Latest news with #China-MiddleEast
Indian Express
24-06-2025
- Business
- Indian Express
What are China's economic interests in Iran?
China, one of Iran's closest allies and the biggest buyer of its oil, has stayed on the sidelines of its conflict with Israel, urging a diplomatic solution. Beijing has long backed US-sanctioned Tehran as part of efforts to deepen its strategic and economic heft in the Middle East. In 2021, they signed a 25-year cooperation deal, though full details were never disclosed and analysts say follow-up implementation has been weak. However, Chinese investment in Iran lags what Beijing puts into other nations in the region. 'Chinese state-owned companies have largely stayed away, mostly out of fear of running afoul of US sanctions,' said Bill Figueroa, a China-Middle East expert at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. The American Enterprise Institute estimates total Chinese investment since 2007 at just under $5 billion, while Chinese commerce ministry data shows its direct investments in Iran by the end of 2023 totalled $3.9 billion. By contrast, Beijing invested more than $8.1 billion in the United Arab Emirates between 2013-2022, and almost $15 billion in Saudi Arabia between 2007-2024, the think-tank says. China imports around 43 million barrels of oil per month from Iran – accounting for some 90% of Iran's oil exports and roughly 13.6% of China's crude purchases. Around 65% of total crude and condensate shipped through the Strait of Hormuz off Iran is destined for China, according to shipping data firm Vortexa. China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) in 2016 signed a $4.8 billion deal with France's Total to develop the offshore South Pars gas field in the Gulf with an Iranian state firm. CNPC's stake of 30% was worth around $600 million. However, the state-owned petroleum giant pulled out of the project due to US pressure in 2019. CNPC also signed a deal in 2009 to develop the North Azadegan oil field, with the first phase valued at about $2 billion. The first cargo of 2 million barrels was shipped to China in 2016. China's biggest refiner Sinopec signed a $2 billion deal to develop the Yadavaran oil field in 2007. In 2017, Sinopec signed a contract worth about $2.1 billion to upgrade a refinery in Abadan near the Gulf coast. It remains under construction. In 2024, China's LDK Solar reached a deal with Iran's Ghadir Investment Group for a large-scale photovoltaic power plant with investment of around 1 billion euros ($1.16 billion). It was expected to generate 2 billion kilowatt-hours of solar power annually. In 2018, China National Machinery Industry Corporation signed a 5.3 billion yuan ($738 million) deal to expand and renovate a railway connecting Tehran with the cites of Hamedan and Sanandaj to improve connectivity in west Iran. Also that year, a subsidiary of China Railway Construction Corporation signed a contract worth 3.5 billion yuan for the 263 km Kermanshah-Khosravi railway project in west Iran, with a construction period of 48 months. China's Norinco International signed an agreement in 2018 to build the first tramway line in the Iranian city of Qazvin, at about $150 million. In 2017, China Eximbank and an Iranian state bank signed a $1.5 billion deal to upgrade and electrify a 926 km railway between Tehran and the eastern city of Mashhad as part of Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative. However, the project has stalled over financing negotiations. In 2017, China's Metallurgical Corporation (MCC) invested around $350 million in the Sepid Dasht steel plant and won a design contract for a pelletising project. However, local media reported that the projects were delayed by financing issues. ($1 = 7.1783 Chinese yuan renminbi) ($1 = 0.8623 euros)
Straits Times
24-06-2025
- Business
- Straits Times
What are China's economic interests in Iran?
