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The Diplomat
5 days ago
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Hindu Nationalism in the Indian Diaspora: An Interview with Dr. Edward Anderson
This is the transcript of an interview conducted for the July episode of 'Beyond the Indus,' The Diplomat's South Asia-focused podcast. Tushar Shetty (Interviewer): We're pleased to be joined by Dr. Edward Anderson, Senior Fellow at SOAS* and Assistant Professor at Northumbria University*. His research focuses on the Indian diaspora, transnational politics, Hindutva, and Hindu nationalism, as well as British histories of migration, ethnicity, and multiculturalism. His latest book, Hindu Nationalism in the Indian Diaspora, is a fascinating deep dive into these topics, charting the origin and evolution of Hindutva in the British Indian diaspora and examining the organizational aspects of Hindutva-leaning groups. Edward, welcome to Beyond the Indus, and thank you for joining the podcast. Edward Anderson: Thank you so much. It's lovely to talk to you. Tushar Shetty: Edward, I was reading your book on Hindu nationalism and the Indian diaspora, and what I found interesting was that it begins in an unusual place—not in India or the UK, but rather in Nairobi, Kenya, where the RSS actually set up its first overseas shakha* (branch) before India was even an independent country. Could you take us through the origins of transnational Hindutva in East Africa and how it spread to the UK and internationally? Edward Anderson: You're absolutely right. Hindu nationalism outside of India first established itself through the Sangh* in East Africa, specifically in Kenya. It's worth providing some historical context to explain how this happened. While Hindutva only became politically powerful toward the end of the 20th century and into the 21st century, Hindu nationalism and Hindutva ideology have origins that go much earlier—to the early 20th century or even the late 19th century in some ways. As for why it established itself in East Africa, there had been, since the end of the 19th century and early 20th century onward, a substantial population of Indian people in East Africa. East Africa at this time was part of the British Empire—the countries I'm talking about are mainly Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. These parts of East Africa started to see growth in Indian communities, partly as a response to the British colonial state encouraging Indians to move over to work in various parts of the economy. Initially, they were brought over to help construct the Uganda Railway, bringing laborers and skilled workers from India. They were also given certain rights to set up businesses and trading rights, many of which were denied to the local African population. Some people were given positions within the colonial bureaucracy as well. From the outset, the Asian population of East Africa had a relatively privileged position in society and a segregated position as well. They kept to themselves, had their own communities, and lived in particular parts of towns—often parts that had been allocated to them by the British. They maintained quite a close connection with the homeland, with India, which was a short hop over the ocean. The east of Africa and the west of India have been connected via maritime trading routes for hundreds of years. In the mid-1940s, there's a legendary story of a fellow moving over to work in a school who was an RSS member in India. When he arrived in Kenya, he established the first shakhas*, the first branches of the RSS—the leading and most powerful Hindu nationalist organization. He set up the first shakha*, and from that point onward, it became quite popular. Many children were sent there by their parents as a place to socialize with other people from the same community and to learn about Hindu culture and Indian culture in various ways, developing a sense of cultural pride and assertiveness. From that point onward, it started to establish itself through branches of the Sangh* that were set up in other parts of the world. In the historical narrative, during the 1960s and 1970s, after the African countries I mentioned started gaining independence, they were keen to coerce, persuade, or even expel the Asian population in East Africa. Most famously and notoriously, there was Idi Amin's* expulsion of the Asians in 1972. At this point, many East African Asians moved to Britain—often they had British passports by virtue of being citizens of the British Empire—and to other places as well. This is when we start to see the real establishment of Hindu nationalist organizations in the UK, around the exact time when East African Asians were moving over in the 1960s. Tushar Shetty: That community of East African Indians has produced many interesting people who have ascended quite high in both UK and US politics. I believe Kash Patel* and Zoran Mamdani*, who is the mayor incumbent* of New York City, Priti Patel*, who was former Home Secretary in the UK—is Rishi Sunak* part of that East African Indian diaspora as well? Edward Anderson: Yes, you're absolutely right. This is a community that has produced incredibly interesting and successful people in all sorts of areas, and as you've identified, from all parts of the political spectrum as well. In the UK, Rishi Sunak*, the first non-white Prime Minister of the UK and leader of the Conservative Party, and also two subsequent Home Secretaries, Priti Patel* and then Suella Braverman*—all of these people have roots in East Africa. Tushar Shetty: This is a pretty well-educated, well-established community that also brought some Hindutva ideas to the UK. To what extent has the Indian community been receptive to what we would call Hindutva ideology, considering that political Hindutva didn't really take off in India itself until the late 1980s? What was the attraction to these ideas and organizations? Edward Anderson: It's an interesting question. First, it's important to note that there is a kind of received wisdom that the Indian diaspora is highly predisposed toward Hindutva ideology and very sympathetic to the RSS and Narendra Modi*. This has emerged particularly from dramatic political rallies that Modi has participated in that have taken place in London, New York, Texas, Sydney, and various other parts of the world. While it's certainly the case that there is sympathy for Hindutva, there's also a very strong tradition that resists that—a strong liberal, leftist, and socialist tradition. You've already alluded to that when mentioning a few of those names earlier. There's a very diverse range of perspectives in the diaspora, and it's really important not to essentialize, not to generalize, and not to be reductive. That being said, there are certain things that the