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Yahoo
4 days ago
- Business
- Yahoo
Putin is preparing for another invasion while Nato is fatally distracted
At the latest Nato summit in The Hague, the alliance announced that members had set a new target of spending 5 per cent of GDP on defence and security by 2035. In part, this is likely to have been driven by a realisation that Trump envoy Steve Witkoff's shuttle diplomacy and Europe's denunciations of Vladimir Putin will not be enough to end the war in Ukraine. More fundamentally, however, members are waking up to the need to deter Russia from attacking a Nato country – which, according to Mark Rutte, the alliance's secretary-general, it could be ready to do within five years. As a military intelligence analyst specialising in Putin's thinking and Russian military strategy, I agree with Rutte's assessment about Russia's readiness for another offensive military campaign in just a few years. I'm less convinced that a Nato country is likely to be the Kremlin's next target, unless the alliance directly intervenes in Ukraine by deploying troops onto the battlefield. Nevertheless, what Nato does or doesn't do in the next few years could be highly significant in determining whether Putin decides to attack another post-Soviet state – such as Moldova. The problem is that increasing spending on defence and security-related areas will not do the trick on its own. Money and technology, the staples of the West's style of warfare, do not by themselves prevent or win wars. Strategy does. And a successful strategy must be based on a deep understanding of the opponent's way of war, addressing the key elements of its military planning. I briefed Nato members on Russia's war-fighting strategy in September 2013, just months prior to Putin's invasion of Crimea. Regrettably, no counter-strategy was developed by the Pentagon and its Nato counterparts. Hence Putin's invasions. Developed by the Russian General Staff and often dubbed 'asymmetric warfare', Russia's strategy borrows heavily from the classic works of the British strategist Sir Basil Liddell Hart. He advocated indirect methods of fighting the opponent, rather than the brute application of force. The centrepiece of this approach is to bypass the enemy's areas of strength and focus on exploiting weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Obviously, the war in Ukraine has developed into precisely the sort of conflict Russia seeks to avoid. But that doesn't mean that the Kremlin has fundamentally changed its approach to conflict, particularly when facing new opponents. Since Nato militaries are technologically superior to the Russian forces, Moscow knows it will have to rely on seizing the strategic initiative during the initial period of any future war. It will not be seeking a repeat of what has happened in Ukraine. Russian planners therefore envision undermining Nato's network-centric approach to war by disrupting its forces' 'kill chain', the process that enables military decision-making to detect, target, and destroy adversaries. This could be achieved by targeting, perhaps pre-emptively, the C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) and space systems on which Nato forces depend. So Nato members need to do more than spend money. They need to understand what the Russians consider to be the alliance's vulnerabilities, and take action to remove the Kremlin's incentive to exploit them. There are five principal areas that require action. 1. Secure space-related infrastructure Russia has a formidable arsenal of counter-space weapons, designed to degrade or destroy US and allied satellites. It includes GPS-jamming systems, lasers, orbital interceptors, and anti-satellite missiles. The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence warned in its 2025 Annual Threat Assessment that Russia is training its space forces, fielding new anti-satellite weapons, and is already using electronic warfare to counter Western assets. Moscow is also developing a new satellite meant to carry a nuclear weapon as an anti-satellite capability. 2. Harden critical infrastructure against cyber attacks Russia has one of the world's most destructive arsenals of cyber weapons, a sophisticated doctrine, and advanced expertise. The 2025 Annual Threat Assessment warned about Russia's repeated success in compromising sensitive targets for intelligence collection. Moscow is likely to already have access to critical infrastructure in the US and Europe. Moscow has a particular strength and practical experience in integrating cyber attacks with military operations in wartime. 3. Establish stronger protocols to guard undersea communications cables Russia's General Staff Main Directorate has a highly secretive deep sea research programme, known as GUGI. Moscow is highly likely to have put this expertise into practice, with several suspected sabotage operations of undersea cables in the Baltic Sea since the war in Ukraine began. A similar risk applies to energy pipelines. In October 2022, the UK Ministry of Defence acknowledged that a Royal Navy frigate was deployed to the North Sea to assist Norwegian forces in protecting gas pipelines, after the rupture of Nord Stream in the Baltic. 