sanctions, US President promises additional tariffs Cohen's prescience Cohen's privileged opportunities and academic style led him to prioritise research outputs aimed at long shelf lives, which would remain relevant for decades. On this score, he succeeded. He wrote books that would become standard references for policymakers and students alike. His analysis had lacked the strict rigour of his modern counterparts due to its subjectivist and interpretive nature. But the same approach, married with decades of patient listening and reflection, allowed him to achieve a high strike rate in terms of prescience as well as discovering many 'unthought of' thoughts that remain highly relevant. Consider the following instances. In describing India's defence planning apparatus: 'Strategically, the United States should regard India not as another Asian state comparable to Pakistan or Indonesia, but as a player in the larger Asian sphere, one of the five most important states in the world, whether from a strategic, political, or ideological perspective. India may not be China, but neither is it an insignificant 'third world' state'. On the US' naive expectations from India: 'Largely unfamiliar with Indian history and culture, many officials underestimated the core Indian concern with technology and autarky, and the still-powerful sentiment from colonial times that India should not be beholden to any outside power, especially one that provided military technology.' On the US' teleological view of the India-US strategic partnership: 'We regard as naïve the view that somehow the cold war was a barrier to good ties between the two countries … It should not be assumed that India's stunning economic rise automatically implies a US-India strategic alliance.' Even on Pakistan, Cohen was deeply insightful and prescient. Writing in 2004, he anticipated that Pakistan's 'youth bulge' would threaten social unrest by around 2025 if it was not managed by proper urbanisation, education, and employment. This, he expected, would lead to the emergence of new political parties. The adulation of Imran Khan by the lower and middle class youth fits right into this analysis, one could argue. Cohen was not always right, and he would be the first to list his assessment errors in later editions of his work. But his long-term views have proved abidingly useful. He acknowledged the bases of India's rise while seeking to temper US expectations. He was famously pessimistic about India-Pakistan relations despite his personal idealism. And he recommended a policy of 'do no harm, but do something' to the US, thereby framing US involvement in the India-Pakistan rivalry as a necessary but not sufficient condition for normalisation. Cohen also anticipated China's stronger interest in the future in preventing an India-Pakistan reconciliation. By courting India so persistently (as well as gently) over the decades—and despite New Delhi's best efforts to be rid of him—Cohen set the template for the US's own approach of long-term strategic engagement of India. So it is not surprising that he happened to brief Bill Clinton before the American president embarked on his path-defining visit to India. On balance, Cohen was an optimist on India's rise as well as India-US relations. But it was an optimism built on patience and contextual understanding. Cohen chose to pursue broader questions with a long view. It will not be unfair to say that more recent American research and scholarship have not adopted a similar proclivity. To be fair, this is largely due to structural factors and needs to be understood within its own context. Also read: India and China's gruelling civil services exam systems & why Modi's G7 visit did not 'go as planned' New paradigm of India studies in Washington The India-US conversation has changed in many ways since the early 2000s. Cohen's areas of interest were particular to his time: India's democratic experiment, the Kashmir question, the Indian military as an institution, and the prospect of strategic normalisation between India and Pakistan in the context of Afghanistan and greater nuclearisation in the region. The paradigm of inquiry saw a sea of change after India's nuclear test in 1998. Thereafter, it has been shaped by three main variables: the hype and expectations related to strategic partnership, the urgency and imperative of responding to China's rise, and a research paradigm closely wedded to policy planning. India-US strategic hype The relationship started to peak in the first two decades of the 21st century. This had generated a popular story. It went something like this: India and the US are democratic liberal natural allies with similar societies that had been separated by the tragedy of Cold War geopolitics. