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Express Tribune
15-07-2025
- Climate
- Express Tribune
Flood fears mount in twin cities
The monsoon flood season is set to reach its critical phase in the twin cities of Rawalpindi and Islamabad starting today (Wednesday). Historical data spanning the last 71 years reveals that all major floods in the region have occurred between July 17 and July 27. The first 15 days of the traditional Sawan season, beginning July 16, are considered the most perilous in terms of flood risk. By the start of August, the likelihood of catastrophic flooding typically declines. Between July 16 and July 31, every intense downpour poses a serious threat of urban flooding in low-lying neighborhoods, streets, and roadways. With the onset of Sawan, residents living along the 22-kilometer-long Nullah Leh and the banks of 15 rain-fed tributaries — winding through the city like serpents — have already begun precautionary evacuations. Residents from approximately 19 vulnerable communities have either relocated entirely or transferred only their valuable belongings to safer locations, leaving behind basic necessities. When water levels rise, these families move swiftly to higher ground and return as soon as the water subsides — often within a few hours — to begin cleaning and restoring their homes. Historically, Nullah Leh was a pristine stream fed by natural springs and rainwater flowing from the Margalla Hills of Islamabad. It entered Rawalpindi near New Katarian and eventually emptied into the River Soan. The area was originally settled by the Aryan community, drawn by the clean water and dense forests. To this day, their legacy remains in names such as Arya Mohalla, located near Liaquat Bagh Chowk. Until 1925, the stream's waters were crystal clear — used for ablution, drinking, washing clothes, and Hindu religious rituals. Cremated remains were also immersed in its waters. According to local elders, the stream was once home to fish, which the Aryans would catch. However, following the Partition in 1947, this once-pristine waterway began to deteriorate. With Rawalpindi's industrialization and the rapid development of Islamabad as the federal capital, the stream steadily turned into a polluted drain. Today, Nullah Lai and its tributaries function as open sewage channels, overflowing and causing destruction with each monsoon season. Nullah Lai spans 22 kilometers, with a width ranging from 500 to 1,000 feet. Of its total length, 11 kilometers run through urban Rawalpindi, with the remainder passing through cantonment areas. The deadliest flood in its history occurred on July 23, 2001, when surging waters claimed 65 lives and 300 domestic animals. Commercial sectors suffered losses estimated at Rs. 7 billion. Many traders who were millionaires the day before found themselves destitute overnight — and some families have yet to recover, even 24 years later. The first recorded flood in Nullah Lai occurred in 1967 during General Ayub Khan's era. The second followed in 1969 under General Yahya Khan, resulting in three fatalities. The third struck in 1972 during Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's government, taking 10 lives. Further floods occurred in 1975, 1982, and 1986, after which monsoon flooding became a nearly annual crisis.
Economic Times
08-07-2025
- Politics
- Economic Times
Is Munir planning to oust Pakistan's President? A sense of deja vu in India's neighbourhood
Pakistan, no stranger to military coups, is once again abuzz with speculation as fresh rumours of an impending takeover circulate in the media. The chatter coincides with the 47th anniversary of General Zia-ul-Haq's infamous 1977 coup and is further fueled by claims from Pakistani journalist Azaz Syed that General Munir is actively positioning himself to assume the presidency. Moreover, Pakistan Army Chief General Asim Munir's rare elevation to the rank of Field Marshal has solidified his position as the most powerful man in the country. Since Pakistan's creation in 1947, only one other officer, General Ayub Khan, has been promoted to Field Marshal, and he received the rank after seizing power in a 1958 coup. Munir, only the second Field Marshal in Pakistan's 78-year history, as per experts, may have promoted himself to strengthen his grip on the military and to emphasize the military's supremacy over the the Army Chief, who can technically be removed by the Prime Minister, a Field Marshal in Pakistan is untouchable. The title comes with lifetime tenure, full military privileges, and immunity from civilian or judicial Pakistan is nominally a democracy, the army has remained the ultimate power broker. Since the ousting of former Prime Minister Imran Khan and the ensuing political vacuum, the military — under Munir — has steadily expanded its role beyond security into economic policy, media management and judicial oversight. This Field Marshal title reinforces that shift. Historically, Pakistan's military has used external conflict, especially with India, as a tool to regain legitimacy and centralize authority. From Ayub Khan's incursion into Kashmir in 1965 to Pervez Musharraf's Kargil adventure in 1999, each confrontation has been repurposed to galvanize nationalist sentiment and position the military as Pakistan's only credible Munir's case, Operation Sindoor appears to have served a similar purpose. Though militarily damaging, it has been reimagined