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AllAfrica
3 days ago
- Politics
- AllAfrica
Neither at war nor at peace in Singapore
In his inaugural Singapore Armed Forces Day message, Defense Minister Chan Chun Sing remarked, 'We are not at war, but neither are we at peace.' The defense chief's words captured a deeper truth: Strategic ambiguity in the Indo-Pacific has become a structural reality amid the return of a multipolar security order. As Singapore builds its fifth-generation Armed Forces – digitally networked, AI-integrated, and autonomous-capable – to address manpower constraints and enhance force multiplication, it must also contend with a more crowded Indo-Pacific theater comprised of old neighbors and distant new visitors. In this context, three shifts warrant closer attention. 1. New Indo-Pacific military balance Between May and June 2025, China deployed both its Liaoning and Shandong aircraft carrier groups beyond the First Island Chain, conducting more than 1,100 sorties over two weeks in the Philippine Sea. These operations, supported by Type 055 destroyers and logistics vessels, confirmed the People's Liberation Army-Navy's rising ability to sustain carrier-based operations in the Western Pacific within the Second Island Chain. The United Kingdom responded with its own signal. In mid-June, HMS Spey transited the Taiwan Strait en route to join Carrier Strike Group 25 (CSG25), whose flagship HMS Prince of Wales docked in Singapore days later. London called the transit lawful and routine; Beijing condemned it as a provocation. On the day HMS Spey transited, the PLA sent 74 aircraft toward Taiwan, with 61 of them crossing the median line in what Taipei described as an unprecedented incursion. Singapore welcomed HMS Prince of Wales with considerable fanfare. Photos and videos of the carrier docked at Marina Bay were widely shared, and officials highlighted the strength of bilateral defense ties. But the symbolism ran deeper. CSG25 will join Exercise Bersama Lima this September under the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA), alongside Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore. Originally established as a collective security arrangement for Malaysia and Singapore after Britain's East of Suez withdrawal, the FPDA's evolution could today be seen to reflect a broader rebalancing of China's presence in the region, thus complicating Singapore's fundamental interests of military non-entanglement with China. 2. Limits of defense diplomacy Economic ties with China are deep and still growing. Singapore remains China's largest foreign investor and strategic partner in projects like the Suzhou Industrial Park and Chongqing Connectivity Initiative. New areas of collaboration, including digital economy and green development, are also taking shape. Notably, SAF-PLA engagements have quietly expanded in recent years, adding nuance to the familiar framing that security ties are limited while economic ties flourish. Yet, Singapore's troops continue to train in Taiwan under Project Starlight – an arrangement maintained for over 40 years, as former Deputy Prime Minister and Senior Minister S. Jayakumar reflected in his book 'Diplomacy: A Singapore Experience.' This has been a point of tension with China, despite Singapore's unequivocal 'one-China policy.' Singapore remains the only Southeast Asian nation to acquire the American F-35 Joint Strike Fighter – unlike US treaty allies Thailand and the Philippines, which have opted to hedge with Sweden's Gripens and South Korea's FA-50s. Coincidentally, the UK has also announced an expansion of its F-35 fleet. Unlike Britain's F-35s, which support its NATO nuclear deterrent posture, Singapore's fleet has no such role yet it underscores deep interoperability with US platform architecture. Additionally, the SAF maintains rotational access agreements for US forces under the 1990 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding United States Use of Facilities in Singapore, the 2005 Strategic Framework Agreement and the 2015 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. While access is also extended to international navies, the scale and frequency of US deployments – especially during heightened South China Sea and Taiwan Strait tensions – raises the perception that Singapore is de facto aligned with the US, even when it is not. This perception risk is not trivial. The precedent of Qatar is instructive. In June, Iran launched at least 14 ballistic missiles at the Al-Udeid air base, a US facility in Qatar, in retaliation for US strikes on Iran's Fordow nuclear facility. The Qatari Prime Minister later said it 'scarred' the relationship. Qatar was targeted not for what it did, but for what it hosted. In a future US-China conflict, could the distinction between hosting and aligning of military assets and facilities similarly blur in the eyes of great-power rivals? 