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Politico
01-07-2025
- Business
- Politico
There Is No ‘Axis of Autocracy'
In the days since Israel and Iran agreed to end what President Donald Trump has dubbed 'the 12-Day War,' much remains unknown. But one thing is clear: As Israeli and U.S. munitions were slamming into numerous Iranian nuclear, military and economic targets, Tehran's so-called friends and allies stood on the sidelines. This might come as a surprise to many foreign policy analysts, officials and lawmakers in Washington, D.C. Indeed, over the last several years, a budding assumption has taken hold within the foreign policy establishment that the United States' most significant competitors and enemies — China, Russia, Iran and North Korea — are not only teaming up to complicate U.S. foreign policy goals and undermine American power but to shift the global balance in an authoritarian direction. The word 'axis' — as in 'Axis of Upheaval,' 'Axis of Autocracies' or 'Axis of Aggressors' — has been thrown around as if it were confetti at a parade. The events in Iran over the last several weeks suggest this concept is far too simplistic. In fact, it could also be dangerous — potentially leading the United States to make bad decisions that, ironically, could create the very axis the bipartisan foreign policy blob sometimes hyperventilates about. By lumping all four countries together into one unified bloc, Washington risks papering over the considerable differences that exist between them and could sap the motivation for the United States to exploit those differences. There's no disputing that Russia, China, Iran and North Korea have increased their cooperation as of late. Iran, for instance, has provided Russian President Vladimir Putin with significant military assistance for its war in Ukraine by sharing the designs of its Fateh drones as well as the technology required to produce them on their own. North Korea has gone to even greater lengths, sending Moscow ballistic missiles, massive quantities of ammunition and at least 10,000 North Korean troops to help the Russian army push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk. Putin has reportedly returned the favor by assisting North Korean leader Kim Jong-un with air defenses, the provision of a new air-to-air missile for the dilapidated North Korean air force and diplomatic support at the United Nations Security Council. The relationship between China and Russia has risen to new heights too. While Chinese officials make it plainly clear they aren't supporting Putin's war in Ukraine with weapons shipments, Beijing has nevertheless given the Russian strongman an alternative market to sell his crude oil and natural gas at a time when Moscow is hemmed in by U.S. and European sanctions and largely cut off from Europe, once its biggest customer. China has purchased more than $184 billion worth of crude oil from the Russians since the war in Ukraine began. Beijing is also serving as Russia's backstop for critical components needed for Russian weapons systems, helping the Kremlin circumvent Western export controls. The term 'axis,' however, suggests that all four powers have a unified view of what they want the global order to look like and have a grand plan to get there. It sounds mischievous and conspiratorial, and it's most certainly inaccurate. What's occurring is less a strong, cohesive grouping bounded by ideology and long-term considerations and more a collection of bilateral relationships whose interests sometimes converge — until they don't. Take Russia-North Korea ties. Yes, the two countries have strengthened relations considerably, culminating in a defense agreement ratified in November 2024 that technically mandates mutual military assistance to the other in the event of a national security crisis. But we should be under no illusions that Putin and Kim are leaning on each other out of kinship, loyalty or even ideological ambitions. The Russians, frankly, need all the outside aid they can get, whether in the form of men, materiel or munitions, and North Korea is one of the few states willing to provide it at a cost. Kim, in turn, is happy to grant some of Putin's requests but only if the terms are advantageous to his own regime. The North Koreans aren't so much bailing the Russians out as they are exploiting Russia's war-time desperation for its own ends. In essence, Kim is squeezing Putin as much as he can, betting that North Korean armor will be compensated with increased food and energy from Moscow and Russian defense systems that will allow Pyongyang to modernize its antiquated military. The same dynamic is at play between China and Russia. Some prominent U.S. foreign policy experts have described Russia-China ties as a kind of 'quasi-alliance' or coalition designed to erode U.S. power and influence around the world and weaken — if not eventually destroy — the system of alliances the United States built since World War II. The general perception is that Beijing and Moscow are at the very least trying to rejigger the U.S.