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the two mighty democracies are destined to come closer and eventually cooperate economically, politically, strategically, and militarily in order to jointly shape the conditions underlying China's rise in Asia. This paradigm had a defining intellectual consequence. It created and strengthened the idea that the two societies are sufficiently familiar to each other, and what is needed is greater research to help shape the policies that advance greater strategic cooperation. So the focus shifted from peoples, history, and society to policymaking and identifying areas of convergence and divergence—as well as constraints. What it gained in meticulousness toward policy planning, it lost in depth, and by design. Also read: Modi raises 'great concern' over humanitarian crisis in Gaza in BRICS address Urgency of responding to China's rise Cohen had the luxury of 'tackling' an India that had just come out of colonialism. The present generation 'faces' an India that is seen as a West-oriented strategic actor, and increasingly so. Moreover, the imperative to counterbalance China during what Jonathan Ward calls 'the decisive decade' has been urgent, especially since 2017. So scholarly attention has been compelled to stay close to policy aims, churn frequent publications to reinforce policy initiatives, and concern themselves with a narrow set of interests pertaining to strategic initiatives. Such a framework, while indispensable in helping policymakers gain immediate context and assistance, forsakes the world of deep and long-term insights and broader reflections. The long-term approach offers perspective and allows us to place the transient, dramatic, and episodic within a longer-term and less-changing framework—an essential aid in managing expectations. It is somewhat telling that Cohen had famously described India as incomparable and unique in itself, while the present policy paradigm places India's central value as a key votary and beneficiary of China 'plus one'. By viewing India as a 'solution' to China's rise, the post-2000 paradigm elevates India's strategic position in world affairs, but it has also come with epistemic costs. Its impact on India's own policy choices has been enormous, but that is a separate story. Indian analysts would like to assert that the Indian role in counterbalancing China should not be seen as a fixed given—it was somewhat flawed in the first place. However, such assertions entail an inherent depletion of India's geopolitical profile, which requires consideration, and perhaps, acceptance. Also read: India-Pakistan terms of engagement: H-word, M-word & the Trump hyphenation Blame game China's consequential rise occurred much ahead of 'schedule'. Its actions at the LAC in April 2020 were a strategic surprise, and the seeming success of its grey-zone operations in the South China Sea has left the US scrambling. US disappointment with India's ability to 'get its act together', after all, often masks the US' own shortcomings vis-a-vis China's rise. Instead of mutual empathy and solidarity, this factor has ironically encouraged a greater 'blame game'. At the same time, the India-US strategic partnership is perceived as having under-delivered, compared to earlier expectations. This is in relation to India's four-year-long stand-off with China, as well as the US' expectations from India vis-a-vis Russia and China. By 7-8 May, the US expressed its indifference toward India during the escalatory conflict with Pakistan in a 'none of our business' approach, only to then reverse course and serve a backchannel role. In its aftermath, the 'partners' are left in a bitter rhetorical dispute about how the ceasefire came about, while the Pakistan-China 'transactional' ties appear to be on the upswing. Needless to say, this raises questions about the US' role during the next crisis—a sobering development. Also read: There's an all-new N-word now. And India's soft power has become its hard liability Mutual exhaustion It is in this deteriorating context that the strategic conversation appears so broken and tired. American India watchers appear exhausted by New Delhi's continued inability to read the strategic writing on the wall. At the same time, Indian analysts appear more adept at rhetoric against its strategic partner than against China. Within a short span, many Indian analysts have gone from 'India-US ties strongest ever due to India's strategic value' to 'The US is apprehensive of India's rise, wants to keep India down'. With every passing year, there is yet another 'last-ditch' effort to revive the partnership (in both policy and analysis), armed with fresh insights, lessons, learnings or adjustments. The iCET initiative, as well as PM Modi's visit to the US in June 2023, represented the same trend at the policy level, armed with unhindered ambition based on tech transfer and strategic alignment through greater military-tech interdependence. Given that the paradigm of India studies in the US had put almost all its eggs in the 'strategic partnership' thesis, there is an understandable dilemma. The thesis is undergoing difficult days, and it is likely to only get worse before it gets better. India watchers are keen to retain the interest of policy-makers toward India, but they are also wary of generating over-expectations while facing an Indian strategic community that increasingly sees the US as a perfidious element in world politics. Ties have become only denser and multi-varied with time, but such thickets of linkages are no substitute for strategic mutual understanding and consensus. This trajectory from peak optimism to the current scepticism has encompassed prior administrations (Manmohan Singh and AB Vajpayee) as well as the subsequent Modi administrations. The former represented the appreciation of unbound potential during a time when the central proposition of 'convergence and consensus' was yet to be strongly tested. The latter period, especially since 2022, has represented greater volatility because