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India.com
4 days ago
- Business
- India.com
First S-400 missiles, now Russian Oil warning...., NATO countries trying to pressure ‘non-aligned' India! MEA says....
First S-400 missiles, now Russian Oil warning...., NATO countries trying to pressure 'non-aligned' India! MEA says.... The Russia-Ukraine conflict has had implications across the geopolitical, economic, and humanitarian domains. The conflict, which began in 2022, has created numerous global problems. Politically, it has raised tensions with Russia and Western countries, while arguably strengthening NATO as more countries continue to join its ranks for stability. Economically, the war has caused worldwide prices of fuel and food to increase since both are major exporters. As Ukrainian troops are continuing to endure setbacks from Russian troops, there is growing frustration from the US and NATO allies. Former US President Donald Trump seems to be directing that frustration towards Russia's allies, India, and China. The US has put forth a bill that would put a 500% tariff on oil imports from Russia. Why is NATO putting pressure on India? Adding to the pressure, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte issued a stark warning to India and China on Wednesday, that if Russia is not in peace talks in 50 days, countries still buying Russian oil, will face a 100% secondary tariff. In response, India strongly rebutted the threat and stated that ever since the start of the Ukraine war, Western countries have consistently tried to pressure India over its long-standing relations with Russia. It is to be noted that India has firmly asserted its independence of foreign policy based on its national interest. Earlier, Trump threatened to impose 100 per cent 'secondary tariffs' on Russia if a deal on Ukraine is not reached within 50 days, during his meeting with Rutte in the White HouseTrump also expressed disappointment with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, and threatened to impose severe tariffs if there is no deal within 50 days. Meanwhile, moments after Trump's call for imposing 100 per cent 'secondary tariffs' on Moscow, Senators Lindsey Graham and Richard Blumenthal warned countries, including India, of economic sanctions if they continue business with per a joint statement by Graham and Blumenthal, China, India, Brazil and other nations 'prop up Putin's war machine' by purchasing 'cheap Russian oil and gas', which they claim is fuelling Putin's effort in the conflict with Russia. What role did the S-400 deal play in India's firm stand? Previously, Western countries had also issued veiled threats when India announced its purchase of the S-400 missile defense system from Russia. During Operation Sindoor, the Russian S-400 air defense system provided important protection from missile attacks from Pakistan. Not long ago, the United States warned India that continuing with the S-400 deal would put it in danger of CAATSA sanctions (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) from the U.S. CAATSA sanctions may be enforced on a country if the country engages in a significant defense or related sale from Russia or North Korea or Iran. According to the news agency PTI report(2022), CAATSA is a tough US law that was brought in 2017 and authorises the US administration to impose sanctions on countries that purchase major defence hardware from Russia. Why is NATO targeting India over its ties with Russia? India stood firm against U.S threats and firmly communicated that it would proceed with the Russian S-400 air defense system deal. The right decision was made as the Russian system acted as a shield for India during Operation Sindoor. Eventually, the U.S would issue a waiver by recognizing India's firm defense agreement with Russia. Now, similar threats are issued by the NATO chief regarding India's ties with Russia. NATO countries have delivered ammunition and missiles to support Ukraine, but have been unable to subdue Russia. Out of frustration with their inability to control Russia, they are coming for India. It is worth noting that NATO member Turkey is now the third-largest customer for Russian oil. What did India say in response to NATO's Russian oil warning? Meanwhile, on Thursday, the External Affairs Ministry, in a rebuttal to NATO chief Mark Rutte's remarks on the possibility of secondary sanctions on the purchase of Russian oil, said that securing energy needs of India was an 'overriding priority' for the country which is 'guided by available offers' and 'prevailing global circumstances. 'The Ministry of External Affairs further cautioned against 'double standards' on the matter. Addressing a press conference in the national capital, MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said, 'We have seen reports on the subject and are closely following the developments. Let me reiterate and I have said this in the past as well that securing the energy needs of our people is, understandably, an overriding priority for us. In this endeavour, we are guided by what is available in the markets, as well as by the prevailing global circumstances.' 'We would particularly caution against any double standards on the matter,' the MEA Spokesperson said, ANI reported. During the Ukraine war, India not only met their domestic need for energy by importing oil from Russia, it also kept world oil prices from rising sharply. This was beneficial for all oil-importing countries anywhere in the world. India even exported refined oil to Europe and led the way as the largest exporter of oil products to Europe. India, today, is one of the leading buyers of oil from Russia, which is a bit of a sore point for the NATO chief. While the U.S. and NATO countries continually threaten to punish India, India remains a Key ally of the West in the Indo-Pacific region against China. Experts have also maintained that India, despite U.S. or NATO leaders threatening, will continue to operate solely in its national interests. Western countries will not be able to impede India's decision-making or dictate India's policy.