through domestic channels as an act of resolve in the face of Indian aggression. Munir's promotion thus completes the cycle: a setback transformed into a symbolic triumph, used to cement control in both the military and the political Khan's ouster, incarceration, and exclusion from the political process have largely been orchestrated with the implicit — if not overt — support of the military. His populist appeal, particularly among the youth and urban middle classes, posed a long-term threat to military primacy in national politics. By neutralizing Khan and then elevating Munir to Field Marshal, the army has sent a definitive message: there is no space for parallel power centers. The democratic process is once again subordinated to institutional the short term, this may bring a veneer of stability. In the long term, however, it may exacerbate the cycle of repression and resistance, and possibly even lead to military dictatorship. Many were already calling his promotion as a soft coup by the military, as per an ET Online report in May. The timing of the recent chatter about Asif Ali Zardari's potential ouster eerily coincides with the 47th anniversary of General Zia-ul-Haq's historic 1977 coup, evoking memories of political upheaval and military intervention in Pakistan's turbulent 1977, COAS Gen Ziaul Haq seized power just when the opposition Pakistan National Alliance, which was holding a national protest movement against the allegedly rigged general elections, was about to sign a pact with Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party to call off the to the chatter, Pakistan's Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi said, people should not pay heed to "social media speculations".He, in fact, said that for the first time, politicians, government, and military establishment are on the same page in the country, as per a Geo TV report.2007 - Two-time Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto is assassinated in a gun and bomb attack after holding an election rally in Rawalpindi. A few months before her death, she survives a suicide bomb assassination attempt in Karachi, where at least 139 people are killed in one of the country's deadliest attacks. 1999 - Former army chief Pervez Musharraf seizes power in a bloodless coup. He is sworn in as president and head of state in June 2001. He resigns in 2008 and Asif Ali Zardari, Benazir Bhutto's husband, takes over as president. 1988 - Military ruler President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq is killed when the Hercules C-130 aircraft carrying him crashes in mysterious circumstances. Conspiracy theorists have suggested a case of mangoes put aboard the plane shortly before takeoff contained a timer device that released gas that knocked out the cockpit crew. 1979 - Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the father of Benazir who was elected as prime minister in 1970, is hanged on a disputed conviction for conspiring to commit a political murder by Zia ul-Haq. 1977 - Zia ul-Haq seizes power after a coup against the Bhutto government. He puts Bhutto under house arrest, imposes martial law, suspends the constitution and bans political parties. 1973 - Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto elected as prime minister, taking over from General Yahya Khan. 1958 - In Pakistan's first military coup, Governor-General Iskander Mirza enforces martial law with General Ayub Khan as chief martial law administrator. Ayub Khan later assumes the presidency and sacks Mirza, who is exiled. 1951 - Pakistan's first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, after the 1947 partition of India, is shot dead at a political rally in Rawalpindi.
Indian Express
04-07-2025
- Business
- Indian Express
‘India must renegotiate IWT on its terms': Uttam Kumar Sinha at explained.Live
When I look at the Indus basin, I am often reminded of what William Shakespeare wrote in The Tempest, 'What's past is prologue.' The context in which the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) was signed effectively set the stage for what is happening in the present. The Indus Waters Treaty is not a simple water-sharing agreement, like, for example, the Ganga Treaty of 1996 between India and Bangladesh. It is the partitioning of the Indus river system itself. After the Partition in 1947, a new geography was created, where the newly-formed nation of Pakistan found itself in the lower riparian region of most rivers that irrigated it. For Pakistan, the question of Indus waters was existential. The treaty was signed in 1960 by then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Pakistan's Field Marshal Ayub Khan and World Bank vice- president William Iliff. In India, the leadership of Nehru was very important to get the treaty through. In Pakistan, Ayub Khan dominated proceedings. Many believe that had Khan not been there and Pakistan had a civilian government, the treaty would have been held up endlessly. In the 1950s, the Americans became interested in South Asia because they could see the potential instability in the subcontinent between these two nations, including over water. They wanted to bring in stability but also a certain degree of American influence because they were clearly sensing that India and Nehru were moving towards the then Soviet Union. And, therefore, you had the World Bank coming in. Initially, there was great resentment in India about the