Latest news with #CSCE
Russia Today
2 days ago
- Politics
- Russia Today
This treaty helped save the world from nuclear war. Its legacy is crumbling
In times of upheaval, it is tempting to draw comparisons with the past. We search for patterns, wondering if things will repeat. As Israel and the United States waged war against Iran, many were reminded of other historical calamities: the outbreak of world wars, or more regionally, the destruction of Iraqi statehood in the early 2000s. Experience may be instructive, but it rarely repeats in quite the same way. This extraordinary campaign has shown that once again. Yet if we look at the deeper logic of state behavior, there is often more consistency. Even so, paradigms do shift; and the future can be predicted, in part, if we apply knowledge and imagination. Fifty years ago this month, in July 1975, leaders of 35 European states, the United States, and Canada gathered in Helsinki to sign the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). That landmark document crowned years of negotiation over how to manage coexistence between ideological systems whose rivalries had shaped the entire postwar world. The act formalized the status quo after World War II, including state borders and spheres of influence, especially between the two Germanies, Poland, and the Soviet Union. It confirmed the division of Europe, and the rules by which that division would be managed. Half a century is a long time. Counting back fifty years from Helsinki takes us to 1925, a brief interwar calm. Back then, the great powers believed the age of world wars was behind them, even as conflict potential was building on social, economic, ideological, military, and technological fronts. The Second World War was an unimaginable catastrophe, and the victors were determined to stop anything like it happening again. From that came a new international system. Despite the chronic Cold War confrontation that sometimes turned acute, mutual constraints and a stable balance of power preserved Europe's security. The CSCE then cemented this relative stability. The past fifty years have brought equally profound shifts in the international order, yet they are often perceived differently. In 1975, hardly anyone referred to 1925 as a framework; the eras were understood to be totally distinct. Today, in contrast, the Helsinki Accords are still cited as a supposed foundation of European security, and their principles treated as universal. There is no arguing with the ideals the Helsinki Final Act set out: respect for sovereignty, commitment to avoid the use of force, upholding borders, and promoting cooperation for mutual development. At that time, these promises were credible because they were backed by a durable balance of power – a balance guaranteed by Cold War competition. But the Cold War ended long ago, and with it the system of checks and balances that gave those promises substance. For the United States and its allies, the 1975 Helsinki framework (and the even earlier settlements at Yalta and Potsdam) were always seen as reluctant compromises with totalitarian adversaries. When the socialist bloc collapsed and the Soviet Union dissolved a decade and a half later, Western leaders felt confirmed in their historical righteousness. They believed they had a mandate to enforce the Helsinki principles as they interpreted them – this time on their own terms, with no rival power to check them. The disappearance of previous guarantees was not frightening to the West but encouraging. Today, on this anniversary, we must ask how relevant those ideals still are. The liberal world order is unraveling, and even the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which inherited the CSCE's mission, is struggling to justify its existence. In the 1970s, world war was the fixed point of reference. Negotiations did not create a balance; they preserved it. The limits of what was acceptable had been established decades earlier, and the CSCE merely updated them. Had the Cold War ended with a clear and recognized victor, a new framework might have emerged, with widespread legitimacy. But because the outcome was never fully formalized, strategic uncertainty took its place. Everyone assumed the West had won, but no treaty codified it. That opened the door for every power to try to revise the settlement whenever the balance of power shifted. And when the stronger party – the United States – began ignoring its own declared rules to chase short-term advantage, the system began to unravel even faster. The OSCE still claims to rest on the order born in 1945 and affirmed in 1975, but that order no longer exists. Around the globe, countries are revisiting the results of World War II, challenging old hierarchies in different ways. That alone undermines Europe's postwar stability. Meanwhile, the West has lost its once-undisputed ability to impose its preferences on others. The United States is struggling to redefine its place in the world, with no clear outcome yet. Europe has lost its status as the world's political steward. Eurasia is becoming a more integrated space, though still unfinished. The Middle East is undergoing profound change, while Asia – from its eastern to southern edges – is a field of intense competition, even as it drives global growth. At moments like this, everything seems to move at once, including borders – both physical and moral. All the reference points are shifting simultaneously. So, is the Helsinki legacy completely irrelevant? Not entirely. Its core mission was to stabilize a known confrontation, to give it structure and predictability. Today's world does not have that kind of stable confrontation, and is unlikely to develop one soon, because events are too chaotic and too multidirectional. There is no solid balance of power to anchor things. Trying to copy Helsinki logic in Asia, for example, would only backfire. There, globalization has created massive interdependence – even between rivals. Forcing a political-military architecture on top of that would worsen tensions rather than calm them, subordinating economic logic to rigid power blocs. The Old World was prone to this mistake; Asia would suffer for repeating it. Nor can we expect the OSCE to recover its conflict-management role in Europe, given the gap between its lofty ambitions and its actual means. However, there is still something to learn from Helsinki. Diplomacy then was guided by classical principles: weighing complex interests, acknowledging you cannot achieve everything, maintaining at least a minimum of trust, and respecting your counterpart even amid deep ideological opposition. These approaches seem obvious, but after decades of liberal moral posturing and talk of 'the right side of history,' they are almost revolutionary once more. Perhaps we must relearn those basic diplomatic virtues. Helsinki's experience – born of the worst of wars but committed to peace – reminds us that respect, realism, and a readiness to talk can matter far more than fantasies of ideological purity.