Indian Express
5 days ago
- Business
- Indian Express
India should disregard NATO threat on doing business with Russia
During Operation Sindoor, the S-400 formed the outermost layer of India's air defence. This is the missile system that India acquired from Russia a few years ago despite the US threatening sanctions under CAATSA — a law mandating punitive measures against countries engaging in 'significant transactions' with Russia, North Korea, or Iran. India made it clear that it would proceed with the S-400 deal anyway. Eventually, the US House carved out an India-specific waiver. A similar episode is playing out again. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte warned this week that countries like India, China, and Brazil could face secondary sanctions if they continue doing business with Russia. This comes as several US senators back a new sanctions bill proposing a 500 per cent tariff on nations buying Russian goods. US President Donald Trump, too, said this week that the US would impose 100 per cent secondary tariffs targeting Russia's trade partners if a peace deal with Ukraine did not happen in 50 days. The Ministry of External Affairs' sharp rebuttal on Thursday — underlining that the energy requirements of the Indian people are the overriding priority, and cautioning against 'double standards' — serves as a timely reminder to the West, particularly Europe, of its own manoeuvres in pursuit of energy security. Yes, India was quick to seize the opportunity to purchase discounted Russian oil after the West imposed price caps and turned away from it. But while Russia's emergence as India's top crude supplier has helped meet domestic energy demand and stabilise prices, it is no secret that a substantial volume of refined fuel, derived from the Russian oil imported to India, is ultimately exported to Europe. A CREA report noted that by late 2024, 'capitalising on the refining loophole', India had become the EU's largest exporter of oil products. Europe also imported LNG at record levels from Russia last year. The sanctions threat to its trade partners is intended to choke Russia's war funding and pressure President Vladimir Putin into agreeing to a ceasefire. In doing so, however, the US and NATO risk undermining their relationship with one of the world's largest economies and an essential ally in the Indo-Pacific. The West cannot have it both ways: Penalise India for pursuing national interest while simultaneously expecting cooperation in regional and global initiatives. It is high time the West engaged with India as an equal partner. Petroleum Minister Hardeep Singh Puri said on Thursday that there was nothing to worry about even if sanctions were activated because India has expanded its crude sourcing slate. New Delhi should remain firm in pursuing its own path, even as the West seeks to dictate terms.
The Print
11-07-2025
- Business
- The Print
Paradox of India's S-400 deal—key asset delayed when country needs it most
However, this optimism belies the long and complicated journey of the S-400 deal. Signed in 2018 at a value of $5.43 billion, the agreement was initially hailed as a bold assertion of India's strategic autonomy, especially during the Trump administration. In 2020, NATO ally Turkey faced sanctions under CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) for pursuing the same system. India had escaped US sanctions, a testament to its rising importance in the evolving Indo-Pacific calculus. The S-400 systems, which form the outermost layer of India's integrated air defence shield, have proven particularly effective during Operation Sindoor. They successfully integrated with domestically developed platforms like the Akash surface-to-air missiles, L-70 anti-aircraft guns, and indigenous drones. Unsurprisingly, there is a growing consensus within India's strategic community that New Delhi must not only complete the current S-400 procurement but also explore future acquisitions, possibly including the more advanced S-500 systems. On the sidelines of the otherwise contentious Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Qingdao, a quiet yet significant development unfolded. India was once again assured by Russia of the timely delivery of the remaining two S-400 Triumf air defence systems. Russian defence minister Andrei Belousov himself communicated this to his Indian counterpart Rajnath Singh, offering some comfort to New Delhi's strategic planners. Indian media outlets covered the commitment with cautious relief. Yet, what was once a symbol of defiance and diplomatic balance has now become a victim of President Putin's protracted war in Ukraine. Originally scheduled for delivery between 2021 and 2023, the first three S-400 systems did arrive by late 2021. The remaining two, however, remain undelivered as Russia's war in Ukraine enters its fourth year, with no clear end in sight. The timeline has repeatedly slipped. There are at least four critical factors behind these delays, which highlight both vulnerabilities and priorities of the Russian defence sector, as well as the geopolitical complexities surrounding Moscow's partnerships. 