China has stayed on the sidelines of Iran's conflict with Israel, urging a diplomatic solution. PHOTO: AFP BEIJING - China, one of Iran's closest allies and the biggest buyer of its oil, has stayed on the sidelines of its conflict with Israel, urging a diplomatic solution. Following are details of its investments in Iran. Cooperation pact Beijing has long backed US-sanctioned Tehran as part of efforts to deepen its strategic and economic heft in the Middle East. In 2021, they signed a 25-year cooperation deal, though full details were never disclosed and analysts say follow-up implementation has been weak. However, Chinese investment in Iran lags behind what Beijing puts into other nations in the region. 'Chinese state-owned companies have largely stayed away, mostly out of fear of running afoul of US sanctions,' said Dr Bill Figueroa, a China-Middle East expert at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. The American Enterprise Institute estimated that total Chinese investment since 2007 at just under US$5 billion (S$6.4 billion), while Chinese commerce ministry data shows its direct investments in Iran by the end of 2023 totalled US$3.9 billion. In contrast, Beijing invested more than US$8.1 billion in the United Arab Emirates between 2013 and 2022, and almost US$15 billion in Saudi Arabia between 2007 and 2024, the think-tank said. Energy China imports around 43 million barrels of oil per month from Iran – accounting for some 90 per cent of Iran's oil exports and roughly 13.6 per cent of China's crude purchases. Around 65 per cent of total crude and condensate shipped through the Strait of Hormuz off Iran is destined for China, according to shipping data firm Vortexa. China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) in 2016 signed a US$4.8 billion deal with France's Total to develop the offshore South Pars gas field in the Gulf with an Iranian state firm. CNPC's stake of 30 per cent was worth around US$600 million. However, the state-owned petroleum giant pulled out of the project due to US pressure in 2019. CNPC also signed a deal in 2009 to develop the North Azadegan oil field, with the first phase valued at about US$2 billion. The first cargo of 2 million barrels was shipped to China in 2016. China's biggest refiner Sinopec signed a US$2 billion deal to develop the Yadavaran oil field in 2007. In 2017, Sinopec signed a contract worth about US$2.1 billion to upgrade a refinery in Abadan near the Gulf coast. It remains under construction. In 2024, China's LDK Solar reached a deal with Iran's Ghadir Investment Group for a large-scale photovoltaic power plant with investment of around €1 billion (S$1.49 billion). It was expected to generate 2 billion kilowatt-hours of solar power annually. Railways In 2018, China National Machinery Industry Corporation signed a 5.3 billion yuan (S$945 million) deal to expand and renovate a railway connecting Tehran with the cites of Hamedan and Sanandaj to improve connectivity in west Iran. Also that year, a subsidiary of China Railway Construction Corporation signed a contract worth 3.5 billion yuan for the 263 km Kermanshah-Khosravi railway project in west Iran, with a construction period of 48 months. China's Norinco International signed an agreement in 2018 to build the first tramway line in the Iranian city of Qazvin, at about US$150 million. In 2017, China Eximbank and an Iranian state bank signed a US$1.5 billion deal to upgrade and electrify a 926km railway between Tehran and the eastern city of Mashhad as part of Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative. However, the project has stalled over financing negotiations. Metals In 2017, China's Metallurgical Corporation invested around US$350 million in the Sepid Dasht steel plant and won a design contract for a pelletising project. However, local media reported that the projects were delayed by financing issues. REUTERS Join ST's Telegram channel and get the latest breaking news delivered to you.
Time of India
24-06-2025
- Business
- Time of India
What are China's economic interests in Iran?
China , one of Iran's closest allies and the biggest buyer of its oil, has stayed on the sidelines of its conflict with Israel , urging a diplomatic solution. Following are details of its investments in Iran: Cooperation Pact: by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like If You Eat Ginger Everyday for 1 Month This is What Happens Tips and Tricks Undo Beijing has long backed U.S.-sanctioned Tehran as part of efforts to deepen its strategic and economic heft in the Middle East . In 2021, they signed a 25-year cooperation deal, though full details were never disclosed and analysts say follow-up implementation has been weak. However, Chinese investment in Iran lags what Beijing puts into other nations in the region. Live Events "Chinese state-owned companies have largely stayed away, mostly out of fear of running afoul of U.S. sanctions," said Bill Figueroa, a China-Middle East expert at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. The American Enterprise Institute estimates total Chinese investment since 2007 at just under $5 billion, while Chinese commerce ministry data shows its direct investments in Iran by the end of 2023 totalled $3.9 billion. By contrast, Beijing invested more than $8.1 billion in the United Arab Emirates between 2013-2022, and almost $15 billion in Saudi Arabia between 2007-2024, the think-tank says. Energy: China imports around 43 million barrels of oil per month from Iran - accounting for some 90% of Iran's oil exports and roughly 13.6% of China's crude purchases. Around 65% of total crude and condensate shipped through the Strait of Hormuz off Iran is destined for China, according to shipping data firm Vortexa. China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) in 2016 signed a $4.8 billion deal with France's Total to develop the offshore South Pars gas field in the Gulf with an Iranian state firm. CNPC's stake of 30% was worth around $600 million. However, the state-owned petroleum giant pulled out of the project due to U.S. pressure in 2019. CNPC also signed a deal in 2009 to develop the North Azadegan oil field, with the first phase valued at about $2 billion. The first cargo of 2 million barrels was shipped to China in 2016. China's biggest refiner Sinopec signed a $2 billion deal to develop the Yadavaran oil field in 2007. In 2017, Sinopec signed a contract worth about $2.1 billion to upgrade a