3. Diffusion as deterrence As part of its 5G SAF evolution, Singapore's investments in AI-enabled platforms and unmanned systems go beyond addressing manpower constraints. They are designed to enhance the SAF's ability to project presence, monitor contested environments and sustain operations without unnecessarily placing personnel at risk. Take, for example, the SAF's use of digital twins – computer-generated simulation environments that replicate high-threat theatres and allow units to rehearse complex operations virtually. These simulations extend operational readiness across scenarios that may be too politically sensitive or physically hazardous to stage in real life. Paired with autonomous maritime patrols and remote sensing platforms, such tools are increasingly vital to maintaining forward situational awareness while minimizing exposure on the ground. Geographic diffusion is another critical dimension. While longstanding overseas training partnerships remain foundational, new options merit exploration. For instance, could Timor-Leste , soon to join ASEAN and cooperate with both Singapore and China under the Third Country Training Program, serve as neutral terrain for future SAF training, given its strategic proximity to Singapore and relatively low geopolitical baggage? Similarly, could Oman's Port Salalah, situated near key chokepoints in the Indian Ocean, offer a viable platform for naval exercises or maritime logistics access beyond the operational reach of the First and Second Island Chains? Deterrence through cohesion Concentration of force has long been a cornerstone of military doctrine, famously championed by Carl von Clausewitz as the path to achieving a decisive advantage. But in today's Indo-Pacific, where threats are more asymmetric, intentions more easily misread and escalation more automated than ever, the logic of strategic diffusion is gaining ground. For a point target like Singapore, diffusion buys time, creates space and preserves freedom of maneuver. Yet diffusion does not replace concentration; it relies on it. The ability to disperse assets and operate with agility across domains only works when anchored by cohesion. And for Singapore, that cohesion is Total Defense: The belief that an attack on one is met by all. On that basis, Singapore's ultimate deterrence rests on its people – mobilized psychologically, economically, socially and militarily. We saw this vividly during the Covid-19 crisis. As global systems buckled, Singapore activated its entire nation. Under the direction of the Multi-ministry Taskforce, then-Trade and Industry Minister Chan Chun Sing and team diversified supply lines, secured vaccine cold-chains, and built and repurposed facilities overnight. The SAF, public service and citizen-volunteers were mobilized into providing a single, unified response to the pandemic. It wasn't framed as Total Defense, but that's exactly what it was. And it worked. This is why partisan politics must never breach the water's edge; why national institutions must remain trusted; why Singaporeans must never become vessels for foreign agendas, wittingly or otherwise; and why we must not import the ideological suspicions that plague the civil-military-technological discourse elsewhere. This SAF Day, Singaporeans must remember: What truly matters is the will of a people who know what they stand for – and what gives them meaning. In a more crowded and contested Indo-Pacific, that shared sense of purpose remains the foundation of Singapore's defence posture, from which all else must flow. Marcus Loh is chairman of the Public Affairs Group at the Public Relations and Communications Association (PRCA) Asia Pacific. An MA candidate of the War Studies Department in King's College London, Loh also serves on the Executive Committee of SGTech's Digital Transformation Chapter, contributing to national conversations on AI, data infrastructure, and digital policy. A former president of the Institute of Public Relations of Singapore, he has played a longstanding role in shaping the relevance of strategic communication and public affairs in an evolving policy, technology and geoeconomic landscape.