Hindu nationalist movement and organizations have done that have attempted to cater to the diaspora in certain ways. They provide people with a sense of belonging and pride—people who might be marginalized by society around them more broadly. This is quite unusual and departs significantly from Hindu nationalism in India. The whole point of Hindu nationalism in India is that it's a majoritarian ideology relating to an ostensible majority community, an overwhelming majority community depending on how it's enumerated. Whereas in the diaspora, this is an ideology that appeals to quite a small minority—in fact, a minority that is significantly smaller than the Muslim minority in Britain and the US. That dynamic is notable, particularly in the context of the war on terror and Islamophobia in the West. There's clearly a way for Hindutva and certain Hindu nationalist mobilizations and ideas to engage with that tension and politics as well. Tushar Shetty: What's interesting when I was going through your book was the organizational aspect of this. Could you give us an overview of how Hindutva-leaning groups are organized in the UK and elsewhere – what sections of the diaspora do they cater to, how are they financed, what services do they provide and what role do they play in the community? And to what extent does their messaging and culture differ from the Sangh Parivar* in India? Edward Anderson: That's a really good set of questions with a lot in it, and it's hard to give a short answer. Just like in India, Hindutva groups in the diaspora are extremely heterogeneous. There's a bewildering plethora of different groups, and it feels like there are new ones being set up every year. While some groups might function in one way and reach out to a particular demographic, others might be very different. Even the type of Hindutva that they espouse—the tone and messaging—might differ drastically. In terms of which sections of the diaspora they cater to, one answer would be 'all.' Hindutva is a majoritarian ideology and needs to create an ostensibly monolithic and unified majority community to fulfil its ambitions. In this sense, Hindutva can be all-encompassing. We often hear the term 'Dharmic religions' being used in efforts to incorporate Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs into the fold, although this can be highly contentious. On one hand, they try to cater to many people, but on the other hand, there are clearly specific focuses. I've already mentioned a notable concentration of East African Asians. Reflecting the demography of East African Asians, there's quite a striking proportion of middle and upper-caste Gujarati Hindus. Another area of focus has been younger generations, which relates to another part of your question about the roles these groups play. These groups are eager to provide a service to the diaspora, particularly second and third generations and their parents, by positioning themselves as a place where they can convey particular versions of Hindu culture, history, and spirituality to people who are dislocated from that and living in another part of the world where they're not necessarily surrounded by it. They function by having classes—language classes, for instance. There's a very pedagogical role that these groups often play. There's a wide range of them as well. I'm referring quite broadly to the Sangh*, but there are also diasporic branches of the VHP* (Vishva Hindu Parishad). The more political side is reflected in the Overseas Friends of the BJP*. There are also various student groups and charities. The other interesting thing is that in the diaspora—and this is something I discuss in relation to an idea called 'Neo-Hindutva,' which I wrote about initially about 10 years ago and pursue further in this book—Neo-Hindutva is a term I've used to explain the way Hindutva has evolved and entered into spaces well beyond the Sangh Parivar*. We see completely new groups that operate and distance themselves from both the ideology of Hindutva and the organizational structures of the Sangh Parivar*. Yet when we look at them closely, we can identify them as Hindutva in ideology, even though they're functioning more in a multicultural context. Tushar Shetty: I recall reading about the HSS* (Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh) in the UK, which is quite similar to the RSS, but I think you noted that they claim to just be influenced by them and not have direct links. To what extent are these Hindu advocacy groups linked to or influenced by the RSS and its affiliates – are they just Sangh Parivar* subsidiaries abroad, or do they have their own independent agenda or presence? We're seeing a wider rise of Hindu advocacy groups gaining ground in places like the US and Canada, e.g. The Hindu American Foundation* comes to mind. Are all these groups linked to the RSS, or are they just a natural consequence of diaspora mobilization, similar to other immigrant communities in the Anglosphere? Edward Anderson: This is an important question and one I try to delve into in depth in the book. The overseas equivalent or wing of the RSS in the diaspora is called the HSS*, the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh*. Originally in East Africa, it was called the Bharatiya Swayamsevak Sangh*. This group does try to occasionally distance itself from the main RSS in India. They often talk about being inspired by or having ideological commonality with the RSS without being structurally connected. That being said, if you look at the organizations side by side, it's very clear that they are deeply connected. Full-time workers of the RSS in India—Pracharaks*—are sent abroad and work in various communities outside India to facilitate coordination. The Supreme Leader, the Sarsanghchalak* of the RSS, Mohan Bhagwat*, was present in Britain in 2016 for the 50th anniversary celebrations of the HSS* in the UK. We can see RSS leaders traveling across the diaspora, so there are clearly institutional connections. That being said, these groups are vernacularized—they do evolve in slightly different directions. They're not carbon copies of what we see in India in various ways. They also rely to some extent on organic, local volunteers and dynamic local leaders who are heavily invested in what they do. So there is a degree of separateness as well, even though there are clearly institutional links. These institutional links are something that many of these groups have been quite keen to obfuscate, not least because these are registered non-profits in the US and registered charities in Britain. The connection with political organizations is something that's quite contested and has been discussed and debated in various settings over quite a long period of time. Tushar Shetty: Do you think this is substantially