refinery in Abadan near the Gulf coast. It remains under construction. In 2024, China's LDK Solar reached a deal with Iran's Ghadir Investment Group for a large-scale photovoltaic power plant with investment of around 1 billion euros ($1.16 billion). It was expected to generate 2 billion kilowatt-hours of solar power annually. Railways: In 2018, China National Machinery Industry Corporation signed a 5.3 billion yuan ($738 million) deal to expand and renovate a railway connecting Tehran with the cites of Hamedan and Sanandaj to improve connectivity in west Iran. Also that year, a subsidiary of China Railway Construction Corporation signed a contract worth 3.5 billion yuan for the 263 km Kermanshah-Khosravi railway project in west Iran, with a construction period of 48 months. China's Norinco International signed an agreement in 2018 to build the first tramway line in the Iranian city of Qazvin, at about $150 million. In 2017, China Eximbank and an Iranian state bank signed a $1.5 billion deal to upgrade and electrify a 926 km railway between Tehran and the eastern city of Mashhad as part of Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative. However, the project has stalled over financing negotiations. Metals: In 2017, China's Metallurgical Corporation (MCC) invested around $350 million in the Sepid Dasht steel plant and won a design contract for a pelletising project. However, local media reported that the projects were delayed by financing issues. ($1 = 7.1783 Chinese yuan renminbi) ($1 = 0.8623 euros)
DW
17-06-2025
- Politics
- DW
Iran-Israel conflict: 'China has no appetite to be involved' – DW – 06/17/2025
In an interview with DW, China expert William Figueroa said that Beijing lacks the capability for power projection in the Middle East, however, the Iran-Israel conflict poses some risk to China's energy security. China on Tuesday accused US President Donald Trump of "pouring oil" on the conflict as the Israel-Iran fighting raged for a fifth straight day. "Making threats and mounting pressure will not help to promote the de-escalation of the situation, but will only intensify and widen the conflict," Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Guo Jiakun said in Beijing. He was referring to a social media post by Trump before he left for the G7 Summit in Canada, in which the US president wrote: "I said it over and over again! Everyone should immediately evacuate Tehran!" Guo said China was calling on all sides concerned — "especially those countries with particular influence over Israel" — to take immediate measures to calm the tense situation. While the US is Israel's strongest ally, Beijing and Tehran share close ties. In a DW interview, William Figueroa, an international relations expert focusing on China-Middle East relations at University of Groningen, talks about how China sees the conflict, and what role Beijing could play to defuse the tensions. DW: How do you see China's stance on the ongoing conflict between Iran and Israel? William Figueroa: China's reaction closely mirrors its stance on the Israel-Palestinian conflict and the war in Gaza. Essentially, China tends to focus on two main points: first, it largely places the blame on Israel, and second, it consistently calls for dialogue, negotiation, and de-escalation, rather than resorting to military action or coercive diplomacy. As the situation evolved, China's position continued to emphasize Iran's right to retaliate and defend itself, particularly in response to Israeli attacks. China's objections have primarily been framed around the issue of sovereignty. 'The situation does pose some risk to China's energy security, and Chinese leaders are certainly aware of that,' says Figueroa Image: Privat Would you say China hasn't been so far actively involved in the situation? No, nor does China see this as an arena where it can exercise influence — Chinese state media are barely covering this issue. I believe this position reflects China's fundamental limitations in this arena. Simply put, China does not have a significant role in this conflict. It lacks the capability for power projection in the region and is not a key player in the traditional security sense. China's real competitive advantage in the Middle East lies in its economic relationships and, occasionally, in its ability to serve as a diplomatic bridge. However, in this specific conflict, Iran and Israel are not short of communication channels — they are simply unwilling to talk. This leaves China with very little room to maneuver diplomatically. Additionally, given the relatively limited exposure, I don't think China has any appetite to involve itself directly in this conflict, even if it had the capacity to do so, especially when an action carries high costs and offers little benefit. China has actively engaged in Middle East affairs in recent years, most notably facilitating the Saudi-Iran reconciliation. Do you think China will attempt to mediate in the Iran-Israel conflict as well? I believe China will maintain its current approach, which is to stay open to regionally initiated efforts. China prefers to act as a facilitator for negotiations that are generated from within the region itself. It does encourage diplomatic engagement, but China does not have the tools nor the diplomatic style to apply pressure in the way that, for example, the United States might. To put it simply: the Saudi-Iran deal was a low-hanging fruit that China was happy to pick — it involved low cost and high political reward. Any involvement in the Iran-Israel conflict would be the opposite: very high cost and very low potential gain. I do not believe China has the ability or the incentive to pursue such a role. Iranians protest Israeli strikes To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video Given China's reliance on Middle Eastern oil, do you think the current situation poses a threat to China's energy security? The situation does pose some risk to China's energy security, and Chinese leaders are certainly aware of that. This is part of the reason why they want the conflict to de-escalate quickly. However, I would not characterize it as a major threat. Currently, Russia is China's largest supplier of oil, surpassing Iran. China also has substantial domestic oil reserves. So, while losing access to Iranian oil would affect supply, it would not create a critical shortage. Iran accounts for roughly 10% of China's total oil imports. Additionally, China sources