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Time of India
4 days ago
- Politics
- Time of India
In 1988, Vajpayee flirted with the idea of joining V P Singh but realised the cost
. The man mourned by both Shah Rukh Khan and Vladimir Putin, and whose legacy has only grown since his death, is at the heart of Abhishek Choudhary's expansive biography of Atal Behari Vajpayee. In an interview with Neelam Raaj, the author, who has just released the second volume titled 'Believer's Dilemma,' reflects on his eventful life and poignant final years It's the centennial year of both Vajpayee and the RSS. Does the dilemma in the title allude to Vajpayee's complicated relationship with the Sangh Parivar? Yes. In phases of ascendancy, Vajpayee outgrew the RSS to become a national figure; in moments of crisis, he was pulled back into the fold by the Parivar's organisational muscle. Tensions sharpened in 1979, when he publicly blamed the RSS for the Janata govt's collapse. They floated the BJP in confusion, but the relationship remained convoluted. The title also gestures beyond Vajpayee- to broader dilemmas in the right-wing ecosystem: the tension between power and responsibility versus ideological purity. It also hints at the predicament of the average Hindu believer: how to inhabit one's religious identity without surrendering to its chauvinistic articulations. You call Vajpayee a 'classic doublethinker'... Only in a specific context. Vajpayee saw himself as both a swayamsevak and a democrat and convinced himself the two were not only compatible but complementary: that a gentle kind of Hindutva was the only sustainable model of secularism. Flip the conviction slightly, and yes, one could call him a classic doublethinker. But that tendency isn't unique to him. Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel, Ambedkar too had moral dilemmas, but not this kind of double-speaking. Yet, the same traits that made Vajpayee a doublethinker also kept him consequential, while more progressive voices of his generation faded from public memory. You write that in 1988, Vajpayee came close to quitting the BJP- a moment V P Singh also alluded to in his memoir. But Vajpayee later laughed this off. How did you confirm this, and what brought him to that point? The late 1980s were a confusing, event-packed phase, and Vajpayee's worst period. Marginalised after the 1984 rout, he let Advani and Nagpur steer the party rightward. After Shiv Sena won Vile Parle in 1987, the BJP sought collaboration. Simultaneously, Bofors broke out and V P Singh was floating a new party. Vajpayee flirted with joining him. The BJP's founding president proposed a new party with select moderates. But he realised the cost: his political capital and emotional investment were tied to the Sangh ecosystem. If the alternative had been more robust, Vajpayee may have quit. I would not judge him. He would deny it later, but several people I spoke to confirmed that it did happen. You start the book by saying you wanted to set some facts straight. What were these myths? Let me mention three here. First, he wasn't as culpable in the 1983 Assam violence as some make out. Second, his obfuscations during the Ayodhya movement — especially his defence of the BJP in Parliament — helped spread the impression that the razing of Babri was a freak accident, despite much evidence to the contrary. Third, that the 1998 nuclear tests were a political stunt by the right-wing govt. In fact, by this time, with the CTBT deadline looming, nuclear testing had ceased to be a moral question for the political class. The Treaty was seen as the P5 (permanent members of the UN Security Council) freezing the nuclear apartheid status quo. Even the CPM thought the P5 were being hypocritical. Any stable govt might have tested. The protests from Communists and Congress later were mostly tactical. Why has Brand Vajpayee become bigger after his death? Because the ideological project he served has grown far bigger. We forget how often he was overshadowed by Congress prime ministers. In 2004, he completed a full term, helping turn India into a multi-party democracy. At this moment of paranoid polarisation, it's easy to forget that three decades ago, few believed that a party other than Congress could steer this mindbogglingly disparate country. There's a PR aspect too: the current dispensation wants his name on welfare schemes etc, minus his civility and sagacity. Some of the posthumous glow also comes from liberal nostalgia — for a more conciliatory era. But that, too, is selective memory. You describe how Vajpayee voted against the Indo-US nuclear deal he helped lay the groundwork for. What made him do that? It had everything to do with the BJP's desperation by mid-2008. As poll defeats piled up, survival instincts trumped foreign policy. Vajpayee, stroke-battered, wanted to help Advani bag the top job. If the UPA lost a trust vote, a bypoll might follow. If the NDA grabbed power, Advani told allies he'd renegotiate the deal. And so, the patriarch was stretchered into Parliament to vote against the deal — a pathetic final visit for India's longest-serving parliamentarian. You write with empathy, especially in the final chapters. How did you navigate the balance between biographical detachment and empathy? Navigating the balance is not my chief concern. I gather the material, then let it lead me; both take depressingly long. Yes, I try to understand my subjects on their own terms, especially when I disagree with them. Vajpayee's final years, stripped of voice and agency- were tragic, and I tried to capture that. In one of his last appearances, he wondered if a human being could ever truly liberate oneself. Asked to recite a poem, he said he'd turned into a kavi ka bhoot, a poet's ghost, the title of the last chapter. For his peers, his end also intimated the nearing of their own. The last bits are, therefore, about the tolls of ambition and the burden of history.