Canada Standard
3 days ago
- Politics
- Canada Standard
Cold War diplomacy is dead. What lessons did we never learn
Fifty years after Helsinki, little remains of Europes security order In times of upheaval, it is tempting to draw comparisons with the past. We search for patterns, wondering if things will repeat. As Israel and the United States waged war against Iran, many were reminded of other historical calamities: the outbreak of world wars, or more regionally, the destruction of Iraqi statehood in the early 2000s. Experience may be instructive, but it rarely repeats in quite the same way. This extraordinary campaign has shown that once again. Yet if we look at the deeper logic of state behavior, there is often more consistency. Even so, paradigms do shift; and the future can be predicted, in part, if we apply knowledge and imagination. Fifty years ago this month, in July 1975, leaders of 35 European states, the United States, and Canada gathered in Helsinki to sign the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). That landmark document crowned years of negotiation over how to manage coexistence between ideological systems whose rivalries had shaped the entire postwar world. The act formalized the status quo after World War II, including state borders and spheres of influence, especially between the two Germanies, Poland, and the Soviet Union. It confirmed the division of Europe, and the rules by which that division would be managed. Half a century is a long time. Counting back fifty years from Helsinki takes us to 1925, a brief interwar calm. Back then, the great powers believed the age of world wars was behind them, even as conflict potential was building on social, economic, ideological, military, and technological fronts. The Second World War was an unimaginable catastrophe, and the victors were determined to stop anything like it happening again. From that came a new international system. Despite the chronic Cold War confrontation that sometimes turned acute, mutual constraints and a stable balance of power preserved Europe's security. The CSCE then cemented this relative stability. The past fifty years have brought equally profound shifts in the international order, yet they are often perceived differently. In 1975, hardly anyone referred to 1925 as a framework; the eras were understood to be totally distinct. Today, in contrast, the Helsinki Accords are still cited as a supposed foundation of European security, and their principles treated as universal. There is no arguing with the ideals the Helsinki Final Act set out: respect for sovereignty, commitment to avoid the use of force, upholding borders, and promoting cooperation for mutual development. At that time, these promises were credible because they were backed by a durable balance of power - a balance guaranteed by Cold War competition. But the Cold War ended long ago, and with it the system of checks and balances that gave those promises substance. For the United States and its allies, the 1975 Helsinki framework (and the even earlier settlements at Yalta and Potsdam) were always seen as reluctant compromises with totalitarian adversaries. When the socialist bloc collapsed and the Soviet Union dissolved a decade and a half later, Western leaders felt confirmed in their historical righteousness. They believed they had a mandate to enforce the Helsinki principles as they interpreted them - this time on their own terms, with no rival power to check them. The disappearance of previous guarantees was not frightening to the West but encouraging. Today, on this anniversary, we must ask how relevant those ideals still are. The liberal world order is unraveling, and even the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which inherited the CSCE's mission, is struggling to justify its existence. In the 1970s, world war was the fixed point of reference. Negotiations did not create a balance; they preserved it. The limits of what was acceptable had been established decades earlier, and the CSCE merely updated them. Had the Cold War ended with a clear and recognized victor, a new framework might have emerged, with widespread legitimacy. But because the outcome was never fully formalized, strategic uncertainty took its place. Everyone assumed the West had won, but no treaty codified it. That opened the door for every power to try to revise the settlement whenever the balance of power shifted. And when the stronger party - the United States - began ignoring its own declared rules to chase short-term advantage, the system began to unravel even faster. The OSCE still claims to rest on the order born in 1945 and affirmed in 1975, but that order no longer exists. Around the globe, countries are revisiting the results of World War