1. Russia's battlefield losses Russia has suffered significant material losses in Ukraine. While propaganda from both sides makes verification difficult, independent monitoring groups like Oryx have documented that at least 12 S-400 systems have been partially or completely destroyed. This is significant, given the S-400's role as the backbone of Russia's long-range air defence, with more than 30 regiments reportedly in service. The S-400 is vital for safeguarding Russia's expansive territory—particularly as its military posture faces new threats from NATO's rejuvenated eastern flank. If Russia is short on operational systems, it is far more likely to divert new production toward replenishing its own arsenals than fulfilling export obligations. To understand how important the S-400 programme is for Russia, we must look back at its roots. Revitalised around 2000 under President Putin, the programme was part of a broader effort to restore Russia's defence industrial base and resuscitate its economy. A state-backed investment drive led to the expansion of three major production hubs: Obukhov Plant in St Petersburg, the Avitek Plant in Kirov, and the NMP Plant in Nizhny Novgorod. These efforts bore fruit by 2016, enabling large-scale production of the S-400 as well as newer systems like the S-300V4 and S-500. In January 2023, Putin even visited the Obukhovsky Plant, publicly claiming that Russia's surface-to-air missile production exceeded the combined output of the rest of the world. Yet, India hasn't received its remaining systems over the last two years—a telling contradiction. Also read: Tejas must not meet the fate of India's first indigenous fighter jet 2. Collapse of Russian weapon exports Data supports this broader trend. According to SIPRI, Russian arms exports declined by 64 per cent between 2020 and 2024 compared to the previous five-year period. Even starker, Kazakhstan-based outlet Arbat Media reported that Russian weapon exports shrank by 92 per cent between 2021 and the end of 2024, falling to below $1 billion annually—a staggering fourteenfold drop. While the SIPRI figures span a longer horizon, Arbat's data focuses specifically on the war years, offering a more immediate sense of Russia's commercial collapse. Therefore, the correlation is not ill-founded. Russia's declining military export prowess is even more evident considering its inability to protect key allies. Despite Syria being central to Russia's Middle East strategy, Moscow failed to defend Bashar al-Assad's regime or secure its own military bases, even though supply lines like the Syrian Express link its Tartus naval base to the Black Sea war efforts. Similarly, during the recent 12-day war between Israel and Iran, Russia offered Iran only verbal support, despite Tehran's vital role in the Ukraine war through its Shahed drones. Iran's request for air defence systems like the S-300 and S-400 was ignored, prompting rare public criticism from Iranian officials. This reflects Russia's retreat in the Caucasus and its inability to assert its military posture anymore. The loss of access to Western markets, materials, and customers—combined with battlefield attrition—has dramatically curtailed Moscow's ability to act as a reliable defence supplier. Also read: IAF needs a transformation. Bring in 5G fighters, fast-track Tejas Mk2, upgrade AMCA to 6G 3. Sanctions and supply chains Due to prolonged Western sanctions, Russia has become increasingly reliant on China for microchips and other sensitive technological components. While the Indian Ministry of Defence has periodically issued advisories urging the armed forces to remove Chinese-origin technology from military hardware—particularly in imported systems—the matter has assumed greater urgency following the developments during Operation Sindoor. It becomes pertinent to consider what this means for the production and delivery of new S-400 systems. One likely inference from the ongoing delays is that Russia may be supplying India with newly manufactured units rather than from existing stock. To navigate Western restrictions—primarily imposed by the US and European Union—Russia has been sourcing microelectronic components via regional partners such as Kazakhstan and China. While this workaround has helped keep some production lines active, it has significantly inflated the cost of crucial parts and further deepened Russia's dependency on China for sustaining its defence manufacturing capabilities. Indeed, weapons analysts examining destroyed Russian equipment in Ukraine have repeatedly found Western-made components—often from the US, Japan, and Europe—despite sanctions. Whether these parts were smuggled in after 2022 or are merely leftover stockpiles remains unclear. What's evident, however, is that Russia's production chain is neither sorted nor independent. And when faced with scarcity, Russia will always prioritise its domestic requirements over foreign contracts—even longstanding ones like India's. Reports suggest that Almaz-Antey, the Russian conglomerate that makes S-400 , has recently set up a drone manufacturing facility in China, likely using this as a channel to access chips and other sensitive technologies. While this allows Russia to keep its production lines running, it further entrenches its reliance on Chinese goodwill—a development that is uncomfortable for India. Also read: UPI to Ayurveda, PM Modi's Ghana visit will unlock new trade frontiers for India 4. China's strategic pressure A more troubling possibility is that China may be pressuring Russia—either directly or subtly—not to prioritise India's defence deliveries. This wouldn't be unprecedented. After the Galwan clash, Chinese officials made their displeasure with the Russia-India defence cooperation quite explicit. Since then, Beijing's growing technical and strategic