4. Bullet-proof against Russian espionage It hardly needs saying that Russia routinely infiltrates spies all across Europe and recruits locals to steal military, political, and economic secrets. But Moscow has also been able to insert intelligence operatives to conduct destabilisation operations, targeting critical infrastructure. Some estimates suggest that such sabotage operations almost quadrupled in number between 2023-24. Multiple arrests have taken place, including in Germany, Poland, and the UK. But the alliance must take a more pro-active approach, neutralising and disrupting Russia's espionage operations before they are able to do damage. 5. Establish advantage in total combat potential Having moved onto a war footing several years prior to the invasion of Ukraine, Russia now produces more ammunition in three months than Europe does in one year. Scaling up production of air defence systems, tanks, drones, and ammunition is imperative for Nato to catch up to Russia and restock its depleted arsenals. Weapons don't shoot themselves, however. The alliance must recruit, train, and equip a fighting force sufficient to change Putin's decision calculus. Moscow has been mobilising overtly and covertly throughout its three and a half year war in Ukraine. And on Tuesday, a bill was submitted to the State Duma introducing year-round conscription for military service. If approved and signed by Putin, the law will come into effect on Jan 1, 2026. In Europe, only a few countries have mandatory military service, and so far most of the others are not considering it. But in a war of attrition, such as the one Russia is fighting in Ukraine, the side that has more manpower is better positioned to win. The good news is that the alliance has time to get its act together to prevent another invasion. It would be tragic if the alliance fails to step up to the plate now, especially given the colossal price Ukraine is paying to defend itself against the Russians. Nato owes it to all those dead Ukrainians and their families to develop a viable counter-strategy to Putin's playbook. Rebekah Koffler is a strategic military intelligence analyst, formerly with the US Defense Intelligence Agency. She is the author of 'Putin's Playbook', Regnery 2021. Her next book 'Trump's Playbook' will be published later this year. Rebekah's podcast Trump's Playbook is running on her channel Censored But Not Silenced and is available on most social media platforms @Rebekah0132. Broaden your horizons with award-winning British journalism. 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The Print
04-07-2025
- Politics
- The Print
‘1 border, 3 adversaries': Army Deputy Chief on Op Sindoor, says Pakistan got live inputs from China
Further explaining his statement, he added, 'Pakistan was the front face. We had China providing all possible support. This is no surprise because if you look at statistics, in the last five years, 81 percent of the military hardware that Pakistan is getting is all Chinese. China, of course, the good old dictum, killed by a borrowed knife…So, he would rather use the neighbour to cause pain than get involved in the mud-slinging match on the northern borders.' Speaking Friday at an event 'New Age Military Technologies' organised by FICCI, Lt Gen Singh said, 'First, one border, two adversaries. So, we saw Pakistan on one side, but adversaries were two, actually four, or let's say three.' New Delhi: In candid assessment of India's Operation Sindoor, Lieutenant General Rahul R. Singh, Deputy Chief of Army Staff (Capability Development & Sustenance), has said that there are multiple lessons to be learnt from the 87-hour conflict, with the biggest lesson being that while there was just one border, there were a minimum of three adversaries. China has been able to test its weapons against others, he said. 'So, it's like a live lab available to them. It is something that we have to be very cognizant about. Turkey also played an important role in providing the type of support it did…' he said on the use of Turkish drones of various kinds by the Pakistani military. Lt Gen Singh also spoke about what has emerged as one of the primary concerns within the defence and security establishment—China using its satellites to monitor Indian military deployment. 'The next important lesson is the importance of C4ISR and civil military fusion. There is a lot to be done as far as this domain is concerned.' C4ISR stands for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. 'When DGMO-level talks were on, Pakistan actually was mentioning that we know that your such and such vector was primed and ready for action, and we would request you to perhaps pull it back. So he was getting live inputs from China. That is one place we really need to move fast and take appropriate action,' the Deputy Chief said. While ThePrint held back a lot of information verified by it while Operation Sindoor was underway, it has been learnt that China was indeed an active participant in this conflict by providing strategic military inputs to Pakistan. Indian leadership has been trying to downplay the involvement of the Chinese in the conflict. Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan had said on 31 May that while Pakistan may have leveraged Chinese commercial satellite imagery, there is no proof of real-time targeting support. ThePrint's Editor-In-Chief Shekhar Gupta had written in his column 'National Interest' on 7 June how Operation Sindoor was the first battle in India's two-front war, and that the Chinese use Pakistan as a cheap instrument to triangulate India between them. 'It is safer to presume that the Chinese now see Pakistan as an extension of their Western Theatre Command,' he wrote. Lt Gen Singh said that 'thankfully our population centres were not quite at risk' during Operation Sindoor. 'In the next round, we will have to be prepared for that. For that more and more air defence, more and more counter rockets, artillery, and drone sort of systems has to be prepared for which we have to move very very fast,' he noted, while admitting that while indigenous systems did very well, some did not. (Edited by Mannat Chugh) Also Read: IAF lost 'some' jets in Op Sindoor over political constraint to not hit military—Indian Defence Attaché