II, challenging old hierarchies in different ways. That alone undermines Europe's postwar stability. Meanwhile, the West has lost its once-undisputed ability to impose its preferences on others. The United States is struggling to redefine its place in the world, with no clear outcome yet. Europe has lost its status as the world's political steward. Eurasia is becoming a more integrated space, though still unfinished. The Middle East is undergoing profound change, while Asia - from its eastern to southern edges - is a field of intense competition, even as it drives global growth. At moments like this, everything seems to move at once, including borders - both physical and moral. All the reference points are shifting simultaneously. So, is the Helsinki legacy completely irrelevant? Not entirely. Its core mission was to stabilize a known confrontation, to give it structure and predictability. Today's world does not have that kind of stable confrontation, and is unlikely to develop one soon, because events are too chaotic and too multidirectional. There is no solid balance of power to anchor things. Trying to copy Helsinki logic in Asia, for example, would only backfire. There, globalization has created massive interdependence - even between rivals. Forcing a political-military architecture on top of that would worsen tensions rather than calm them, subordinating economic logic to rigid power blocs. The Old World was prone to this mistake; Asia would suffer for repeating it. Nor can we expect the OSCE to recover its conflict-management role in Europe, given the gap between its lofty ambitions and its actual means. However, there is still something to learn from Helsinki. Diplomacy then was guided by classical principles: weighing complex interests, acknowledging you cannot achieve everything, maintaining at least a minimum of trust, and respecting your counterpart even amid deep ideological opposition. These approaches seem obvious, but after decades of liberal moral posturing and talk of "the right side of history," they are almost revolutionary once more. Perhaps we must relearn those basic diplomatic virtues. Helsinki's experience - born of the worst of wars but committed to peace - reminds us that respect, realism, and a readiness to talk can matter far more than fantasies of ideological purity. (
Canada News.Net
3 days ago
- Politics
- Canada News.Net
Cold War diplomacy is dead. What lessons did we never learn
Fifty years after Helsinki, little remains of Europes security order In times of upheaval, it is tempting to draw comparisons with the past. We search for patterns, wondering if things will repeat. As Israel and the United States waged war against Iran, many were reminded of other historical calamities: the outbreak of world wars, or more regionally, the destruction of Iraqi statehood in the early 2000s. Experience may be instructive, but it rarely repeats in quite the same way. This extraordinary campaign has shown that once again. Yet if we look at the deeper logic of state behavior, there is often more consistency. Even so, paradigms do shift; and the future can be predicted, in part, if we apply knowledge and imagination. Fifty years ago this month, in July 1975, leaders of 35 European states, the United States, and Canada gathered in Helsinki to sign the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). That landmark document crowned years of negotiation over how to manage coexistence between ideological systems whose rivalries had shaped the entire postwar world. The act formalized the status quo after World War II, including state borders and spheres of influence, especially between the two Germanies, Poland, and the Soviet Union. It confirmed the division of Europe, and the rules by which that division would be managed. Half a century is a long time. Counting back fifty years from Helsinki takes us to 1925, a brief interwar calm. Back then, the great powers believed the age of world wars was behind them, even as conflict potential was building on social, economic, ideological, military, and technological fronts. The Second World War was an unimaginable catastrophe, and the victors were determined to stop anything like it happening again. From that came a new international system. Despite the chronic Cold War confrontation that sometimes turned acute, mutual constraints and a stable balance of power preserved Europe's security. The CSCE then cemented this relative stability. The past fifty years have brought equally profound shifts in the international order, yet they are often perceived differently. In 1975, hardly anyone referred to 1925 as a framework; the eras were understood to be totally distinct. Today, in contrast, the Helsinki Accords are still cited as a supposed