-led world order to its advantage and at most establish an entirely new one based on a spheres-of-influence model, whereby the United States is forced to vacate Europe and East Asia in deference to the big powers in the regions. But Washington would be making a mistake if it minimized a key ingredient driving the Russia-China relationship: mutual convenience. Moscow and Beijing are willing to greet one another with open arms when there is a benefit to doing so but remain wary of placing all their chips in each other's baskets. Despite Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping's pronouncements of a 'no limits' friendship between their countries, there are plenty of limits built into the partnership. Suspicion, if not distrust, is embedded in segments of their respective national security agencies, so much so that Russian counterintelligence is trying to root out Chinese spying inside Russia. The Chinese are tough negotiators on energy contracts and continue to press Moscow for cheaper terms to the point where Russia's Power of Siberia 2 natural gas pipeline, meant to serve the Chinese market, is stalled. At the end of the day, Russia isn't going to sacrifice too much for China. The feeling is mutual on the Chinese side; Xi may be willing to purchase cheap Russian oil and gas when it suits him but he hasn't shown an inclination to sacrifice Beijing's relations with the West, particularly now when his negotiators are attempting to hammer out a new trade deal with the United States. Iran's relations with Russia, China and North Korea are no exception to this rule. If the Iranian Supreme Leader or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps anticipated some degree of support from their Russian, Chinese and North Korean partners during the 12-day conflict with Israel, then they set themselves up for disappointment. It turns out that the strategic partnership agreement Tehran signed with Moscow in January was no match for Washington's 30,000-pound Massive Ordnance Penetrators or the Israeli air force, which made a mockery of Iran's air defense network. Iran is a valuable friend for Russia and China but not to the point of getting involved in a conflict both viewed as a secondary distraction. Both have mutually profitable relationships with the Gulf Arab states to maintain as well, and those states didn't want to see Moscow or Beijing contributing to a longer war in its neighborhood. The most Moscow was willing to offer Iran was supportive rhetoric. On June 21, the day the Trump administration ordered the U.S. strike on the Iranian nuclear program, Putin argued there was no evidence that Tehran was seeking to build a nuclear weapon. Two days later, Putin hosted Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, where he claimed the Russian government was 'making efforts…to provide support to the Iranian people' and referred to the attacks on Iran as 'absolutely unprovoked aggression' without a legitimate basis. Strong words, but nothing that can stop a U.S. B-2 bomber from flying in Iranian airspace unmolested. The Iranian foreign minister left Russia with nothing more than a pat on the back. China was equally strong in its condemnation on Iran's behalf. Beijing called the U.S. strike a violation of the U.N. Charter and used a U.N. Security Council meeting on June 24 to allege that Washington was manufacturing a crisis over Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program as cover to justify military action. But much like the Russians, the Chinese didn't offer Tehran a lick of concrete support. If anything, China was likely just rooting for an early end to hostilities. Given the fact that nearly half of Beijing's oil comes from the Persian Gulf, the last thing China wanted was higher oil prices or a disruption to supplies. The Trump administration will be spending the days and weeks ahead trying to get a full accounting of the damage assessment of its strikes, something that has already caused a bit of a scandal in Washington. Yet U.S. officials in agencies across the federal government focusing on longer-term grand strategy should take the 12-day conflict between Iran and Israel as a case study for how fickle international relations can be, even amongst a small group of strongmen who often talk a big game but are concerned first and foremost with their own power — partners be damned. A failure to account for this basic dynamic creates a number of problems for U.S. foreign policy. First, elevating the 'axis' framing will likely result in the United States spreading its resources too thin in an effort to thwart these sprawling adversaries when what Washington truly needs is a hard-nosed, honest assessment of which threats truly require U.S. attention and which should be left to its allies to manage. Second, the United States risks fueling a self-fulfilling prophecy, as punitive U.S. actions — sanctions, export controls and more military deployments in Europe, the Middle East and East Asia, to name a few — incentivize Russia, China, Iran and North Korea to consolidate their relations in an attempt to counter U.S. power. Finally, the United States makes it harder on itself to explore a détente with any of these four states in the future if it is stuck in an 'axis' mindset. While such an outcome may seem implausible today, the reality of international politics is ever changing, and new developments can often spark new opportunities between previously hostile states. Overly generalizing now can produce more aggravation later.