different from the way other communities mobilize? We have different examples of this—I'm thinking of AIPAC* in the US, which advocates for Israeli interests, even though it's not necessarily connected to Israel directly in terms of donations, and is supported by the American Jewish community. We have Sikhs in Canada and the US who have strong political networks because of community connections. Is this mobilization or growth of Hindu-focused organizations substantially different from that, or is it just following a familiar pattern? Edward Anderson: I think there are some levels of similarity and other levels of distinctiveness. I wouldn't say that you can reduce all motivations of ethnic minority communities or diasporic communities to being all the same—there is real distinctiveness there, and it's important to study different groups and individuals on their own terms. That being said, there are certainly connections and links, not just across different communities but also across time. I'm a historian, although I work on topics that go almost right up to the present day. If you look at the political identities that were being formed and long-distance activism that was being conducted by Indians in Britain in the very early 20th century—people campaigning against the British Empire, seeking independence from Britain, people considered freedom fighters, including interestingly a founding father of Hindutva, Savarkar*, who was a student in London in the very early part of the 20th century—we can see a longer theme where there are similarities across different groups. But the sorts of connections and ways of doing politics have definitely been different in different parts of the world, in the US and Canada. As you say, there's a diversity of political perspectives among South Asian diasporas. Sometimes, in the case of some Sikh and Khalistani* activists, they come up in very heated and highly contested ways with other sections of the broader South Asian diaspora. Tushar Shetty: Mobilization in any community tends to be disruptive to politics – I wonder how these groups have impacted local politics in the UK and elsewhere. Do they wield enough power to influence legislation and foreign policy, and how do other communities respond to this? We've talked about Khalistani* groups reacting to certain aspects of Hindu nationalism emanating from India, and we also saw the riots in Leicester. I'd be grateful if you could talk about that for our listeners, and if there are other instances of negative fallout or reactions to Hindu politics in the Indian diaspora. Edward Anderson: Let me first address the Leicester tensions. What we saw in Leicester in August and September 2022 was rather unprecedented and extremely upsetting scenes of tension and violence between Hindu and Muslim communities in the city. Leicester is a city in the Midlands in the middle of the UK that saw a very large influx of Asians, particularly South Asian people, in the 1960s and 1970s. It's one of the most diverse parts of the country, with nearly 45% of people identifying in the census as Asian, nearly 20% of the city being Hindu, and nearly 25% being Muslim. It's a very multicultural city that has seen various difficulties over the years, but multiculturalism is often identified as one of the great successes of the city and has enabled it to be economically successful. Tensions between communities have been present, and this reached a head in the summer of 2022. Various triggers have been suggested for what happened, but one might have been a cricket match between India and Pakistan. Following this, tensions spilled over into violence. We saw on social media videos of people walking through parts of the city shouting 'Pakistan Murdabad*' (death to Pakistan) and chanting 'Jai Shri Ram*'—a religious chant often associated with Hindutva. Subsequently, there were retaliations, including a flag being pulled down from a Hindu temple. There was a lot of rumor spreading and social media misinformation. Certain extremist elements, including the far right, were clearly stirring things up. We have evidence suggesting that a large amount of social media interaction on this matter originated in the Indian subcontinent, with hashtags like 'Hindus under attack' being spread in tens and hundreds of thousands of tweets. The flames were clearly being fanned from various parts of the world. This was a moment of considerable tension, and a lot of work has been done subsequently to try to build bridges between communities. While I said it was unprecedented, the unprecedented nature was in its scale and visibility and the reaction to it, but there have been tensions previously. If you go back three decades to 1992, one of the most pivotal moments for Indian democracy was the demolition of the Babri Masjid* by Hindu extremists. This led to significant outbreaks of violence and many deaths between Hindus and Muslims in various parts of India. There are reports from 1992 and 1993 showing that communal tensions had also found their way to Britain and other parts of the diaspora. There were reports of attacks on both Hindu and Muslim places of worship, and suggestions that opportunistic right-wing groups were also stirring things up. These tensions have existed for quite a long time. As well as tensions, there is also a lot of solidarity and groups working together—a lot of good relationships as well. Regarding the impact on UK politics, there has definitely been a concerted effort to influence legislation and be a force of lobbying. This comes back to your previous question about AIPAC*. What we can definitely identify is a desire to replicate the kind of level of influence that certain other communities have, notably the level of influence of certain elements of the Israeli lobby. It's not just a desire to replicate or mimic that but to form alliances as well. This is explored in depth in a new book called Hostile Homelands by Azad Essa*. There's definitely an effort to do advocacy and influence members of parliament, and we've seen this happen in numerous settings. One of the most dramatic was in 2019, when the Labour Party was still being led by Jeremy Corbyn*, who has been quite critical of Modi, has been a strong advocate for Dalit* rights, and has spoken out on the Kashmir issue and human rights issues in Kashmir. This led to an enormous backlash and resistance, with an effort by the Overseas Friends of the BJP* to campaign against the Labour Party in 48 constituencies. This was quite unusual—for the Overseas Friends of the BJP* to campaign specifically on a UK election and try to ensure that someone they framed as being anti-Indian and anti-Hindu would not get into office. There's definitely a level of influence going on there. The extent to which that influence has reaped