AllAfrica
01-07-2025
- Politics
- AllAfrica
China's new graphite bomb signals shift to silent siege of Taiwan
China's tease of a graphite bomb signals a shift toward non-kinetic warfare aimed at crippling Taiwan's power grid and eroding resistance from within. Recently the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that China in a state broadcaster video had teased a potential new graphite bomb, which appears designed to disable enemy power infrastructure through non-kinetic means. The animation, shared via a CCTV-affiliated channel, shows a land-launched missile deploying 90 submunitions. These eject carbon filaments mid-air, short-circuiting electrical grids across an area exceeding 10,000 square meters. While not officially named, the weapon mirrors characteristics of graphite munitions historically used by the US in Iraq and Kosovo. With a stated range of 290 kilometers and a 490-kilogram warhead, the weapon is allegedly suitable for precision strikes on substations, although its operational status remains undisclosed. CCTV attributed the concept to China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation but withheld technical specifications. Analysts highlighted its alignment with People's Liberation Army (PLA) priorities, enabling the paralyzing of command, control and surveillance systems without confrontation. A 2017 commentary by Modern Ships editor Chen Chundi classified graphite bombs as 'game-changing,' citing their potential to bypass conventional defenses and integrate BeiDou-guided tail kits for enhanced accuracy. Online speculation quickly linked the system's deployment to a potential contingency in Taiwan. While China offered no confirmation of deployment or mass production, the broadcast marks a rare public reference to a capability aimed at undermining adversarial command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) frameworks through electromagnetic disruption. The implications of this weapon go beyond battlefield utility. Analyzing the tactical, operational, and strategic impact of China's new graphite bomb in a Taiwan scenario necessitates contextualization within a broader framework. Timothy Heath and other writers mention in a June 2023 RAND report that Taiwan's durability against China's reunification efforts hinges on three interconnected factors: its infrastructure, economy and public resilience. Heath and others state that disruption to power production could exacerbate economic hardships and public suffering. They note that since Taiwan is heavily dependent on trade, it is vulnerable to disruption in the event of a blockade, and low public tolerance towards hardship could result in limited support for resistance. Highlighting the vulnerability of Taiwan's power grid, the Financial Times (FT) reported in March 2024 that Taiwan's energy grid faces acute wartime vulnerabilities due to its centralization, outdated crisis protocols and heavy (82%) dependence on imported fossil fuels for electricity generation. Citing a war game by the Taiwan Center for Security Studies, the FT states that Greater Taipei relies on just three transmission chokepoints, which link northern demand centers to power plants in the center and south, making the grid highly susceptible to kinetic, cyber or electromagnetic attacks. According to a Chinese military journal cited by SCMP in May 2025, a simultaneous strike on three key substations would carry a 99.7% probability of triggering a total blackout in northern Taiwan. The report adds that if timed for peak disruption, such as during a typhoon or election, the collapse of other infrastructure systems could unfold 40% faster. Such infrastructure fragility makes graphite bombs an ideal first-strike tool in a strategy designed to break Taiwan's will to fight before a conventional war even starts, especially if paired with a blockade that controls the tempo of escalation. The logic of this strategy goes beyond infrastructure; it aims to fracture morale and governance. In line with that, Franklin Kramer and others write in a July 2024 Atlantic Council report that a large-scale attack could trigger cascading failures across Taiwan's emergency services, healthcare, water supply and transportation, plunging society into chaos. Such disruptions, they argue, could shake public faith in the government's response, potentially destabilizing its ability to maintain order. They point out that the PLA could exploit societal collapse to enable a decapitation strike aimed at Taiwan's political and military leadership. Kramer and others emphasize that blackouts would be not merely collateral damage but a deliberate tactic designed to paralyze governance, disrupt national defense coordination and accelerate Taiwan's potential capitulation. Targeting