foundation of European security, and their principles treated as universal. There is no arguing with the ideals the Helsinki Final Act set out: respect for sovereignty, commitment to avoid the use of force, upholding borders, and promoting cooperation for mutual development. At that time, these promises were credible because they were backed by a durable balance of power - a balance guaranteed by Cold War competition. But the Cold War ended long ago, and with it the system of checks and balances that gave those promises substance. For the United States and its allies, the 1975 Helsinki framework (and the even earlier settlements at Yalta and Potsdam) were always seen as reluctant compromises with totalitarian adversaries. When the socialist bloc collapsed and the Soviet Union dissolved a decade and a half later, Western leaders felt confirmed in their historical righteousness. They believed they had a mandate to enforce the Helsinki principles as they interpreted them - this time on their own terms, with no rival power to check them. The disappearance of previous guarantees was not frightening to the West but encouraging. Today, on this anniversary, we must ask how relevant those ideals still are. The liberal world order is unraveling, and even the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which inherited the CSCE's mission, is struggling to justify its existence. In the 1970s, world war was the fixed point of reference. Negotiations did not create a balance; they preserved it. The limits of what was acceptable had been established decades earlier, and the CSCE merely updated them. Had the Cold War ended with a clear and recognized victor, a new framework might have emerged, with widespread legitimacy. But because the outcome was never fully formalized, strategic uncertainty took its place. Everyone assumed the West had won, but no treaty codified it. That opened the door for every power to try to revise the settlement whenever the balance of power shifted. And when the stronger party - the United States - began ignoring its own declared rules to chase short-term advantage, the system began to unravel even faster. The OSCE still claims to rest on the order born in 1945 and affirmed in 1975, but that order no longer exists. Around the globe, countries are revisiting the results of World War II, challenging old hierarchies in different ways. That alone undermines Europe's postwar stability. Meanwhile, the West has lost its once-undisputed ability to impose its preferences on others. The United States is struggling to redefine its place in the world, with no clear outcome yet. Europe has lost its status as the world's political steward. Eurasia is becoming a more integrated space, though still unfinished. The Middle East is undergoing profound change, while Asia - from its eastern to southern edges - is a field of intense competition, even as it drives global growth. At moments like this, everything seems to move at once, including borders - both physical and moral. All the reference points are shifting simultaneously. So, is the Helsinki legacy completely irrelevant? Not entirely. Its core mission was to stabilize a known confrontation, to give it structure and predictability. Today's world does not have that kind of stable confrontation, and is unlikely to develop one soon, because events are too chaotic and too multidirectional. There is no solid balance of power to anchor things. Trying to copy Helsinki logic in Asia, for example, would only backfire. There, globalization has created massive interdependence - even between rivals. Forcing a political-military architecture on top of that would worsen tensions rather than calm them, subordinating economic logic to rigid power blocs. The Old World was prone to this mistake; Asia would suffer for repeating it. Nor can we expect the OSCE to recover its conflict-management role in Europe, given the gap between its lofty ambitions and its actual means. However, there is still something to learn from Helsinki. Diplomacy then was guided by classical principles: weighing complex interests, acknowledging you cannot achieve everything, maintaining at least a minimum of trust, and respecting your counterpart even amid deep ideological opposition. These approaches seem obvious, but after decades of liberal moral posturing and talk of "the right side of history," they are almost revolutionary once more. Perhaps we must relearn those basic diplomatic virtues. Helsinki's experience - born of the worst of wars but committed to peace - reminds us that respect, realism, and a readiness to talk can matter far more than fantasies of ideological purity.
Russia Today
4 days ago
- Politics
- Russia Today
Cold War diplomacy is dead. What lessons did we never learn?