rewards is a moot point—it's hard to identify necessarily. Tushar Shetty: How is Modi utilizing the Indian diaspora to advance some of his or India's foreign policy goals? Post-2014, do you think Modi's personal popularity has changed the dynamics of the Indian diaspora's politics and contributed to the rise of Hindutva ideas? Perhaps more controversially, could Modi's popularity in the diaspora have any impact on domestic politics in India, either indirectly through media coverage or perhaps directly through campaign contributions? Edward Anderson: This is an important question, certainly one that people have discussed perhaps more than any other aspect of diasporic Hindu nationalism. What we've definitely seen is the BJP being more proactive since 2014—and before that as well—in engaging the diaspora, perhaps much more dynamically than any of their rivals. The rewards they seem to be reaping perhaps reflect that. In 2014, after the election, Modi embarked upon a series of international visits—diplomatic visits, but also visits in which the diaspora featured quite heavily. The first and most striking was him filling out Madison Square Garden, a venue that usually has sports superstars and rock stars on its stage. This was a rock star-type event that the diaspora were extremely excited about in the US. In the following year, we saw a similar event with even more people—maybe 50,000 or 60,000—filling much of Wembley Stadium in west London, England's national football stadium. These were really dramatic scenes, and all of these were livestreamed back to India, which I think is crucial. What you're seeing is the diaspora being engaged with and maybe thanked for their influence and the way they can promote the BJP, Modi, and India more broadly. But what those rallies do is provide really powerful images for media back in India, both via social media—which Hindu nationalists have been very adept at using—and also via mainstream media, which has been very sympathetic to the BJP in recent years. They provide striking images that reflect popularity abroad or try to instill this idea of popularity abroad, which might be influential. The diaspora is still looked up to in many ways for their success and often enhanced levels of cultural, political, and economic capital. While the diaspora might not actually be voting—Indians who take citizenship of another country lose their Indian citizenship, as there's no dual nationality—even NRIs* (Non-Resident Indians) who still have Indian citizenship very often don't vote because it's logistically very complicated. The majority of the Indian diaspora don't vote, and unlike other countries, there's no distance voting option yet. The influence they might have in terms of PR influence or ability to influence people on the ground in India is possibly considered much greater than people who just turn up and vote. Modi has definitely been a key figure—he has inspired people, there's that charisma, assertiveness, and feeling of strength that has been conveyed. The diaspora participate in lots of aspects of that rallying around the individual. One of the early campaigns was 'Chai pe Charcha*' (discussions over tea), in which support for Modi was promoted. These took place across India but also in the diaspora. The diaspora have also been involved via the Overseas Friends of the BJP*, doing car rallies, driving around in different contexts, and even turning up for particular protests. When the BBC released its very controversial two-part Modi documentary, which was banned in India, members of the Indian diaspora went outside BBC headquarters in London and protested against that. There are lots of ways in which support for Modi has been manifested, and he is clearly an important figure. One caveat to add is that there have been surveys that push against the idea of universal support. A survey conducted by the Platform for Indian Democracy* at the end of 2023 suggested that more people of Indian origin in Britain had a negative view than a positive view of Modi and the BJP, particularly among younger generations. Yes, there is hero worship for Modi, like there is among many Indians. There's also a significant proportion of members of the Indian diaspora who would turn up when he comes overseas not to support him but to protest against him. Tushar Shetty: Before we end, I want to ask you—you're a historian, and I was reading recently Lee Kuan Yew's* autobiography, where he talked about the changing dynamics in the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia in response to the unification of the People's Republic of China. He discussed how the Malayan Communist Party* attracted many more recruits from the Chinese diaspora, not necessarily due to a flare-up of Communist ideology, but because there was a flare-up of nationalist pride. In that light, to what extent do you think the popularity of Modi and the rise of India as a global power has propelled these Hindutva ideas among the diaspora? Is this just a natural inclination toward Hindutva ideas, or is it also a response to the perceived rise of India in the global arena? Edward Anderson: I certainly wouldn't ever say anything's natural. I think there are always ways of explaining and understanding how things happen. There's not an innate predisposition to any particular sort of politics or identity. What the book discusses is the much longer picture that goes back to the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. There's a long backstory to the institutional establishment of Hindu nationalism and the ideological inculcation of Hindu nationalism among the Indian diaspora. This goes back a long time, clearly to a period long predating Modi and the 21st century saffronization of India—the 'New India' in which Hindu nationalism and Hindutva have had an impact on almost all aspects of society. But definitely, something different has happened over the last decade or so, and part of that is due to a new level of confidence. Previously, people inclined toward Hindutva might have been more reticent, maybe even secretive about it, less keen to show their cards. But the election of Modi since 2014 has completely changed that. There has been a renewed level of assertiveness and confidence. People are much less shy to discuss that aspect of their politics. Another big difference is that the world is so much more interconnected than it was. The experience of being a member of a diaspora in 2025 is significantly different from what it must have been like in the 1960s or 1970s. I'm not suggesting that in the 1960s or 1970s there was no connection with the subcontinent—that's obviously not the case. There was communication and interaction, but today you're instantly connected and almost constantly connected via social media and a device in