Latest news with #CVN-79
AllAfrica
16-07-2025
- Business
- AllAfrica
Carrier crunch leaves US unprepared for a China fight
The US Navy is running out of aircraft carriers—and time—as global threats multiply faster than it can build, launch or sustain its next-generation warships. USNI reported this month that delivery of the USS John F Kennedy (CVN-79), the US Navy's second Ford-class aircraft carrier, has been delayed by two years due to ongoing challenges with integrating Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) and Advanced Weapons Elevators (AWE). Originally scheduled for July 2025, the carrier is now expected to enter service by March 2027, according to the US Navy. That will reduce its fleet to 10 carriers, below the legally mandated 11 units, for nearly a year following the May 2026 retirement of USS Nimitz (CVN-68). The delay stems from the Navy's 2020 decision to shift from a dual-phase to a single-phase delivery plan, which was meant to enable earlier incorporation of the F-35C Joint Strike Fighter and Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar. Lessons learned from CVN-78 were only partially applied to CVN-79, and retrofitting proved complex, according to Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII). The US Navy is now coordinating with stakeholders to explore preliminary acceptance prior to full delivery. Similar delays also affect the CVN-80 Enterprise, now projected for July 2030, due to supply chain and material availability issues, extending its timeline by 28 months. These setbacks highlight broader integration and sustainment challenges in the Ford-class program, with US Navy officials working to mitigate operational gaps and preserve readiness amid increasingly strained global commitments. Persistent delays, spiraling costs and unresolved technical flaws in the Ford-class program are undermining the US Navy's ability to field and sustain the kind of forward-deployed force needed to deter rising multi-theater threats from near-peer and regional adversaries like China. Summarizing key concerns, Brent Eastwood notes in a June 2025 National Security Journal article that the Ford-class's $13 billion per unit cost, $5 billion in R&D and 23% cost overrun have alarmed lawmakers. Chris Panella notes in a March 2025 Business Insider piece that delays in procuring CVN-82 threaten over 60,000 jobs across more than 2,000 firms. Without immediate action, he says 96% of sole-source suppliers could halt production by 2027, raising costs and risking the loss of skilled workers. Eastwood also warns that repeated construction delays—such as the USS Enterprise's slip to 2029—undermine fleet readiness, just as emerging threats like hypersonic missiles, drone swarms and cyberattacks raise serious doubts about carrier survivability in conflict scenarios. He adds that munitions and fuel resupply demands place additional pressure on logistics chains already stretched thin. Eastwood further notes that unproven technologies such as the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) and AAG have contributed to deployment delays. A January 2025 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report states that although both systems aboard the USS Gerald R Ford have shown improvement, they still fall well short of US Navy reliability goals—EMALS averaging just 614 cycles between failures against a target of 4,166, and AAG at 460 against 16,500. The CRS report says these persistent gaps have led the US Navy to enhance testing protocols and data collection for further refinement. At the operational level, Ford-class delays are straining the Navy's ability to meet global Carrier Strike Group (CSG) commitments. Steven Wills observes in a July 2024 article for the Center for Maritime Strategy (CMS) that the US Navy's carrier force remains overstretched, operating with only 11 carriers in a world that demands at least 15 for sustained global presence. Wills writes that repeated crises, particularly in the Red Sea, have pushed deployments beyond readiness cycles, disrupting both maintenance and training. He points out that the US Navy's reliance on temporary solutions—like rushing Pacific-based carriers to relieve overburdened ships—reflects persistent gaps in force structure and planning. These shortfalls, Wills argues, are degrading air superiority in key theaters like the Indo-Pacific and the Levant and are the consequence of years of procurement underreach. He also criticizes the logic of 'cheating the math' by slashing carrier numbers without adjusting mission demands. Ishaan Anand, in a CMS article this month, further stresses that concurrent maritime crises in the Red Sea and Indo-Pacific reveal the US Navy's growing dual-theater challenge. He notes that