World Bank coming in and supposedly dictating terms. Pakistan, on the other hand, welcomed — it still welcomes — third party involvement. The World Bank's role became almost inevitable because the basin required infrastructure. It required building canals and link canals, all of which needed funds. So the World Bank gradually became an inevitable force. Pakistan wanted the water treaty linked to Kashmir but Nehru was quite clear that the World Bank would not get involved in the Kashmir issue. Ultimately, using the expertise and financial strength of the Bank, a mutually acceptable treaty was pushed through. Something that is often repeated in the context of the treaty is that Pakistan got 80 per cent of the water while India got only 20 per cent. It was actually Ayub Khan who first started this to claim credit for himself. But it is not the right way of looking at the treaty. The treaty was negotiated by engineers. There were civil engineers from Punjab and Bikaner in particular, who looked at the basin and thought the best way to deal with it was to apportion it between western and eastern rivers. The western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab), which went to Pakistan, have more volume of water than the eastern rivers (Sutlej, Beas and Ravi). But it was not so much the volume that determined India's negotiating position. It was the control of the eastern rivers that mattered more. The reason was quite simple. India had to irrigate fields in Punjab. A 15-million acre field needed to be irrigated. India had set about building the Bhakra Nangal Dam and the Rajasthan Canal. So they needed the control of the eastern rivers completely. Likewise, Pakistan also wanted control of the eastern rivers. Western rivers were not much in the picture. Because of the difficult terrain, one couldn't do much on them. There was no technological heft to build dams on them. Eventually, India retained its interest in the eastern rivers. This is why Pakistan still complains that the treaty was unfair to it. India, too, had to give a lot, of course. India paid £62,060,000 to Pakistan to build canals. No treaty can be good when one party gains everything. It has to be a process in which you gain something and you concede something. India's responsibilities get a lot of attention because it is the upper riparian state. Pakistan's responsibility was to uphold the spirit of the treaty, which it has not done. It raises objections, seeks arbitration and eventually delays and raises the costs of whatever projects India plans on the western rivers, which it is entitled to under the treaty. Pakistan has always painted itself as a victim of the aggression of an upper riparian state to gain international sympathy. This is a playbook which is still in use today. 'Keeping in abeyance' means freezing the normal functioning of the treaty. The Indus permanent commissioners' meetings with Pakistan have been suspended since 2023. Now, day-to-day water data-sharing with Pakistan has also been stopped. We have been very slow on optimising the provisions of the treaty and we must do that now. India has the right to create water storage capacity of up to 3.6 million acre-feet (MAF) on the western rivers. A capacity of only about 0.7 MAF on Salal and Baglihar dams have been achieved. With the Pakaldul dam nearing completion, the storage capacity is set to inch up to 0.8 maf. There is an estimated 20,000 megawatts of hydropower potential on the western rivers. India has only developed about 4,000 megawatts. Going forward, when India and Pakistan do sit down to renegotiate the treaty, India should rework the dispute resolution mechanism. The treaty has a three-layered approach involving the appointment of a neutral expert and the International Court of Arbitration. Pakistan has long abused this process. India should insist that disputes are settled bilaterally, with at best a neutral expert to talk about the technicalities of the project. Also, more hydrological knowledge, the science of climate, the science of glaciology, atmospheric science, should be looked at when the treaty is renegotiated. Bangladesh is in the lower riparian area when it comes to the Brahmaputra. So China and Bangladesh can't really get together to push us in the corner. That said, India needs to be watchful of what China is doing. There is a lot for us to do in the Northeast — which can be affected by China's actions — in terms of storage capacity, flood mitigation and so on. There is also a diplomatic way of dealing with it. We should bring water issues into the core dialogue process with China diplomatically. We should also have a lot of interaction between lower-riparian countries. Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar and other Southeast Asian countries are all lower riparian countries vis-a-vis China. India can take a lead in this lower riparian arc to talk to China about water issues. Yes, climate change is becoming an important factor in looking at what the Indus basin is today. When the treaty was signed, the hydrological profile of the basin was very different. The population, the demand for water and the demand for irrigation were also quite different. Things have changed dramatically now. The changing landscape, the changing waterscape, the impact of climate change and new knowledge of the river flow will be critical for renegotiation whenever the two parties sit and talk through it.