your pocket to what's going on in other parts of the world. You're living a transnational life. Those levels of influence—whether it's important news stories, memes, viral YouTube videos, or the latest speech of a political leader—that's all coming to you directly, and you're participating in that directly. That's a phenomenon that has shifted in a very big way over the last decade or so, and I think that, as much as anything else, has had a big impact on the politics of the diaspora. Tushar Shetty: To those who want to read more, I would definitely recommend Edward's book, Hindu Nationalism in the Indian Diaspora. Is this available in India? Edward Anderson: Yes, it was published by Penguin and is available in India. It's published in the US by Oxford University Press and in the UK by Hurst. Tushar Shetty: Fantastic. Edward, thank you so much again for joining the podcast. Edward Anderson: Thanks, it's been great talking to you. Note: Names and terms marked with asterisks have been corrected from the original transcript based on context and standard spellings.*
The Diplomat
5 days ago
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Revival of Hindu Politics in Nepal: An Interview with Biswas Baral
This is the transcript of an interview conducted for the July episode of 'Beyond the Indus,' The Diplomat's South Asia-focused podcast. Tushar (Interviewer): Today, we're happy to be joined by Biswas Baral, the editor of the Kathmandu Post, Nepal's most widely read English daily. With over two decades of experience in Nepali journalism, Biswas frequently writes articles on Nepali politics and foreign policy for several international outlets, including The Diplomat. He also has a fascinating YouTube series called 'Idea of Nepal,' where he has wide-ranging discussions on Nepal's history, politics, economy, and foreign policy. He's perhaps the best person to talk to about the rise, or perhaps the revival, of Hindu politics in Nepal. Biswas, welcome to Beyond the Indus, and thank you so much for joining the podcast. Biswas Baral: Thank you so much, Tushar. It's lovely to be here. Tushar: Nepal was once the world's only official Hindu state, ruled over by a semi-divine monarch since, I suspect, the mid-18th century. That state of affairs lasted, not without change, but it did last until 2008 when a popular revolution ousted the last king, Gyanendra* Shah. Just to begin with, could you give our listeners a brief outline of the politics of Nepal under the monarchy and the transition and circumstances that led to its fall in 2008? Biswas Baral: When we talk about monarchy, its history begins in the mid-18th century when Prithvi Narayan* Shah founded modern-day Nepal. The kings were the main rulers under the Shahs* for nearly 100 years, and then they were not ousted but made secondary rulers by the Ranas*, who were a family of courtiers who took over executive powers. This happened in the mid-19th century, and this rule of a single family lasted for 104 years until it was overthrown in 1951. When the Rana rule ended in 1951, the king came back into the picture as the head of state and as a constitutional monarch. In 1951, when the king was restored and the Rana rule ended, he was restored with the promise that he would hold constituent assembly elections and hand over power to a democratic government. However, this could not happen for the next eight years until Nepal had its first parliamentary elections in 1959, whereupon a democratic government was brought in. But it lasted maybe a year and a half before the monarch took over again and started a one-party rule, which lasted until 1990. In 1990, there was a popular protest, and again, the era of active kingship ended and constitutional monarchy was restored. After that, in 1996, the Maoist insurgency started. The Maoists aimed to overthrow the democratically elected government and wanted to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat. Then you come to 2001, while the war against the Maoists was at its peak. The entire royal family was massacred. This is a very crucial point in the history of Nepali monarchy because when the royal family was massacred in 2001, the earlier king was much more popular and well-liked. The new king who came in his place, Gyanendra*, was always unpopular. He was known for his dubious ways. His son was involved in various crimes, including running over a popular Nepalese singer. They were extremely unpopular. When King Gyanendra* came to power in 2001, I think many people lost their faith in monarchy. That was the first big blow to the institution of monarchy in Nepal. Tushar: I just wonder if you could go into the detail of what exactly happened there, because was it someone from the royal family who did the massacre? Biswas Baral: Yes, the official version is that the Crown Prince gunned down his entire family. He was intoxicated and shot his entire family. Many Nepalis don't believe that version. They somehow think that Gyanendra* had something to do with it. But the official version is that the Crown Prince shot the entire family when he was intoxicated, supposedly because his family would not let him marry the woman of his choice. Tushar: I was wondering if you could give us an overview of the political transition from monarchy to secular democracy and the subsequent post-2008 politics of Nepal. Who are the major parties, which communities formed the base of support, and how has their performance been in terms of governance and stability? In your view, has the current political arrangement and the current parties lived up to their social contract that the Nepali people expected of them? Biswas Baral: Before I go to post-2008 politics, it's very important to cover the period between 2001 and 2008. Gyanendra* came to power and subsequently took over executive powers, dismissing the elected government. On one hand, the Maoist war was raging. On the other hand, he had alienated all the political parties. What happened is that the Maoists and these political parties came together and jointly launched a movement to remove the monarchy. By this time, the king had become extremely unpopular because he had suspended democratic rights and had jailed leaders and civil society members. The earliest suspicions people had about him were heightened. By the time he was removed in 2008, a major section of Nepalese believed that he was unfit for the role and somehow supported his removal. Now, there can be an argument that many people supported the removal of just King Gyanendra*, not the monarchy, but that's a debate which continues to this day. In 2006, the seven main political parties at the time and the Maoists signed an agreement in New Delhi whereby they agreed to elect a Constituent Assembly and whereby the Maoists would come back into mainstream