oil from countries like Brazil and Saudi Arabia. I believe Saudi Arabia is relatively insulated from this particular conflict. If Iran were to attack Saudi Arabia or significantly involve it in the conflict, it would provoke a much stronger response from the United States. Such an escalation would be very costly for Iran, making it an unlikely scenario. China is the biggest buyer of Iranian oil and its largest trade partner. Could this economic relationship give Beijing meaningful influence over Iran? Generally speaking, no. I think this has been demonstrated quite clearly. For example, when Iran-backed groups attacked Israeli shipping in the Red Sea, there were calls for China to use its influence over Iran to prevent further escalation. Either China chose not to act, or they were not able to. Fundamentally, I don't believe it's in China's interest to weaponize its economic relationships. China is unlikely to say to Iran, "If you don't do what we want, we will cancel our deals." China might consider such tactics in situations where its core national interests are involved — such as matters concerning Taiwan — but not over what it considers to be regional or domestic issues in the Middle East. Even if China had significant leverage over Iran, it would be very difficult to resolve this particular issue. No country is going to persuade Iran to abandon its civilian nuclear program, and China does not even support that objective. Beijing believes Iran has the right to civilian nuclear energy. If the Iran-Israel conflict drags on, there is a possibility that the US could be drawn more deeply into it. Would such US entanglement be seen as a strategic advantage for China? Yes, I believe that would generally be seen as beneficial to China. In fact, this is a frequent point made by both mainstream scholars and popular commentators in China. They often argue that America's continued military entanglement in the Middle East drains US resources, time, and strategic attention. This is precisely why many Chinese analysts advocate for China to avoid similar military commitments and instead continue focusing on its strengths — economic development, investment, and initiatives like the Belt and Road. Even American politicians are debating this issue. Some in Congress argue that the US should prioritize competition with China in the Pacific rather than becoming further involved in the Middle East. From China's perspective, further US entanglement in Middle Eastern conflicts would likely be viewed as strategically advantageous. Israel-Iran conflict: 'Deciding factor is likely Washington' To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video Given China's growing alignment with non-Western powers, do you see it moving more aggressively toward anti-Western positions in conflicts like this? There's sometimes a misconception that China will automatically align itself with an anti-Western bloc in opposition to US-backed policies. In reality, while China is diplomatically, emotionally, and perhaps ideologically supportive of the Palestinian cause, when it comes to practical influence and the willingness to incur costs to shift outcomes, China is like most other countries, and it is willing to do very little. If the Iranian regime were to collapse, would China quietly welcome the power vacuum? I don't think China would welcome such a scenario. China generally opposes power vacuums and chaotic transitions. China has had no significant issues dealing with the Islamic Republic and would actually prefer that the international community normalize relations with Iran. Historically, China has acted with caution in these situations. For example, in 1979, as Iran's monarchy was collapsing. China's past behavior suggests that in the event of regime collapse, it would adopt a wait-and-see approach, preferring to work with whoever emerges as the next stable authority. The interview was conducted by Jinhan Li. It has been edited for length and clarity. Edited by: Srinivas Mazumdaru
Yahoo
21-05-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
China's Hainan FTP Promotion Event Successfully Held in Dubai
HAIKOU, China, May 21, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- On May 19, the 2025 Hainan Free Trade Port (FTP) promotion event, focusing on the liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment, was held in Dubai. Jointly organized by the Hainan Provincial People's Government and the Chinese Embassy in the UAE, with support from the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade Hainan Provincial Committee (CCPIT Hainan) and the China Chamber of International Commerce Hainan Chamber of Commerce (CCOIC Hainan), the event aimed to facilitate high-level dialogue and practical cooperation. H.E. Abdullah Ahmed Al Saleh, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Economy, stated that the UAE will actively align with the FTP's financial liberalization and cross-border trade facilitation policies, exploring innovative cooperation models in emerging fields such as AI and blockchain. UAE delegates at the conference expressed full confidence in the prospects of bilateral cooperation, stressing that governments, industrial parks, and trade promotion agencies of both sides should play an active role in advancing bilateral economic and trade collaboration. During the conference, Hainan signed four batches of agreements with institutions from the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and other countries, covering new energy, free trade zone development, logistics parks, automotive trade, and headquarters base development. Hainan provincial leadership underscored that after the customs closure, the FTP will adopt a framework centered on "zero tariffs, low tax rates, and a simplified tax system" to cultivate a market-oriented, law-based, and internationalized business environment. They highlighted the importance of deepening cooperation with the UAE in areas like the digital economy and green energy. Chinese Ambassador to the UAE Zhang Yiming noted that the FTP's open policies closely align with the UAE's 50-Year Development Plan, adding that bilateral collaboration will set a new benchmark for China-Middle East economic and trade cooperation. Hainan is intensifying efforts to build itself into a free trade port (FTP), aiming to establish independent customs operations by the end of 2025. Source: CCPIT Hainan CONTACT: Contact person: Ms. Fu, Tel: 86-10-63074558