The Print
22-06-2025
- Politics
- The Print
Trump's seduction of Asim Munir won't get him cheap labour to uphold American Peace
The gushing reception President Donald Trump gave to Field Marshal Munir—making him the first Pakistan Army chief not holding political office to visit the White House—has caused no small anxiety in India. For the first time since 26/11, the United States seems to be tilting toward Islamabad, with Trump insisting on playing peacemaker on Kashmir. And yet, the effort can add up to little. Look at the old film of the imperial reception granted to Field Marshal Ayub Khan as he travelled through the United States in 1961. In the following decade, he lost a war and was rejected by his people and forced out of office by his brother officers. To seduce Pakistani generals is a perilous project. Field Marshal Asim Munir was content with goat cheese gateau and caramelised onions over his rack of lamb. Field Marshal Ayub Khan, one account assures us , was present at a party where 19-year-old showgirl Christine Keeler wasn't wearing any clothes. There is the story —take it for what it is worth—that General Yahya Khan snubbed his key ally, the Shah of Iran, Muhammad Raza Pehlavi, as he was busy in the bedroom. Trump's gargantuan vanity gives the impression that he's just after a Nobel Peace Prize. In fact, he seeks to resolve a fracture that has confronted American policy since the birth of India and Pakistan, one that defeated figures like General Dwight Eisenhower and Robert F Kennedy. The stakes are far higher than containing jihadists in Afghanistan: They go to the heart of America's projection of power in the Middle East. Endless wars, Trump is discovering, will continue to be fought whether or not America continues to maintain the imperial presence that has upheld the global order across the Middle East. Iran is just one of many conflicts that might erupt across the region. To fight these wars of the future, Trump needs allies and partners—the cheaper, the better. The eastern guard Following the lessons of the war in Korea, the US persuaded itself it needed partners to secure its access to oil—to the great fields in Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran. In February 1951, a meeting of US ambassadors in the Middle East marked out Pakistan as one possible source of troops. Later that month, historian Robert McMahon has written, State Department officials based in South Asia concluded that Pakistan would be willing to commit forces to the Middle East, 'provided the Kashmir question is settled'. Through 1951, gushing commentary on Pakistan's military size, its martial traditions, and its pro-Western leanings spread rapidly through the US establishment. Later that year, newly appointed as Pakistan's military chief, Ayub reached out to Washington, asking for discussions on his country's role in the Middle East. America's strategic establishment was keen to take the bait. 'With Pakistan, the Middle East could be defended,' George McGhee, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African affairs, told a meeting at the Pentagon that summer. 'Without Pakistan, I don't see any way to defend the Middle East.' General Omar Bradley, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concurred, suggesting that the US should find means to arm both Pakistan and Turkey. From America's point of view, Pakistani troops were desperately needed to stabilise a volatile region. 'Currently, the danger in this area to the security of the free world arises not so much from the threat of direct Soviet military attack as from acute instability, anti-western nationalism and Arab-Israeli antagonism,' read a paper from the National Security Council, approved by President Harry Truman in April 1952. These concerns were adroitly manipulated by Pakistan. In a meeting that July, Ayub's Special Advisor on Defence, Mir Laik, requested $200 million worth of supplies for Pakistan's air force and army, as well as a substantial line of credit. The weapons, he told American Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, were needed for use not against India, but against communist aggression. Even though diplomats responsible for engaging India were less than enthusiastic, the proposal to arm Pakistan soon had overwhelming political momentum. Following a visit to Karachi, Vice President Richard Nixon told the National Security Council that Pakistan was 'a country [he] would like to do everything for'. 'The people have less complexes than the Indians. The Pakistanis are completely frank, even when it hurts. It will be disastrous if the Pakistan aid does not go through,' he added. For its part, Pakistan had no interest in getting drawn into wars in the Middle East. It had manipulated American anxieties to secure its position against its principal regional rival. Also read: To be or not to be? Trump's next call on Iran-Israel conflict will reshape West Asia Fallout in Kashmir The government of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru responded by hardening its position on Kashmir in response to these pressures, historian Paul McGarr observes. Talks between Nehru and Pakistan's Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra in 1953, as well as with Ayub Khan in 1959, led nowhere. Later, six desultory rounds of dialogue took place between 27 December 1962 and 16 May 1963. India declined concessions beyond minor adjustments on the ceasefire line. For its part, Pakistan demanded that only the Hindu-majority parts of Jammu stay with India. Frustration mounted in Islamabad over the Kashmir deadlock, with dramatic consequences. From the mid-1950s, American aid to Pakistan had played a dramatic role in modernising its infrastructure and enabling industrialisation. The country's annual GDP growth, between 4 per cent and 6 per cent, had earned Ayub extravagant praise from economists like Samuel Huntington. To pressure