The Hindu
25-06-2025
- Business
- The Hindu
The ‘Axis of Upheaval' in the West Asia conflict
As the war between Israel and Iran has resulted in a ceasefire after being layered with America's bombing of Iran's nuclear sites, the narrative of the world being divided into power blocs like those during the Cold War era stands punctured. With Iran having suffered a political and military decapitation of leadership and capacity alike, its main partners, China and Russia, have maintained a distance. Before the conflict, Iran had been central to the narrative of the global order's perceived fracturing between palatable West-led alliances against a Moscow- and Beijing-knitted axis, dubbed as the 'Axis of Upheaval' by American scholars Richard Fontaine and Andrea Kendall-Taylor. In Russia's war against Ukraine, Iranian drone technologies have played a critical role, while Moscow and Tehran, despite certain regional differences, once joined hands to stabilise the government of the now ousted Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad. Meanwhile, as sanctions have gnawed at Iran's economic depth over the years, China has gained much by continuing to buy cheap oil from the country. This has been helpful to Beijing in powering its stagnating growth while giving Tehran much needed cash inflows in a polity and society that is starved of steady financial streams. No treaties However, all this balancing has strategic limitations as well. The axes, at best, are a narrative construct. There are no treaties that bind these states into military blocs, where charters can be mobilised to push the others to join a war if a partner country is attacked. The underpinnings of these partnerships nonetheless go deeper, spilling over into a reconstruction of institutions, currencies, multilateralism and how the world operates today. They want de-dollarisation, alternatives to western payments gateways such as SWIFT, and a strengthening of organisations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as well as fundamental anti-West ecosystems. But there is no military treaty to anchor all these, which marks a critical gap in taking on western influence which is pinned using both treaties and understandings. Russia and China, nonetheless, have made statements in favour of Iran as a way of support. Moscow has criticised those backing Israel's actions, including the ambiguity of positions taken by the International Atomic Energy Agency and attempts to manipulate international non-proliferation regimes. Russia's President Vladimir Putin in a telephone call offered mediation, which was sidelined by United States President Donald Trump. The noticeable part was this: it was not that Mr. Putin wanted to mediate, but political and diplomatic support may be the only thing Russia may be able to offer Iran at this stage. Tehran has comprehensive strategic partnerships that it signed with Mr. Putin (2025) and China's President Xi Jinping (2021), which are almost exclusively economic in nature. While aligning with Iran as part of an axis in the long term makes sense if one considers the country's vast energy reserves (many of which remain untapped due to technology-led roadblocks aided by international sanctions), the fact is that neither Russia nor China have the intent or the bandwidth to come to Tehran's aid in a military sense even though the suitability of the current political system under Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is critical to their own individual interests. Where Russia stands For Moscow, its war against Ukraine has tied down most of its political and military capabilities. The other opaque member of the axis, North Korea, is already providing soldiers to Russia to arrest its depleting military depth. This denies it any capabilities to tactically help Tehran. Previously, with its bases and assets in Syria, providing some air power assistance could have been possible, at least theoretically. However, with the fall of the Assad regime, which has now been replaced by former al-Qaeda leader Ahmed Al Sharaa — ironically, he is prioritising relations with the West pushed by Arab partners — Moscow has lost the only military footing it had in West Asia. China too has come out in support of Iran. While its Foreign Minister Wang Yi in a call with his Israeli counterpart highlighted how Israeli strikes were violating international law, a readout after a call between Mr. Xi and Mr. Putin interestingly demanded that the U.S. (without referencing it directly) orchestrate a de-escalation. While both Russia and China are worried about the wider implications of this conflict, it benefits their strategic postures in many ways. With the U.S. now having joined Israel in attacking Iran, a decision Mr. Trump took while keeping even his closest advisers in the dark, it would bog the White House down once again in West Asia, potentially relocating critical military assets away from the Indo-Pacific and from Ukraine. This would free-up space in both Beijing and Moscow's immediate geographies of interest while also potentially sowing self-inflicted discord within the Trump administration. For now, a brittle U.S.-backed ceasefire is holding Tehran and Tel Aviv at bay. The outlook For Iran, the news on any of the axes front is not good. While Russia and China may prioritise their own positions, the proverbial 'Axis of Resistance' made up of Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis among others is down for the count as Iran's first line of defence and offence in the region. Finally, the future of Iran, irrespective of what kind of political reality prevails, even in a moderate system, may be shaped by the point that only nuclear power can hereon guarantee sovereignty. Kabir Taneja is Deputy Director and Fellow, Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation
Yahoo
19-04-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
Iran Sells Russia Drones And Missiles To Kill Ukrainians And Trump Doesn't Care