Japan Times
02-07-2025
- Politics
- Japan Times
British F-35B fighters could soon land on a Japanese carrier
British F-35B carrier-borne fighter aircraft could potentially be landing and taking off from one of Japan's de facto aircraft carriers soon, as members of a U.K. carrier strike group are set to reach Japanese waters in August, the final leg of a monthslong Indo-Pacific deployment. The Japan Times understands that part of the joint activities could include having F-35Bs from the Royal Navy's Prince of Wales aircraft carrier touch down on and take off from the deck of the Maritime Self-Defense Force's Kaga carrier as the partner navies seek to boost interoperability. If confirmed, the drills, which could include information exchanges on F-35B operations, would come as the MSDF is set to begin receiving the first of 42 F-35Bs being procured from the United States, most of which it aims to deploy from its two recently refitted Izumo-class carriers. Accompanying the Prince of Wales to Japan will be two other members of the multinational Carrier Strike Group 25, the British destroyer Dauntless and the Norwegian frigate Roald Amundsen. Other members of the strike group will head to South Korea. The three warships are expected to make port calls in Japan between late August and early September, with the carrier set to berth at the U.S. naval base in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture, and in Tokyo. The Japanese capital will also briefly host the Norwergian warship, which will dock at the MSDF's base at Yokosuka with the Dauntless. The strike group's Japan leg, which follows a stop in Singapore, is scheduled to be its final destination during Operation Highmast — the name of this year's deployment — before the group reassembles and makes its way back home to Britain to end the Royal Navy's second carrier deployment to the region since 2021. The route has already taken the strike group from Portsmouth in England to the Mediterranean, across the Red Sea via the Suez Canal and through the Indian Ocean to Southeast Asia to conduct exercises and port visits with partners such as the U.S., India, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia. A sailor runs back to her post after a flag-raising ceremony on the flight deck of Japan's Kaga, one of its de facto aircraft carriers. | REUTERS Over the coming days, strike group elements will also take part in this year's iteration of the multinational Talisman Sabre exercise in Australia and Papua New Guinea from July 13 to Aug. 4, highlighting that the eight-month deployment is not only aimed at showing presence and making port calls. Just like with the Queen Elizabeth carrier-led deployment four years ago, this year's mission will also test the Royal Navy's logistical capabilities as well as its ability to operate alongside regional partners. This is key as the navy seeks to understand how to better operate and exchange capabilities with non-NATO partners while discussing how best to handle potential regional contingencies ranging from disaster relief operations and gray-zone activities to countering hostile cyberactivities and engaging in high-end warfighting. But the British deployments are also meant to send a dual strategic message — one of deterrence to potential adversaries and another of reassurance to allies and partners that Britain remains laser-focused on maintaining stability in the Indo-Pacific. While the country's recently released Strategic Defence Review sets out a 'NATO First' defense approach, it also stresses that this does not mean 'NATO only.' This comes after the U.K. Ambassador to Tokyo told The Japan Times last year that London will remain laser-focused on the Indo-Pacific as the region remains critical for British economic and security interests. Of particular importance are ties with Japan, which views Britain as its closest European defense and security partner. In recent years, the scope and frequency of joint military activities with the Self-Defense Forces has grown, including port calls and exercises such as the Vigilant Isles drills. The two countries are also working together in a number of joint defense-industrial projects, including the development alongside Italy of a next-generation fighter aircraft by 2035. Many of the military maneuvers are now being facilitated by a visiting-forces pact that entered into force in October 2023. Known as a Reciprocal Access Agreement, the deal underpins bilateral cooperation, enabling British and Japanese forces to operate and exercise together more easily. Britain was the first European country to sign such a pact with Japan, with France expected to be next.
Spectator
26-05-2025
- Politics
- Spectator
The crisis facing the Royal Navy
General Sir Gwyn Jenkins is stepping into the role of First Sea Lord at a difficult time, with the Royal Navy's fleet in a sorry state. On 22 April, Carrier Strike Group 25 (CSG25) set sail on an eight-month publicity tour, leaving British waters sparsely defended. Keir Starmer posed on the flight deck of HMS The Prince of Wales, his battleship grey hair perfectly set like a middle-aged Ken doll. He said the CSG25 shows 'the UK's leadership on global issues and security and defence'. It really doesn't. Britain could only field one of its two carriers, one destroyer, one frigate and one attack submarine. The Royal Navy also has insufficient logistics vessels to support the deployment, with no new solid store ships expected before the end of this decade. Today, besides coastal patrol vessels, all we have to defend British shores are one seaworthy destroyer, two frigates and one attack submarine. The Royal Navy has shrunk in the teeth of defence cuts and each new efficiency drive makes it smaller.