Taiwan's critical power infrastructure with 'soft weapons' such as graphite bombs shows China's approach to urban warfare. In an October 2022 RAND report, Sale Lilly notes that the PLA has increasingly focused on the challenges of urban warfare in its preparations for a potential invasion of Taiwan. He cites the Chinese idiom 'killing rats in a porcelain shop' to illustrate the PLA's recognition of the fragility of urban environments like Taipei and the need for caution in such settings. Lilly explains that the phrase, drawn from historical precedent, conveys the difficulty of conducting combat operations without causing widespread damage. While the report highlights the PLA's efforts to prepare for operations in complex urban terrain, it also points out that Chinese military writings may underestimate the duration and intensity of such fighting. A graphite bomb attack on Taiwan's power grid would likely be done in concert with a blockade and intense information warfare, all to ensure that the self-governing island capitulates with little to no resistance. Noting Taiwan's economic vulnerability, Bonny Lin and other writers mention in an August 2024 report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that in 2022, Taiwan's imports and exports accounted for 61% and 69% of its GDP, respectively. They also note that 97% of Taiwan's energy and 70% of its food are imported. The same report warns that a Chinese blockade resulting in a 50% trade disruption could spark widespread blackouts and cripple key economic sectors, including the semiconductor industry. It adds that even without total isolation, incremental disruptions to fuel and food shipments alone could induce widespread panic, weaken morale, and prompt Taiwan to negotiate. In concert with a blockade, Vincent So mentions in a May 2025 article for The Interpreter that China's information warfare strategy toward Taiwan aims to erode political cohesion and societal confidence without triggering kinetic retaliation. So says that rather than persuading Taiwan that reunification is desirable, China aims to convince it that reunification is unavoidable. He explains that this is pursued through gradualist grey-zone tactics, including cyberattacks, disinformation, economic coercion and narrative saturation, designed to normalize pressure and fragment decision-making. He adds that Taiwan's fragmented media landscape creates fertile ground for amplification and manipulation, while elite economic dependencies enable quietist accommodation. China's graphite bomb is not just a battlefield tool; it is part of a broader strategy of incapacitation through blackouts, blockade, and narrative warfare. If China views blackout warfare as a prelude to political collapse, graphite bombs may not just be an option. They could be the opening act of a war designed to end without invasion at all.
Yahoo
27-06-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
If You Invested $1000 in Leidos a Decade Ago, This is How Much It'd Be Worth Now
For most investors, how much a stock's price changes over time is important. Not only can it impact your investment portfolio, but it can also help you compare investment results across sectors and industries. FOMO, or the fear of missing out, also plays a role in investing, particularly with tech giants and popular consumer-facing stocks. What if you'd invested in Leidos (LDOS) ten years ago? It may not have been easy to hold on to LDOS for all that time, but if you did, how much would your investment be worth today? With that in mind, let's take a look at Leidos' main business drivers. Founded in 1969, Delaware-based Leidos Holdings, Inc. is a global science and technology leader that serves the defense, intelligence, civil and health markets. Its core capabilities include providing solutions in the fields of cybersecurity; data analytics; enterprise IT modernization; operations and logistics; sensors, collection and phenomenology; software development; and systems engineering. During the first quarter of 2024, Leidos Holdings completed a realignment of its segment and reporting structure. Consequently, the company currently operates through the following four business segments: National Security and Digital: This business segment offers technology-enabled services and mission software capabilities in the areas of cyber, logistics, security operations and decision analytics, as well as IT operations and digital transformation programs. In 2024, this division generated revenues of $7,365 million, contributing 44.2% to Leidos' total & Civil: This segment provides services and solutions in the areas of public health, care coordination, life and environmental sciences and transportation. Its core capabilities include health information management services, managed health services, systems and infrastructure modernization, and life sciences research and development. The unit recorded revenues of $5,015 million in 2024, which accounted for 30.1% of Leidos' total revenues. Commercial & International: This unit's products include IT modernization, software solutions, mission support and logistics, Command, Control, Computers, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) technologies and services, cloud services, power grid engineering, energy modernization and security products and services. Revenues from this division totaled $2,252 million, representing 13.5% of Leidos' total