In times of upheaval, it is tempting to draw comparisons with the past. We search for patterns, wondering if things will repeat. As Israel and the United States waged war against Iran, many were reminded of other historical calamities: the outbreak of world wars, or more regionally, the destruction of Iraqi statehood in the early 2000s. Experience may be instructive, but it rarely repeats in quite the same way. This extraordinary campaign has shown that once again. Yet if we look at the deeper logic of state behavior, there is often more consistency. Even so, paradigms do shift; and the future can be predicted, in part, if we apply knowledge and imagination. Fifty years ago this month, in July 1975, leaders of 35 European states, the United States, and Canada gathered in Helsinki to sign the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). That landmark document crowned years of negotiation over how to manage coexistence between ideological systems whose rivalries had shaped the entire postwar world. The act formalized the status quo after World War II, including state borders and spheres of influence, especially between the two Germanies, Poland, and the Soviet Union. It confirmed the division of Europe, and the rules by which that division would be managed. Half a century is a long time. Counting back fifty years from Helsinki takes us to 1925, a brief interwar calm. Back then, the great powers believed the age of world wars was behind them, even as conflict potential was building on social, economic, ideological, military, and technological fronts. The Second World War was an unimaginable catastrophe, and the victors were determined to stop anything like it happening again. From that came a new international system. Despite the chronic Cold War confrontation that sometimes turned acute, mutual constraints and a stable balance of power preserved Europe's security. The CSCE then cemented this relative stability. The past fifty years have brought equally profound shifts in the international order, yet they are often perceived differently. In 1975, hardly anyone referred to 1925 as a framework; the eras were understood to be totally distinct. Today, in contrast, the Helsinki Accords are still cited as a supposed foundation of European security, and their principles treated as universal. There is no arguing with the ideals the Helsinki Final Act set out: respect for sovereignty, commitment to avoid the use of force, upholding borders, and promoting cooperation for mutual development. At that time, these promises were credible because they were backed by a durable balance of power – a balance guaranteed by Cold War competition. But the Cold War ended long ago, and with it the system of checks and balances that gave those promises substance. For the United States and its allies, the 1975 Helsinki framework (and the even earlier settlements at Yalta and Potsdam) were always seen as reluctant compromises with totalitarian adversaries. When the socialist bloc collapsed and the Soviet Union dissolved a decade and a half later, Western leaders felt confirmed in their historical righteousness. They believed they had a mandate to enforce the Helsinki principles as they interpreted them – this time on their own terms, with no rival power to check them. The disappearance of previous guarantees was not frightening to the West but encouraging. Today, on this anniversary, we must ask how relevant those ideals still are. The liberal world order is unraveling, and even the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which inherited the CSCE's mission, is struggling to justify its existence. In the 1970s, world war was the fixed point of reference. Negotiations did not create a balance; they preserved it. The limits of what was acceptable had been established decades earlier, and the CSCE merely updated them. Had the Cold War ended with a clear and recognized victor, a new framework might have emerged, with widespread legitimacy. But because the outcome was never fully formalized, strategic uncertainty took its place. Everyone assumed the West had won, but no treaty codified it. That opened the door for every power to try to revise the settlement whenever the balance of power shifted. And when the stronger party – the United States – began ignoring its own declared rules to chase short-term advantage, the system began to unravel even faster. The OSCE still claims to rest on the order born in 1945 and affirmed in 1975, but that order no longer exists. Around the globe, countries are revisiting the results of World War II, challenging old hierarchies in different ways. That alone undermines Europe's postwar stability. Meanwhile, the West has lost its once-undisputed ability to impose its preferences on others. The United States is struggling to redefine its place in the world, with no clear outcome yet. Europe has lost its status as the world's political steward. Eurasia is becoming a more integrated space, though still unfinished. The Middle East is undergoing profound change, while Asia – from its eastern to southern edges – is a field of intense competition, even as it drives global growth. At moments like this, everything seems to move at once, including borders – both physical and moral. All the reference points are shifting simultaneously. So, is the Helsinki legacy completely irrelevant? Not entirely. Its core mission was to stabilize a known confrontation, to give it structure and predictability. Today's world does not have that kind of stable confrontation, and is unlikely to develop one soon, because events are too chaotic and too multidirectional. There is no solid balance of power to anchor things. Trying to copy Helsinki logic in Asia, for example, would only backfire. There, globalization has created massive interdependence – even between rivals. Forcing a political-military architecture on top of that would worsen tensions rather than calm them, subordinating economic logic to rigid power blocs. The Old World was prone to this mistake; Asia would suffer for repeating it. Nor can we expect the OSCE to recover its conflict-management role in Europe, given the gap between its lofty ambitions and its actual means. However, there is still something to learn from Helsinki. Diplomacy then was guided by classical principles: weighing complex interests, acknowledging you cannot achieve everything, maintaining at least a minimum of trust, and respecting your counterpart even amid deep ideological opposition. These approaches seem obvious, but after decades of liberal moral posturing and talk of 'the right side of history,' they are almost revolutionary once more. Perhaps we must relearn those basic diplomatic virtues. Helsinki's experience – born of the worst of wars but committed to peace – reminds us that respect, realism, and a readiness to talk can matter far more than fantasies of ideological purity.