of rapid geopolitical shifts and the need to produce strategic deliverables. Meanwhile, even as Trump has seemingly abandoned the long-term playbook, it is less than certain that there will be a return to the period of optimism (similar to 2001 or 2021-22) in future US administrations. Also read: US and China are 2 clashing elephants. India can't be the grass under their feet Back to Cohenism? Given that the India-US strategic partnership is in a state of indecision amid many global and national shifts, there is an opportunity to rethink the future of India studies in the US. If anything, the current trends and realities would suggest a qualified return to the Cohen approach. Insufficient advancement toward strategic alignment mandates a re-inquiry and re-testing of assumptions. Perhaps it was not just the Cold War that kept India and the US apart, a view that was always too simplistic. Perhaps India's under-balancing of China has as much to do with sociology and history than it does with contemporary institutional muddle and resource constraints. Perhaps India has a fundamentally different view of deterrence toward China, sensitive to the toll such a frontal posture would take on India's social and political order. The imperative of 'deterrence coproduction' would have to grapple with the same, if true. If India appears 'inscrutable' again, it might have something to do with India itself being in a state of lasting indecision, given its own scale and the pace of geopolitical shifts in recent years. Hence, the catchphrase 'multipolarity' may be more low-cost low-risk rhetorical safehouse than a top-down strategy. India, after all, wants more US counterbalancing of China (the most salient challenger to unipolarity)—not less. These deeper lines of inquiry were always present under the radar, and South Asia scholars have always been aware of them. They were simply overlooked in the time-bound pursuit of the 'strategic partnership' thesis. It is indeed time to return to Cohen's interpretive approach. The wily institution-builder and mentor has, after all, ensured that his concrete, timeless body of knowledge continues well beyond his lifetime. Policy-relevant backgrounders, reports, and commentaries will still be indispensable. But it could be matched with broader approaches that seek to understand India 'as it is' all over again. Despite its immediate value to the balance of power, India still needs more time, in more senses than one. Sidharth Raimedhi is a Fellow at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research (CSDR), a New Delhi-based think tank. He tweets @SidharthRaimed1. Views are personal. (Edited by Prasanna Bachchhav)
Indian Express
30-06-2025
- Politics
- Indian Express
India doesn't seek a multipolar world — it's already here
This is a response to Ashley Tellis's article 'India's great-power delusions: How New Delhi's grand strategy thwarts its grand ambitions' (Foreign Affairs, July/August 2025). Briefly, the article alleges that India seeks to fabricate a multipolar world and asserts that its pursuit of strategic autonomy risks weakening its relationship with the US to the detriment of India's security concerns over China. The article claims that India aims 'to restrain not just China — the near-term challenge — but also any country that would aspire to singular, hegemonic dominance, including the United States'. India does not 'seek' a multipolar international system; the world is already multipolar. It is pragmatism that necessitates that international systems evolve to reflect this reality, not the foreign policy ambitions or 'grand strategies' of any particular state. As S Jaishankar put it in his book, The India Way, '… what appeared then (the end of the Cold War era) as permanent was a transient moment of American unipolarity, as it was with other powers in history before. Larger competitiveness and political contestation proceeded to return the world to a more natural diversity.' India does not seek to 'restrain' anyone but to safeguard its own sovereignty and territorial integrity — the distinction is paramount. India's pursuit of strategic autonomy is not because it will help India become a 'superpower'. Strategic autonomy offers the space to optimally navigate an increasingly uncertain and fragmented world, which India is not alone in valuing. Moreover, it is reasonable for large and civilisational powers to seek as much freedom as possible while aligning, broadly, with like-minded nations. The article also makes the bold claim that 'New Delhi, despite its often-confident rhetoric, is skittish about confronting Beijing unless pressed, even when it is backed by Washington'. There is a fine line between being skittish and being deliberate. New Delhi's holistic response to the Galwan clashes – both military and diplomatic – and its categorical rejection of China's efforts to challenge its territorial integrity hardly qualify as 'skittish'. Even US administrations have adopted a calibrated approach to China. In a speech in April 2023, Jake Sullivan, the former national security advisor in the Biden administration, said that America was for de-risking and diversifying but not for decoupling from China. Was he being skittish? Tellis also criticises India for 'pushing against the United States on climate policy, data sovereignty and global governance', among others. That is strange. India faces