the extended deployment of the Eisenhower CSG to counter Houthi threats in CENTCOM's area of responsibility has diverted assets from priority Indo-Pacific zones, enabling China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to ramp up exercises near Taiwan and the Luzon Strait. Anand writes that the absence of forward-deployed carriers like the USS Ronald Reagan has forced the US Navy to rely on destroyers and littoral combat ships with far less power projection capability. He argues this operational tradeoff—between Middle Eastern deterrence and Indo-Pacific stability—shows the US Navy's inability to maintain a carrier-led presence in two contested regions simultaneously. And yet a third front may already be forming. As Russia becomes more assertive in the Arctic and North Atlantic, US carrier strike groups have been forward-deployed to Northern Europe as part of NATO deterrence efforts. This signals a growing awareness in Washington that even while juggling crises in the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East, Europe cannot be neglected. The convergence of these crises has elevated the specter of a simultaneous three-front contingency in the Pacific, Middle East, and Europe, testing whether a US Navy built for peacetime presence can withstand wartime demands. Hal Brands warns in an October 2022 Bloomberg article that Russia's invasion of Ukraine, China's designs on Taiwan, and Iran's nuclear provocations expose fundamental US vulnerabilities under its current 'one-war' defense planning framework. He argues that while these adversaries are not formally aligned, their actions could generate overlapping crises that would force the US into unacceptable tradeoffs, fracturing its global posture. Mackenzie Eaglen underscores this point in an August 2024 National Security Journal article, stating that the 'one-war' force-sizing construct is increasingly seen as obsolete in the face of converging near-peer threats from China and Russia, alongside regional challengers such as Iran and North Korea. Eaglen cites the US Commission on the National Defense Strategy, which warns that the US lacks the capabilities and capacity to prevail across multiple theaters—a vulnerability that could embolden adversaries to test US resolve. She writes that despite calls for a 'Multiple Theater Force Construct,' the US military remains smaller, older, and less ready, with naval, ground, and air assets stretched across outdated global postures. Pivoting between regions, she argues, invites dangerous strategic gaps that erode deterrence and compromise leadership at a time when unity of effort is most crucial. The Ford class's technical limits, operational wear, and inability to meet multiple strategic demands suggest the US Navy's carrier-focused force isn't prepared to deter or fight future wars.
Newsweek
08-07-2025
- Business
- Newsweek
New US Aircraft Carrier Hit by Significant Delays
Based on facts, either observed and verified firsthand by the reporter, or reported and verified from knowledgeable sources. Newsweek AI is in beta. Translations may contain inaccuracies—please refer to the original content. The USS John F. Kennedy, the second ship in the new Ford class of U.S. Navy aircraft carriers, could be delayed by up to two years, according to a new report. Why It Matters Many U.S. Navy shipbuilding projects have been plagued by setbacks and ballooning costs, including the USS Gerald R. Ford, the first Ford-class aircraft carrier. The Gerald R. Ford was commissioned, or formally marked as in active service, by President Donald Trump during his first term in office. What To Know The USS John F. Kennedy, also known as the CVN-79, was expected to be handed over to the U.S. military in July this year, but will instead be ready in March 2027, according to U.S. Navy budget documents for the coming year. The delay was first reported by the USNI News outlet attached to the Naval Institute non-profit on Monday. The USS Gerald R. Ford heads to the Norfolk, Virginia naval station on April 14, 2017 after almost a week of trials during which the ship's systems were tested. The USS Gerald R. Ford heads to the Norfolk, Virginia naval station on April 14, 2017 after almost a week of trials during which the ship's systems were tested. Bill Tiernan/The Virginian-Pilot via AP The USS John F. Kennedy is the second of the new Ford-class aircraft carriers, replacing the decades-old Nimitz-class. The third aircraft carrier in the class, the USS Enterprise, will be delivered in July 2030, rather than September 2029, according to the U.S. Navy budget documents. The delay was chalked up to issues getting hold of materials for the vessel, and hold-ups with industry and supply chains. The delay in delivery of the USS John