Yahoo
18-02-2025
- Health
- Yahoo
Hartford HealthCare's Constitution Surgery Center East in Waterford Connecticut Named Among Best Ambulatory Surgery Centers in America by Newsweek
AVON, Conn., Feb. 18, 2025 /PRNewswire/ -- In recognition of its quality and patient safety, Hartford HealthCare's Constitution Surgery Center East in Waterford, CT ("CSCE") was named as one of America's Best Ambulatory Surgery Centers by Newsweek. CSCE is jointly owned by Hartford HealthCare, local surgeons, and Constitution Surgery Alliance, a leading national developer and operator of ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs). Newsweek's "Best Ambulatory Surgery Center" designations were awarded to only the top 5% of ASCs in the nation. ASCs were rigorously evaluated on key criteria from multiple sources of data including clinical quality of care, patient experience, and peer recommendations. Data sources for the ranking were obtained by Newsweek through accreditation records from the Accreditation Association for Ambulatory Health Care (AAAHC) and by evaluating quality outcomes measures set by the U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Hartford HealthCare's Constitution Surgery Center East opened in 2001 and moved to a new and larger location in 2017. With 4 operating rooms, one procedure room and thirty surgeons on staff, CSCE offers a wide complement of outpatient surgical specialties including total joint replacements, orthopedic surgery, spine surgery, cataract surgery, ocular plastic surgery and pain management procedures. CSCE plans to open a 5th operating room in 2025. Notably, CSCE was the first ASC in the southeast Connecticut region to offer manual and robotic arm assisted total joint replacements in an ambulatory surgery center setting. In 2025 CSCE will be the only ASC in New England to offer Stryker Mako® robotic arm assisted total shoulder replacements. "We are proud to have our dedication to clinical quality and patient safety acknowledged by Newsweek. This award is a true reflection of the hard work and commitment of our physician partners and staff, who strive every day to deliver the best possible patient outcomes and experiences," said Dwayne Kertanis, Senior Vice President of Operations. "It is an honor to be recognized as one of America's Best Ambulatory Surgery Centers. This recognition reflects our unwavering commitment to excellence in patient care and safety. Our success stems from our team's prioritization of personalized care for each patient while our surgeons focus on utilizing the latest surgical technologies and techniques," Tarik Kardestuncer, MD, Medical Director for CSCE. "We are so proud of this recognition from Newsweek which confirms that our strategy to advance access, affordability, health equity, and excellence is working. We are transforming health care for the better," said Karen Goyette, Executive Vice President and Chief Strategy and Transformation Officer at Hartford HealthCare. "We have long recognized the need for convenient care locations and outpatient sites that bring the highest quality care at the most affordable cost to all communities. As we move care to lower cost settings, we are lowering the overall cost of care while improving its quality, ensuring that patients receive exceptional services in convenient, community-based locations. This recognition is a true testament to our commitment and a celebration of the colleagues who put patients first every day." About CSACSA is a leading developer and operator of outpatient surgery centers. Over the past 25 years, CSA has developed 26 surgery centers, including 15 hospital joint ventures, and has partnered with more than 500 surgeons. CSA's surgery centers complete more than 100,000 surgical cases each year. For more information about Hartford HealthCare's Constitution Surgery Center East or other CSA award-winning ASCs, please visit About Hartford HealthCareWith 44,000 dedicated colleagues and a bold vision for the future, Hartford HealthCare is transforming healthcare across Connecticut and beyond—enhancing access, affordability, health equity, and excellence. Spanning 500 locations across 185 towns and cities, our comprehensive care-delivery system is built to serve every community, every day. From world-class hospitals—including two tertiary-level teaching hospitals, an acute-care community teaching hospital, an acute-care hospital and trauma center, and three community hospitals—to an expansive network of behavioral health services, multispecialty physician groups, urgent and virtual care, surgery centers, home care, senior care, rehabilitation, and mobile neighborhood health programs, Hartford HealthCare is there when and where it matters most. We touch the lives of nearly 28,000 people every single day, delivering unparalleled care through our unique Institute Model—bringing together leading experts in neuroscience, cancer, digestive health, heart and vascular care, orthopedics, and urology & kidney health to provide a unified, high standard of care at the most affordable cost. Recognized nationally for patient safety and clinical excellence, Hartford HealthCare boasts Leapfrog A-ratings across all our hospitals—making us one of the safest healthcare systems in the country. Join us on our journey to redefine healthcare. Visit and stay connected through our newsletters and social media. View original content to download multimedia: SOURCE Constitution Surgery Alliance Sign in to access your portfolio