the unenviable task of delivering a better tomorrow for 1.4 billion people while transitioning to cleaner sources of energy. High-income countries of today did not face the energy transition constraints that India does. Yet India is investing heavily in renewable energy while focusing on adaptation and energy demand management. It is worth noting that the current US administration has made providing Americans with cheaper energy its priority, and stated that global warming was a price to pay for delivering better lives to people. Global governance has not kept pace with the economic performance and prospects of nations and, therefore, has become unfair and unbalanced. India is not alone in recognising the need for reappraisal of global governance institutions. This is not to impose its brand of hegemony but to enhance the capacity of such institutions to build consensus and act in the shared interests of all. As far as data sovereignty is concerned, India is not acting against the interests of America but of a few American corporations. Data — personal and non-personal — of a country's citizens, assets and transactions are and should be sovereign unless there is express consent provided by the owner(s) of the data. The EU is asserting its digital sovereignty through the GDPR Act, the Digital Services Act, and the Digital Markets Act. The US has its own patchwork of state and federal laws, like California's CCPA, HIPAA for healthcare, COPPA for children's online privacy and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act for financial data to protect the privacy and safety of its citizens. Lastly, the article bemoans the rise of 'Hindu nationalism' in India. It asserts that internal discontent in India, fuelled by Hindu nationalism, 'could also spill over into India's neighbourhood, as the ideological animus against Muslims exacerbates tensions with both Bangladesh and Pakistan'. Regarding internal discontent, an assumption has been framed as a conclusion. Until recently, India maintained excellent relations with Muslim-majority Bangladesh. India's relationship with several countries in the Persian Gulf has never been better. The recent multi-party delegations from India that went around the globe to explain what happened in Pahalgam and its aftermath featured members of all political and religious persuasions. This is a more effective response to the charge of 'illiberal nationalism' than any we can muster. Therefore, if there is a risk of aggravated tensions in the neighbourhood, it is far more likely to come from outside India's borders than from its embrace of its civilisational heritage. There are some statements in Tellis's article that we find agreeable. As he states, 'with China on one side and an adversarial Pakistan on the other, India must always fear the prospect of an unpalatable two-front war'. However, such a prospect only strengthens the case for India to move forward with caution and flexibility. In the final analysis, the emergence of a multipolar world is simply a case of history marching to its own rhythm, as it always does. Vyas Nageswaran is pursuing his undergraduate studies in economics; Anantha Nageswaran is the Chief Economic Advisor to the Government of India. Views are personal
AllAfrica
17-06-2025
- Politics
- AllAfrica
Philippine naval upgrade more spectacle than strategy
As tensions rise with China in the South China Sea, the Philippines may be advancing a naval modernization strategy centered more on signaling and alignment than actual deterrence. This month, USNI News reported that the Philippine Navy (PN) launched its first Rajah Solayman-class offshore patrol vessel (OPV) in Ulsan, South Korea, marking a significant step in its maritime modernization. Named after a 16th-century Filipino hero, BRP Rajah Solayman (PS20) is the first of six ships procured from South Korea's Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) under a 2022 contract aimed at reinforcing the country's overstretched fleet. Initially designed as a 1,500-ton vessel, the OPV was later expanded to 2,400 tons under HHI's HDP-2200+ design, which enhanced its range and endurance for extended patrols. Armed with an Oto Melara 76-millimeter main gun and Aselsan SMASH 30-millimeter remote-controlled weapon systems, the ship is built for maritime security operations amid increasing tensions in the South China Sea. Philippine military officials have emphasized that the six-vessel program will replace aging patrol assets, supplement forces in critical maritime areas and enhance the country's sovereignty defense posture. The ship's 5,500 nautical mile range and 30-day endurance ensure prolonged operational capability. While production is slated to conclude by 2028, South Korea is already positioning itself for further defense contracts in the 2030s, including potential frigate and corvette programs under the Philippines' next phase of military modernization. Yet, beneath these moves is a crucial strategic question: Are they aimed at real deterrence, or are they crafted more for show, particularly to China? In line with the Philippines' de facto 'assertive transparency' strategy to name and shame China's assertive actions in the South China Sea and galvanize international support for its cause, Manila requires high-profile, high-visibility assets, such as frigates, OPVs, and light combat aircraft, to effectively respond to