F. Kennedy is "not surprising," bearing in mind the changes it needed after its initial building phase and "challenges throughout the U.S. shipbuilding industry," said Robert Murrett, a retired U.S. Navy vice admiral who is now a professor of practice of public administration and international affairs at Syracuse University. The USS John F. Kennedy needs to take on board the lessons from the first of the new class of aircraft carriers, Murrett told Newsweek. It also needs to build in new technology, like updated radars, and equipment for F-35C fighter jets, Murrett said. Although the U.S. Navy's fleet of operational carriers will hit just 10 for a year, he added, "this can be mitigated with careful management of existing CVNs' maintenance and overhaul schedules, as well as equally careful management of longer deployments for our carrier sailors, which is already an issue." CVN is shorthand for nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. A Navy spokesperson told USNI News that the military was "exploring opportunities for preliminary acceptance of the vessel prior to formal delivery and is coordinating closely with stakeholders to ensure the fastest possible transition to fleet operations and a combat-capable carrier." Newsweek has reached out to the U.S. Navy for comment via email. The Navy budget documents put the delay to the USS John F. Kennedy down to the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) for the ship and Advanced Weapons Elevator work. AAG is a new system for the second and third Ford-class aircraft carriers, according to the military. It is designed to make sure aircraft landing on the carriers slow down quickly and safely. Advanced Weapons Elevators help move weapons and ammunition around a ship. What People Are Saying The U.S. military has hailed the USS John F. Kennedy as "the most agile and lethal combat platform globally," kitted out with "improved systems" that link the carrier up more closely with other forces.
AllAfrica
11-04-2025
- Business
- AllAfrica
US aircraft carriers adrift as China surges at sea
Production delays, rising threats and shrinking numbers are putting the US's traditional aircraft carrier dominance on a knife's edge just as China surges ahead at sea. This month, in a hearing before the US Senate Armed Services Committee, US Navy officials acknowledged schedule setbacks for two Ford-class aircraft carriers under construction. The USS John F Kennedy (CVN-79), which is almost 95% finished, is under heavy pressure to meet its scheduled delivery date of July 2025. This pressure is mainly due to Advanced Weapons Elevators and the Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment issues. While the initial design issues that plagued the class have been resolved, as demonstrated by the USS Gerald R Ford's (CVN-78) successful 2024 deployment, production-specific hurdles continue to delay progress on CVN-79. Meanwhile, construction of the USS Enterprise (CVN-80), currently 44% complete, is also running behind schedule. The delay is attributed to late-sequenced critical material, which US Navy officials say will 'significantly delay delivery past the contractual date.' The US Navy works closely with shipbuilder Huntington Ingalls Industries-Newport News Shipbuilding (HII-NNS) and critical path vendors to mitigate the schedule risks. Although no updated delivery dates were given for either ship, the testimony emphasized that insights gained are being utilized to enhance operational efficiency in CVN-80 and the USS Doris Miller (CVN-81). Despite the persistent construction obstacles, the US Navy is concentrating on reaching the quickest route to having a combat-ready aircraft carrier, crew and air wing. Underscoring the urgency of having the CVN-79 and CVN-80 ready as soon as possible, Tal Manvel mentions in a February 2025 Proceedings article that the Nimitz-class carriers urgently need replacement as they approach decommissioning due to limitations in power, space and weight highlighted during a 1995 system analysis. Manvel warns that retiring the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) in 2026 and the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) in 2027—without promptly initiating the next Ford-class dual buy for CVN-82 and CVN-83—will reduce the fleet below the legally required 11 aircraft carriers and disrupt shipyard efficiency by creating a costly seven-year production gap. Despite debates over their relevance, the US's continued building of aircraft carriers ensures their place as a centerpiece of force projection, regardless of their growing vulnerability. Underscoring the point, Mark Cancian and other writers mention in a January 2023 report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank that the US lost two carriers in a simulation of a US-China conflict over Taiwan. Further, Steve Balestrieri mentions in a March 2025 article for 1945 that while China and Russia have hypersonic missiles that can sink US carriers, the US has no effective defense against such weapons. Balestrieri adds that stealthy conventional submarines can evade a carrier's defenses, possibly sinking the latter. In line with those threats, Cancian and others note that the US only avoided losing its carriers in optimistic Taiwan war scenarios when it didn't push its fleet forward as a deterrent signal. Nevertheless, US carriers may still have a role to play in such a conflict, provided they are kept out of harm's way. In a February 2022 article for The American Sea Power Project, Thomas Mahnken proposes that carriers could be part of an 'outside force' in the Second Island Chain that acts as a strategic reserve to prevent China from projecting power beyond the First Island Chain while supporting US offensive operations. Alternatively, Trevor Phillips-Levine and Andrew Tenbusch mention in a July 2024 article for the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) that the US could use its carriers as a 'fleet-in-being' decoy to tie down significant Chinese resources and weapons that could otherwise be used against the US in a war over Taiwan. While the US may have the world's largest carrier fleet at 11 ships, that number might not be enough for great power competition with China. Kyle Mizokami mentions in a March 2021 article for Popular Mechanics that during the Cold War, the US had 13 to 15 carriers, compared to today's minimum mandated strength of 11 ships. Mizokami points out that the rule of thirds typically governs carrier deployments—one-third of the fleet is on patrol, one-third is returning from patrol, and one-third is undergoing repair and maintenance. With the US having just 11 carriers, he says four might be available for operations, but that number could surge to five or six in an emergency. As of April 2025, Newsweek reports that the US has three carriers deployed in the Pacific: the USS George Washington (CVN-73), based in Japan; the USS Nimitz (CVN-68), moving into the Western Pacific to replace the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70); and the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72), operating in the Eastern Pacific. Mizokami mentions that the US Atlantic and Pacific carrier fleets are already overstretched and that adding a 12th carrier could alleviate some of the strain. He also suggests that the US could decide that it doesn't need carriers in certain regions all the time and scale down deployments, but that risks degrading deterrence against potential adversaries such as Iran and China. But could the US put 12 carriers at sea? In an August 2024 article for The National Interest (TNI), Peter Suciu mentions that a Ford-class carrier costs around US$13.3 billion and requires hundreds of millions of dollars to maintain. Suciu notes that carriers' complexity and cost make them tempting targets, and if they were to be damaged or lost in combat, that would mean a waste of billions of dollars and seriously impair US force projection capabilities. Moreover, a report from the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) from January 2025 indicates that although the US Navy plans to ultimately deploy 12 aircraft carriers as a part of its projected 381-ship battle force fleet, there are considerable obstacles to reaching and maintaining this target. According to the report, the US Navy's FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan projects reaching 12 carriers in only three years within the FY2025–FY2054 timeframe—2025, 2029, and 2032—with the carrier fleet dropping to nine by 2047 in some scenarios. It notes that barriers include budget constraints, delays in ship construction and industrial base limitations. While the US struggles with building and maintaining its carriers, China seems to be progressing apace. Kris Osborne mentions in a March 2025 article for 1945 that China, with the world's largest navy, now has three carriers in the Pacific and is building a fourth, the Type 004, which could be its first nuclear-powered carrier to rival or even be larger than the US Ford class. Osborne notes that while China faces the same arguments regarding the utility of carriers in modern naval warfare, the construction of the Type 004 shows that it still sees these ships as relevant. He mentions China's development of ship-based defenses and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to detect incoming anti-ship missiles, underscoring its military planners' belief that carriers could provide unique and extremely valuable advantages in war.