WASHINGTON — While Donald Trump brags about his 'maximum pressure' campaign to impoverish Iran and force its leaders to give up its nuclear program, there remains one source of revenue that the president appears to be OK with: Iran's sale to Russia of deadly drones, missiles and technical expertise to help slaughter Ukrainian civilians. Iran has earned at least tens of millions of dollars, perhaps many hundreds of millions, from its agreement to supply weapons to Russia over the past two years. And while that deal drew new sanctions against both countries under former President Joe Biden, it appears to have received no pushback from Trump. 'Not sure why specifically the Trump administration is not making this an issue with Russia,' said Steven Pifer, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine in its early years after the breakup of the Soviet Union. 'The Trump administration has not addressed the 'Axis of Upheaval' as it was called under Biden — the increasing cooperation between Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea — in a forceful way,' said Liana Fix, a Ukraine analyst with the Council on Foreign Relations. When asked by HuffPost why he has not done anything to stop Iranian drone and missile sales to Russia, even as the U.S. cracks down on Iranian oil sales, Trump — who has long defended Russian dictator Vladimir Putin and who initially called Putin's 2022 invasion a 'genius' move — did not answer the question and instead offered a rambling explanation acknowledging the lethality of Iranian drones. 'I'm getting reports on that and we're looking at a report. You're right, they make a lot of drones. Iran makes a lot of drones. They make very effective drones too. They do very effectively at some things. But Iran is very high on my list of things to watch,' he said during a recent Oval Office question-and-answer session. HuffPost's follow-up queries to the White House, the Treasury Department and the State Department on this topic all went unanswered over a period of weeks. As Russia depleted its own stocks of weaponry in the first year of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it turned to North Korea for artillery rounds and to Iran for sophisticated short-range ballistic missiles and drones, including the notorious Shahed-136. That relationship continues, even after Trump's Feb. 4 'maximum pressure' memorandum designed to deny 'the regime and its terror proxies access to revenue.' Yet even the language of the order avoids any mention of Iran's new alliance with Russia. It states that Iran 'bears responsibility' for Hamas' Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel and the Houthi rebels' ongoing attacks on Red Sea shipping — but does not say a word about Russia's use of Iranian arms to kill Ukrainians. An April 1 announcement of new sanctions by the Treasury Department regarding Iran's weapons sales names entities in Iran, the United Arab Emirates and China — but fails to address Russia at all. 'It is apparently unwilling to pressure Putin in any meaningful way,' said Pifer, who is now with the Brookings Institution. 'If it wanted to, it has significant potential leverage over Moscow. The U.S. government could tighten economic sanctions and work with G7 to seize frozen Russian Central Bank assets. It should have started to apply some of this leverage after it became clear that Putin did not accept the U.S. proposal for a full 30-day ceasefire.' That Iran is getting a pass on its sale of deadly weapons to Russia is just one of numerous signs that, under Trump, the United States has effectively switched sides on the Ukraine war. Instead of supporting the victim of the largest invasion in Europe since World War II as the U.S. did under Biden, the country is now backing the aggressor and its dictator as Russia continues to kill civilians in Ukrainian cities. 'Trump has basically made enough concessions to Russia already that he is objectively on Russia's side,' said John Bolton, one of Trump's national security advisers during his first term. 'After all, he thinks he and Putin are friends. That's the strategy.' The day after a missile attack murdered 38 in the town of Sumy as residents were celebrating Palm Sunday, Trump during an Oval Office photo opportunity suggested that somehow Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was responsible. 'You don't start a war against someone 20 times your size and then hope that people give you some missiles,' he told reporters. 'When you start a war, you got to know you can win.' Days earlier, Trump adviser Steven Witkoff suggested the best way to end the war would be to allow Russia to keep four eastern provinces, or 'oblasts' — a concession that would reward Putin for having invaded his neighbor and killed tens of thousands of its citizens. Then, on Wednesday, the United States was among just nine countries, Russia and Belarus among them, to vote against a United Nations resolution naming Russia as the aggressor in the conflict. The U.S. had in February voted against a resolution calling on Russia to withdraw from Ukraine. In another photo opportunity on Friday, Trump denied that Putin was manipulating him and then blamed Putin's invasion on his predecessor, Biden. 'This is Biden's war,' he said. 'We have switched sides both literally, including in terms of multiple U.N. votes on which we sided with Moscow over our allies, and in spirit, in the sense that we no longer stand on the side of democracy, freedom and independence,' said Ned Price, a former spokesman for the National Security Council in the Barack Obama White House and for the State Department under Biden. Added Olivia Troye, a White House national security adviser during Trump's first term: 'I said this would happen if Trump got elected and here we are. It's happening. We are abandoning Ukraine officially and siding with dictators.' 'Everything this administration is doing seems to be in alliance with Russia,' she added. 'My worry is that by the time Americans wake up and realize this — MAGA included — and regret it, it will be too late. The significant damage is happening right now before our very eyes, and most don't see it or understand it.'