politics. Kingship and monarchy were kept in deep freeze in 2006. After the Constituent Assembly election in 2008, when the Maoists and all the anti-monarchy forces came to the Constituent Assembly, they formally removed monarchy. The institution of monarchy was formally abolished in 2008. Since 2008, and actually since 1990 after the first political change, the two main political parties in Nepal are the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), or CPN-UML*. After 2008, the Maoists also entered the scene. So right now, there are three main parties: the Nepali Congress, the CPN-UML*, and the Maoist Unified Center*. These three are the main political actors. Tushar: Where do they draw their basis of support? Is it similar to India, where you have certain castes and communities that tend to drift towards parties, or is there a different setup in Nepal? Biswas Baral: Right now, if you look at the support base of Nepali Congress, it's generally more liberal and believes in liberal values. The CPN-UML* is a Communist Party by name, but there's nothing communist about it. They have absolutely diluted whatever programs they had adopted. Even in the case of Maoists, the agendas they waged war with, they have step-by-step abandoned all those agendas. Initially, at least, the left parties like CPN-UML* and Maoists were the parties of the proletariat—the farmers, laborers, and low-wage earners—while Nepali Congress attracted those who didn't believe in communist values and thought the country could only be run by modern liberal values. But right now, I would say it's a mixed bag. I don't think there's a strict distinction, particularly between Nepali Congress and CPN-UML*. They have nationwide networks and do well throughout the country. In terms of Maoists, during the civil war, their main support came from the marginalized Hill communities. But even now, since they came into mainstream politics—it's been nearly two decades—they are indistinguishable from the other two political parties. People say there's absolutely no difference between these parties. They look similar, they sound similar, their leaders sound similar, and the same three leaders of these parties take turns as government head. There's no material or significant difference in their ideology or what they do. Maybe there's a big difference in what they espouse, but in terms of their practice, there's absolutely no difference between these three main political parties. Tushar: How would you evaluate their performance since 2008 in terms of delivering what the Nepali people expected of them? When the Constitution was formed, there were three founding principles: federalism, republicanism, and secularism. Was there an economic promise, or a promise to deliver certain growth? To what extent are the Nepali people satisfied that these three parties, in their different alliances and times in power, have delivered on those promises? Biswas Baral: I think Nepali people have been not at all satisfied. What we see post-2008 is that the monarchy was removed, but there's a popular saying that we removed one monarchy and now we have produced ten monarchs. All the political parties and political leaders are acting as owners. What happened is that the Nepali Congress, CPN-UML*, and the Maoists have basically come to power, and their leaders have become prime ministers by turn. It's purely person-centric politics. The government doesn't change because of ideology or because certain ideology wins in the elections. It's purely person-centric politics: How do I get to power? How do I monopolize it? How do I get to power and make enough money, develop enough resources, so that I can do even better in the next election? How do I distribute important government portfolios so that I can form a base which supports me at all times? Corruption is very high at all levels among the bureaucracy, in politics, and in political parties. When people see this, they question why they overthrew the monarchy because they thought the king was acting entitled and was jailing leaders. How are these leaders any different from him? Some are wondering if they made a mistake by throwing out the monarchy. This has given rise to some new political parties, for instance, the Rastriya Swatantra Party*, which emerged in the 2022 election with around 21-22 seats. Largely, the votes they got were a reflection of the unpopularity of the three main political parties. That said, the vast majority of parliament, both national and federal, are occupied by members from the two largest parties, with some filled by the Maoists. Other parties are still distant to these three parties, including the new ones. Tushar: I asked this question to establish context for our next question about the rise of Hindu politics, because I wonder to what extent this dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs is leading to this revival of Hindu politics. To what extent does the former king continue to have political support and influence in Nepal – are there sections of the population that want the monarchy restored? Is the rise of Hindu politics solely linked to the idea of restoration of the monarchy, or are there other factors behind this phenomenon? Biswas Baral: Like I said, people do not want the same three leaders. It's not even the three parties, but the three leaders who take turns to become Prime Minister. They are sick and tired of seeing the same faces come to power again and again, and they want change. Some opted for the new political party, the Rastriya Swatantra Party*. Some opted for independent candidates. But it's very curious and interesting because if you look at the two most recent general elections, first in 2017 and then in 2022, nearly 95% of the seats in the most recent election went to pro-republican forces or those who don't support monarchy. In the election, just 5% of the votes went to avowedly pro-monarchy parties. If that is the barometer, then monarchy still has very little support. Another thing is that even if you look at the most recent pro-monarchy protests, there are not that many people—2,000, 3,000, maximum 5,000. Whereas at the height of the anti-monarchy protests in 2006, which removed monarchy, there were easily up to a million people coming out in the streets. You don't see that level of support. It seems that monarchy has a lot of support on social media or online to international observers, but when it comes to people coming out on the ground, you don't see that kind of support. There's a mismatch between what we're seeing. This year, there were student elections, and the pro-monarchy parties were absolutely nowhere in the scene. So where is the support for monarchy? How do we calculate the support? Is it the number of people coming out in the streets? Not many