the US, Ayub Khan reached out to China, organising an eight-day red-carpet visit for Premier Zhou Enlai in February 1964. From the colonial colonnades of Karachi's Frere Hall Garden, Zhou spoke of China's ancient trading relationship with the Indus plains and condemned the influence of colonialism. Newly elected US President Lyndon Johnson cancelled an invitation to Ayub Khan to visit the country after the Field Marshal publicly criticised the war in Vietnam. From 1964, tensions began to build up over Kashmir, too. The disappearance of the Hazratbal relic in December 1963 led to anti-Hindu riots in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Kolkata's Hindus responded with an anti-Muslim pogrom, which led to hundreds of deaths. The Hazratbal crisis also led Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri to extend provisions of the Indian Constitution, which allowed New Delhi to exercise direct rule in Kashmir. Led by Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Field Marshal Ayub Khan allowed himself to be persuaded that a limited war in Kashmir would compel the US and the United Kingdom to intervene again. The Indian Army, weakened by the war against China, would be in no position to widen the war, the argument went. National Security Council staff member Robert Komer warned his bosses of what was coming. In a 22 October 1963 memorandum, he noted that the Pakistanis appeared to be deliberately building up tensions over Kashmir. 'I wonder if we aren't doing ourselves a disservice by our continued pressure on Kashmir,' Komer wrote. Also read: Pakistan's coldness to Iran shows idea of Ummah is poetic illusion Partners in crime Islamabad's defeat in the 1965 war marked the coming of a long period of disengagement between the two allies. Though President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, facilitated arms supplies from third countries like Iran in the 1971 war, the United States proved unwilling to directly intervene, documents show. Following the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan proved critical in facilitating flows of jihadists and weapons to fight the Soviet Union. Aid diminished again after 1989, though, with the Soviet withdrawal. Like the Afghan war had been for General Zia, 9/11 would prove a gift for another military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf. In 2011, though, President Barack Obama's government sharply reduced aid after the killing of Al-Qaeda chief Osama Bin Laden. Trump further slashed funds after 2017, compelling Pakistan to turn ever-closer to China for support. Islamabad emerged as a gun-for-hire to fight American regional conflicts, but not the partner for peacekeeping that the US had imagined it would become in 1951. This is the relationship Trump hopes he will be able to resuscitate. America is today the largest oil producer in the world, and no longer needs the enormous system of Middle East bases it set up after 1947 to secure its energy. 'Keeping the region's shipping lanes, including the Strait of Hormuz, open to tanker traffic costs the Pentagon, on average, $50 billion a year—a service that earns us the undying enmity of populations in that region,' wrote scholar Arthur Herman in a superb 2014 analysis. Like his predecessors, Trump is holding out the prospect of a deal on Kashmir, with some lashings of aid, to persuade Field Marshal Munir to take on the job. Will Trump succeed where his predecessors failed? Free lunches—especially third-rate racks of lamb, lacking the least hint of garam masala, ginger, garlic, and exotic women—are likely to get you only so far. (Edited by Prasanna Bachchhav)
Business Recorder
20-06-2025
- Politics
- Business Recorder
PARTLY FACETIOUS: Field Marshal Asim Munir got to meet US President
'How would you define victim?' 'That depends.' 'Really? How come?' 'Well, you could be a victim of domestic abuse that some may term as the abuser's rights.' 'Careful.' 'No, I meant a parent could slap a child to discipline him…' 'Well yes I understand that in the West hitting a child is defined as abuse, but what if the child was say hitting another child or…' 'Nuances, my friend, nuances, but if you are in politics victimhood can win elections.' 'So the best way is not to make a victim out of an opponent?' 'Nah that's not a lesson that our politicians have learned. Given the seesaw that our politics…' 'Seesaw?' 'In on one day, and out the other.' 'You need to qualify that statement. Did you mean in government one day out the other, or did you mean in jail one day and out the other, or did you mean…' 'Dear Lord. Anyway, Field Marshal Asim Munir got to meet the President of the United States, the first time ever and…' 'Didn't our first Field Marshal Ayub Khan also meet with the then US President?' 'Why are you being so flippant. Ayub Khan met the President when he had proclaimed himself as the head of government and state and the army and…' 'Gotcha, but the social media, not ours but Western social media, is full of chatter about Pakistan sending off missiles to Iran and that we have threatened Israel that if it nukes Iran we will nuke Israel.' 'I thought the Deputy Prime Minister refuted these…' 'But anyway going back to defining the word victim, the Israeli Prime Minister takes the cake: he continues to starve the people of Gaza and when they come to the few food depots he has allowed to be opened he fires on them, on average 50 plus a day are dying, and he attacked Iran and guess what? Israel is the victim in all this.' 'Netanyahu's narrative or definition of victimhood is supported by the US led Western hemisphere'. 'But the majority of the people of the US led Western hemisphere, the people they purport to represent, are no longer supporting this narrative.' 'Change in policy will take a bit more time I reckon but change it will and with it so will the definition of victimhood.' Copyright Business Recorder, 2025