support to Pakistan—especially during events like Operation Swift Retort—has made the regional dynamics clearer to Indian observers. Indian Air Force officials have acknowledged that China provided real-time intelligence to Pakistan during that episode, revealing that Pakistan was merely the front while China orchestrated key moves from behind. In this broader context, China may actually have incentives to keep Russian weapon exports subdued. With Russia increasingly bogged down in Ukraine and facing sanctions, China has quietly filled the void in regions traditionally influenced by Moscow. In the Caucasus, for example, Azerbaijan has begun purchasing China-Pakistan co-produced fighter jets. Even in Iran, Russia was unable to offer any military aid—leaving space for China to expand its influence. Although no official foreign policy statement would admit such motives, these strategic shifts suggest a calculated Chinese effort to limit Russia's defence outreach—especially toward India—while positioning itself as the emerging arms supplier in contested theatres. The long arc of India's acquisition of the Russian-made S-400 Triumf now embodies a paradox—an extraordinary asset delayed at a time when the country's outer defensive architecture demands urgent consolidation. While definitive explanations for the four factors discussed remain elusive, it is strategically prudent for India to invest in building its own air defence capabilities through initiatives like Project Kusha—even if the development timelines appear extended. Swasti Rao is a Consulting Editor (International and Strategic Affairs) at ThePrint. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal. (Edited by Prasanna Bachchhav)
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First Post
04-07-2025
- Business
- First Post
Not an ‘enemy': How India's ties with Russia reflect the West's past choices
Rather than cast New Delhi as a liability, the West should view it as a potential bridge between democratic alliances and Eurasian realities read more A recent Telegraph article by Tom Sharpe has stirred controversy by branding India an 'enemy' over its continued partnership with Russia—a nation blamed for fuelling the Ukraine war through oil exports and defence cooperation. As a long-time observer of India's strategic calculus, I believe this framing is dangerously simplistic. Rather than vilify India, the West must reckon with how its own historical choices—and geography—shaped India's ties with Moscow. A Relationship Forged by Strategy, Not Defiance STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD India's ties with Russia are not born of hostility toward the West, but of historical necessity and geographic logic. During the Cold War, India's non-alignment masked a tilt towards the Soviet Union, which proved decisive during the 1971 war with Pakistan—a US-backed ally. Soviet support then was not merely symbolic; it was strategic, helping India in a conflict that played out more than 4,000 miles from Moscow's borders. That partnership matured into robust defence cooperation. The 2009 renewal of a Soviet-era agreement, joint projects like the BrahMos cruise missile, and India's $5.43 billion S-400 Triumf deal in 2018—pursued despite US CAATSA sanctions—reflect more than nostalgia. They represent a calculated hedge: Russia as a steady supplier and a counterweight to China, India's northern adversary. Sharpe's article fails to engage with this layered history. India's position was not forged in defiance of the West but shaped by the West's Cold War choices and India's need to manage its precarious neighbourhood. Moscow offered what Washington would not: reliable arms without conditionality. Oil, Ukraine, and West's Reaction Russia's war in Ukraine has sharpened scrutiny of India's neutrality. By May 2025, India was importing 1.96 million barrels of Russian crude daily—roughly 40–44 per cent of its oil supply, a 40 per cent increase since 2022, according to OPEC. This surge reflects economic pragmatism: Russian oil is cheap, plentiful, and accessible. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD But economic logic has met political backlash. US Senator Lindsey Graham recently proposed a 500 per cent tariff on nations trading with Russia, aiming to cut off the lifeblood of what he calls Putin's war machine—estimated to have cost Ukraine $400 billion, per the Kiel Institute. Sharpe leans into this narrative, interpreting India's oil purchases and naval cooperation as alignment with Moscow against the West. Yet this interpretation overlooks a critical point: geography. India is nearly 4,000 miles from the front lines of Europe's war. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has consistently urged peace in Ukraine, but India's interests remain regional—focused on border security, energy access, and economic resilience. Unlike Europe, India does not have a belligerent Russia on its doorstep. To Europe, Russia is a bad neighbour. With 80 per cent of Russians living west of the Ural Mountains, Europe faces a persistent neighbourly threat. India, however, is separated by vast distances, with no territorial disputes or shared battlefields with Russia. This geographical divide shapes a pragmatic alignment, not rivalry, challenging the West's projection of its neighbourly anxieties onto India. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Russia: A Neighbourly Threat to Europe, Not to India To understand the West's frustrations, one must also understand its geography. For Europe, Russia is not a distant actor—it is a revisionist power next door. The 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine displaced over 8 million people, as the UN notes. Hybrid attacks like the 2022 Nord Stream sabotage and simmering conflicts in Georgia and Moldova have intensified European insecurity. A 2023 Chatham House report underscored this tension, pointing to Russia's proximity and history of destabilisation as central to the EU's hardened stance. This is Europe's reality—and it is not India's. New Delhi is separated from Moscow by vast geography and divergent histories. It has no territorial disputes with Russia, no competing security pacts, and no shared battlefield. Its relationship with Moscow is not one of rivalry but of steady, if pragmatic, alignment. To conflate Europe's neighbourly anxieties with India's strategic autonomy is to miss the point entirely. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Not a Pawn, Not an Enemy Branding India an enemy because of its Russia ties ignores the role the West itself played in shaping that very relationship. During the Cold War, it was Western hesitation and alignment with Pakistan that pushed India closer to Moscow. In the decades since, India has maintained a careful, multipolar approach—balancing its partnerships with Russia, the US, and other regional actors through institutions like Brics, SCO, and the Quad. India's decisions are guided not by loyalty or betrayal, but by national interest. Just as Britain acts to safeguard its own security and energy needs, so does India. Its approach to Russia reflects long-term calculations shaped by history, geography, and economic necessity—not ideological sympathy for Moscow's adventurism. The West's Opportunity: Respect India's Perspective The United States has thus far tolerated India's neutrality because it values India's role in balancing China in the Indo-Pacific. But as domestic pressure mounts in Washington, London, and Brussels, proposals like Graham's tariff threaten to upend this fragile balance. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Sharpe's article, though provocative, should be seen as a warning: the West risks alienating India by failing to understand its perspective. Rather than cast New Delhi as a liability, the West should view it as a potential bridge between democratic alliances and Eurasian realities. With its unique vantage point, India could help moderate tensions, not exacerbate them—if only it is treated as a partner, not a problem. The author is a strategist in international relations and economic development. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.
India.com
01-07-2025
- Business
- India.com
Trump rewards Erdogan for not helping Iran during Israel war, Turkey to get this US-made deadly weapon by..., its capable of...
(File) US-Turkey relations: The United States is likely to reward Turkey for adopting a neutral stance and not backing Iran during the recent Israel-Iran war, and fulfil Ankara's long-time wish of acquiring 5th-gen F-35 fighter jets from Washington, something which has caused friction between the two countries for a long period of time. Additionally, the US may also relax CAATSA sanctions on Turkey, as was confirmed by Tom Barrack, the US Ambassador to Ankara and Special Representative for Syria. Speaking to Ankara's state-run Anadolu Agency during his Kemeralti Bazaar in Izmir, Barrack bilateral talks and diplomatic engagement between the leaders of the two countries could yield concrete results by the end of 2025. The US diplomat said that both presidents, US President Donald Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, are eager to complete the F-35 fighter jet deal, and the US Senate is also looking forward to a 'proper result'. Why there are tensions over F-35 between Turkey and US? The F-35 stealth fighter jet has long-been a source of tensions for US-Turkey relations as Ankara was initially part of the US' F-35 fighter jet program, and had made an advance payment of $1.14 billion. The US was prepared to deliver a fleet of six F-35 stealth fighters to Turkey, but scrubbed the deal after Ankara purchased the Russian-made S-400 air defense system. US considered Turkey's arms purchases from Moscow as threat to its security and went on to exclude Ankara from the F-35 deal. Additionally, the advance amount was not paid back to Ankara, and CAATSA sanctions were imposed under which US exports to Turkey were barred, while economic and financial transactions were limited. What is the current position of US-Turkey relations? Tom Barrack said the US wishes to put the F-35 row with Turkey behind, and CAATSA sanctions become a thing of the past, adding that both will move forward on this by the end of this year. The US ambassador said Turkey has already paid for the F-16 and also played a role in manufacturing parts of the F-35 which proves its reliability. 'For the first time, we are seeing a shared commitment between the US and Turkey to act not only as defense partners but also as regional leaders,' he said. Turkey's reward for not backing Iran Barrack indirectly praised Turkey for not backing Iran during the recent Israel-Iran war, and said that the growing tensions between Tehran and Tel Aviv could have turned into a decisive moment that had the potential to affect the entire Middle East. 'We must create a new path in the Middle East and Turkey is the key to that path,' he added.