people are coming out. Is it the votes they're getting? They're just getting 5% of the votes. It seems that people are dissatisfied with the current political setup and current political parties, but they don't trust the monarchy as yet. They don't think the future of the country lies with monarchy. There is some nostalgia about monarchy among youngsters, particularly those who came of age after it was removed, but this nostalgia is not translated into support in terms of protesting or voting in favor of monarchy. To international observers, it looks like monarchy is on the brink of coming back, but that's not happening. Tushar: I'm reminded of the rise of the BJP in the 1980s in India and how they piggybacked on an issue—the Ram Janmabhoomi* issue and eventually the Babri Masjid* destruction—that catapulted them to power in the 1990s. What issues do Hindu political parties in Nepal campaign on – are there specific social or economic issues? Is the king involved in this at all – has he become a rallying figure of sorts? Biswas Baral: The king's involvement could clearly be seen in the most recent pro-monarchy protests, which unfortunately turned violent. In one protest, two people were killed. The problem was that if the king has new supporters and his support base is growing, then he should have relied on new faces to lead the movement. But who's leading the pro-monarchy movement this time? It's all old faces. The commander of the movement was about 80 years old. These are all old faces at the forefront of recent pro-monarchy protests. When you talk about the factors fuelling the rise of pro-monarchy parties, there's just one pro-monarchy party that has any kind of presence in Nepal. It's the fifth-largest force in parliament, but even that is small—like I said, 5% of the total votes. When you're saying 'rise of pro-monarchy parties,' what does that actually mean? You don't see that in the elections. I don't know what will happen in the next election, but even in by-elections after 2022, no pro-monarchy party is anywhere in the scene. Again, my question is: How do you judge the popularity of monarchy? How do you say that monarchy is gaining more and more support? Yes, you see that on social media, but is that translated on the street? No. Is that translated in the ballot box? No, at least not until now. Right now, this campaign for the restoration of monarchy, even in the last month, is dying down. It's not picking up steam at all. Tushar: Maybe we can broaden from the pro-monarchy specifically to Hindu politics generally. To what extent is a rise in Hindu politics influenced or linked to the rise in Hindutva* ideas and the BJP that we're seeing on the other side of the border in India? Biswas Baral: When we talk about Hindu politics, it's very interesting because two of our three big parties are communist parties. Their leaders are supposedly atheists who don't believe in any religion. But what has happened is that since the rise of the BJP in India, when the political parties and political leaders here saw the allure of Hinduism and a Hindu agenda in India, they suddenly started visiting temples—even communist parties, even the leader of the Maoist party who went to war to establish a secular republic. Nearly 17,000 people died in the process to establish a secular republic, and now they want to be seen as not atheist. They want to be seen by India, particularly, that they believe in Hindu religion. This happens because it's very difficult, given our geopolitics and our precarious situation whereby we are surrounded on three sides by India, and given our large dependence on India trade-wise, for a Nepali Prime Minister to operate and continue in office for any length of time without some support from New Delhi. New Delhi has a lot of leverage in Kathmandu*. Even for that purpose, even the supposedly atheist leaders show off by going to Pashupatinath* or even Indian temples. Even Prachanda*, the leader of the Maoists, when he goes to India, visits temples there. In a way, they have all adopted this approach. The Nepali Congress, the biggest political party, has always had a very ambivalent stand on Hinduism. There's a strong pro-Hindu voice inside the party, and there's a strong Hindu voice in all the major political parties. The support for the restoration of a Hindu state is much bigger than the support for the restoration of monarchy. Those two are not synonymous because support for one is clearly more than support for the other. Coming back to the BJP, I don't think the BJP is directly involved in what's happening. It's more the RSS itself, which has branches in Nepal and supports various pro-monarchy activities in Nepal. That is much more active. Another thing is that we have an open border, so whatever politics is happening in Bihar* or Uttar Pradesh* easily spills over into Nepal. What we see, at least in the Tarai* Belt adjoining India, which is nearly a third of Nepal's territory, is that there has been a shift in terms of visibility of religion. The Hindus suddenly feel they need to show off their religion. They need to go out on streets and organize big rallies. Earlier, you didn't see that. Earlier, the kind of Hinduism practiced in Nepal was done inside the puja ghar*, the small room in your house. They didn't feel the need to go out and assert themselves. That is a very troubling sign because, for the first time in our history, there have been reports of Hindu-Muslim clashes from some of the areas bordering India. We find this extremely troubling. Our political leaders especially make a show of being religious, being Hindu, to please certain constituencies in India. There is a level of support for a Hindu state because many people believe that Nepal was declared a secular republic at the behest of Westerners because they wanted to spread Christianity. Christianity has spread very rapidly in the past, and that only adds to the argument. There is some influence from what's happening in India, and I also see the possibility of this Hindu state agenda gaining ground among the mainstream political parties. They somehow feel that the pro-monarchy party, like the Rastriya Prajatantra Party*, is bidding for public support through their pro-Hindu agenda—not just pro-monarchy, but also pro-Hindu state. Many in the mainstream political parties are thinking they need to attract this sizable conservative constituency, or if it gets out of hand, they'll suffer electorally. So there's a debate in all the political parties about whether they should embrace a Hindu state. One very curious thing I must add is that Nepal is a secular republic right now, but we have a very curious definition of secularism. Even our constitution states that Nepal is a secular republic, but all the ancient cultures and all the religions that