Voice of America
14-03-2025
- Politics
- Voice of America
G7 urges Russia to accept ceasefire or face further sanctions
Top diplomats from the Group of Seven leading democracies urged Russia on Friday to agree to a U.S.-proposed ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine war. 'We called for Russia to reciprocate by agreeing to a ceasefire on equal terms and implementing it fully,' the diplomats said in a joint statement from the talks in Canada. 'We discussed imposing further costs on Russia in case such a ceasefire is not agreed, including through further sanctions, caps on oil prices, as well as additional support for Ukraine, and other means.' The White House said U.S. President Donald Trump's special envoy, Steve Witkoff, spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Thursday. 'All G7 foreign ministers agree with the U.S. proposal of a ceasefire that is supported by Ukrainians,' and the focus now is on Russia's response, said Canadian Foreign Minister Melanie Joly on Friday. She added, 'The ball is now in Russia's court when it comes to Ukraine.' British Foreign Minister David Lammy echoed this sentiment, stating, 'There is unity that now is the time for a ceasefire with no conditions. Ukraine has made its position clear. It is now up to Russia to accept it.' Lammy also noted that a 'coalition of the willing' is forming to provide Ukraine with the necessary 'security architecture' and monitoring mechanisms to support the ceasefire. The G7 joint statement comes as the Kremlin said that much remains to be done on a Ukraine ceasefire deal, signaling its reluctance to fully endorse the U.S. proposal. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that Putin still awaits answers after raising several questions about the ceasefire's implementation. Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy dismissed Putin's response as 'deliberately' setting conditions that complicate and 'drag out the process.' 'An unconditional 30-day interim ceasefire is the first crucial step that could bring us significantly closer to a just and lasting peace,' Zelenskyy wrote Wednesday in a post on the social media platform X. The G7 talks in Charlevoix, Quebec, brought together ministers from Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States. China's position Behind closed doors, G7 foreign ministers also discussed China's role in global security, stability for the Indian and Pacific Ocean regions, and maritime security. On Friday, G7 foreign ministers held a session focused on strategic challenges posed by China, North Korea, Iran and Russia. Many foreign policy analysts and military officials refer to these four nations as the 'Axis of Upheaval,' describing their growing anti-Western collaboration. The G7 joint statement said the group remains 'concerned with China's military build-up and the continued, rapid increase in China's nuclear weapons arsenal.' They called on China 'to engage in strategic risk reduction discussions and promote stability through transparency.' The foreign ministers also reaffirmed their serious concerns over the situations in the East and South China Seas, strongly opposing any unilateral attempts to alter the status quo, particularly through force or coercion. G7 members also emphasized the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, reiterating their opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. A potential ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine war could affect the U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific, as officials and analysts suggest that ending the conflict would allow Washington to redirect resources toward addressing challenges in the region. 'I don't think an endless, ongoing conflict in Europe or in Ukraine is good for the Indo-Pacific region. It diverts a lot of the world's attention, time and resources away from areas where we continue to see growing threats,' Rubio told VOA earlier this week during a briefing aboard a military plane. 'In many ways, we could be spending even more time focused on the Indo-Pacific if somehow we could bring peace to the European continent,' the top U.S. diplomat said.