The Hindu
18-07-2025
- Politics
- The Hindu
An excerpt from Believer's Dilemma:Vajpayee and the Hindu Right's Path to Power (1977-2018)
The second volume of a two-part biography, Believer's Dilemma begins with a watershed moment when India voted in its first non-Congress government at the Centre in 1977. The Sangh Parivar was in the coalition, and Atal Bihari Vajpayee got the post of External Affairs Minister. Two years later, when the coalition collapsed, Vajpayee 'publicly apportioned some of the blame to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh,' whose ideology he believed in. After a stint in government, 'the believer now had dilemmas,' and Vajpayee's relationship with the Sangh Parivar would 'remain a convoluted affair till the very end.' An edited excerpt: Janata went to its funeral not only unsung but also unbathed. In mid-July 1979, the RSS's labour wing Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh instigated a strike in Delhi's water supply department, demanding a pay hike and better working conditions. It led to 'choking lavatories, bursting sewers, threat of epidemics in the slums and not a drop to drink anywhere in the city'. Confined to his hospital bed, Vajpayee felt exasperated with old colleagues such as Dattopant Thengadi, who was spearheading the water strike, for worsening the chaos in the capital. Seeds of discord Away from the mayhem, undergoing physiotherapy at his private retreat, Vajpayee introspected on the previous twenty-eight months. He used the time to churn out a longish op-ed for theIndian Express, where he argued that the responsibility for the collapse of the first non-Congress government lay with leaders across all factions. Partly because he was under pressure from both sides, and divided in his loyalties, he adopted the tone of a detached referee. The highlight of this essay was Vajpayee's takedown of his own fraternity for their failure to demonstrate that they did not seek a political role: 'Patronising a press that takes sides in the sordid politics of power, involvement in youth bodies that interact with political parties, participating in trade union rivalries such as the one which recently brought enormous misery to the people of Delhi by callously cutting off the water supply – these do not help an organisation to establish its apolitical credentials. It is possible that some people genuinely feel apprehensively about the RSS. A certain onus accordingly devolved on the RSS, an onus that has not been discharged effectively by the RSS. Its repudiation of the theocratic form of the state was welcome, yet the question could legitimately be asked – why does it not open its doors to non-Hindus?' Vajpayee's unexpected outburst had an urgent purpose: it was a careful PR exercise in showcasing the Jan Sangh's independence from Nagpur, so Janata could lure back some of the MPs who had crossed over. In truth, he continued to be emotionally tied to and dependent on the RSS to bolster his political muscle. His mild criticism also evaded the more serious charges of the Sangh Parivar's involvement in anti-Muslim violence. Later, the enquiry commissions implicated the RSS. As in the past, the essay declared the riots to be a law-and-order failure (in Aligarh) or a response to provocation from the Muslims, such as an attack on a Ram Navami procession (in Jamshedpur). Power games Charan Singh had found his moment of supreme glory, but with enough hint that he could not hold on to it for long. He had agreed to withdraw Emergency cases against Indira and Sanjay Gandhi. But this demand was rebuffed by Congress-U, a breakaway faction of Mrs. Gandhi's party that formed the backbone of his ragtag coalition. It served Indira Gandhi well to pull the plug after twenty-three days of outside support. The way was finally clear for Jagjivan Ram, who had more than 200 Janata MPs supporting him. Vajpayee's essay helped the Janata president, Chandra Shekhar, who praised 'Atal jee on his courageous clear vision' and beseeched the defectors to return and help usher Jagjivan Ram as the first Dalit prime minister of the republic. If the plan succeeded, it would make for a profound moment of democratic deepening. On 22 August, Vajpayee had flown to Madras to induce M. G. Ramachandran of the AIADMK – All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam – whose flock had eighteen MPs, to support the Dalit leader. Just when MGR had nearly agreed that afternoon, the bid turned infructuous. Vajpayee received news from the capital: the president of India had, rather dubiously, dissolved the Lok Sabha. Claims, counter claims It was now a three-ring circus. Touring for elections, Vajpayee's twin targets were Charan Singh and Indira Gandhi. The strategy left many voters confused, unable to distinguish between Janata and Charan Singh's new party. Vajpayee tried convincing the voters that Janata had accomplished 'a lot in its short tenure'. Everywhere he flew – now in a private plane – he made hour-long speeches reminding the crowd of Janata having restored democracy, freedom of press, and judiciary. He cited improved economic indicators: falling prices, rising food stocks, doubled foreign exchange reserves. He pointed out that Janata had boosted relations with all major countries without damaging with any. Mrs. Gandhi mocked Janata as a mishmash – a 'khichdi sarkaar' – and beseeched people to 'vote for a government that works'. The Congress-I even managed to pierce the armour of the former foreign minister: they convinced his eldest brother, Awadh Behari, who had recently retired from his government job in Bhopal, to join Mrs. Gandhi's party. Atal was obviously embarrassed, but salvaged the situation saying there was 'nothing wrong' with his elder brother joining his rivals: 'It is his personal decision. I will not mind if my other brothers joined the Lok Dal or the Congress-U.' Excerpted with permission from Pan Macmillan India