have been practiced from ancient times, Sanatan Dharma*, will be preserved. Many people say we are already a de facto Hindu state because conversion is prohibited. Our constitution prohibits conversion, so it's a criminal offense. Many people are saying we are already a de facto Hindu state, so what's the harm in now officially adopting a Hindu state? On the other hand, critics say we are already giving priority to our traditions and cultures, we are protecting Sanatan Dharma*, so what's the need to now declare a Hindu state? Many people are not aware that our definition of secularism is very qualified. Tushar: It's interesting how secularism as it manifests in South Asia differs from the traditional Western conception, or the French conception of laïcité*, where the state separates itself completely from all religions. I do want to ask about the foreign policy implications of this, starting from Nepal's largest trading partner and big neighbour, India. India and Nepal have had a mixed relationship at best. In 2015, we saw the devastating blockade that happened in the Tarai* region of Nepal, and I think India cooperated in blockading Nepal, which strained relations considerably. I wonder how this rise of Hindu politics interacts with nationalistic sentiments within Nepal that perhaps may be directed against India. Are we seeing a more positive relationship or feeling towards India because of this rise of Hindu politics? Biswas Baral: I would say the general perception of Nepalese towards India is not influenced by Hinduism or any other religion. Historically, Nepalese think of themselves as the only state in South Asia that has never been colonized, unlike India. So we are a very proud people. Another thing is that, being surrounded by India on three sides and being so dependent on India for everything, we feel this need to assert ourselves, otherwise we'll be lost. A sense of this Nepaliness, at least among the people of the Hills especially, comes from being not Indian. Even our founder, Prithvi Narayan Shah*, defined Nepal as the Asli Hindustan*—the real home of Hindus—by which he meant that India is not the real Hindustan*. Even in religious matters and cultural matters, the Nepali psyche and mentality is to differentiate ourselves from India. For instance, the current Prime Minister claims that Lord Ram* was not born in India but was born in Nepal. They are looking to appropriate Indian religion because they want to show that we are the true cradle of Hinduism, not India. Another thing is that in 2015, one big reason for the blockade was that India did not want Nepal to become a secular state, which has been borne out by later books and scholarly works of various organizations and individuals who were active at the time. After Nepal became a secular state, I don't think the BJP as a political party itself is so interested in turning Nepal back into a Hindu state. It's much more organizations like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* (RSS), which is very active here. This rise of Hindu politics would not have much effect on our relations with India and similarly would not have much effect on our relations with China. Many Nepalese, practicing Hindus and devout Hindus, are perfectly happy with the idea of cultivating the Chinese as a counterweight to India. Even if we have similar religion, similar traditions and cultures, there's this need to assert the Nepali identity—a very strong need to assert the Nepali identity. Historical factors and cultural factors that go much beyond religion are responsible for Nepal-India ties. For instance, we have an open border, people marry across the border. It's a very multifaceted relationship, and I don't think Hindu politics will have very limited impact, even when it comes to pro-monarchy politics. No political party in Nepal can come to power and be anti-Indian. That's just not possible because India will find a way to punish it. We have seen that historically too. A government that is overtly anti-India—for instance, the first government of Prachanda* when he came above ground and his political party emerged the biggest in the 2008 election—he had formed the government, but he took such a strong anti-India line that India played an instrumental role in removing him from power. There were other secondary issues, but without India's backing, he would not have been removed. Even the current political leader, for instance, K.P. Sharma Oli*, is known as China's man in New Delhi, but even he has been trying very hard in the last few years to reach out to India. He has been trying very hard to get an official invite to India, which has not been possible to date, but I hear that he could be visiting India soon. Tushar: That's fascinating, and I was particularly interested in the part where the RSS is influencing cultural activities. Could you maybe just explain very briefly how the RSS is doing this? Biswas Baral: The RSS has branches in Nepal, especially in the Tarai*. It supports religious activities here and has also played some role in making Hinduism, the brand of Hinduism, more like what Hindutva* is doing in India. Given our cultural similarities, the RSS finds it very easy to operate in Nepal, especially in the Tarai* Belt, which adjoins India. It continues to play a very subtle, very behind-the-scenes, but very important role in the so-called preservation of Hindu culture and tradition and in opposing proselytization and Christianization in Nepal. Tushar: Biswas, thank you so much. That was a very interesting interview. Biswas Baral: Amazing talking to you. Thank you for having me. Note: Names and terms marked with asterisks have been corrected from the original transcript based on context and standard spellings.*
The Diplomat
6 days ago
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Hindutva International: The Globalization of Hindu Politics Outside India
Biswas Baral and Edward Anderson explore the rise of Hindu politics outside India, and how it is changing the dynamic of Hindu communities and diaspora worldwide. This month's episode of Beyond the Indus explores the rise of Hindu politics outside India, and how it is changing the dynamic of Hindu communities and diaspora worldwide. We speak to Biswas Baral, editor of The Kathmandu Post, on the revival of Hindu politics in Nepal and its impact on the pro-monarchy restoration movement. Then Dr. Edward Anderson, author of the book 'Hindu Nationalism in the Indian Diaspora,' charts the origins and evolution of organized Hindutva in the United Kingdom, its links to the RSS and the impact of Narendra Modi's BJP on the Indian diaspora. For more in-depth analysis on South Asia, you can subscribe to the Beyond the Indus podcast on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, or Google Podcasts.