China's gray zone challenges. However, the survivability of such assets in the event of escalating tensions with China may be questionable. As seen in Taiwan's case, high-visibility platforms, such as surface warships and fighter jets, are vulnerable to rapid destruction in a Chinese first strike, prompting substantial investment in asymmetric warfare assets, including submarines. But with Philippine submarine procurement still in the early planning phase, the Brahmos missile system has become the centerpiece of the country's asymmetric deterrent posture. However, as Ashley Tellis notes in a July 2024 article for The Print, without supporting Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) infrastructure for dynamic targeting, these missiles will remain largely symbolic. Tellis says those deficiencies mean the missiles will be useful only against fixed, nearby targets, such as the contested Scarborough Shoal, and are not credible tools for flexible or long-range deterrence. Furthermore, China could easily repair or replace damaged or destroyed warships, given its massive shipbuilding capabilities. Underscoring this capability, a 2025 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report states that China's shipbuilding capacity is 230 times that of the US. If the Philippines truly recognized the urgency of building asymmetric capabilities, it might be willing to make more difficult defense trade-offs. For example, Felix Chang mentions in a November 2019 Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) article that Vietnam, a similarly challenged maritime neighbor, acquired six Kilo-class submarines from Russia in 2009 at a cost of US$2 billion, equivalent to half its defense budget. While Vietnam's proximity to China and history of conflict justify such investment, the Philippines has not demonstrated the same urgency or strategic commitment to undersea deterrence. Yet, such stealth investments appear to be mismatched with the Philippines' budget constraints and its current emphasis on diplomatic visibility through multilateral defense engagement. In line with this, the Philippines has been signing military access agreements with 'like-minded' countries, such as Japan, Australia and New Zealand, with the possible goal of maintaining a high tempo of high-publicity multinational naval exercises in the South China Sea. 'We have noted a marked decrease in the illegal and coercive actions of the PLA each time there is a multilateral or bilateral maritime cooperative activity… No PLA Navy, Coast Guard, or maritime militia noted within proximity,' says Philippine Navy spokesperson Admiral Roy Trinidad, as quoted by Defense Post in a February 2025 article. Still, when push comes to shove in the South China Sea, it is unclear whether the Philippines' 'alternative' defense partners will come to its aid. Even the US, its most capable and only treaty partner, has more than once prioritized its broader strategic interests over Philippine concerns during past incidents with China. At the political level, multinational naval exercises may also serve as part of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr's broader effort to claim legitimacy among wealthy liberal democracies, thereby securing economic assistance and political support despite the historical controversies associated with the Marcos dynasty. Moreover, since the US has indefinitely stationed the Typhon and NMESIS missile systems in the Philippines, nominally for training purposes, it provides Marcos Jr with a strategic buffer that reinforces his domestic position. Typhon is armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles that can reach mainland China from the Philippines, while NMESIS is an anti-ship system that could hit Chinese warships transiting the Bashi Channel. The 2022 US National Defense Strategy prioritizes Taiwan and the broader Indo-Pacific region, while accepting a higher risk in theaters such as Europe. This focus gives Marcos Jr room to rely on US support to enhance his security credentials and consolidate domestic legitimacy. According to a February 2025 Social Weather Station (SWS) survey, 78% of Philippine respondents support political candidates who assert sovereign rights against China's aggressive actions in the South China Sea. With such strong public sentiment, Marcos Jr could frame his administration as resolute on sovereignty, even with limited military muscle. However, the Philippines does not face any existential threat on the level of Taiwan, Ukraine, Israel and South Korea, as no country since World War II has threatened its destruction. The country's primary threats are internal, including poverty, political instability, insurgency and terrorism. While China has been a troublesome neighbor for the Philippines, it does not seek the destruction of the Philippine state, making China more of a challenge to be managed than a threat to be dealt with. Even if Philippine policymakers understand that nuance, and Marcos Jr courts Chinese investment while under rising economic pressure, his previous hardline stance and the Philippines' longstanding dependency on US politico-military ties may prevent anything substantial from happening in the near term. But as long as Philippine defense planning is shaped by external validation rather than internal resolve, its military buildup risks remaining more symbolic than strategic.