revenues. Defense Systems: This unit develops and produces advanced space, aerial, surface, and sub-surface manned and unmanned defense systems. Revenues from this division totaled $2,030 million in 2024, representing 12.2% of Leidos' total revenues. Anyone can invest, but building a successful investment portfolio requires research, patience, and a little bit of risk. So, if you had invested in Leidos ten years ago, you're likely feeling pretty good about your investment today. According to our calculations, a $1000 investment made in June 2015 would be worth $3,751.33, or a 275.13% gain, as of June 27, 2025. Investors should keep in mind that this return excludes dividends but includes price appreciation. Compare this to the S&P 500's rally of 192.22% and gold's return of 172.55% over the same time frame. Analysts are anticipating more upside for LDOS. Leidos Holdings' defense solutions continue to witness increased orders from the Pentagon and other U.S. allies. These contracts enhanced the company's bookings, which, in turn, led to a solid backlog of $46.30 billion at the end of the first quarter of 2025. Leidos boasts a strong financial position, which enables it to reward its shareholders with lucrative share repurchases. Our model predicts solid revenue growth for Leidos during the 2025-2027 period. Its shares have outperformed the industry in the year-to-date period. However, the shortage of labor in the aerospace and defense industry poses a threat to Leidos. Persistent supply-chain constraints might continue to affect Leidos. The U.S. government's enhanced export controls imposed on certain products and sanctions on certain industry sectors in Russia may hurt Leidos. The stock has jumped 5.55% over the past four weeks. Additionally, no earnings estimate has gone lower in the past two months, compared to 6 higher, for fiscal 2025; the consensus estimate has moved up as well. Want the latest recommendations from Zacks Investment Research? Today, you can download 7 Best Stocks for the Next 30 Days. Click to get this free report Leidos Holdings, Inc. (LDOS) : Free Stock Analysis Report This article originally published on Zacks Investment Research ( Zacks Investment Research Error while retrieving data Sign in to access your portfolio Error while retrieving data Error while retrieving data Error while retrieving data Error while retrieving data
Telegraph
23-06-2025
- Politics
- Telegraph
UK should lead Nato spying operations, commander says
The UK should take the lead on Nato intelligence operations as the US shifts its focus towards China, one of the alliance's most senior officers has said. Pierre Vandier, Nato's supreme allied commander transformation, said that Britain should play a key role in developing Western surveillance technology in the coming years. Under Donald Trump's administration, the US government has repeatedly said that European allies will be required to do more to protect themselves against Russia. At this week's Nato summit, Mr Trump will push member states to commit to spending 5 per cent of GDP on defence to shore up the alliance against threats from the East. Mr Vandier, a former French navy officer, said that Britain and its spy agencies would work on new 'C4ISR' intelligence systems, which are used to predict air, land, sea and space attacks. He told the House Magazine that if an attack was to be launched, the UK would focus on the 'joint prioritised target list', which is a register of Nato targets. 'The US may lack satellite people, analysts and brain time if they are focused on China if something happens, and not be able to help the Europeans to build their joint prioritised target list,' he said. 'I think the UK has this in its DNA and so may be useful to build this new generation of C4ISR in Nato.' This week's summit has been described as the most consequential in decades, because of pressure from the US to increase defence spending and the joint threats of conflict in Ukraine and the Middle East. Mr Trump's team have said they believe the UK and other Nato allies should focus on European security while the US handles the rise of China and the prospect of a war over Taiwan. The president has suggested that American forces could withdraw entirely from Europe and that Nato will be left with minimal defences on its eastern flank. Mr Vandier said that a direct attack on Nato countries by Russia was 'possible' and that allies had a 'sense of urgency' about the threat. 'We can't say it will not happen,' he said. 'I'm not able to say what will go on in the future. But I definitely can say it's a race, and so each minute, each week, each month, each year counts.' He added that the UK and other countries were 'not ready' for biological weapon attacks because preparations have focused on 'terrorist attacks and for limited attacks'. 'With biowarfare, you would have maybe thousands of cruise or ballistic missiles arriving with chemical warheads,' he said. 'We are not ready for that.' A Ministry of Defence spokesman said: 'The UK is committed to strengthening our leadership within Nato. 'As set out in the Strategic Defence Review, the UK will adopt a 'Nato first' approach, stepping up on European security by leading in Nato, with strengthened nuclear, new tech and updated conventional capabilities. 'We remain committed to defending Nato's eastern flank, from our permanent presence in Estonia to our Nato air policing mission in Poland.'
